Basic Documents Relating to the
Religious Clauses of the First Amendment[1]
Introductory
Commentary, John Adams, 1965
I. Memorial & Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
James Madison, 1785
II. Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
Thomas Jefferson, 1779
III. Letter to
Danbury Baptist Association
Thomas Jefferson, 1802
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTARY
John J. Adams,
Americans United, 1965
“Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . . .”
First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States
Containing the
foregoing words, the Bill of Rights to the Constitution of the United States
was proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789 and presented to the several
states for ratification. Through the
years it has been necessary to subject these words, as well as other portions
of the Constitution, to interpretation in order to secure a meaningful
constitutional precept upon which we, as a people, may guide our actions in
religious matters coming properly within the purview of the First Amendment.
In our constitutional framework this responsible task
has been accorded to the Supreme Court of the United States. During the course of American history the
Supreme Court has rendered approximately 50 decisions which relate significantly
to either the “establishment” clause or the “free exercise” clause. Some of these decisions are more important
than others. Yet each in some way
contributed to the evolving mosaic which describes the constitutional
relationship of religion and government in our society. Future decisions will further detail this
relationship in years to come.
In its decisions the Supreme Court has found it
imperative to delve into this country's historical settings, to ascertain a
meaningful interpretation of these first sixteen words of the First
Amendment. To insure a proper
construction the Court has examined at length various documents, public
pronouncements and speeches written or delivered either before or contemporaneously
with the drafting of the First Amendment.
Singular attention has been focused upon writings and speeches of the
founders of our constitutional system, principally those of James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson.
Of all the documents authored by these two
gentlemen, three have been accorded special attention by the Supreme
Court. Indeed, it may very well be said
that these three writings have been decisive in directing the Court's
interpretation of the religious clauses of the First Amendment. It is these three writings which have been
included within this work.
The first of these documents is James Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious
Assessments, Written in 1785, this document opposed an Assessment Bill for religious
instruction introduced the previous year in the Virginia General Assembly, but
upon which Madison had maneuvered deferment of final consideration until the
fall of 1785. In the interim the Memorial and Remonstrance was issued and
circulated throughout the Commonwealth.
The Assessment Bill as introduced sought only to
benefit a single church. This
preference incurred the opposition of other sects. It was, therefore, amended to pacify the dissentient groups by
providing for a general assessment to support religious education, the right
being given to each taxpayer to designate which church should receive his share
of the tax.
The Memorial
and Remonstrance assailed the Assessment Bill in its amended form. Opposition to the proposed legislation was
aroused, bringing a flood of protest petitions. Madison later recalled that his Memorial and Remonstrance “met with the approbation of the
Baptists, the Presbyterians, the Quakers and the few Roman Catholics,
universally; of the Methodists, in
part; and even of not a few of the Sect
formerly established by law.”
Madison's “Detached Memoranda”, 3 Wm.
and Mary Q. 534,551,(1946).
So eloquent and persuasive were Madison's
arguments that, largely due to his efforts, the Assessment Bill died
ignominiously in committee in December, 1785.
Recognizing Madison's leading role in the drafting
of the Bill of Rights four years later, and particularly his role in
formulating the religious clauses, the United States Supreme Court has in its
decisions repeatedly accorded the Memorial
and Remonstrance pre‑eminence in interpreting the religious clauses
of the First Amendment. Indeed,
Mr. justice Frankfurter described this
document as “an event basic in the history of religious liberty,” McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203, 214 (1948), while Mr. justice
Rutledge stated “the Remonstrance is at once the most concise and the most
accurate statement of the views of the First Amendment's author concerning what
is 'an establishment of religion'.” Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 37 (1947).
The second document included within this work
reflects the combined talents of both Madison and Jefferson. It is the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, introduced into the Virginia
General Assembly by Jefferson in June of 1779.
The Bill failed of enactment in successive legislative sessions until,
following Madison's defeat of the Assessment Bill in December, 1785, Madison
successfully steered the Bill for
Establishing Religious Freedom to its enactment in January, 1786. The work today commonly is called “The
Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom.”
At its passage Jefferson was in France, where he
served as a minister from 1784 to 1789.
In his autobiography, however, Jefferson made the following comment on
the intended scope of this important enactment:
“The Bill for
establishing religious freedom, the principles of which had to a certain
degree, been enacted before, I had drawn in all the latitude of reason and
right . . . where the preamble
declares that coercion is a departure from the plan of the holy author of our
religion, an amendment was proposed, by inserting the words “Jesus Christ,” so
that it should read, “a departure from the plan of Jesus Christ, the holy
author of our religion;” the insertion was rejected by a great majority, in
proof that they meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the
Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and the Mahometan,[2]
the Hindu, and the infidel of every denomination.”[3]
The authoritative influence of this Virginia
statute in the interpretation of the religious clauses of the First Amendment
was summarized by Mr. justice Black when, speaking for the Court, he said,
“This Court has previously recognized that the provisions of the First
Amendment, in the drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played
such leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide the
same protection against governmental intrusion on religious liberty as the
Virginia statute.” Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947).
The third and final document included in this work
was written by Jefferson while President of the United States. It is a letter replying to an address from a
committee of the Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut. In this letter, dated January 1, 1802, Jefferson in a single phrase
articulated a word picture of the purpose of the religious clauses of the First
Amendment ‑they built, he said, “a wall of separation between Church and
State.”
Referring to this Jeffersonian statement and its
meaning with respect to the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized
that “Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the
measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope
and effect of the amendment thus secured.”
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1878).
It is difficult to
overstate the important role these three documents have played in the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the religious clauses of the First Amendment.
In respect to the “establishment” clause, they
were certainly instrumental in leading the Supreme Court to enunciate the
following definitive statement of the scope of the clause:
The
“establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non‑attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a
wall of separation between Church and State.”
Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. 1, 15‑16 (1947).
Absent these documents and an awareness of the
historic circumstances in which they were written, a different construction of
the religious clauses might well have resulted. Thus a reading and understanding of these documents is basic to a
full appreciation of the religious clauses of the First Amendment. Their message is timeless ‑ as
important for today and tomorrow as yesterday.
August 15, 1965
John J. Adams
Associate
Director, Americans United
I
To The Honorable The General Assembly of The
Commonwealth Of Virginia. A Memorial
and Remonstrance.
We, the subscribers, citizens of the said Commonwealth,
having taken into serious consideration, a Bill printed by order of the last
Session of General Assembly, entitled “A Bill establishing a provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion,” and conceiving that the same, if finally
armed with the sanctions of a law, will be a dangerous abuse of power, are
bound as faithful members of a free State, to remonstrate against it, and to
declare the reasons by which we are determined. We remonstrate against the said Bill,
1. Because
we hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, “that Religion or the duty
which we owe to our Creator and the Manner of discharging it, can be directed
only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.” The Religion then of every man must be left
to the conviction and conscience of every man;
and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may
dictate. This right is in its nature an
unalienable right. It is
unalienable; because the opinions of
men, depending only on the evidence contemplated by their own minds, cannot
follow the dictates of other men: It is
unalienable also; because what is here
a right towards men, is a duty towards the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage,
and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in order of time
and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. Before any man can be considered as a member
of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of the Governor of the
Universe: And if a member of Civil
Society, who enters into any subordinate Association, must always do it with a
reservation of his duty to the general authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of any particular
Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal
Sovereign. We maintain therefore that
in matters of Religion, no man's right is abridged by the institution of Civil
Society, and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance. True it is, that no other rule exists, by
which any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined,
but the will of the majority; but it is
also true, that the majority may trespass on the rights of the minority.
2. Because
if religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less
can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body. The latter are but the creatures and vicegerents of the
former. Their jurisdiction is both derivative
and limited: it is limited with regard
to the co‑ordinate departments, more necessarily is it limited with
regard to the constituents. The
preservation of a free government requires not merely, that the metes and
bounds which separate each department of power may be invariably maintained; but more especially, that neither of them be
suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends the rights of the
people. The Rulers who are guilty of
such an encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive their
authority, and are Tyrants. The People
who submit to it are governed by laws made neither by themselves, nor by an
authority derived from them, and are slaves.
3.
Because, it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our
liberties. We hold this prudent
jealousy to be the first duty of citizens, and one of the noblest
characteristics of the late Revolution.
The freemen of America did not wait till usurped power had strengthened
itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents. They saw all the consequences in the
principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle. We revere this lesson too much, soon to
forget it. Who does not see that the
same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians,
in exclusion of all other Sects? That
the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of
his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform
to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever?
4.
Because, the bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis of
every law, and which is more indispensable, in proportion as the validity or
expediency of any law is more liable to be impeached. If “all men are by nature equally free and independent,” all men
are to be considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore
retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to be considered as
retaining an “equal title to the free
exercise of Religion according to the dictates of conscience.” Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to
embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of
divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds have not
yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an offence against God, not
against man: To God, therefore, not to men,
must an account of it be rendered. As
the Bill violates equality by subjecting some to peculiar burdens; so it violates the same principle, by
granting to others peculiar exemptions.
Are the Quakers and Menonists the only sects who think a compulsive
support of their religions unnecessary and unwarrantable? Can their piety alone be entrusted with the
care of public worship? Ought their
Religions to be endowed above all others, with extraordinary privileges, by
which proselytes may be enticed from all others? We think too favorably of the justice and good sense of these
denominations, to believe that they either covet pre‑eminencies over
their fellow citizens, or that they will be seduced by them, from the common
opposition to the measure.
5.
Because the bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent
judge of Religious truth; or that he
may employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by the
contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world: The second an unhallowed perversion of the
means of salvation.
6.
Because the establishment proposed by the Bill is not requisite for the
support of the Christian Religion. To
say that it is, is a contradiction to the Christian Religion itself; for every page of it disavows a dependence
on the powers of this world: it is a
contradiction to fact; for it is known
that this Religion both existed and flourished, not only without the support of
human laws, but in spite of every opposition from them; and not only during the period of miraculous
aid, but long after it had been left to its own evidence, and the ordinary care
of Providence: Nay, it is a
contradiction in terms; for a Religion
not invented by human policy, must have pre‑existed and been supported,
before it was established by human policy.
It is moreover to weaken in those who profess this Religion a pious
confidence in its innate excellence, and the patronage of its Author; and to foster in those who still reject it,
a suspicion that its friends are too conscious of its fallacies, to trust it to
its own merits.
7. Because
experience witnesseth that ecclesiastical establishments, instead of
maintaining the purity and efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary
operation. During almost fifteen
centuries, has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits? More or less in all places, pride and
indolence in the Clergy; ignorance and
servility in the laity; in both,
superstition, bigotry, and persecution.
Enquire of the Teachers of Christianity for the ages in which it
appeared in its greatest luster; those
of every sect, point to the ages prior to its incorporation with Civil
policy. Propose a restoration of this
primitive state in which its Teachers depended on the voluntary rewards of
their flocks; many of them predict its
downfall. On which side ought their
testimony to have greatest weight, when for or when against their interest?
8. Because
the establishment in question is not necessary for the support of Civil
Government. If it be urged as necessary
for the support of Civil Government only as it is a means of supporting
Religion, and it be not necessary for the latter purpose, it cannot be
necessary for the former. If Religion
be not within the cognizance of Civil Government, how can its legal establishment
be said to be necessary to civil Government?
What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil
Society? In some instances they have
been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen
upholding the thrones of political tyranny;
in no instance have they been seen the guardians of the liberties of the
people. Rulers who wished to subvert
the public liberty, may have found an established clergy convenient
auxiliaries. A just government,
instituted to secure & perpetuate it, needs them not. Such a government will be best supported by
protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal
hand which protects his person and his property; by neither invading the equal rights of any Sect, nor suffering
any Sect to invade those of another.
9. Because
the proposed establishment is a departure from that generous policy, which,
offering an asylum to the persecuted and oppressed of every Nation and Religion,
promised a luster to our country, and an accession to the number of its
citizens. What a melancholy mark is the
Bill of sudden degeneracy? Instead of
holding forth an asylum to the persecuted, it is itself a signal of
persecution. It degrades from the equal
rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those of
the Legislative authority. Distant as
it may be, in its present form, from the Inquisition it differs from it only in
degree. The one is the first step, the
other the last in the career of intolerance.
The magnanimous sufferer under this cruel scourge in foreign Regions,
must view the Bill as a Beacon on our Coast, warning him to seek some other
haven, where liberty and philanthropy in their due extent may offer a more certain
repose from his troubles.
10.
Because, it will have a like tendency to banish our Citizens. The allurements presented by other
situations are every day thinning their number. To superadd a fresh motive to emigration, by revoking the liberty
which they now enjoy, would be the same species of folly which has dishonored
and depopulated flourishing kingdoms.
11.
Because, it will destroy that moderation and harmony which the
forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion, has produced amongst its
several sects. Torrents of blood have
been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the secular arm to extinguish
Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious opinions. Time has at length revealed the true
remedy. Every relaxation of narrow and
rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried, has been found to assuage the
disease. The American Theatre has
exhibited proofs, that equal and complete liberty, if it does not wholly
eradicate it, sufficiently destroys its malignant influence on the health and
prosperity of the State. If with the
salutary effects of this system under our own eyes, we begin to contract the
bonds of Religious freedom, we know no name that will too severely reproach our
folly. At least let warning be taken at
the first fruits of the threatened innovation.
The very appearance of the Bill has transformed that “Christian
forbearance, love and charity,” which of late mutually prevailed, into
animosities and jealousies, which may not soon be appeased. What mischiefs may not be dreaded should
this enemy to the public quiet be armed with the force of a law?
12.
Because, the policy of the bill is adverse to the diffusion of the light
of Christianity. The first wish of
those who enjoy this precious gift, ought to be that it may be imparted to the
whole race of mankind. Compare the
number of those who have as yet received it with the number still remaining
under the dominion of false Religions;
and how small is the former! Does the policy of the Bill tend to lessen
the disproportion? No; it at once discourages those who are
strangers to the light of revelation from coming into the Region of it; and countenances, by example the nations
who continue in darkness, in shutting out those
who might convey it to them. Instead of
leveling as far as possible, every obstacle to the victorious progress of
truth, the Bill with an ignoble and unchristian timidity would circumscribe it,
with a wall of defense, against the encroachments of error.
13.
Because attempts to enforce by legal sanctions, acts obnoxious to so
great a proportion of Citizens, tend to enervate the laws in general, and to
slacken the bands of Society. If it be
difficult to execute any law which is not generally deemed necessary or
salutary, what must be the case where it is deemed invalid and dangerous? and what may be the effect of so striking an
example of impotency in the Government, on its general authority.
14.
Because a measure of such singular magnitude and delicacy ought not to
be imposed, without the clearest evidence that it is called for by a majority
of citizens: and no satisfactory method
is yet proposed by which the voice of the majority in this case may be
determined, or its influence secured.
“The people of the respective counties are indeed requested to signify
their opinion respecting the adoption of the Bill to the next Session of
Assembly.” But the representation must
be made equal, before the voice either of the Representatives or of the Counties,
will be that of the people. Our hope is
that neither of the former will, after due consideration, espouse the dangerous
principle of the Bill. Should the event
disappoint us, it will still leave us in full confidence, that a fair appeal to
the latter will reverse the sentence against our liberties.
15.
Because, finally, “the equal right of every citizen to the free exercise
of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience” is held by the same
tenure with all our other rights. If we
recur to its origin, it is equally the gift of nature; if we weigh its importance, it cannot be
less dear to us; if we consult the
Declaration of those rights which pertain to the good people of Virginia, as
the “basis and foundation of government,” it is enumerated with equal
solemnity, or rather studied emphasis.
Either then, we
must say, that the will of the Legislature is the only measure of their
authority; and that in the plenitude of
this authority, they may sweep away all our fundamental rights; or, that they are bound to leave this
particular right untouched and sacred:
Either we must say, that they may control the freedom of the press, may
abolish the trial by jury, may swallow up the Executive and judiciary Powers of
the State; nay that they may despoil us
of our very right of suffrage, and erect themselves into an independent and
hereditary assembly: or we must say,
that they have no authority to enact into law the Bill under
consideration. We the subscribers say,
that the General Assembly of this Commonwealth have no such authority: And that no effort may be omitted on our
part against so dangerous an usurpation, we oppose to it, this
remonstrance; earnestly praying, as we
are in duty bound, that the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating
those to whom it is addressed, may on the one hand, turn their councils from
every act which would affront his holy prerogative, or violate the trust
committed to them: and on the other,
guide them into every measure which may be worthy of his blessing, may redound
to their own praise, and may establish more firmly the liberties, the
prosperity, and the Happiness of the Commonwealth.
James
Madison, 1785
I.
WHEREAS Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to influence it by
temporal punishments or burdens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to
beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of
the Holy author of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet
chose not to propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power
to do; that the impious presumption of
legislators and rulers, civil as well as ecclesiastical, who being themselves
but fallible and uninspired men, have assumed dominion over the faith of
others, setting up their own opinions and modes of thinking as the only true
and infallible, and as such endeavoring to impose them on others, hath
established and maintained false religions over the greatest part of the world,
and through all time; that to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he
disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical;
that even the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own
religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his
contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he would make his pattern,
and whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness, and is withdrawing
from the ministry those temporary rewards, which proceeding from an approbation
of their personal conduct, are an additional incitement to earnest and
unremitting labors; for the instruction
of mankind; that our civil rights have
no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics
or geometry; that therefore the
proscribing any citizen as unworthy the public confidence by laying upon him an
incapacity of being called to offices of trust and emolument, unless he profess
or renounce this or that religious opinion, is depriving him injuriously of
those privileges and advantages to which in common with his fellow‑citizens
he has a natural right; that it tends
only to corrupt the principles of that religion it is meant to encourage, by
bribing with a monopoly of worldly honors and emoluments, those who will
externally profess and conform to it;
that though indeed these are criminal who do not withstand such
temptation, yet neither are those innocent who lay the bait in their way; that to suffer the civil magistrate to
intrude his powers into the field of opinion, and to restrain the profession or
propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency, is a dangerous
fallacy, which at once destroys all religious liberty, because he being of
course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the rule of judgment, and
approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square with or
differ from his own; that it is time
enough for the rightful purposes of civil government, for its officers to
interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good
order; and finally, that truth is great
and will prevail if left to herself, that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist
to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict, unless by human
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate, errors
ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them:
II. Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That no man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be
enforced, restrained, molested, or burdened in his body or goods, nor shall
otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess,
and by argument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and that
the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
III. And
though we well know that this Assembly, elected by the people for the ordinary
purposes of legislation only, have no power to restrain the acts of succeeding
Assemblies, constituted with
powers equal to our own, and that therefore to
declare this act to be irrevocable would be of no effect in law; yet we are free to declare, and do declare,
that the rights hereby asserted are of the natural rights of mankind, and that
if any act shall be hereafter passed to repeal the present, or to narrow its
operation, such act will be an infringement of natural right.
Thomas Jefferson, 1779
LETTER TO
DANBURY BAPTIST ASSOCIATION[6]
Thomas Jefferson, 1802
To Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, &
Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state
of Connecticut.
Gentlemen:
The affectionate sentiments of esteem and
approbation which you are so good as to express towards me on behalf of the
Danbury Baptist association, give me the highest satisfaction. My duties dictate a faithful and zealous
pursuit of the interests of my constituents, and in proportion as they are
persuaded of my fidelity to these duties, the discharge of them becomes more
and more pleasing.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which
lies solely between Man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions
only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the
whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church & State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme
will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to
man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to
his social duties.
I reciprocate your kind prayers for the
protection and blessing of the common father and creator of man and tender you
or yourselves and your religious association, assurances of my high respect and
esteem.
Thomas Jefferson
Jan. 1, 1802
The Memorial
and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments is found in the Writings of James Madison, (Hunt Ed.)
Vol. II pp. 183‑191.
The Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom is taken from XII Hening Statutes of Virginia 84‑86
(1823).
The letter to the Danbury Baptist Association is
located in the Writings of Thomas
Jefferson (Monticello Ed.), vol. XVI, pp. 281‑282.
[1] “Basic Documents Relating to the Religious Clauses
of the First Amendment,” Library Series:
Number One (Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Washington, D.C., 1965).
[2] Note: “Mahometan” is supposed to be understood as a Muslim, but Jefferson did not know that Muslims do not worship Muhammad.
[3] Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, with an introduction by Dumas Malone (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), 58‑59.
[4] The Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments is found in the Writings of James Madison, (Hunt Ed.) Vol. II, pp. 183‑191.
[5] The Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom is taken from XII Hening Statutes of Virginia 84‑86 (1823).
[6] The letter to the Danbury Baptist Association is located in the Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Monticello Ed.), Vol. XVI, pp. 281‑282.