A Careful And
Strict Inquiry into The
Modern Prevailing Notions Of That
Freedom Of Will
Which Is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency,
Virtue and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame
Published
1754
Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758)
Romans 9:16: “It is not of him that willeth”
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1.I. Concerning the nature of the will.
1.II. Concerning the determination of the will.
1.IV. Of the distinction of natural and moral
necessity, and inability.
1.V. Concerning the notion of liberty, and of
moral agency.
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2.II. Several supposed ways of evading the
foregoing reasoning considered.
2.IV. Whether volition can arise without a cause,
through the activity of the nature of the soul.
2.VII. Concerning the notion of liberty of will,
consisting in indifference.
2.VIII. Concerning the supposed liberty of the will,
as opposite to all necessity.
2.IX. Of the connection of the acts of the will
with the dictates of the understanding.
2.XI. The evidence of God’s certain foreknowledge
of the volitions of moral agents.
Having taken notice of those things
which may be necessary to be observed, concerning the meaning of the principal
terms and phrases made use of in controversies concerning human liberty. And particularly observed what liberty
is, according to the common language and general apprehension of mankind, and
what it is as understood and maintained by Arminians. I proceed to consider the Arminian
notion of the freedom of the will, and the supposed necessity of it in
order to moral agency, or in order to anyone’s being capable of virtue or
vice. And properly the subject of
command or counsel, praise or blame, promises or threatenings, rewards or
punishments. Or whether that which has
been described, as the thing meant by liberty in common speech, be not
sufficient, and the only liberty, which make, or can make anyone a moral agent,
and so properly the subject of these things.
In this part, I shall consider whether any such thing be possible
or conceivable as that freedom of will which Arminians insist on; and shall inquire, whether any such sort of
liberty be necessary to moral agency, etc.
in the next part.
And first of all, I shall consider the
notion of a self-determining power in the will, wherein, according to
the Arminians, does most essentially consist the will’s freedom. And [I] shall particularly inquire, whether
it be not plainly absurd, and a manifest inconsistency, to suppose that the
will itself determines all the free acts of the will.
Here I shall not insist on the great
impropriety of such ways of speaking as the will determining itself. Because actions are to be ascribed to
agents, and not properly to the powers of agents, which improper way of
speaking leads to many mistakes, and much confusion, as Mr. Locke
observes. But I shall suppose that the
Arminians, when they speak of the will’s determining itself, do by the will
mean the soul willing. I shall
take it for granted, that when they speak of the will, as the determiner, they
mean the soul in the exercise of a power of willing, or acting
voluntarily. I shall suppose this, to
be their meaning, because nothing else can be meant, without the grossest and
plainest absurdity. In all cases when
we speak of the powers or principles of acting, or doing such things we mean
that the agents which have these powers of acting, do them, in the exercise of
those powers. So when we say, valor
fights courageously, we mean, the man who is under the influence of valor
fights courageously. Where we say, love
seeks the object loved, we mean, the person loving seeks that object. When we say, the understanding discerns, we
mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty.
So when it is said, the will decides or determines; the meaning must be, that the person, in the
exercise of [the] power of willing and choosing, or the soul, acting
voluntarily, determines.
Therefore, if the will determines all
its own free acts, the soul determines them in the exercise of a power
of willing and choosing; or, which is
the same thing, it determines them of choice [and] it determines its own
acts, by choosing its own acts.
If the will determines the will, then choice orders and determines the
choice and acts of choice are subject to the decision, and follow the conduct
of other acts of choice. And
therefore if the will determines all its own free acts, then every free act of
choice is determined by a preceding act of choice, choosing that act. And if that preceding act of the will be
also a free act, then by these principles, in this act too, the will is
self-determined. That is, this, in like
manner, is an act that the soul voluntarily chooses, or which is the same
thing. It is an act determined still by
a preceding act of the will, choosing that.
Which brings us directly to a contradiction: for it supposes an act of the will preceding the first act in the
whole train, directing and determining the rest; or a free act of the will, before the first free act of the
will. Or else we must come at last to
an act of the will, determining the consequent acts, wherein the will is not
self-determined, and so is not a free act, in this notion of freedom. But if the first act in the train,
determining and fixing the rest, be not free, none of them all can be free, as
is manifest at first view, but shall be demonstrated presently.
If the will, which we find governs the
members of the body, and determines their motions, does also govern itself, and
determines its own actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even by
antecedent volitions. The will
determines which way the hands and feet shall move, by an act of choice: and there is no other way of the will’s
determining, directing, or commanding anything at all. Whatsoever the will commands, it commands by
an act of the will. And if it has
itself under its command, and determines itself in its own actions, it doubtless
does it the same way that it determines other things, which are under its command. So that if the freedom of the will consists
in this, that it has itself and its own actions under its command and
direction, and its own volitions are determined by itself, it will follow, that
every free volition arises from another antecedent volition, directing and
commanding that. And if that directing
volition be also free, in that also the will is determined; that is to say, that directing volition is
determined by another going before that;
and so on, till we come to the first volition in the whole series. And if that first volition be free, and the
will self-determined in it, then that is determined by another volition
preceding that. Which is a contradiction
because by the supposition, it can have none before it, to direct or determine
it, being the first in the train. But
if that first volition is not determined by any preceding act of the will, then
that act is not determined by the will, and so is not free in the Arminian
notion of freedom, which consists in the will’s self-determination. And if that first act of the will, which
determines and fixes the subsequent acts, be not free, none of the following
acts, which are determined by it, can be free.
If we suppose there are five acts in the train, the fifth and last
determined by the fourth, and the fourth by the third, the third by the second,
and the second by the first. If the
first is not determined by the will, and so not free, then none of them are
truly determined by the will. That is,
that each of them are as they are, and not otherwise, is not first owing to the
will, but to the determination of the first in the series, which is not
dependent on the will, and is that which the will has no hand in
determining. And this being that which
decides what the rest shall be, and determines their existence; therefore the first determination of their
existence is not from the will. The
case is just the same, if instead of a chain of five acts of the will, we
should suppose a succession of ten, or an hundred, or ten thousand. If the first act be not free, being
determined, by something out of the will, and this determines the next to be
agreeable to itself, and that the next, and so on, none of them are free. But all originally depend on, and are
determined by some cause out of the will.
And so all freedom in the case is excluded, and no act of the will can
be free, according to this notion of freedom.
If we should suppose a long chain of ten thousand links so connected,
that if the first link moves, it will move the next, and that the next. And so the whole chain must be determined to
motion, and in the direction of its motion, by the motion of the first
link. And that is moved by something
else in this case, though all the links, but one, are moved by other parts of
the same chain. Yet it appears that the
motion of no one, nor the direction of its motion, is from any self-moving or
self-determining power in the chain, anymore than if every link were
immediately moved by something that did not belong to the chain. — If the will be not free in the first act,
which causes the next, then neither is it free in the next, which is caused by
that first act. For though indeed the
will caused it, yet it did not cause it freely, because the preceding act, by
which it was caused, was not free. And
again, if the will be not free in the second act, so neither can it be in the
third, which is caused by that; because
in like manner, that third was determined by an act of the will that was not
free. And so we may go on to the next
act, and from that to the next; and how
long soever the succession of acts is, it is all one. If the first on which the whole chain depends, and which
determines all the rest, be not a free act, the will is not free in causing or
determining anyone of those acts.
Because the act by which it determines them all is not a free act, and
therefore the will is no more free in determining them, than if it did not
cause them at all. — Thus, this
Arminian notion of liberty of the will, consisting in the will’s self-determination,
is repugnant to itself and shuts itself wholly out of the world.
If to evade the force of what has been
observed, it should be said, that when the Arminians speak of the will
determining its own acts, they do not mean that the will determines them by any
preceding act, or that one act of the will determines another. But only that the faculty or power of will,
or the soul in the use of that power, determines its own volitions. And that it does it without any act going
before the act determined; such an
evasion would be full of the most gross absurdity. I confess, it is an evasion of my own inventing; and I do not know but I should wrong the
Arminians, in supposing that any of them would make use of it. But, it being as good a one as I can invent; I would observe upon it a few things.
First, if the power of the will determines an act of
volition, or the soul in the use or exercise of that power
determines it, that is the same thing as for the soul to determine volition by
an act of will. For an exercise
of the power of will, and an act of that power, are the same thing. Therefore to say, that the power of will, or
the soul in the use or exercise of that power, determines volition, without an
act of will preceding the volition determined, is a contradiction.
Secondly, if a power of will determines the act of the
will, then a power of choosing determines it.
For, as was before observed, in every act of will, there is choice and a
power of willing is a power of choosing.
But if a power of choosing determines the act of volition, it determines
it by choosing it. For it is most
absurd to say that a power of choosing determines one thing rather than
another, without choosing anything. But
if a power of choosing determines volition by choosing it, then here is the act
of volition determined by an antecedent choice, choosing that volition.
Thirdly, to say, that the faculty, or the soul, determines
its own volition, but not by any act, is a contradiction. Because for the soul to direct, decide,
or determine anything, is to act;
and this is supposed. For the
soul is here spoken of as being a cause in this affair, doing something; or, which is the same thing, exerting itself
in order to an effect, which effect is the determination of volition, or the
particular kind and manner of an act of will.
But certainly, this action is not the same with the effect, in order to
the production of which it is exerted;
but must be something prior to it.
The advocates for this notion of the
freedom of the will speak of a certain sovereignty in the will, whereby
it has power to determine its own volition.
And therefore the determination of volition must itself be an act of the
will; for otherwise it can be no
exercise of that supposed power and sovereignty. Again, if the will determines itself, then either the will is active
in determining its volitions, or it is not.
If active, then the determination is an act of the will; and so there is one act of the will
determining another. But if the will is
not active in the determination, then how does it exercise any
liberty in it? These gentlemen suppose that the thing wherein the will
exercises liberty is in its determining its own acts. But how can this be, if it be not active in determining?
Certainly the will, or the soul, cannot exercise any liberty in that
wherein it doth not act, or wherein it doth not exercise itself. So that if either part of this dilemma be
taken, this scheme of liberty, consisting in self-determining power, is
overthrown. If there be an act of the
will in determining all its own free acts, then one free act of the will is
determined by another; and so we have
the absurdity of every free act, even the very first, determined by a foregoing
free act. But if there be no act or
exercise of the will in determining its own acts, then no liberty is exercised
in determining them. From whence it
follows, that no liberty consists in the will’s power to determine its own
acts: or, which is the same thing, that
there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a self-determining power of the
will.
If it should be said that although it
be true, if the soul determines its own volitions, it must be active in so
doing, and the determination itself must be an act. Yet there is no need of supposing this act to be prior to the
volition determined, but the will or soul determines the act of the will in
willing. It determines its own
volition, in the very act of volition;
it directs and limits the act of the will, causing it to be so and not
otherwise, in exerting the act, without any preceding act to exert that. If any should say after this manner, they
must mean one of these three things:
either, (1.) That the determining act, though it be before the act
determined in the order of nature, yet is not before it in order of time. Or, (2.) That the determining act is not
before the act determined, either in the order of time or nature, nor is truly
distinct from it. But that the soul’s
determining the act of volition is the same thing with its exerting the act of
volition. The mind’s exerting such a
particular act, is its causing and determining the act. Or, (3.) That volition has no cause, and is
no effect; but comes into existence,
with such a particular determination, without any ground or reason of its
existence and determination. — I shall
consider these distinctly. (1.) If all
that is meant, be, that the determining act is not before the act determined in
order of time, it will not help the case at all, though it should be
allowed. If it be before the determined
act in the order of nature, being the cause or ground of its existence, this as
much proves it to be distinct from, and independent on it, as if it were before
in the order of time. As the cause of
the particular motion, of a natural body, in a certain direction, may have no distance
as to time; yet cannot be the same,
with the motion effected by it, but must be as distinct from it, as any other
cause that is before its effect in the order of time. As the architect is distinct from the house, which he builds, or
the father distinct from the son which he begets. And if the act of the will determining be distinct from the act
determined, and before it in the order of nature, then we can go back from one
to another, till we come to the first in the series, which has no act of the
will before it in the order of nature, determining it. And consequently, is an act not determined
by the will and so not a free act, in this notion of freedom. And this being the act, which determines all
the rest, none of them are free acts.
As when there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken
hold of and drawn by hand; all the rest
may follow and be moved at the same instant, without any distance of time. But yet the motion of one link is before
that of another in the order of nature;
the last is moved by the next, and that by the next, and so till we come
to the first; which not being moved by
any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain, this as much proves
that no part is moved by any self-moving power in the chain, as if the motion
of one link followed that of another in the order of time.
(2.) If any should say, that the
determining act is not before the determined act, either in the order of time,
or of nature, nor is distinct from it;
but that the exertion of the act is the determination of the
act. That for the soul to exert a
particular volition is for it to cause and determine that act of volition. I would on this observe that the thing in
question seems to be forgotten, or kept out of sight in a darkness and
unintelligibleness of speech, unless such an objector would mean to contradict
himself. The very act of volition
itself is doubtless a determination of mind;
i. e. it is the mind’s drawing up a conclusion, or coming to a choice
between two or more things proposed to it.
But determining among external objects of choice, is not the same
with determining the act of choice itself, among various possible acts
of choice. — The question is; what influences, directs, or determines the
mind or will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does? Or what is the
cause, ground, or reason, why it concludes thus, and not otherwise? Now it must
be answered, according to the Arminian notion of freedom, that the will
influences, orders, and determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say, it must be by some
antecedent act. To say, it is caused,
influenced, and determined by something, and yet not determined by anything
antecedent, either in order of time or nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by a thing’s being
prior in the order of nature, that it is some way the cause or reason of the
thing, with respect to which it is said to be prior.
If the particular act or exertion of
will, which comes into existence, be anything properly determined at all, then
it has some cause of existing, and of existing in such a particular determinate
manner, and not another. Some cause,
whose influence decides the matter: which
cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that the will or mind orders, influences, and determines
itself to exert an act by the very exertion itself, is to make the exertion
both cause and effect; or the exerting
such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of such an act. For the question is, What is the cause and
reason of the soul’s exerting such an act? To which the answer is, The soul
exerts such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so, by this, the exertion must be distinct from, and in the
order of nature prior to, itself.
(3.) If the meaning be, that the
soul’s exertion of such a particular act of will, is a thing that comes to pass
of itself, without any cause;
and that there is absolutely no reason of the soul being determined to
exert such a volition, and make such a choice, rather than another; I say, if this be the meaning of Arminians,
when they contend so earnestly for the will determining its own acts, and for
liberty of will consisting in self-determining power; they do nothing but confound themselves and others with words
without a meaning. In the question, What
determines the will? and in their answer, that the will determines
itself; and in all the dispute, it
seems to be taken for granted, that something determines the will; and the controversy on this head is not,
whether its determination has any cause or foundation at all; but where the foundation of it is, whether
in the will itself, or somewhere else.
But if the thing intended be what is above mentioned, then nothing at
all determines the will; volition
having absolutely no cause or foundation of its existence, either within or
without. — There is a great noise made
about self-determining power as the source of all free acts of the will. But when the matter comes to be explained,
the meaning is, that no power at all is the source of these acts, neither self-determining
power, nor any other, but they arise from nothing; no cause, no power, no influence, being at all concerned in the
matter.
However, this very thing, even that
the free acts of the will are events, which come to pass without a
cause, is certainly implied in the Arminian notion of liberty of will. Though it be very inconsistent with many
other things in their scheme, and repugnant to some things implied in their
notion of liberty. Their opinion
implies that the particular determination of volition is without any
cause; because they hold the free acts
of the will to be contingent events;
and contingence is essential to freedom in their notion of it. But certainly, those things, which have a
prior ground and reason of their particular existence, a cause, which
antecedently determines them to be, and determines them to be just as they are,
do not happen contingently. If
something foregoing, by a casual influence and connection, determines and fixes
precisely their coming to pass, and the manner of it, then it does not remain a
contingent thing whether they shall come to pass or no.
And because it is a question in many
respects very important in this controversy, whether the free acts of the
will are events which come to pass without a cause; I shall be particular in examining this point in the two
following sections.
Before I enter on any argument on this
subject, I would explain how I would be understood, when I use the word cause
in this discourse. Since, for want of a
better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense which is more extensive
than that in which it is sometimes used.
The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify, only that
which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing,
or bring it to pass. But there are many
things which have no such positive productive influence; which yet are causes in this respect, that
they have truly the nature of a reason why some things are, rather than
others; or why they are thus, rather
than otherwise. Thus, the absence of
the sun in the night, is not the cause of the fall of dew at that time, in the
same manner as its beams are the cause of the ascent of vapors in the
daytime. And its withdrawment in the
winter, is not in the same manner the cause of the freezing of the waters, as
its approach in the spring is the cause of their thawing. But yet the withdrawment, or absence of the
sun, is an antecedent with which these effects in the night and winter are
connected, and on which they depend;
and is one thing that belongs to the ground and reason why they come to
pass at that time, rather than at other times;
though the absence of the sun is nothing positive, nor has any positive
influence.
It may be further observed, that when
I speak of connection of causes and effects, I have respect to moral
causes, as well as those that are called natural in distinction from
them. Moral causes may be causes in as
proper a sense as any causes whatsoever;
may have as real an influence, and may as truly be the ground and reason
of an event’s coming to pass.
Therefore I sometimes use the word cause,
in this inquiry, to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral,
positive or negative, on which an event, either a thing, or the manner and
circumstance of a thing, so depends.
That it is the ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it
is, rather than not; or why it is as it
is, rather than otherwise. Or, in other
words, any antecedent with which a consequent event is so connected, that it
truly belongs to the reason why the proposition which affirms that event is
true; whether it has any positive
influence, or not. And agreeably to
this, I sometimes use the word effect for the consequence of another thing,
which is perhaps rather an occasion than a cause, most properly speaking.
I am the more careful thus to explain
my meaning. That I may cut off
occasion, from any that might seek occasion to cavil and object against some
things which I may say concerning the dependence of all things which come to
pass, on some cause, and their connection with their cause.
Having thus explained what I mean by cause,
I assert, that nothing ever comes to pass without a cause. What is self-existent must be from eternity,
and must be unchangeable: but as to all
things that begin to be, they are not self-existent, and therefore must
have some foundation of their existence without themselves. — That whatsoever begins to be, which before
was not, must have a cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first
dictate of the common and natural sense which God has implanted in the minds of
all mankind, and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence
of things, past, present, or to come.
And this dictate, of common sense,
equally respects substances and modes, or things and the manner and
circumstances of things. Thus, if we
see a body, which has hitherto been at rest, start out of a state of rest, and
begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose there is some cause
or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the existence of a body itself
which had hitherto not existed. And so
if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain direction, should suddenly
change the direction of its motion; or
if it should put off its old figure, and take a new one; or change its color: the beginning of these new modes is a new
event, and the human mind necessarily supposes that there is some cause or
reason of them.
If this grand principle of common
sense be taken away, all arguing from effects to causes ceases. And so all knowledge of any existence, besides
what we have by the most direct and immediate intuition, particularly all our
proof of the being of God, ceases. We
argue his being from our own being, and the being of other things, which we are
sensible once were not, but have begun to be.
And from the being of the world, with all its constituent parts and the
manner of their existence; all which we
see plainly are not necessary in their own nature, and so not self-existent,
and therefore must have a cause. But if
things, not in themselves necessary, may begin to be without a cause, all this
arguing is vain.
Indeed, I will not affirm that there
is, in the nature of things, no foundation for the knowledge of the Being of
God, without any evidence of it from his works. I do suppose there is a great absurdity in denying being in
general, and imagining an eternal, absolute, universal nothing: and therefore that there would be, in the
nature of things, a foundation of intuitive evidence, that there must be an eternal,
infinite, most perfect Being. If we had
strength and comprehension of mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general
and universal Being. But then we should
not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of God by arguing; our evidence would be intuitive. We should see it, as we see other things
that are necessary in themselves: the
contraries of which are in their own nature absurd and contradictory; as we see that twice two is four; and as we see that a circle has no
angles. If we had as clear an idea of
universal, infinite entity, as we have of these other things, I suppose we
should most intuitively see the absurdity of supposing such Being not to
be. [We] should immediately see there
is no room for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most
general, abstracted notion of it should not be. But we have not that strength and extent of mind, to know this
certainly in this intuitive, independent manner: but the way that mankind come to the knowledge of the Being of
God, is that which the apostle speaks of, Rom. 1:20. The invisible things of him from the creation of the world,
are clearly seen; being understood by
the things that are made; even his
eternal power and Godhead. We first
ascend, and prove a posteriori, or from effects, that there must
be an eternal cause; and then secondly,
prove by argumentation, not intuition, that this Being must be necessarily
existent; and then thirdly, from
the proved necessity of his existence, we may descend, and prove many of
his perfections a priori.
[To
the inquirer after truth it may here be recommended, as a matter of some
consequence, to keep in mind the precise difference between an argument a
priori and one a posteriori, a distinction of considerable use, as well as of
long standing, among divines, metaphysicians, and logical writers. An argument from either of these, when
legitimately applied, may amount to a demonstration, when used, for instance,
relatively to the being and perfections of God; but the one should be confined to the existence of Deity, while the
other is applicable to his perfections.
By the argument a posteriori we rise from the effect to the cause, from
the stream to the fountain, from what is posterior what is prior; in other words, from what is contingent to
what is absolute, from number to unity;
that is, from the manifestation of God to his existence. By the argument a priori we descend from the
cause to the effect, from the fountain to the stream, from what is a priori to
what is posterior; that is, from the
necessary existence of God we safely infer certain properties and
perfections. To attempt a demonstration
of the existence of a first cause, or the Being of God, a priori, would be most
absurd; for it would be an attempt to
prove a prior ground or cause of existence of a first cause; or, that there is some cause before the very
first. The argument a priori,
therefore, is not applicable to prove the divine existence. For this end, the argument a posteriori
alone is legitimate; and its
conclusiveness rests on this axiom, that “there can be no effect without a
cause.” The absurdity of denying this
axiom is abundantly demonstrated by our author. — W.]
But if once this grand principle of
common sense be given up, that what is not necessary in itself, must have a
cause; and we begin to maintain,
that things which heretofore have not been, may come into existence, and begin
to be of themselves, without any cause;
all our means of ascending in our arguing from the creature to the
Creator, and all our evidence of the Being of God, is cut off at one blow. In this case, we cannot prove that there is
a God, either from the Being of the world, and the creatures in it, or from the
manner of their being, their order, beauty, and use. For if things may come into existence without any cause at all,
then they doubtless may without any cause answerable to the effect. Our minds do alike naturally suppose and
determine both these things; namely,
that what begins to be has a cause, and also that it has a cause proportionable
to the effect. The same principle,
which leads us to determine, that there cannot be anything coming to pass
without a cause, leads us to determine that there cannot be more in the effect
than in the cause.
Yea, if once it should be allowed,
that things may come to pass without a cause, we should not only have no proof
of the Being of God, but we should be without evidence of the existence of
anything whatsoever, but our own immediately present ideas and
consciousness. For we have no way to
prove anything else, but by arguing from effects to causes. From the ideas now immediately in view, we
argue other things not immediately in view.
From sensations now excited in us, we infer the existence of things
without us, as the causes of these sensations;
and from the existence of these things, we argue other things, on which
they depend, as effects on causes. We
infer the past existence of ourselves, or anything else, by memory; only as we argue, that the ideas, which are
now in our minds, are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. We immediately perceive nothing else but the
ideas, which are this moment extant in our minds. We perceive or know other things only by means of these,
as necessarily connected with others, and dependent on them. But if things may be without causes, all
this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our
knowledge is gone. If there be no
absurdity or difficulty in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence
into being, of itself without a cause;
then there is no absurdity or difficulty in supposing the same of
millions of millions. For nothing, or
no difficulty, multiplied, still is nothing, or no difficulty. Nothing multiplied by nothing, does not
increase the sum.
And indeed, according to the
hypothesis I am opposing, of the acts of the will coming to pass without a
cause, it is the cause in fact, that millions of millions of events are
continually coming into existence contingently, without any cause or reason
why they do so, all over the world, every day and hour, through all ages. So it is in a constant succession, in every
moral agent. This contingency, this
efficient nothing, this effectual No-cause, is always ready at hand, to produce
this sort of effects, as long as the agent exists, and as often as he has
occasion.
If it were so, that things only of one
kind, viz. acts of the will, seemed to
come to pass of themselves; and it were
an event that was continual, and that happened in a course, wherever were found
subjects capable of such events; this
very thing would demonstrate that there was some cause of them, which made such
a difference between this event and others, and that they did not really happen
contingently. For contingence is blind,
and does not pick and choose a particular sort of events. Nothing has no choice. This no-cause, which causes no existence,
cannot cause the existence which comes to pass, to be of one particular sort
only, distinguished from all others.
Thus, that only one sort of matter drops out of the heavens, even water,
and that this comes so often, so constantly and plentifully, all over the
world, in all ages, shows that there is some cause or reason of the falling of
water out of the heavens; and that
something besides mere contingence has a hand in the matter.
If we should suppose non-entity to be
about to bring forth; and things were
coming into existence, without any cause or antecedent, on which the existence,
or kind, or manner of existence depends;
or which could at all determine whether the things should be stones, or
stars, or beasts, or angels, or human bodies, or souls, or only some new motion
or figure in natural bodies, or some new sensations in animals, or new ideas in
the human understanding, or new volitions in the will; or anything else of all the infinite number
of possibilities; then certainly it
would not be expected, although many millions of millions of things were coming
into existence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they should
all be only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, and
that this sort of existences should never fail to come to pass where there is
room for them, or a subject capable of them, and that constantly, whenever
there is occasion.
If any should imagine, there is
something in the sort of event that renders it possible for it to come into
existence without a cause, and should say, that the free acts of the will are
existences of an exceeding different nature from other things; by reason of which they may come into
existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things
cannot. If they make this objection in
good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely forgetting
themselves; for they would be giving an
account of some ground of the existence of a thing, when at the same time they
would maintain there is no ground of its existence. Therefore I would observe, that the particular nature of
existence, be it never so diverse from others, can lay no foundation for that
thing coming into existence without a cause.
Because to suppose this, would be to suppose the particular nature
of existence to be a thing prior to the existence, and so a thing which makes
way for existence, without a cause or reason of existence. But that which in any respect makes way for
a thing coming into being, or for any manner or circumstance of its first
existence, must be prior to the existence.
The distinguished nature of the effect, which is something belonging to
the effect, cannot have influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called
volition, can do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its
influence: for then the thing has made
sure of existence already, without its help.
So that it is indeed as repugnant to
reason, to suppose that an act of the will should come into existence without a
cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or
the whole universe, should come into existence without a cause. And if once we allow, that such a sort of
effect as a volition may come to pass without a cause, how do we know but that
many other sorts of effects may do so too? It is not the particular kind
of effect that makes the absurdity of supposing it has being without a cause,
but something which is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz. that they are not self-existent or necessary
in the nature of things.
The author of the Essay on the
Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures, in answer to that objection
against his doctrine of a self-determining power in the will (p. 68-69). That nothing is, or comes to pass,
without a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than
another. Allows that it is thus in
corporeal things, which are, properly and philosophically speaking, passive
being; but denies it is thus in spirits,
which are beings of an active nature, who have the spring of action within
themselves, and can determine themselves.
By which it is plainly supposed, that such an event as an act of the
will, may come to pass in a spirit, without a sufficient reason why it comes to
pass, or why it is after this manner, rather than another. But certainly this author, in this matter,
must be very unwary and inadvertent.
For,
1.
The objection or difficulty proposed by him seems to be forgotten in his
answer or solution. The very
difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this: How an event can come to pass without a sufficient reason
why it is, or why it is in this manner rather than another? Instead of solving
this difficulty, with regard to volition, as he proposes, he forgets himself,
and answers another question quite diverse, viz. What is a sufficient reason, why it is, and why it is in
this manner rather than another! And he assigns the active being’s own
determination as the cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect; and leaves all the difficulty unresolved,
even, How the soul’s own determination, which he speaks of, came to exist, and
to be what it was, without a cause? The activity of the soul may
enable it to be the cause of effects;
but it does not at all enable it to be the subject of effects which have
no cause; which is the thing
this author supposes concerning acts of the will. Activity of nature will no more enable a being to produce
effects, and determine the manner of their existence, within itself,
without a cause, than out of itself, in some other being. But if an active being should, through its
activity, produce and determine an effect in some external object, how absurd would
it be to say, that the effect was produced without a cause!
2.
The question is not so much, How a spirit endowed with activity comes to
act, as why it exerts such an act, and not another, or why it acts
with such a particular determination? If activity of nature be the cause why a
spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts, and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the cause why its
action is thus and thus limited, directed, and determined. Active nature is a general thing, it
is an ability or tendency of nature to action, generally taken, which may be a
cause why the soul acts as occasion or reason is given. But this alone cannot be a sufficient cause
why the soul exerts such a particular act, at such a time, rather than
others. In order to this there must be
something besides a general tendency to action; there must also be a particular tendency to that individual
action. — If it should be asked, why
the soul of man uses its activity, in such a manner as it does; and it should be answered, that the soul
uses its activity thus, rather than otherwise, because it has activity; would such an answer satisfy a rational man?
Would it not rather be looked upon as a very impertinent one?
3.
An active being can bring no effects to pass by his activity, but
what are consequent upon his acting.
He produces nothing by his activity, any other way than by the exercise
of his activity, and so nothing but the fruits of its exercise: he brings nothing to pass by a dormant
activity. But the exercise of his
activity is action; and so his action,
or exercise of his activity, must be prior to the effects of his activity. If an active being produces an effect in
another being, about which his activity is conversant, the effect being the
fruit of his activity, his activity must be first exercised or exerted, and the
effect of it must follow. So it must
be, with equal reason, if the active being is his own object, and his activity
is conversant about himself, to produce and determine some effect in
himself; still the exercise of his
activity must go before the effect, which he brings to pass and determines by
it. And therefore, his activity
cannot be the cause of the determination of the first action, or exercise
of activity itself, whence the effects of activity arise; for that would imply a contradiction; it would be to say, the first exercise of
activity is before the first exercise of activity, and is the cause of it.
4.
That the soul, though an active substance, cannot diversify its
own acts, but by first acting; or be a
determining cause of different acts, or any different effects, sometimes
of one kind, and sometimes of another, any other way than in consequence of its
own diverse acts, is manifest by this;
that if so, then the same cause, the same causal influence, without
variation in any respect, would produce different effects at
different times. For the same substance
of the soul before it acts, and the same active nature of the soul before it is
exerted, i. e. before in the order of nature, would be the
cause of different effects, viz.
different volitions at different times.
But the substance of the soul before it acts, and its active nature
before it is exerted, are the same without variation. For it is some act that makes the first variation in the
cause, as to any causal exertion, force, or influence. But if it be so, that the soul has no
different causality, or diverse causal influence, in producing these diverse
effects, then it is evident, that the soul has no influence in the diversity of
the effect. And that the difference of
the effect cannot be owing to anything in the soul; or which is the same thing, the soul does not determine the
diversity of the effect; which is
contrary to the supposition. — It is
true, the substance of the soul before it acts, and before there is any
difference in that respect, may be in a different state and circumstances: but those whom I oppose, will not allow the
different circumstances of the soul to be the determining causes of the acts of
the will; as being contrary to their
notion of self-determination.
5.
Let us suppose, as these divines do, that there are no acts of the soul,
strictly speaking, but free volitions;
then it will follow, that the soul is an active being in nothing further
than it is a voluntary or elective being;
and whenever it produces effects actively, it produces effects
voluntarily and electively. But to
produce effects thus, is the same thing as to produce effects in consequence
of, and according to its own choice. And if so, then surely the soul does not by its activity, produce
all its own acts of will or choice themselves.
For this, by the supposition, is to produce all its free acts of choice
voluntarily and electively, or in consequence of its own free acts of choice,
which brings the matter directly to the aforementioned contradiction, of a free
act of choice before the first free act of choice. — According to these gentlemen’s own notion
of action, if there arises in the mind a volition without a free act of the
will to produce it, the mind is not the voluntary cause of that volition; because it does not arise from, nor is
regulated by, choice or design. And
therefore it cannot be that the mind should be the active, voluntary,
determining cause of the first and leading volition that relates to the
affair. — The mind being a designing
cause, only enables it to produce effects in consequence of its design; it will not enable it to be the designing
cause of all its own designs. The mind
being an elective cause, will enable it to produce effects only in
consequence of its elections, and according to them; but cannot enable it to be the elective
cause of all its own elections; because
that supposes an election before the first election. So the mind being an active cause, enables it to produce
effects in consequence of its own acts;
but cannot enable it to be the determining cause of all its own
acts; for that is, in the same manner,
a contradiction, as it supposes a determining act conversant about the first
act, and prior to it, having a causal influence on its existence, and manner of
existence.
I can conceive of nothing else that
can be meant by the soul having power to cause and determine its own volitions,
as a being to whom God has given a power of action, but this; that God has given power to the soul,
sometimes at least, to excite volitions at its pleasure, or according as it
chooses. And this certainly supposes,
in all such cases, a choice preceding all volitions, which are thus caused,
even the first of them. Which runs into
the aforementioned great absurdity.
Therefore the activity of the nature
of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties with which the notion of a
self-determining power in the will is attended, nor will it help, in the least,
its absurdities and inconsistencies.
What was last observed in the
preceding section, may show — not only that the active nature of the soul
cannot be a reason why an act of the will is, or why it is in this manner
rather than another, but also, that if it could be proved, that volitions are
contingent events, their being and manner of being not fixed or determined by
any cause, or anything antecedent. It
would not at all serve the purpose of Arminians, to establish their notion of
freedom, as consisting in the will’s determination of itself, which
supposes every free act of the will to be determined by some act of the will
going before; inasmuch as for the will
to determine a thing, is the same as for the soul to determine a thing by willing; and there is no way that the will can
determine an act of the will, than by willing that act of the will, or, which
is the same thing, choosing it.
So that here must be two acts of the will in the case, one going before
another, one conversant about the other, and the latter the object of the
former, and chosen by the former. If
the will does not cause and determine the act by choice, it does not cause or
determine it at all. For that which is
not determined by choice, is not determined voluntarily or willingly. And to say, that the will determines
something which the soul does not determine willingly, is as much as to say,
that something is done by the will, which the soul does not with its will.
So that if Arminian liberty of will,
consisting in the will determining its own acts, be maintained, the old
absurdity and contradiction must be maintained, that every free act of will is
caused and determined by a foregoing free act of will. Which does not consist with the free acts
arising without any cause, and being so contingent, as not to be fixed by
anything foregoing. So that this
evasion must be given up, as not at all relieving this sort of liberty, but
directly destroying it.
And if it should be supposed, that the
soul determines its own acts of will some other way, than by a foregoing act of
will, still it will help not their cause.
If it determines them by an act of the understanding, or some other
power, then the will does not determine itself; and so, the self-determining
power of the will is given up. And what liberty is there exercised, according
to, their own opinion of liberty, by the soul being determined by something
besides its own choice? The acts of the will, it is true, may be
directed, and effectually determined and fixed; but, it is not done, by the soul’s own will and pleasure. There is no exercise at all of choice or
will in producing the effect; and if, will
and choice, are not exercised in it, how is the liberty of the will
exercised in it?
So that let Arminians turn which way
they please with their notion of liberty, consisting in the will determining its
own acts, their notion destroys itself.
If they hold every free act of will to be determined by the soul’s own
free choice, or foregoing free act of will;
foregoing either in the order of time, or nature; it implies that gross contradiction. That the first free act belonging to
the affair, is determined by a free act which is before it. Or if they say, that the free acts of the
will are determined by some other act of the soul, and not an act of
will or choice; this also destroys
their notion of liberty consisting in the acts of the will being determined by
the will itself. Or if they hold
that the acts of the will are determined by nothing at all that is prior
to them, but that they are contingent in that sense, that they are determined
and fixed by no cause at all; this also
destroys their notion of liberty, consisting in the will determining its own
acts.
This being the true state of the
Arminian notion of liberty, the writers who defend it are forced into gross
inconsistencies, in what they say upon this subject. To instance in Dr. Whitby;
he, in his discourse on the freedom of the will, [In his book on
the five Points, Second Edit. p. 350,
351, 352.] opposes the opinion
of the Calvinists, who place man’s liberty only in a power of doing what he
will, as that wherein they plainly agree with Mr. Hobbes. And yet he himself mentions the very same
notion of liberty, as the dictate of the sense and common reason of mankind,
and a rule laid down by the light of nature;
viz. that liberty is a power of
acting from ourselves, or DOING WHAT WE WILL. [In his book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 325, 326.] This is indeed, as he says, a thing agreeable to the
sense and common reason of mankind; and
therefore it is not so much to be wondered at, that he unawares acknowledges it
against himself. For if liberty does
not consist in this, what else can be devised that it should consist in? If it
be said, as Dr. Whitby elsewhere insists, that it does not only consist in
liberty of doing what we will, but also a liberty of willing without
necessity. Still the question returns,
what does that liberty of willing without necessity consist in, but in a power
of willing as we please, without being impeded by a contrary necessity?
Or; in other words, a liberty for the
soul in its willing to act according to its own choice? Yea, this very
thing the same author seems to allow, and suppose again and again, in the use
he makes of sayings of the fathers, whom he quotes as his vouchers. Thus he cites the words of Origen, which he
produces as a testimony on his side; [In his book on
the five Points, Second Edit. p.
342.] “The soul acts by
HER OWN CHOICE, and it is free for her to incline to whatever part SHE
WILL.” And those of Justin Martyr; [In his book on the five Points, Second
Edit. p. 360.] “The doctrine of the Christians is this, that
nothing is done or suffered according to fate, but that every man does good or
evil ACCORDING TO HIS OWN FREE CHOICE.
And from Eusebius, these words; [In his book on
the five Points, Second Edit. p. 363] “If fate be established, philosophy and piety are
overthrown. All these things depending
upon the necessity introduced by the stars, and not upon meditation and
exercise PROCEEDING FROM OUR OWN FREE CHOICE. And again, the words of Maccarius; [In his book on the five Points, Second Edit. p. 369, 370.] “God, to preserve the liberty of man’s will,
suffered their bodies to die, that it might be IN THEIR CHOICE to turn to good
or evil.” — “They who are acted by the
Holy Spirit, are not held under any necessity, but have liberty to turn
themselves, and DO WHAT THEY WILL in this life.”
Thus, the Doctor in effect comes into
that very notion of liberty, which the Calvinists have; which he at the same time condemns, as agreeing
with the opinion of Mr. Hobbes, namely, “The soul acting by its own choice,
men doing good or evil according to their own free choice, their being in that
exercise which proceeds from their own free choice, having it in their choice
to turn to good or evil, and doing what they will.” So that if men exercise this liberty in the
acts of the will themselves, it must be in exerting acts of will according
to their own free choice; or,
exerting acts of will that proceed from their choice. And if it be so, then let everyone judge
whether this does not suppose a free choice going before the free act of will,
or whether an act of choice does not go before that act of the will which proceeds
from it. And if it be thus with all
free acts of the will, then let everyone judge, whether it will not follow that
there is a free choice going before the first free act of the will
exerted in the case! And finally, let everyone judge whether in the scheme of
these writers there be any possibility of avoiding these absurdities.
If liberty consists, as Dr. Whitby
himself says, in a man’s doing what he will; and a man exercises this liberty, not only in external
actions, but in the acts of the will themselves; then so far as liberty is exercised in the
latter, it consists in willing what he wills: and if any say so, one of these two things must be meant,
either, 1. That a man has power to
will, as he does will; because what he
wills, he wills; and therefore power to
will what he has power to will. If this
be their meaning, then all this mighty controversy about freedom of the will
and self-determining power, comes wholly to nothing. All that is contended for being no more than this, that the mind
of man does what it does, and is the subject of what it is the subject, or that
what is, is; wherein none has any
controversy with them. Or, 2. The meaning must be, that a man has power to
will as he chooses to will: that is, he
has power by one act of choice to choose another; by an antecedent act of will to choose a consequent act and
therein to execute his own choice. And
if this be their meaning, it is nothing but shuffling with those they dispute
with, and baffling their own reason. For
still the question returns, wherein lies man’s liberty in that antecedent act of
will which chose the consequent act.
The answer according to the same principles must be, that his liberty in
this also lies in his willing as he would, or as he chose, or agreeable to
another act of choice preceding that.
And so the question returns in infinitum, and the like answer
must be made in infinitum: in
order to support their opinion, their must be no beginning, but free acts of
will must have been chosen by foregoing free acts of will in the soul of every
man, without beginning.
A great argument for self-determining
power, is the supposed experience we universally have of an ability to
determine our wills, in cases wherein no prevailing motive is presented. The will, as is supposed, has its choice to
make between two or more things, that are perfectly equal in the view of the
mind; and the will is apparently,
altogether indifferent, and yet we find no difficulty in coming to a
choice. The will can instantly
determine itself to one, by a sovereign power which it has over itself, without
being moved by any preponderating inducement.
Thus the aforementioned author of an Essay
on the Freedom of the Will, etc.
(p. 25, 26, 27) supposes, “That there are many instances, wherein the
will is determined neither by present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent
good nor by the last dictate of the understanding nor by anything else, but
merely by itself, as a sovereign self-determining power of the soul. And that the soul does not will this or that
action, in some cases, by any other influence but because it will. Thus, says he, I can turn my face to the
south, or the north; I can point with
my finger upward, or downward. — And
thus, in some cases, the will determines itself in a very sovereign manner,
because it will, without a reason borrowed from the understanding: and hereby it discovers its own perfect
power of choice, rising from within itself, and free from all influence or
restraint of any kind.” And (p. 66, 70,
73, 74) this author very expressly supposes the will in many cases to be
determined by no motive at all, and acts altogether without motive, or
ground of preference. — Here I
would observe,
1.
The very supposition which is here made, directly contradicts and
overthrows itself. For the thing
supposed, wherein this grand argument consists, is, that among several things
the will actually chooses one before another.
At the same time that it is perfectly indifferent, which is the very
same thing as to say the mind has a preference, at the same time that it has no
preference. What is meant cannot be,
that the mind is indifferent before it comes to have a choice, or until
it has a preference; for certainly this
author did not imagine he had a controversy with any person in supposing
this. Besides, it appears in fact, that
the thing which he supposes, is — not that the will chooses one thing before
another, concerning which it is indifferent before it chooses. But that the will is indifferent when
it chooses; and that it being
otherwise than indifferent is not until afterwards, in consequence of its
choice; that the chosen thing appearing
preferable, and more agreeable than another, arises from its choice already
made. His words are (p. 30), “Where the
objects which are proposed appear equally fit or good, the will is left without
a guide or director; and therefore must
take its own choice, by its own determination;
it being properly a self-determining power. And in such cases the will does as it were make a good to itself
by its own choice, i. e. creates its own pleasure or delight in this
self-chosen good. Even as a man by seizing
upon a spot of unoccupied land, in an uninhabited country, makes it his own
possession and property, and as such rejoices in it. Where things were indifferent before, the will finds nothing to
make them more agreeable, considered merely in themselves, but the pleasure it
feels arising from its own choice, and its perseverance therein. We love many things which we have chosen, and
purely because we chose them.”
This is as much as to say that we
first begin to prefer many things, purely because we have preferred and chosen
them before. — These things must needs
be spoken inconsiderately by this author.
Choice or preference cannot be before itself in the same instance, either
in the order of time or nature: It
cannot be the foundation of itself, or the consequence of itself. The very act of choosing one thing rather
than another is preferring that thing, and that is setting a higher
value on that thing. But that the mind
sets a higher value on one thing than another, is not, in the first place, the fruit
of its setting a higher value on that thing.
This author says (p. 36), “The will
may be perfectly indifferent, and yet the will may determine itself to choose
one or the other.” And again, in the
same page, “I am entirely indifferent to either; and yet my will may determine itself to choose.” And again, “Which I shall choose must be
determined by the mere act of my will.”
If the choice is determined by a mere act of will, then the choice is
determined by a mere act of choice. And
concerning this matter, viz. That the
act of the will itself is determined by act of choice; this writer is express (p. 72). Speaking of the case, where there is no
superior fitness in objects presented, he has these words: “There it must act by its own CHOICE, and
determine itself as it PLEASES.” Where
it is supposed that the very determination, which is the ground and
spring of the will’s act, is an act of choice and pleasure,
wherein one act is more agreeable than another: and this preference and superior pleasure is the
ground of all it does in the case. And
if so, the mind is not indifferent when it determines itself, but had rather
determine itself one way than another.
And therefore the will does not act at all in indifference; not so much as in the first step it
takes. If it be possible for the understanding
to act in indifference, yet surely the will never does; because the will beginning to act is
the very same thing as it beginning to choose or prefer. And if in the very first act of the will, the
mind prefers something, then the idea of that thing preferred, does at that
time preponderate, or prevail in the mind:
or, which is the same thing, the idea of it has a prevailing influence
on the will. So that this wholly
destroys the thing supposed, viz. That
the mind can by a sovereign power choose one of two or more things, which in
the view of the mind are, in every respect, perfectly equal, one of which does
not at all preponderate, nor has any prevailing influence on the mind above
another.
So that this author, in his grand
argument for the ability of the will to choose one of two or more things,
concerning which it is perfectly indifferent, does at the same time, in effect,
deny the thing he supposes, even that the will, in choosing, is subject to no
prevailing influence of the view of the thing chosen. And indeed it is impossible to offer this argument without
overthrowing it; the thing supposed in
it being that which denies itself. To
suppose the will to act at all in a state of perfect indifference, is to assert
that the mind chooses without choosing.
To say that when it is indifferent, it can do as it pleases, is to say
that it can follow its pleasure, when it has no pleasure to follow. And therefore if there be any difficulty in
the instances of two cakes, or two eggs, etc.
which are exactly alike, one as good as another; concerning which this author supposes the
mind in fact has a choice, and so in effect supposes that it has a preference; it as much concerned himself to solve
the difficulty, as it does those whom he opposes. For if these instances prove anything to his purpose, they prove
that a man chooses without choice. And
yet this is not to his purpose; because
if this is what he asserts, his own words are as much against him, and does as
much contradict him, as the words of those he disputes against can do.
2.
There is no great difficulty in showing, in such instances as are
alleged, not only that it must needs be so, that the mind must be
influenced in its choice by something that has a preponderating influence upon
it, but also how it is so. A
little attention to our own experience, and a distinct consideration of the
acts of our own minds, in such cases, will be sufficient to clear up the
matter.
Thus, supposing I have a chessboard
before me and because I am required by a superior, or desired by a friend, or
on some other consideration, I am determined to touch some one of the spots or
squares on the board with my finger.
Not being limited or directed, in the first proposal, to anyone in
particular; and there being nothing in
the squares, in themselves considered, that recommends anyone of all the
sixty-four, more than another; in this
case, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgarly called accident,
[I have elsewhere observed, what that is which is vulgarly called
accident; that is nothing akin to the
Arminian metaphysical notion of contingence, or something not connected with
anything foregoing; but that it is
something that comes to pass in the course of things, unforeseen by men, and
not owing to their design.] by determining to touch that square which
happens to be most in view, which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or
which happens to be then most in my mind, or which I shall be directed to by
some other such like accident. Here are
several steps of the mind proceeding (though all may be done, as it
were, in a moment). The first
step is its general determination that it will touch one of the
squares. The next step is
another general determination to give itself up to accident, in some
certain way; as to touch that which
shall be most in the eye or mind at that time, or to some other such like
accident. The third and last
step is a particular determination to touch a certain individual spot,
even that square, which, by that sort of accident the mind has pitched upon,
has actually offered itself beyond others.
Now it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind
proceed in absolute indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a
preponderating inducement. So it is in
the first step: the mind’s
general determination to touch one of the sixty-four spots. The mind is not absolutely indifferent
whether it does so or no; it is induced
to it, for the sake of making some experiment, or by the desire of a friend, or
some other motive that prevails. So it
is in the second step, the mind determining to give itself up to
accident, by touching that which shall be most in the eve, or the idea of which
shall be most prevalent in the mind, etc.
The mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule
or no; but chooses it, because it
appears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfill
the general purpose. And so it is in
the third and last step, which is determining to touch that individual
spot which actually does prevail in the mind’s view. The mind is not indifferent concerning this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement
and reason; which is, that this is a
prosecution of the preceding determination, which appeared requisite, and was
fixed before in the second step.
Accident will ever serve a man,
without hindering him a moment, in such a case. Among a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye,
or in idea, beyond others. When we have
our eyes open in the clear sunshine, many objects strike the eye at once, and
innumerable images, may be at once painted in it by the rays of light. But the attention of the mind is not equal
to several of them at once; or if it
be, it does not continue so for any time.
And so it is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general: several ideas are not in equal strength in
the mind’s view and notice at once; or
at least, does not remain so for any sensible continuance. There is nothing in the world more
constantly varying, than the ideas of the mind. They do not remain precisely in the same state for the least
perceivable space of time; as is evident
by this: — That all time is perceived
by the mind, only by the successive changes of its own ideas. Therefore while the perceptions of the mind
remain precisely in the same state, there is no perceivable length of time,
because no sensible succession at all.
As the acts of the will, in each step
of the aforementioned procedure, do not come to pass without a particular
cause, but every act is owing to a prevailing inducement; so the accident, as I have called it, or
that which happens in the unsearchable course of things, to which the mind yields
itself, and by which it is guided, is not anything that comes to pass without a
cause. The mind in determining to be
guided by it, is not determined by something that has no cause; any more than if it be determined to be
guided by a lot, or the casting of a die.
For though the die falling in such a manner be accidental to him that
casts it, yet none will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it
does. The involuntary changes in the
succession of our ideas, though the cause may not be observed, have as much a
cause, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the
continual, infinitely various, successive changes of the unevennesses on the
surface of the water.
There are two things especially, which
are probably the occasions of confusion in the minds of them who insist upon
it, that the will acts in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any
inducement, in its determinations in such cases as have been mentioned.
[The
reader is particularly requested to give due attention to these two remarks,
especially the former, as being of the utmost importance in the
controversy. If he be pleased to
examine, with this view, the most popular advocates for the liberty of
indifference, he will find them continually confounding the objects of choice,
and the acts of choice. When they have
shown, with much plausibility, that there is no perceivable difference, or
ground of choice, in the objects, they hastily infer the same indifferences as
applicable to the acts of choice. W.]
1.
They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it
distinctly in view. The question they
dispute about, is, whether the mind be indifferent about the objects
presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, etc. as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally
good. Whereas the question to be
considered, is, whether the person be indifferent with respect to his own actions; whether he does not, on some
consideration or other, prefer one act with respect to these objects before
another. The mind in its determination
and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly conversant
about the objects presented, but the acts to be done concerning
these objects. The objects may appear
equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them; but the next act of the will being about the
external actions to be performed, taking, touching, etc. these may not appear equal, and one action
may properly be chosen before another.
In each step of the mind’s progress, the determination is not about the
objects, unless indirectly and improperly, but about the actions, which it
chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and for reasons
not taken at all from the objects.
There is no necessity of supposing,
that the mind does ever at all properly choose one of the objects before
another: either before it has taken, or
afterwards. Indeed the man chooses to take
or touch one rather than another;
but not because it chooses the thing taken, or touched,
but from foreign considerations. The
case may be so, that of two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons,
prefer taking that which he undervalues, and choose to neglect that
which his mind prefers. In such
a case, choosing the thing taken, and choosing to take, are diverse: and so they are in a case where the things
presented are equal in the mind’s esteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact and experience makes evident,
is, that the mind chooses one action rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring,
in order to be to their purpose, should be to prove that the mind chooses the
action in perfect indifference, with respect to that action; and not to prove that the mind chooses the
action in perfect indifference with respect to the object; which is very possible, and yet the will
not act at all without prevalent inducement, and proper preponderation.
2.
Another reason of confusion and difficulty, in this matter, seems to be,
not distinguishing between a general indifference, or an indifference with
respect to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it; and a particular indifference, or an
indifference with respect to the next immediate act, viewed with its particular
and present circumstances. A man may be
perfectly indifferent with respect to his own actions, in the former
respect; and yet not in the
latter. Thus in the foregoing instance
of touching one of the squares of a chessboard; when it is first proposed that I should touch one of them, I may
be perfectly indifferent which I touch.
Because as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being but in
the first step of the mind’s progress in the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the last step, and the very
next thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having already
determined that I will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind,
and my mind being now fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that,
considered thus immediately, and in these particular present circumstances, is
not what my mind is absolutely indifferent about.
What has been said in the foregone
section, has a tendency in some measure to evince the absurdity of the opinion
of such as place liberty in indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the
will is without all antecedent bias.
That the determination of the will to either side may be entirely from
itself, and that it may be owing only to its own power, and the sovereignty
which it has over itself, that it goes this way rather than that.
But inasmuch as this has been of such
long standing, and has been so generally received, and so much insisted on by Pelagians,
Semi-Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Arminians, and others, it may deserve a
more full consideration. And therefore
I shall now proceed to a more particular and thorough inquiry into this notion.
Now lest some should suppose that I do
not understand those that place liberty in indifference, or should charge me
with misrepresenting their opinion, I would signify, that I am sensible, there
are some, who, when they talk of liberty of the will as consisting in
indifference, express themselves as though they would not be understood to mean
the indifference of the inclination or tendency of the will, but an
indifference of the soul’s power of willing. Or that the will, with respect to its power or ability to choose,
is indifferent, can go either way indifferently, either to the right hand or
left, either act or forbear to act, one as well as the other. This indeed seems to be a refining of some
particular writers only and newly invented, which will by no means consist with
the manner of expression used by the defenders of liberty of indifference in
general. I wish such refiners would
thoroughly consider, whether they distinctly know their own meaning, when they
make a distinction between an indifference of the soul as to its power
or ability of choosing, and the soul’s indifference as to the preference
or choice itself. And whether they do
not deceive themselves in imagining that they have any distinct meaning at
all. The indifference of the soul as to
its ability or power to will, must be the same thing as the indifference of the
state of the power or faculty of the will, or the indifference of the state
which the soul itself, which has that power or faculty, hitherto remains in, as
to the exercise of that power, in the choice it shall by and by make.
But not to insist any longer on the
inexplicable abstruseness of this distinction;
let what will be supposed concerning the meaning of them that use
it. Thus much must at least be intended
by Arminians when they talk of indifference as essential to liberty of will, if
they intend anything in any respect to their purpose, viz. That it is such an indifference as leaves
the will not determined already; but
free from actual possession, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that there
may be room for the exercise of the self-determining power of the
will. And that the will’s freedom
consists in, or depends upon, this vacancy and opportunity that is left for the
will itself to be the determiner of the act that is to be the free act.
And here I would observe in the first
place, that to make out this scheme of liberty, the indifference must be perfect
and absolute; there must be a
perfect freedom from all antecedent preponderation or inclination. Because if the will be already inclined,
before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not
wholly owing to itself. When two
opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice, the proposal does not find
the soul wholly in a state of indifference, then it is not found in a state of
liberty for mere self-determination. —
The least degree of an antecedent bias must be inconsistent with their notion
of liberty. For so long as prior
inclination possesses the will, and is not removed, the former binds the
latter, so that it is utterly impossible that the will should act otherwise
than agreeably to it. Surely the will
cannot act or choose contrary to a remaining prevailing inclination of the
will. To suppose otherwise, would be
the same thing as to suppose that the will is inclined contrary to its
present prevailing inclination, or contrary to what it is inclined
to. That which the will prefers, to
that, all things considered, it preponderates and inclines. It is equally impossible for the will to
choose contrary to its own remaining and present preponderating inclination, as
it is to prefer contrary to its own present preference, or choose
contrary to its own present choice.
The will, therefore, so long as it is under the influence of an old preponderating
inclination, is not at liberty for a new free act; of any, that shall now be an act of self-determination. That which is a self-determined free act,
must be one which the will determines in the possession and use of a peculiar
sort of liberty; such as consists in a
freedom from everything, which, if it were there, would make it impossible
that the will, at that time, should be otherwise than that way to which
it tends.
If anyone should say, there is no need
that the indifference should be perfect;
but although a former inclination, still remains: yet, if it be not very strong, possibly the
strength of the will may oppose and overcome it. — This is grossly absurd;
for the strength of the will, let it be never so great, gives it no such
sovereignty and command, as to cause itself to prefer and not to prefer at the
same time, or to choose contrary to its own present choice.
Therefore, if there be the least
degree of antecedent preponderation of the will, it must be perfectly
abolished, before the will can be at liberty to determine itself the contrary
way. And if the will determines itself
the same way, it was not a free determination, because the will
is not wholly at liberty in so doing.
Its determination is not altogether from itself, but it was
partly determined before, in its prior inclination. And all the freedom the will exercises in the case, is in an
increase of inclination, which it gives itself, added to what it had by a
foregoing bias; so much is from itself,
and so much is from perfect indifference.
For though the will had a previous tendency that way, yet as to that
additional degree of inclination, it had no tendency. Therefore the previous tendency is of no consideration, with
respect to the act wherein the will is free.
So that it comes to the same thing which was said at first, that as to
the act of the will, wherein the will is free, there must be perfect
indifference, or equilibrium.
To illustrate this, suppose a
sovereign self-moving power in a natural body, but that the body is in motion
already, by an antecedent bias, for instance, gravitation towards the center of
the earth; and has one degree of
motion by virtue of that previous tendency;
but by its self-moving power it adds one degree more to its
motion, and moves so much move swiftly towards the center of the earth than it
would do by its gravity only. It is
evident, all that is owing to a self-moving power in this case, is the additional
degree of motion; and that the
other degree which it had from gravity, is of no consideration in the
case. The effect is just the same, as
if the body had received from itself one degree of motion from a state of
perfect rest. So, if we suppose a
self-moving power given to the scale of a balance, which has a weight of one
degree beyond the opposite scale, and if we ascribe to it an ability to add
to itself another degree of force the same way, by its self-moving
power; this is just the same thing as
to ascribe to it a power to give itself one degree of preponderation
from a perfect equilibrium. And so much
power as the scale has to give itself an over-balance from a perfect equipoise,
so much self-moving self-preponderating power it has, and no more. So that its free power this way is always to
be measured from perfect equilibrium.
I need say no more to prove, that if
indifference be essential to liberty, it must be perfect
indifference. And that, so far as the
will is destitute of this, so far is it destitute of that freedom by which it
is in a capacity of being its own determiner, without being at all passive, or
subject to the power and sway of something else, in its motions and
determinations.
Having observed these things, let us
now try whether this notion of the liberty of will consisting in indifference
and equilibrium, and the will’s self-determination in such a state, be not
absurd and inconsistent.
And here I would lay down this as an
axiom of undoubted truth; that every
free act is done IN a state of freedom, and not only AFTER such a
state. If an act of the will be an
act wherein the soul is free, it must be exerted in a state of freedom,
and in the time of freedom. It
will not suffice, that the act immediately follows a state of liberty; but liberty must yet continue, and coexist
with the act; the soul remaining in
possession of liberty. Because that is
the notion of a free act of the soul, even an act wherein the soul uses
or exercises liberty. But if the
soul is not, in the very time of the act, in the possession of liberty,
it cannot at that time be in the use of it.
Now the question is, whether ever the
soul of man puts forth an act of will, while it yet remains in a state of
liberty, viz. as implying a state of
indifference. Or whether the soul ever
exerts an act of preference, while at that very time the will is in a perfect
equilibrium, not inclining one way more than another. The very putting of the question is sufficient to show the
absurdity of the affirmative answer:
for how ridiculous would it be for anybody to insist that the soul
chooses one thing before another, when at the very same instant it is perfectly
indifferent with respect to each! This is the same thing as to say, the soul
prefers one thing to another, at the very same time that it has no preference. — Choice and preference can no more be in a
state of indifference, than motion can be in a state of rest, or than the
preponderation of the scale of a balance can be in the state of
equilibrium. Motion may be the next
moment after rest; but cannot coexist
with it, in any, even the least, part of it. So choice may be immediately after a
state of indifference, but cannot coexist with it: even the very beginning of it is not in a state of
indifference. And therefore, if this be
liberty, no act of the will, in any degree, is ever performed in a state of
liberty, or in the time of liberty.
Volition and liberty are so far from agreeing together, and being
essential one to another, that they are contrary one to another, and one excludes
and destroys the other, as much as motion and rest, light and darkness, or life
and death. So that the will acts not at
all, does not so much as begin to act, in the time of such liberty. Freedom has ceased to be, at the first
moment of action; and therefore liberty
cannot reach the action, to affect, or qualify it, or give it a denomination,
any more than if it had ceased to be twenty years before the action began. The moment that liberty ceases to be, it ceases
to be a qualification of anything. If
light and darkness succeed one another instantaneously, light qualifies nothing
after it is gone out, to make anything lightsome or bright, at the first moment
of perfect darkness, any more than months or years after. Life denominates nothing vital, at
the first moment of perfect death. So
freedom, if it consists in or implies indifference, can denominate nothing free,
at the first moment of preference or preponderation. Therefore it is manifest, that no liberty which the soul is
possessed of, or ever uses, in any of its acts of volition, consists in
indifference. And that the opinion, of
such, as suppose that indifference belongs to the very essence of liberty, is
to the highest degree absurd and contradictory.
If anyone should imagine that this manner
of arguing is nothing but a trick and delusion; and to evade the reasoning, should say that thing wherein the
will exercises its liberty is not the act of choice or preponderance
itself, but in determining itself to a certain choice or
preference. That the act of the will
wherein it is free, and uses its own sovereignty, consists in its causing
or determining the change or transition from a state of
indifference to a certain preference or determining to give a certain turn to
the balance, which has hitherto been even;
and that the will exerts this act in a state of liberty, or while the
will yet remains in equilibrium, and perfect master of itself. — I say , if anyone chooses to express his
notion of liberty after this, or some such manner, let us see if he can succeed
any better than before.
What is asserted is, that the will,
while it yet remains in perfect equilibrium, without preference, determines
to change itself from that state, and excite in itself a certain choice or
preference. Now let us see whether this
does not come to the same absurdity we had before. If it be so that the will, while it yet remains perfectly
indifferent, determines to put itself out of that state, and to give
itself a certain preponderation. Then I
would inquire, whether the soul does not determine this of choice; or whether the will coming to a
determination to do so, be not the same thing as the soul coming to a choice to
do so. If the soul does not determine
this of choice, or in the exercise of choice, then it does not determine it
voluntarily. And if the soul does not
determine it voluntarily, or of its own will, then in what sense does
its will determine it? And if the will does not determine it, then how
is the liberty of the will exercised in the determination? What sort of
liberty is exercised by the soul in those determinations, wherein there is no
exercise of choice, which are not voluntary, and wherein the will is not
concerned? But if it be allowed, that this determination is an act of choice,
and it be insisted on, that the soul, while it yet remains in a state of
perfect indifference, chooses to put itself out of that state, and to turn
itself one way. Then the soul is
already come to a choice; and chooses
that way. And so we have the very same
absurdity which we had before. Here is
the soul in a state of choice, and in a state of equilibrium,
both at the same time: the soul already
choosing one way, while it remains in a state of perfect indifference, and has
no choice of one way more than the other.
— And indeed this manner of talking, though it may a little hide the
absurdity, in the obscurity of expression, increases the inconsistency. To say, the free act of the will, or the act
which the will exerts in a state of freedom and indifference, does not imply
preference in it, but is what the will does in order to cause or produce a
preference, is as much as to say, the soul chooses (for to will and to choose
are the same thing) without choice, and prefers without preference, in order to
cause or produce the beginning of a preference, or the first choice. And that is, that the first choice is
exerted without choice, in order to produce itself!
If any, to evade these things, should
own, that a state of liberty and a state of indifference are not the same, and
that the former may be without the latter;
but should say, that indifference is still essential to freedom,
as it is necessary to go immediately before it; it being essential to the freedom of an act of will that it
should directly and immediately arise out of a state of
indifference; still this will not help
the cause of Arminian liberty, or make it consistent with itself. For if the act springs immediately out of a
state of indifference, then it does not arise from antecedent choice or
preference. But if the act arises
directly out of a state of indifference, without any intervening choice
to determine it, then the act not being determined by choice, is not determined
by the will. The mind exercises
no free choice in the affair, and free choice and free will have no hand in the
determination of the act, which is entirely inconsistent with their notion of
the freedom of volition.
If any should suppose, that these
absurdities may be avoided, by saying, that the liberty of the mind consists in
a power to suspend the act of the will, and so to keep it in a state of indifference,
until there has been opportunity for consideration. And so shall say, that however indifference is not essential to
liberty in such a manner, that the mind must make its choice in a state of
indifference, which is an inconsistency.
Or that the act of will must spring immediately out of
indifference; yet indifference may be
essential to the liberty of acts of the will in this respect, viz., that
liberty consists in a power of the mind to forbear or suspend the act of
volition, and keep the mind in a state of indifference for the present, until
there has been opportunity for proper deliberation. I say, if anyone imagines that this helps the matter, it is a
great mistake. It reconciles no
inconsistency, and relieves no difficulty.
— For here the following things must be observed:
1.
That this suspending of volition, if there be properly any such
thing, is itself an act of volition. If
the mind determines to suspend its act, it determines it voluntarily; it chooses, on some consideration, to
suspend it. And this choice or
determination, is an act of the will.
And indeed it is supposed to be so in the very hypothesis. For it is supposed that the liberty of
the will consists in its power to do this, and that its doing it is the
very thing wherein the will exercises its liberty. But how can the will exercise liberty in it,
if it be not an act of the will? The liberty of the will is not exercised in
anything but what the will does.
2.
This determining to suspend acting is not only an act of the will, but
it is supposed to be the only free act of the will; because it is said, that this is the
thing wherein the liberty of the will consists. — If so, then this is all the act of will that we have to
consider in this controversy. And now,
the former question returns upon us;
viz. Wherein consists the
freedom of the will in those acts wherein it is free? And if this act of
determining a suspension be the only act in which the will is free, then
wherein consists the will’s freedom with respect to this act of suspension? And
how is indifference essential to this act? The answer must be, according to
what is supposed in the evasion under consideration, that the liberty of the will
in this act of suspension, consists in a power to suspend even this act, until
there has been opportunity for thorough deliberation. But this will be to plunge directly into the grossest nonsense: for it is the act of suspension itself that
we are speaking of; and there is no
room for a space of deliberation and suspension in order to determine whether
we will suspend or no. For that
supposes, that even suspension itself may be deferred: which is absurd; for the very deferring the determination of suspension, to
consider whether we will suspend or no, will be actually suspending. For during the space of suspension, to
consider whether to suspend, the act is, ipso facto, suspended. There is no medium between suspending to
act, and immediately acting; and
therefore no possibility of avoiding either the one or the other one moment.
And besides, this is attended with
ridiculous absurdity another way: for
now, it seems, liberty consists wholly in the mind having power to suspend its
determination whether to suspend or no;
that there may be time for consideration, whether it be best to
suspend. And if liberty consists in
this only, then this is the liberty under consideration. We have to inquire now, how liberty, with
respect to this act of suspending a determination of suspension, consists in
indifference, or how indifference is essential to it. The answer, according to the hypothesis we are upon, must be,
that it consists in a power of suspending even this last-mentioned act, to have
time to consider whether to suspend that.
And then the same difficulties and inquiries return over again with
respect to that; and so on forever,
which, if it would show anything, would show only that there is no such thing
as a free act. It drives the exercise
of freedom back in infinitum; and
that is to drive it out of the world.
And besides all this, there is a
delusion, and a latent gross contradiction in the affair another way. Inasmuch as in explaining how, or in what
respect, the will is free, with regard to a particular act of volition, it is
said, that its liberty consists in a power to determine to suspend that
act. Which places liberty not in
that act of volition which the inquiry is about, but altogether in another
antecedent act. [This] contradicts the thing
supposed in both the question and answer.
The question is, wherein consists the mind’s liberty in any
particular act of volition? And the answer, in pretending to show wherein
lies the mind’s liberty in that act, in effect says, it does not lie in
that act at all, but in another, viz. a
volition to suspend that act.
And therefore the answer is both contradictory, and altogether
impertinent and beside the purpose. For
it does not show wherein the liberty of the will consists in the act in
question. Instead of that, it supposes
it does not consist in that act at all, but in another distinct from it, even a
volition to suspend that act, and take time to consider of it. And no account is pretended to be given
wherein the mind is free with respect to that act, wherein this answer supposes
the liberty of the mind indeed consists, viz.
the act of suspension, or of determining the suspension.
On the whole, it is exceeding
manifest, that the liberty of the mind does not consist in indifference, and
that indifference is not essential or necessary to it, or at all belonging to
it, as the Arminians suppose; that
opinion being full of nothing but self-contradiction.
It is chiefly insisted on by
Arminians, in this controversy, as a thing most important and essential in
human liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the will, are contingent
events; understanding contingence as
opposite, not only to constraint, but to all necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this
matter.
And, First, I would inquire,
whether there is or can be any such thing, as a volition which is contingent in
such a sense, as not only to come to pass without any necessity of constraint
or coaction, but also without a necessity of consequence, or an
infallible connection with anything foregoing.
— Secondly, whether, if it were so, this would at all help the
cause of liberty.
I.
I would consider whether volition is a thing that ever does or can come
to pass, in this manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that
it has been already shown, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause,
or a reason, why it exists in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this has been
particularly applied to the acts of the will.
Now if this be so, it will demonstrably follow, that the acts of the
will are never contingent, or without necessity, in the sense spoken of; inasmuch as those things which have a cause,
or a reason of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears by the following
considerations.
1.
For an event to have a cause and ground of its existence, and yet not to
be connected with its cause, is an inconsistency. For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not
dependent on the cause. Its existence
is as it were loose from its influence, and may attend it, or may not; it being a mere contingence, whether it
follows or attends the influence of the cause, or not: And that is the same thing as not to be
dependent on it. And to say, the event
is not dependent on its cause, is absurd;
it is the same thing as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the
effect of it. For dependence on the
influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect. If there be no such relation between one thing and another,
consisting in the connection and dependence of one thing on the influence of
another, then it is certain there is no such relation between them as is
signified by the terms cause and effect. So far as an event is dependent on a cause,
and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case, and no
more. The cause does, or brings to pass,
no more in any event, than is dependent on it.
If we say, the connection and dependence is not total, but partial, and
that the effect, though it has some connection and dependence, yet is not
entirely dependent on it. That is the
same thing as to say, that not all that is in the event is an effect of that
cause, but that only part of it arises from thence, and part some other way.
2.
If there are some events which are not necessarily connected with their causes,
then it will follow, that there are some things which come to pass without any
cause, contrary to the supposition. For
if there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of
the cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would
attend or follow the influence of the cause, or no. It might have followed, and it might not, when the cause was the
same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances. And if so, why did it follow, rather than
not follow? Of this there is no cause or reason. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it
is, viz. the following of the effect on
the influence of the cause, with which it was not necessarily connected. If there be no necessary connection of the
effect on anything antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the event
will follow the cause, and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in
every respect in the same state and circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon,
even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in another
not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any cause or
ground. Here is something in the
present manner of the existence of things, and state of the world, that is
absolutely without a cause, which is contrary to the supposition, and contrary
to what has been before demonstrated.
3.
To suppose there are some events which have a cause and ground of their
existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their cause, is to
suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause. Thus;
if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with its
influence, and influential circumstances;
then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible and supposable, that
the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the same circumstances,
and yet the effect not follow. And if
this actually happens in any instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that
the influence of the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would have
done it. And yet, by the supposition,
in another instance, the same cause, with perfectly the same influence, and
when all circumstances, which have any influence are the same, it was
followed with the effect. By which
it is manifest, that the effect in this last instance was not owing to the
influence of the cause, but must come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the influence
of the cause was not sufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not sufficient to produce it,
then the production of it could not be owing to that influence, but must be
owing to something else, or owing to nothing.
And if the effect be not owing to the influence of the cause, then it is
not the cause. Which brings us to the
contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is the ground and reason of
the existence of a thing, and at the same time is NOT the ground and reason of
its existence.
If the matter be not already so plain
as to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that which
seems to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause. Its power and influence having, on a full
trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect: and if it be not sufficient to produce it, then it does not
produce it. To say otherwise, is to
say, there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause sufficient power
exerted, and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect, and so the
effect be actually produced at one time;
all these things concurring, will produce the effect at all times. And so we may turn it the other way; that which proves not sufficient at one
time, cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely the same influential
circumstances. And therefore if the
effect follows, it is not owing to that cause;
unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence: but that is contrary to the
supposition; for it is supposed that
all circumstances that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the time to be the
cause; which is contrary to the
supposition of the other thing being the cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is
evident that it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to
produce the effect at one time, and not at another; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the effect at a
certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the same
time.
On the whole, it is clearly manifest,
that every effect has a necessary connection with its cause, or with that which
is the true ground and reason of its existence. And therefore, if there be no event without a cause, as was
proved before, then no event whatsoever is contingent, in the manner that
Arminians suppose the free acts of the will to be contingent.
It is manifest, that no acts of the
will are contingent, in such a sense as to be without all necessity, or so as
not to be necessary with a necessity of consequence and connection. Because every act of the will is some way
connected with the understanding, and is as the greatest apparent good is, in
the manner which has already been explained.
Namely, that the soul always wills or chooses that which, in the present
view of the mind, considered in the whole of that view, and all that belongs to
it, appears most agreeable, because, as was observed before, nothing is more
evident than that. When men act
voluntarily, and do what they please, then they do what appears most agreeable
to them. To say otherwise, would be as
much as to affirm, that men do not choose what appears to suit them best, or
what seems most pleasing to them; or
that they do not choose what they prefer, which brings the matter to a
contradiction.
And as it is very evident in itself,
that the acts of the will have some connection with the dictates or views of
the understanding, so this is allowed by some of the chief of the Arminian
writers, particularly by Dr. Whitby and Dr. Samuel Clark. Dr. Turnbull, though a great enemy to the
doctrine of necessity, allows the same thing.
In his Christian Philosophy (p. 196), he with much approbation
cites another philosopher, as of the same mind, in these words: “ No man (says an excellent philosopher)
sets himself about anything, but upon some view or other, which serves him for
a reason for what he does; and
whatsoever faculties he employs, the understanding, with such light as it has,
well or ill formed, constantly leads;
and by that light, true or false, all her operative powers are
directed. The will itself, how absolute
and uncontrollable soever it may be thought, never fails in its obedience to
the dictates of the understanding.
Temples have their sacred images;
and we see what influence they have always had over a great part of
mankind; but in truth, the ideas and
images in men’s minds are the invisible powers that constantly govern
them; and to these they all pay
universally a ready submission.” But
whether this be in a just consistence with themselves, and their own notions of
liberty, I desire may now be impartially considered.
Dr. Whitby plainly supposes, that the
acts and determinations of the will always follow the understanding’s view of
the greatest good to be obtained, or evil to be avoided; or, in other words, that the determinations
of the will constantly and infallibly follow these two things in the
understanding: 1. The degree of good to be obtained,
and evil to be avoided, proposed to the understanding, and apprehended, viewed,
and taken notice of by it. 2. The degree of the understanding’s
apprehension of that good or evil, which is increased by attention and
consideration. That this is an opinion
in which he is exceeding peremptory (as he is in every opinion which he
maintains in his controversy with the Calvinists), with disdain of the contrary
opinion, as absurd and self-contradictory, will appear by the following words,
in his Discourse on the Five Points. [Second
Edit. p. 211, 212, 213.] “Now, it is certain, that what naturally makes the
understanding to perceive, is evidence proposed, and apprehended, considered or
adverted to: for nothing else can be
requisite to make us come to the knowledge of the truth. Again, what makes the will choose, is
something approved by the understanding and consequently, appearing to the soul
as good. And whatsoever it refuseth, is
something represented by the understanding, and so appearing to the will, as
evil. Whence all that God requires of
us is and can be only this; to refuse
the evil, and choose the good.
Wherefore, to say that evidence proposed, apprehended, and considered,
is not sufficient to make the understanding approve. Or that the greatest good proposed, the greatest evil threatened,
when equally believed and reflected on, is not sufficient to engage the will to
choose the good and refuse the evil.
[This],is in effect to say, that which alone doth move the will to
choose or to refuse, is not sufficient to engage it so to do; which being contradictory to itself, must of
necessity be false. Be it then so, that
we naturally have an aversion to the truths proposed to us in the gospel; that only can make us indisposed to attend
to them, but cannot hinder our conviction, when we do apprehend them, and
attend to them. — Be it, that there is
in us also a renitency to the good we are to choose; that only can indispose us to believe it is, and to approve it as
our chief good. Be it, that we are
prone to the evil that we should decline;
that only can render it the more difficult for us to believe it is the
worst of evils. But yet, what we do
really believe to be our chief good, will still be chosen; and what we apprehend to be the worst of
evils, will, whilst we do continue under that conviction be refused by us. It therefore can be only requisite, in
order to these ends, that the Good Spirit should so illuminate our
understandings, that we attending to and considering what lies before us,
should apprehend and be convinced of our duty.
And that the blessings of the gospel should be so propounded to us, as
that we may discern them to be our chiefest good; and the miseries it threatens.
So as we may be convinced that they are the worst of evils; that we may choose the one, and refuse the
other.”
Here let it be observed, how plainly
and peremptorily it is asserted, that the greatest good proposed, and the
greatest evil threatened, when equally believed and reflected on, is sufficient
to engage the will to choose the good, and refuse the evil. And [it]is that alone which does move the
will to choose or to refuse; and that
it is contradictory to itself, to suppose otherwise; and therefore must of necessity be false; and then what we do really believe to be our
chief good will still be chosen, and what we apprehend to be the worst of
evils, will, whilst we continue under that conviction, be refused by us. Nothing could have been said more to the
purpose, fully to signify, that the determinations of the will must evermore
follow the illumination, conviction, and notice of the understanding, with
regard to the greatest good and evil proposed, reckoning both the degree of
good and evil understood, and the degree of understanding, notice, and
conviction of that proposed good and evil;
and that it is thus necessarily, and can be otherwise in no
instance. Because it is asserted, that
it implies a contradiction, to suppose it ever to be otherwise.
I am sensible, the Doctor’s aim in
these assertions is against the Calvinists.
To show, in opposition to them, that there is no need of any physical
operation of the Spirit of God on the will, to change and determine that to a
good choice. But that God’s operation
and assistance is only moral, suggesting ideas to the understanding; which he supposes to be enough, if those
ideas are attended to, infallibly to obtain the end. But whatever his design was, nothing can more directly and fully
prove, that every determination of the will, in choosing and refusing, is
necessary; directly contrary to his
own notion of the liberty of the will.
For if the determination of the will, evermore, in this manner, follows
the light, conviction, and view of the understanding, concerning the greatest
good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the will, and it be a
contradiction to suppose otherwise;
then it is necessarily so.
The will necessarily follows this light or view of the understanding,
not only in some of its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing, so
that the will does not determine itself in anyone of its own acts. But every act of choice and refusal depends
on, and is necessarily connected with, some antecedent cause. Which cause is not the will itself, nor any
act of its own, nor anything pertaining to that faculty, but something
belonging to another faculty, whose acts go before the will, in all its acts,
and govern and determine them.
Here, if it should be replied, that
although it be true, that according to the Doctor, the final determination of
the will always depends upon, and is infallibly connected with, the
understanding’s conviction, and notice of the greatest good. Yet the acts of the will are not necessary,
because that conviction of the understanding is first dependent on a preceding
act of the will, in determining to take notice of the evidence exhibited. By which means the mind obtains that degree
of conviction, which is sufficient and effectual to determine the consequent
and ultimate choice of the will. And
that the will, with regard to that preceding act, whereby it determines whether
to attend or no, is not necessary. And
that in this, the liberty of the will consists, that when God holds forth
sufficient objective light, the will is at liberty whether to command the
attention of the mind to it or not.
Nothing can be more weak and
inconsiderate than such a reply as this.
For that preceding act of the will, in determining to attend and
consider, still is an act of the will;
if the liberty of the will consists in it, as is supposed, as
if it be an act of the will, it is an act of choice or refusal. And therefore, if what the Doctor asserts be
true, it is determined, by some antecedent light in the understanding
concerning, the greatest apparent good or evil. For he asserts, it is that light which alone doth move the
will to choose or refuse. And
therefore the will must be moved by that, in choosing to attend to the
objective light offered, in order to another consequent act of choice: so that this act is no less necessary than
the other. And if we suppose another
act of the will, still preceding both these mentioned, to determine both, still
that also must be an act of the will, an act of choice. And so must, by the same principles, be
infallibly determined by some certain degree of light in the understanding
concerning the greatest good. And let
us suppose, as many acts of the will, one preceding another, as we please, yet
are they everyone of them necessarily determined by a certain degree of light
in the understanding, concerning the greatest and most eligible good in that
case. And so, not one of them free
according to Dr. Whitby’s notion of freedom.
And if it be said, the reason why men do not attend to light held forth,
is because of ill habits contracted by evil acts committed before, whereby
their minds are indisposed to consider the truth held forth to them, the
difficulty is not at all avoided. Still
the question returns, what determined the will in those preceding evil acts? It
must, by Dr. Whitby’s principles, still be the view of the understanding
concerning the greatest good and evil.
If this view of the understanding be that alone which does move the
will to choose or refuse, as the doctor asserts, then every act of choice
or refusal, from a man’s first existence, is moved and determined by
this view. And this view of the
understanding exciting and governing the act, must be before the act. And therefore the will is necessarily
determined, in everyone of its acts, from a man’s first existence, by a cause
beside the will, and a cause that does not proceed from or depend on any act of
the will at all. This, at once, utterly
abolishes the doctor’s whole scheme of liberty of will. And he, at one stroke, has cut the sinews of
all his arguments from the goodness, righteousness, faithfulness, and sincerity
of God, in his commands, promises, threatenings, calls, invitations, and
expostulations. [Those] he makes use
of, under the heads of reprobation, election, universal redemption, sufficient
and effectual grace, and the freedom of the will of man. And has made vain all his exclamations
against the doctrine of the Calvinists, as charging God with manifest
unrighteousness, unfaithfulness, hypocrisy, fallaciousness, and cruelty.
Dr. Samuel Clark, in his Demonstration
of the Being and Attributes of God, [Edit. VI. p. 93.] to evade the argument to prove the necessity of
volition, from its necessary connection with the last dictate of the
understanding, supposes the latter not to be diverse from the act of the will
itself. But if it be so, it will not
alter the case as to the necessity of the act. If the dictate of the understanding be the very same with the
determination of the will, as Dr. Clark supposes, then this determination is no
fruit or effect of choice. And
if so, no liberty of choice has any hand in it: it is necessary; that is, choice cannot prevent it. If the last dictate of the understanding be
the same with the determination of volition itself, then the existence of that
determination must be necessary as to volition; in as much as volition can have no opportunity to determine
whether it shall exist or no, it having existence already before volition has
opportunity to determine anything. It
is itself the very rise and existence of volition. But a thing after it exists, has no opportunity to
determine as to its own existence; it
is too late for that.
If liberty consists in that which
Arminians suppose, viz. in the will
determining its own acts, having free opportunity and being without all
necessity; this is the same as to say,
that liberty consists in the soul having power and opportunity to have what
determinations of the will it pleases.
And if the determinations of the will, and the last dictates of the
understanding, be the same thing, then liberty consists in the mind having
power and opportunity to choose its own dictates of understanding. But this is absurd; for it is to make the determination of
choice prior to the dictate of understanding, and the ground of it; which cannot consist with the dictate of the
understanding being the determination of choice itself.
Here is no alternative, but to recur
to the old absurdity of one determination before another, and the cause of
it; and another before, determining
that; end so on in infinitum. If the last dictate of the understanding, be
the determination of the will itself;
and the soul be free with regard to that dictate in the Arminian notion
of freedom, then the soul, before that dictate of its understanding exists,
voluntarily and according to its own choice determines, in every case, what
that dictate of the understanding shall be.
Otherwise that dictate, as to the will, is necessary; and the acts determined by it must also be
necessary, so that here is a determination of the mind prior to that dictate of
the understanding. An act of choice
going before it, choosing and determining what that dictate of the
understanding shall be. And this
preceding act of choice, being a free act of will, must also be the same with
another last dictate of the understanding:
And if the mind also be free in that dictate of understanding, that must
be determined still by another; and so
on forever.
Besides, if the dictate of the
understanding, and determination of the will be the same, this confounds the
understanding and will, and makes them the same. Whether they be the same or no, I will not now dispute; but only would observe, that if it be so,
and the Arminian notion of liberty consists in a self-determining power in the
understanding, free of all necessity;
being independent, undetermined by anything prior to its own acts and
determinations; and the more the
understanding is thus independent, and sovereign over its own determinations,
the more free: then the freedom of the
soul, as a moral agent, must consist in the independence of the understanding
on any evidence or appearance of things, or anything whatsoever that
stands forth to the view of the mind, prior to the understanding’s
determination. And what a liberty is
this! consisting in an ability, freedom, and easiness of judging, either
according to evidence, or against it;
having a sovereign command over itself at all times, to judge, either
agreeably or disagreeably to what is plainly exhibited to its own view. Certainly, it is no liberty that renders
persons the proper subjects of persuasive reasoning, arguments, expostulations,
and such like moral means and inducements.
The use of which with mankind is a main argument of the Arminians, to
defend their notion of liberty without all necessity. For according to this, the more free men are, the less they are
under the government of such means, less subject to the power of evidence and
reason, and more independent on their influence, in their determinations.
And whether the Understanding and will
are the same or no, as Dr. Clark seems to suppose, yet in order to maintain the
Arminian notion of liberty without necessity, the free will is not determined
by the understanding, nor necessarily connected with the understanding. And the further from such connection, the
greater the freedom. And when the
liberty is full and complete, the determinations of the will have no connection
at all with the dictates of the understanding.
And if so, in vain are all the applications to the understanding, in
order to induce to any free virtuous act.
And so in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations, expostulations,
and all arguments and persuasive whatsoever:
for these are but applications to the understanding, and a clear and
lively exhibition of the objects of choice to the mind’s view. But if, after all, the will must be
self-determined, and independent on the understanding, to what purpose are
things thus represented to the understanding, in order to determine the choice?
That every act of the will has some
cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a necessary
connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity of connection and
consequence, is evident by this, that every act of the will whatsoever is
excited by some motive: which is manifest,
because, if the mind, in willing after the manner it does, is excited by no
motive or inducement, then it has no end which it proposes to itself, or
pursues in so doing; it aims at
nothing, and seeks nothing. And if it
seeks nothing, then it does not go after anything, or exert any inclination or
preference towards anything, which brings the matter to a contradiction. For the mind to will something, and for it
to go after something by an act of preference and inclination, are the same
thing.
But if every act of the will is
excited by a motive, then that motive is the cause of the act. If the acts of the will are excited by
motives, then motives are the causes of their being excited; or, which is the same thing, the cause of
their existence. And if so, the
existence of the acts of the will is properly the effect of their motives. Motives, do nothing as motives or
inducements, but by their influence;
and so much as is done by their influence is the effect of them. For that is the notion of an effect,
something that is brought to pass by the influence of something else.
And if volitions are properly the
effects of their motives, then they are necessarily connected with their
motives. Every effect and event being
as was proved before, necessarily connected with that which is the proper ground
and reason of its existence. Thus it is
manifest, that volition is necessary, and is not from any self-determining
power in the will. The volition, which
is caused by previous motive and inducement, is not caused by the will
exercising a sovereign power over itself, to determine, cause, and excite
volitions in itself. This is not
consistent with the will acting in a state of indifference and equilibrium, to
determine itself to a preference; for
the way in which motives operate, is by biasing the will, and giving it a
certain inclination or preponderation one way.
Here it may he proper to observe, that
Mr. Chubb in his Collection of Tracts on Various Subjects, has advanced
a scheme of liberty, which is greatly divided against itself, and thoroughly subversive
of itself: and that many ways.
1.
He is abundant in asserting, that the will, in all its acts, is
influenced by motive and excitement;
and that this is the previous ground and reason of all its acts,
and that it is never otherwise in any instance. He says (p. 262), “No action can take place without some motive
to excite it.” And (p. 263), “ volition
cannot take place without SOME PREVIOUS reason or motive to induce it.” And (p. 310), action would not take place
without some reason or motive to induce it;
it being absurd to suppose, that the active faculty would be exerted
without some PREVIOUS reason to dispose the mind to action.” (So also p. 257) And he speaks of these
things, as what we may be absolutely certain of, and which are the foundation,
the only foundation we have of certainty respecting God’s moral perfections (p.
252-255, 261-264).
And yet, at the same time, by his
scheme, the influence of motives upon us to excite to action, and to be
actually a ground of volition, is consequent on the volition or choice
of the mind. For he very greatly
insists upon it, that in all free actions, before the mind is the subject of
those volitions, which motives excite, it chooses to be so. It chooses, whether it will comply with the
motive, which presents itself in view, or not;
and when various motives are presented, it chooses which it will yield
to, and which it will reject (p. 256).
“Every man has power to act, or to refrain from acting, agreeably with,
or contrary to, any motive that presents.”
(p. 257) “Every man is at liberty to act, or refrain from acting,
agreeably with, or contrary to, what each of these motives, considered singly,
would excite him to. — Man has power,
and is as much at liberty, to reject the motive that does prevail, as he has
power, and is at liberty, to reject those motives that do not.” (And so p. 310, 311) “In order to constitute
a moral agent, it is necessary, that he should have power to act, or to refrain
from acting, upon such moral motives, as he pleases.” And to the like purpose in many other places,
according to these things, the will acts first, and chooses or refuses to
comply with the motive that is presented, before it falls under its prevailing
influence. And it is first determined,
by the mind’s pleasure or choice, what motives it will be induced by, before it
is induced by them.
Now, how can these things hang
together? How can the mind first act, and by its act of volition and choice
determine what motives shall be the ground and reason of its volition
and choice? For this supposes, the choice is already made, before the
motive has its effect. And that the
volition is already exerted, before the motive prevails, so as actually to be
the ground of the volition; and make
the prevailing of the motive, the consequence of the volition, of which yet it
is the ground. If the mind has already
chosen to comply with a motive, and to yield to its excitement, the excitement
comes in too late, and is needless afterwards.
If the mind has already chosen to yield to a motive which invites
to a thing, that implies, and in fact is, a choosing of the thing invited
to. And the very act of choice is
before the influence of the motive which induces, and is the ground of the
choice. The son is beforehand with the
father that begets him. The choice is
supposed to be the ground of that influence of the motive, which very influence
is supposed to be the ground of the choice.
And so vice versa, the choice is supposed to be the consequence
of the influence of the motive, which influence of the motive is the
consequence of that very choice.
And besides, if the will acts first
towards the motive, before it falls under its influence, and the prevailing of
the motive upon it to induce it to act and choose, be the fruit and consequence
of its act and choice, then how is the motive “a PREVIOUS ground and reason of
the act and choice, so that in the nature of the things, volition cannot take
place without some PREVIOUS reason and motive to induce it;” and that this act
is consequent upon, and follows the motive? Which things Mr. Chubb often
asserts, as of certain and undoubted truth.
So that the very same motive is both previous and consequent,
both before and after, both the ground and fruit of the very same thing!
II.
Agreeable to the aforementioned inconsistent notion of the will first
acting towards the motive, choosing whether it will comply with it, in order to
it becoming a ground of the will’s acting, before any act of volition can take
place, Mr. Chubb frequently calls motives and excitements to the action of the
will, “the passive ground or reason of that action.” Which is a remarkable phrase;
than which I presume there is none more unintelligible, and void of
distinct and consistent meaning, in all the writings of Duns Scotus, or Thomas
Aquinas. When he represents the motive
volition as passive, he must mean — passive in that affair, or passive with
respect to that action, which he speaks of, otherwise it is nothing to the
design of his argument. He must mean
(if that can be called a meaning), that the motive to volition is first acted upon
or towards, by the volition, choosing to yield to it. Making it a ground of action, or determining
to fetch its influence from thence and so to make it a previous ground of its
own excitation and existence. Which is
the same absurdity, as if one should say, that the soul of man, previous to its
existence, chose by what cause it would come into existence. And acted upon its cause, to fetch influence
thence, to bring it into being; and so
its cause was a passive ground of its existence!
Mr. Chubb very plainly supposes motive
or excitement to be the ground of the being of volition. He speaks of it as the ground or reason of
the EXERTION of an act of the will (p. 391, and 392), and expressly says, that
“volition cannot TAKE PLACE without some previous ground or motive to
induce it.” (p. 363) And he speaks of
the act as “FROM the motive, and FROM THE INFLUENCE of the motive” (p. 352),
“and from the influence that the motive has on the man, for the PRODUCTION of
an action,” (p. 317). Certainly, there
is no need of multiplying words about this.
It is easily judged, whether motive can be the ground of volition taking
place, so that the very production of it is from the influence of the motive,
and yet the motive, before it becomes the ground of the volition, is passive,
or acted upon the volition. But this I
will say, that a man, who insists so much on clearness of meaning in others,
and is so much in blaming their confusion and inconsistency, ought, if he was
able, to have explained his meaning in this phrase of “ground of action,” so as
to show it not to be confused and inconsistent.
If any should suppose, that Mr. Chubb,
when he speaks of motive as a “ passive ground of action,” does not mean
passive with regard to that volition which it is the ground of, but some other
antecedent volition (though his purpose and argument, and whole discourse, will
by no means allow of such a supposition), yet it would not help the matter in
the least. For, (1.) If we suppose an
act, by which the soul chooses to yield to the invitation of a motive to
another volition; both these supposed
volitions are in effect the very same.
A volition to yield to the force of a motive inviting to choose
something, comes to just the same thing as choosing the thing which the motive
invites to, as I observed before. So
that here can be no room to help the matter, by a distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the motive be passive, not with
respect to the same volition to which the motive excites, but to one truly
distinct and prior; yet, by Mr. Chubb,
that prior volition cannot take place without a motive or excitement, as a previous
ground of its existence. For he
insists, that “it is absurd to suppose any volition should take place without
some previous motive to induce it.” So
that at last it comes to just the same absurdity. For if every volition must have a previous motive, then
the very first in the whole series must be excited by a previous
motive; and yet the motive to that
first volition is passive; but
cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent volition, because, by the
supposition, it is the very first.
Therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must be so
with regard to that very volition of which it is the ground, and that is
excited by it.
III.
Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above, that every volition has some motive,
and that “in the nature of the thing, no volition can take place without
some motive to induce it;” yet he asserts, that volition does not always
follow the strongest motive. Or,
in other words, is not governed by any superior strength of the motive that is
followed, beyond motives to the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His own words (p. 258) are as follow: “Though with regard to physical causes, that
which is strongest always prevails, yet it is otherwise with regard to moral
causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger,
sometimes the weaker, prevails. And the
ground of this difference is evident, namely, that what we call moral causes,
strictly speaking, are no causes at all, but barely passive reasons of or
excitements to the action, or to the refraining from acting. Which excitements we have power, or are at
liberty, to comply with or reject, as I have showed above.” And so throughout the paragraph, he in a
variety of phrases insists, that the will is not always determined by the
strongest motive, unless by strongest we preposterously mean, actually
prevailing in the event; which is not
in the motive, but in the will; but
that the will is not always determined by the motive which is strongest, by any
strength previous to the volition itself.
And he elsewhere abundantly asserts, that the will is determined by no
superior strength or advantage, that motives have, from any constitution or
state of things, or any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual
determination of the will. And indeed
his whole discourse on human liberty implies it, his whole scheme is founded
upon it.
But these things cannot stand
together. There is a diversity of
strength in motives to choice, previous to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they do previously
invite, induce, excite, and dispose the mind to action. This implies, that they have something in
themselves that is inviting, some tendency to induce and dispose
to volition previous to volition itself.
And if they have in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtless they have
it in certain limited degrees, which are capable of diversity. And some have it in greater degrees, others
in less; and they that have most of
this tendency, considered with all their nature and circumstances, previous to
volition, are the strongest motives, and those that have least, are the weakest
motives.
Now if volition sometimes does not
follow the motive which is strongest, or has most previous tendency or
advantage, all things considered, to induce or excite it, but follows the
weakest, or that which, as it stands previously in the mind’s view, has least
tendency to induce it; herein the will
apparently acts wholly without motive, without any previous reason to dispose
the mind to it, contrary to what the same author supposes. The act, wherein the will must proceed
without a previous motive to induce it, is the act of preferring the weakest
motive. For how absurd is it to say,
the mind sees previous reason in the motive, to prefer that motive before the
other. And at the same time to suppose,
that there is nothing in the motive, in its nature, state, or any circumstance
of it whatsoever, as it stands in the previous view of the mind that gives it
any preference. But on the contrary,
the other motive that stands in competition with it, in all these respects, has
most belonging to it that is inviting and moving, and has most of a tendency to
choice and preference. This is
certainly as much as to say, there is previous ground and reason in the motive
for the act of preference, and yet no previous reason for it. By the supposition, as to all that is in the
two rival motives, which tends to preference, previous to the act of
preference, it is not in that which is preferred, but wholly in the other. And yet Mr. Chubb supposes, that the act of
preference is from previous ground and reason, in the motive which is
preferred. But are these things
consistent? Can there be previous ground in a thing for an event that takes
place, and yet no previous tendency in it to that event? If one thing follows another,
without any previous tendency to its following, then I should think it very
plain, that it follows it without any manner of previous reason why it should
follow.
Yea, in this case, Mr. Chubb supposes,
that the event follows an antecedent, as the ground of its existence, which has
not only no tendency to it, but a contrary tendency. The event is the preference, which the mind
gives to that motive, which is weaker, as it stands in the previous view of the
mind. The immediate antecedent is the
view the mind has of the two rival motives conjunctly; in which previous view of the mind, all the
preferableness, or previous tendency to preference, is supposed to be on the
other side, or in the contrary motive;
and all the unworthiness of preference, and so previous tendency to
comparative neglect, or undervaluing, is on that side which is preferred: and yet in this view of the mind is supposed
to be the previous ground or reason of this act of preference, exciting
it, and disposing the mind to it.
Which I leave the reader to judge, whether it be absurd or not. If it be not, then it is not absurd to say,
that the previous tendency of an antecedent to a consequent, is the ground and
reason why that consequent does not follow.
And the want of a previous tendency to an event, yea, a tendency to the
contrary, is the true ground and reason why that event does follow.
An act of choice or preference is a
comparative act, wherein the mind acts with reference to two or more things
that are compared, and stand in competition in the mind’s view. If the mind, in this comparative act,
prefers that which appears inferior in the comparison, then the mind herein
acts absolutely without motive, inducement, or any temptation whatsoever. Then, if a hungry man has the offer of two
sorts of food, to both which he finds an appetite, but has a stronger appetite
to one than the other; and there be no
circumstances or excitements whatsoever in the case to induce him to take
either the one or the other, but merely his appetite: if in the choice he makes between them, he chooses that which he
has least appetite to, and refuse that to which he has the strongest appetite,
this is a choice made absolutely without previous motive, excitement, reason,
or temptation, as much as if he were perfectly without all appetite to
either. Because his volition in this
case is a comparative act, following a comparative view of the food, which he
chooses, in which view his preference has absolutely no previous ground, yea,
is against all previous ground and motive.
And if there be any principle in man, from whence an act of choice may
arise after this manner, from the same principle volition may arise wholly
without motive on either side. If the
mind in its volition can go beyond motive, then it can go without motive. For when it is beyond the motive, it is out
of the reach of the motive, out of the limits of its influence, and so without
motive. If so, this demonstrates the
independence of volition on motive; and
no reason can be given for what Mr. Chubb so often asserts, even that “in
the nature of things volition cannot take place without o motive to induce it.”
If the Most High should endow a
balance with agency or activity of nature, in such a manner, that when unequal
weights are put into the scales, its agency could enable it to cause that scale
to descend, which has the least weight, and so to raise the greater
weight; this would clearly demonstrate,
that the motion of the balance does not depend on weights in the scales; at least, as much as if the balance should
move itself, when there is no weight in either scale. And the activity of the balance which is sufficient to move
itself against the greater weight, must certainly be more than sufficient to
move it when there is no weight at all.
Mr. Chubb supposes, that the will
cannot stir at all without some motive;
and also supposes, that if there be a motive to one thing, and none to
the contrary, volition will infallibly follow that motive. This is virtually to suppose an entire
dependence of the will on motives; if
it were not wholly dependent on them, it could surely help itself a little
without them; or help itself a little
against a motive, without help from the strength and weight of a contrary
motive. And yet his supposing that the
will, when it has before it various opposite motives, can use them as it
pleases, and choose its own influence from them, and neglect the strongest, and
follow the weakest, supposes it to be wholly independent on motives.
It further appears, on Mr. Chubb’s
hypothesis, that volition must be without any previous ground in any
motive. Thus, if it be as he supposes,
that the will is not determined by any previous superior strength of the
motive, but determines and chooses its own motive, then, when the rival motives
are exactly equal, in all respects, it may follow either; and may, in such a case, sometimes follow
one, sometimes the other. And if so,
this diversity which appears between the acts of the will, is plainly without
previous ground in either of the motives;
for all that is previously in the motives, is supposed precisely and
perfectly the same, without any diversity whatsoever. Now perfect identity, as to all that is previous in the
antecedent, cannot be the ground and reason of diversity in the
consequent. Perfect identity in the
ground, cannot be a reason why it is not followed with the same
consequence. And therefore the source
of this diversity of consequence must be sought for elsewhere.
And lastly, it may be observed, that
however much Mr. Chubb insists, that no volition can take place without some
motive to induce it, which previously disposes the mind to it; yet, as he also insists that the mind,
without reference to any superior strength of motives, picks and chooses for
its motive to follow. He himself herein
plainly supposes, with regard to the mind’s preference of one motive before
another, it is not the motive, that disposes the will, but the will disposes
itself to follow the motive.
IV.
Mr. Chubb supposes necessity to be utterly inconsistent with agency. And that to suppose a being to be an
agent in that which is necessary, is a plain contradiction, p. 311. And throughout his discourses on the subject
of liberty, he supposes, that necessity cannot consist with agency or freedom; and that to suppose otherwise, is to make
liberty and necessity, action and passion, the same thing. And so he seems to suppose, that there is no
action, strictly speaking, but volition.
That as to the effects of volition in body or mind, in themselves
considered, being necessary, they are said to be free, only as they are the
effects of an act that is not necessary.
And yet, according to him, volition
itself is the effect of volition. Yea,
every act of free volition; and
therefore every act of free volition must, by what has now been observed from
him, be necessary, and that every act of free volition is itself the effect of
volition, is abundantly supposed by him.
In p. 341, he says; “if a man is
such a creature as I have proved him to be, that is, if he has in him a power
of liberty of doing either good or evil, and either of these is the subject of
his own free choice, so that he might, IF HE HAD PLEASED, have CHOSEN and done
the contrary.” Here he supposes all
that is good or evil in man is the effect of his choice. And so that his good or evil choice itself
is the effect of his pleasure or choice, in these words, “he might if he had
PLEASED, have CHOSEN the contrary.”
So in p 356, “Though it be highly reasonable, that a man should
always choose the greater good, — yet he may, if he PLEASES, CHOOSE
otherwise.” Which is the same thing as
if he had said, he may if he chooses choose otherwise. And then he goes on, — “that is, he may, if
he pleases, choose what is good for himself,” etc. And again in the same page,” The will is not
confined by the understanding, to any particular sort of good, whether greater
or less; but it is at liberty to choose
what kind of good it pleases.” — If
there be any meaning in the last words, it must be this, that the will is at
liberty to choose what kind of good it chooses to choose; supposing the act of choice itself
determined by an antecedent choice. The
liberty Mr. Chubb speaks of, is not only a man’s power to move his body,
agreeable to an antecedent act of choice, but to use or exert the faculties of
his soul. Thus (p. 379), speaking of
the faculties of the mind, he says,” Man has power, and is at liberty to
neglect these faculties, to use them aright, or to abuse them, as he pleases.” And that he supposes an act of choice or
exercise of pleasure, properly distinct from, and antecedent to, those acts
thus chosen, directing, commanding, and producing the chosen acts, and even the
acts of choice themselves, is very plain in p. 283, “He can command his actions; and herein consists his liberty; he can give or deny himself that pleasure, as
he pleases. And p. 377. If the actions of men — are not the produce
of a free choice, or election, but spring from a necessity of nature, — he
cannot in reason be the object of reward or punishment on their account. Whereas, if action in man, whether good or
evil, is the produce of will or free choice; so that a man in either case, had it in his power, and was at
liberty to have CHOSEN the contrary, he is the proper object of reward or
punishment, according as he chooses to behave himself.” Here, in these last words, he speaks of liberty
of CHOOSING according as he CHOOSES. So that the behavior which he speaks of as subject to his choice,
is his choosing itself, as well as his external conduct consequent upon
it. And therefore it is evident, he
means not only external actions, but the acts of choice themselves, When he
speaks of all free actions, as the PRODUCE of free choice. And this is abundantly evident in what he
says elsewhere (p. 372, 373).
That the acts of the wills of moral
agents are not contingent events, in such a sense, as to be without all
necessity, appears by God’s certain foreknowledge of such events.
In handling this argument, I would in
the first place prove, that God has a certain foreknowledge of the
voluntary acts of moral agents. Secondly,
show the consequence, or how it follows from hence, that the volitions of moral
agents are not contingent, so as to be without necessity of connection and
consequence.
FIRST, I am to prove that God has an
absolute and certain foreknowledge of the free actions of moral agents.
One would think it wholly needless to
enter on such an argument with any that profess themselves Christians, but so
it is. God’s certain foreknowledge of
the free acts of moral agents, is denied by some that pretend to believe the
Scriptures to be the Word of God, and especially of late. I therefore shall consider the evidence of
such a prescience in the Most High, as fully as the designed limits of this
essay will admit; supposing myself
herein to have to do with such as own the truth of the Bible.
ARG.
I. My first argument
shall be taken from God’s prediction of such events. Here I would, in the first place, lay down
these two things as axioms.
1.
If God does not foreknow, he cannot foretell such events; that is, he cannot peremptorily and
certainly foretell them. If God has no
more than an uncertain guess concerning events of this kind, then he can declare
no more than an uncertain guess.
Positively to foretell is to profess to foreknow, or declare positive
foreknowledge.
If God does not certainly foreknow the
future volitions of moral agents, then neither can he certainly foreknow those
events, which are dependent on these volitions. The existence of the one, depending on the
existence of the other, the knowledge of the existence of the one depends on
the knowledge of the existence of the other;
and the one cannot be more certain than the other.
Therefore, how many, how great, and
how extensive soever the consequences of the volitions of moral agents may
be; though they should extend to an
alteration of the state of things through the universe, and should be continued
in a series of successive events to all eternity, and should in the progress of
things branch forth into an infinite number of series, each of them going on in
an endless chain of events. God must be
as ignorant of all these consequences, as he is of the volition whence they
first take their rise. And the whole
state of things depending on them, how important, extensive, and vast soever,
must be hid from him.
These positions being such as, I
suppose, none will deny, I now proceed to observe the following things.
1.
Men’s moral conduct and qualities, their virtues and vices, their
wickedness and good practice, things rewardable and punishable, have often been
foretold by God. — Pharaoh’s
moral conduct, in refusing to obey God’s command, in letting his people go, was
foretold. God says to Moses
(Exo. 3:19), “I am sure that the king
of Egypt will not let you go.”
Here. God professes not only to
guess at, but to know Pharaoh’s future disobedience. In Exo. 7:4, God says,
“but Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you;
that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt,” etc. And chap. 9:30, Moses says to Pharaoh, “as
for thee, and thy servants, I KNOW that ye will not fear the Lord.” See also chap. 11:9. — The moral conduct of Josiah, by
name, in his zealously exerting himself to oppose idolatry, in particular acts,
was foretold above three hundred years before he was born, and the prophecy
sealed by a miracle, and renewed and confirmed by the words of a second
prophet, as what surely would not fail (1 Kin.
13:1-6, 32). This prophecy was
also in effect a prediction of the moral conduct of the people, in upholding
their schismatical and idolatrous worship until that time, and the idolatry of
those priests of the high places, which it is foretold Josiah should offer upon
that altar of Bethel. Micaiah
foretold the foolish and sinful conduct of Ahab, in refusing to hearken to
the word of the Lord by him, and choosing rather to hearken to the false
prophets, in going to RamothGilead to his ruin (1 Kin. 21:20-22).
The moral conduct of Hazael was foretold, in that cruelty he
should be guilty of; on which Hazael
says, (2 Kin. 8:13) “What, is thy
servant a dog, that he should do this thing!” The prophet speaks of the event
as what he knew, and not what he conjectured.
2 Kin. 8:12, “I know the evil
that thou wilt do unto the children of Israel:
Thou wilt dash their children, and rip up their women with child.” The moral conduct of Cyrus is
foretold, long before he had a being, in his mercy to God’ people, and regard
to the true God, in turning the captivity of the Jew’s, and promoting the
building of the temple (Isa. 44:28 and 45:13;
compare 2 Chr. 36:22, 23 and
Ezra 1:1-4). How many instances of the
moral conduct of the kings of the North and South, particular instances
of the wicked behavior of the kings of Syria and Egypt, are foretold in the
11th chapter of Daniel ! Their corruption, violence, robbery, treachery, and
lies. And particularly, how much is
foretold of the horrid wickedness of Antiochus Epiphanes, called there “
a vile person,” instead of Epiphones, or illustrious! In that chapter, and also
in Dan. 8:9, 14, 23, to the end, are
foretold his flattery, deceit, and lies.
His having “his heart set to do mischief,” and set “against the holy
covenant.” His “destroying and treading
under foot the holy people,” in a marvelous manner. His “having indignation against the holy covenant setting his
heart against it, and conspiring against it.”
His “polluting the sanctuary of strength, treading it under foot, taking
away the daily sacrifice, and placing the abomination that maketh desolate;”
his great pride, “magnifying himself against God, and uttering marvelous
blasphemies against Him,” until God in indignation should destroy him. Withal, the moral conduct of the Jews, on
occasion of his persecution, is predicted.
It is foretold, that “he should corrupt many by flatteries,”
(Dan. 11:32-34). But that others should behave with a
glorious constancy and fortitude, in opposition to him (ver. 32).
And that some good men should fall and repent (ver. 35).
Christ foretold Peter’s sin, in denying his Lord, with its circumstances,
in a peremptory manner. And so, that
great sin of Judas, in betraying his master, and its dreadful and
eternal punishment in hell, was foretold in the like positive manner (Matt.
26:21-25, and parallel places in the other Evangelists).
2.
Many events have been foretold by God, which are dependent on the moral
conduct of particular persons, and were accomplished, either by their virtuous
or vicious actions. Thus, the children
of Israel’s going down into Egypt to dwell there, was foretold to Abraham
(Gen. 15), which was brought about by the wickedness of Joseph’s
brethren in selling him, and the wickedness of Joseph’s mistress, and his own
signal virtue in resisting her temptation.
The accomplishment of the thing prefigured in Joseph’s dream, depended
on the same moral conduct. Jotham’s
parable and prophecy (Jdg. 9:15-20),
was accomplished by the wicked conduct of Abimelech, and the men of
Shechem. The prophecies against the
house of Eli (1 Sam. chap. 2 and 3), were accomplished by the wickedness
of Doeg the Elomite, in accusing the priests;
and the great impiety, and extreme cruelty of Saul in destroying
the priests at Nob (1 Sam. 22). Nathan’s
prophecy against David (2 Sam. 12:11, 12) was fulfilled by the horrible
wickedness of Absalom, in rebelling against his father, seeking his life, and
lying with his concubines in the sight of the sun. The prophecy against Solomon (1 Kin. 11:11-13) was fulfilled by Jeroboam’s
rebellion and usurpation, which are spoken of as his wickedness (2 Chr. 13:5, 6, compare verse 18). The prophecy against Jeroboam’s family
(1 Kin. 14) was fulfilled by the
conspiracy, treason, and cruel murders of Bassha, (2 Kin. 15:27 etc.). The predictions of the prophet Jehu against the house of Bassha
(1 Kin. 16 at the beginning), were
fulfilled by the treason and parricide of Zimri (1 Kin. 16:9-13, 20).
3.
How often has God foretold the future moral conduct of nations and
people, of numbers, bodies, and successions of men; with God’s judicial proceedings, and many other events consequent
and dependent on their virtues and vices;
which could not be foreknown, if the volitions of men, wherein they
acted as moral agents, had not been foreseen! The future cruelty of the Egyptians
in oppressing Israel, and God’s judging and punishing them for it, was foretold
long before it came to pass (Gen. 15:13, 14).
The continuance of the iniquity of the Amorites, and the increase
of it until it should be full, and they ripe for destruction, was
foretold above four hundred years before (Gen. 15:16; Acts 7:6, 7). The
prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the land of Judah,
were absolute (2 Kin. 20:17, 18, 19,
chap. 22:15 to the end). It was
foretold in Hezekiah’s time, and was abundantly insisted on in the book
of the prophet Isaiah, who wrote nothing after Hezekiah’s days. It was foretold in Josiah’s time, in the
beginning of a great reformation (2 Kin.
22). And it is manifest by
innumerable things in the predictions of the prophets, relating to this event,
its time, its circumstances, its continuance, and end; the return from the captivity, the
restoration of the temple, city, and land, etc. I say, these show plainly, that the prophecies of this great
event were absolute. And yet
this event was connected with, and dependent on, two things in men’s moral
conduct. First, the injurious
rapine and violence of the king of Babylon and his people, as the efficient
cause; which God often speaks of as
what he highly resented, and would severely punish. Secondly, the final obstinacy of the Jews. That great event is often spoken of as
suspended on this (Jer. 4:1; 5:1; 7:1-7;
11:1-6; 17:24 to the end; Jer. 25:1-7; 26:1-8, 13; and 38:17,
18). Therefore, this destruction and
captivity could not be foreknown, unless such a moral conduct of the Chaldeans
and Jews had been foreknown. And then
it was foretold, that the people should be finally obstinate, to the
utter desolation of the city and land (Isa. 6:9-11; Jer. 1:18, 19;
7:27-29; Eze. 3:7 and 24:13, 14).
The final obstinacy of those Jews who were left in the land of Israel, in their
idolatry and rejection of the true God, was foretold by him, and the prediction
confirmed with an oath (Jer. 44:26, 27).
And God tells the people (Isa. 48:3, 4-8) that he had predicted those
things which should be consequent on their treachery and obstinacy, because he
knew they would be obstinate; and that
he had declared these things beforehand, for their conviction of his being the
only true God, etc.
The destruction of Babylon, with many of the circumstances of it, was
foretold, as the judgment of God for the exceeding pride and haughtiness of the
heads of that monarchy. Nebuchadnezzar
and his successors, and their wickedly destroying other nations, and
particularly for their exalting themselves against the true God and his people,
before any of these monarchs had a being (Isa. 13, 14, and 47; compare Hab. 2:5, to the end, and Jer. 50 and 51). That Babylon’s destruction was to be “a recompense, according to
the works of their own hands,” appears by Jer. 25:14. — The immorality of which the people of Babylon, and particularly
her princes and great men, were guilty, that very night that the city was
destroyed, their reveling and drunkenness at Belshazzar’s idolatrous feast, was
foretold (Jer. 51:39, 57).
The return of the Jews from the
Babylonish captivity is
often very particularly foretold, with many circumstances, and the promises of
it are very peremptory (Jer. 31:35-40, 32:6-15, 32:41-44 and 33:24-26). And the very time of their return was
prefixed (Jer. 25:11, 12 and 29:10, 11;
2 Chr. 36:21; Eze.
4:5, 6 and Dan. 9:2). And yet the prophecies represent their
return as consequent on their repentance, and their repentance itself is very
expressly and particularly foretold (Jer. 29:12, 13, 14; 31:8, 9, 18-31; 33:8; 50:4, 5; Eze.
6:8, 9, 10; 7:16; 14:22, 23 and 20:43, 44).
It was foretold under the Old
Testament, that the Messiah should suffer greatly through the malice and
cruelty of men as is largely and fully set forth, Psa. 22 applied to Christ in
the New Testament (Matt. 27:35, 43;
Luke 23:34; John 19:24; Heb. 2:12).
Likewise, in Psa. 69, which, it is also evident by the New Testament, is
spoken of Christ (John 15:25; 7:5,
etc. and 2:17; Rom. 15:3;
Matt. 27:34, 48; Mark
15:23; John 19:29). The same thing is also foretold, Isa.
53; 50:6 and Mic. 5:1.
This cruelty of men was their sin, and what they acted as moral
agents. It was foretold, that there
should be a union of heathen and Jewish rulers against Christ (Psa. 2:1, 2
compared with Acts 4:25-28). It was
foretold, that the Jew should generally reject and despise the Messiah (Isa.
49:5, 6, 7 and 53:1-3, Psa. 22:6, 7 and 69:4, 8, 19, 20). And it was foretold, that the body of that
nation should be rejected in the Messiah’s days, from being God’s people, for
their obstinacy in sin (Isa. 49:4-7 and 8:14, 15, 16, compared with Rom. 10:19
and Isa. 65 at the beginning, compared with Rom. 10:20, 21). It was foretold, that Christ should be
rejected by the chief priests and rulers among the Jews (Psa. 118:22, compared
with Matt. 21:42; Acts 4:11; 1 Pet.
2:4, 7).
Christ himself foretold his being
delivered into the hands of the elders, chief priests, and scribes, and his
being cruelly treated by them, and condemned to death; and that he by them should be delivered
to the Gentiles: and that he should
be mocked and scourged, and crucified (Matt. 16:21 and
20:17-19; Luke 9:22; John 8:28) and that the people should be
concerned in and consenting to his death (Luke 20:13-18), especially the
inhabitants of Jerusalem (Luke 13:33-35).
He foretold, that the disciples should all be offended because of him,
that night in which he was betrayed, and should forsake him (Matt. 26:31; John 16:32). He foretold, that he should be rejected of that generation, even
the body of the people, and that they should continue obstinate to their ruin
(Matt. 12:45; 21:33-42; and 22:1-7;
Luke 13:16, 21, 24; 17:25; 19:14, 27, 41, 44; 20:13-18; and 23:34-39).
As it was foretold in both the Old
Testament and the New that the Jews should reject the Messiah, so it was
foretold that the Gentiles should receive him, and so be admitted to the
privileges of God’s people; in places
too many to be now particularly mentioned.
It was foretold in the Old Testament, that the Jews should envy the
Gentiles on this account (Deu. 32:21,
compared with Rom. 10:19). Christ
himself often foretold, that the Gentiles would embrace the true religion, and
become his followers and people (Matt. 8:10, 11, 12; 21:41-43; and 22:8, 9,
10; Luke 13:28; 14:16-24;
and 20:16; John 10:16). He also foretold the Jews envy of the
Gentiles on this occasion (Matt. 20:12-16, Luke 15:26 to the end). He foretold, that they should continue in this
opposition and envy, and should manifest it in the cruel persecutions of his
followers, to their utter destruction (Matt. 21:33-42; 22:6;
and 23:34-39; Luke
11:49-51). The obstinacy of the Jews is
also foretold (Acts 22:18). Christ
often foretold the great persecutions his followers should meet with, both from
Jews and Gentiles (Matt. 10:16-18, 21, 22, 34-36; and 24:9; Mark 13:9; Luke 10:3;
12:11, 49-53; and 21:12, 16,
17; John 15:18-21; and 16:1-4, 20, 21, 22, 23). He foretold the martyrdom of particular
persons (Matt. 20:23; John 13:36; and 21:18, 19, 22). He foretold the great success of the gospel
in the city of Samaria, as near approaching, which afterwards was fulfilled by
the preaching of Philip (John 4:35-38).
He foretold the rising of many deceivers after his departure (Matt.
24:4, 5, 11), and the apostasy of many of his professed followers (Matt. 24:10,
12).
The persecutions, which the apostle
Paul was to meet with in the world, were foretold (Acts 9:16; 20:23, and 21:11). The apostle says, to the Christian Ephesians (Acts 20:29, 30), “I
know, that after my departure shall grievous wolves enter in among you, not
sparing the flock; also of your own
selves shall men arise, speaking perverse things, to draw away disciples after
them.” The apostle says, he knew
this: but he did not know it, if
God did not know the future actions of moral agents.
4.
Unless God foreknows the future acts of moral agents, all the prophecies
we have in Scripture concerning the great anti-Christian apostasy, the rise,
reign, wicked qualities, and deeds of “the man of sin,” his instruments and
adherents; the extent and long
continuance of his dominion, his influence on the minds of princes and others,
to corrupt them, and draw them away to idolatry, and other foul vices; his great and cruel persecutions; the behavior of the saints under these great
temptations, etc. etc. I say, unless the volitions of moral agents
are foreseen, all these prophecies are uttered without knowing the things
foretold.
The predictions relating to this great
apostasy are all of a moral nature, relating to men’s virtues and vices, and
their exercises, fruits, and consequences, and events depending on them. [They] are very particular; and most of them often repeated, with many
precise characteristics, descriptions, and limitations of qualities, conduct,
influence, effects, extent, duration, periods, circumstances, final issue,
etc. which it would be tedious to
mention particularly. And to suppose,
that all these are predicted by God, without any certain knowledge of the
future moral behavior of free agents, would be to the utmost degree absurd.
5.
Unless God foreknows the future acts of men’s wills, and their behavior
as moral agents, all those great things which are foretold both in the Old
Testament and the New, concerning the erection, establishment, and universal
extent of the kingdom of the Messiah, were predicted and promised
while God was in ignorance whether any of these things would come to pass or
no, and did but guess at them. For that
kingdom is not of this world. It does
not consist in things external, but is within men, and consists in the dominion
of virtue in their hearts, in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy
Ghost; and in these things made manifest
in practice, to the praise and glory of God.
The Messiah came “to save men from their sins, and deliver them from
their spiritual enemies, that they might serve him in righteousness and
holiness before him. He gave himself
for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a
peculiar people, zealous of good works.”
And therefore his success consists in gaining men’s hearts to virtue, in
their being made God’s willing people in the day of his power. His conquest of his enemies consists in his
victory over men’s corruptions and vices.
And such a victory, and such a dominion, is often expressly foretold,
that his kingdom shall fill the earth;
that all people, nations, and languages should serve and obey him. And so that all nations should go up to the
mountain of the house of the Lord, that he might teach them his ways, and that
they might walk in his paths. And that
all men should be drawn to Christ, and the earth be full of the knowledge of
the Lord (true virtue and religion) as the waters cover the seas. [And] that God’s laws should be put into
men’s inward parts, and written in their hearts; and that God’s people should be all righteous, etc. etc.
A very great part of the Old Testament
prophecies is taken up in such predictions as these. — And here I would observe, that the prophecies of the universal
prevalence of the kingdom of the Messiah, and true religion of Jesus Christ,
are delivered in the most peremptory manner, and confirmed by the oath of God,
Isa. 45:22, to the end, “Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the
earth; for I am God, and there is none
else. I have SWORN by Myself, the word
is gone out of my mouth in righteousness, and shall not return, that unto Me
every knee shall bow, and every tongue shall swear. SURELY, shall one say, in the Lord have I righteousness and
strength: even to him shall men come,”
etc. But, here, this peremptory
declaration and great oath of the Most High, are delivered with such mighty
solemnity, respecting things which God did not know, if he did not certainly
foresee the volitions of moral agents.
And all the predictions of Christ and
his apostles, to the like purpose, must be without knowledge: as those of our Savior comparing the kingdom
of God to a grain of mustard seed, growing exceeding great, from a small
beginning: and to leaven, hid in three
measures of meal, until the whole was leavened, etc. — And the prophecies in the epistles concerning the restoration
of the Jewish nation to the true church of God, and bringing in the fullness of
the Gentiles and the prophecies in all the Revelation concerning the
glorious change in the moral state of the world of mankind, attending the
destruction of AntiChrist, “the kingdoms of the world becoming the kingdoms of
our Lord and of his Christ;” and its being granted to the church to be “arrayed
in that fine linen, white and clean, which is the righteousness of saints,”
etc.
Corol. 1. Hence that great promise and oath of God to
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so much celebrated in Scripture, both in the Old
Testament and the New, namely, “That in their seed all the nations and families
of the earth should be blessed,” must be made on uncertainties, if God does not
certainly foreknow the volitions of moral agents. For the fulfillment of this promise consists in that success of
Christ in the work of redemption, and that setting up of his spiritual kingdom
over the nations of the world, which has been spoken of. Men are “blessed in Christ” no otherwise
than as they are brought to acknowledge him, trust in him, love and serve him,
as is represented and predicted in Psa 72:11.
“All kings shall fall down before him;
all nations shall serve him.”
With verse 17. “Men shall be
blessed in him; all nations shall call
him blessed.” This oath to Jacob and
Abraham is fulfilled in subduing men’s iniquities; as is implied in that of the prophet Micah, chap. 7:19, 20.
Corol. 2. Hence also it appears, that the first gospel
promise that ever was made to mankind, that great prediction of the salvation
of the Messiah, and his victory over Satan, made to our first parents (Gen.
3:15). If there be no certain
prescience of the volitions of moral agents must have no better foundation than
conjecture. For Christ’s victory over
Satan consists in men’s being saved from sin, and in the victory of virtue and
holiness over that vice and wickedness which Satan by his temptations has
introduced, and wherein his kingdom consists.
6.
If it be so, that God has not a prescience of the future actions of moral
agents, it will follow, that the prophecies of Scripture in general are
without foreknowledge. For Scripture
prophecies, almost all of them, if not universally, are either predictions of
the actions and behavior of moral agents, or of events depending on them, or
some way connected with them. Judicial
dispensations, judgments on men for their wickedness, or rewards of virtue and
righteousness, remarkable manifestations of favor to the righteous, or
manifestations of sovereign mercy to sinners, forgiving their iniquities, and
magnifying the riches of divine grace;
or dispensations of providence, in some respect or other, relating to
the conduct of the subjects of God’s moral government, wisely adapted thereto; either providing for what should be in a future
state of things, through the volitions and voluntary actions of moral agents,
or consequent upon them, and regulated and ordered according to them. So that all events that are foretold, are
either moral events, or others which are connected with and accommodated to
them.
That the predictions of Scripture in
general must be without knowledge, if God does not foresee the volitions of
men, will further appear, if it be considered, that almost all events belonging
to the future state of the world of mankind, the changes and revolutions which
come to pass in empires, kingdoms, and nations, and all societies, depend, in
ways innumerable, on the acts of men’s wills;
yea, on an innumerable multitude of millions of volitions. Such is the state and course of things in
the world of mankind, that one single event, which appears in itself exceeding
inconsiderable, may, in the progress and series of things, occasion a
succession of the greatest and most important and extensive events; causing the state of mankind to be vastly
different from what it would otherwise have been, for all succeeding
generations.
For instance, the coming into
existence of those particular men, who have been the great conquerors of the
world, which, under God, have had the main hand in all the consequent state of
the world, in all after-ages; such as
Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander, Pompey, Julius Caesar, etc. undoubtedly depended on many millions of
acts of the will, in their parents. And
perhaps most of these volitions depended on millions of volitions in their
contemporaries of the same generation;
and most of these on millions of millions of volitions in preceding
generations. — As we go back, still the
number of volitions, which were some way the occasion of the event, multiply as
the branches of a river, until they come at last, as it were, to an infinite
number. This will not seem strange to
anyone who well considers the matter;
if we recollect what philosophers tell us of the innumerable multitudes
of those things which are the principia, or stamina vitae,
concerned in generation; the animalcula
in semine masculo, and the ova in the womb of the female; the impregnation or animating of one of
these in distinction from all the rest, must depend on things infinitely minute
relating to the time and circumstances of the act of the parents, the state of
their bodies, etc. which must depend on
innumerable foregoing circumstances and occurrences; which must depend, infinite ways, on foregoing acts of their
wills; which are occasioned by
innumerable things that happen in the course of their lives, in which their own
and their neighbor’s behavior must have a hand, an infinite number of
ways. And as the volitions of others
must be so many ways concerned in the conception and birth of such men; so, no less, in their preservation, and
circumstances of life, their particular determinations and actions, on which
the great revolutions they were the occasions of, depended. As, for instance, when the conspirators in
Persia, against the Magi, were consulting about a succession to the empire, it
came into the mind of one of them, to propose, that he whose horse neighed
first, when they came together the next morning, should be king. Now, such a thing coming into his mind,
might depend on innumerable incidents, wherein the volitions of mankind had
been concerned. But, in consequence of
this accident, Darius, the son of Hystaspes, was king. And if this had not been, probably his
successor would not have been the same, and all the circumstances of the
Persian empire might have been far otherwise.
Then perhaps Alexander might never have conquered that empire; and then probably the circumstances of the
world in all succeeding ages, might have been vastly otherwise. I might further instance in many other
occurrences; such as those on which
depended Alexander’s preservation, in the many critical junctures of his life,
wherein a small trifle would have turned the scale against him; and the preservation and success of the
Roman people, in the infancy of their kingdom and commonwealth, and
afterwards; upon which all the
succeeding changes in their state, and the mighty revolutions that afterwards
came to pass in the habitable world, depended.
But these hints may be sufficient for every discerning considerate
person, to convince him, that the whole state of the world of mankind, in all
ages, and the very being of every person who has ever lived in it, in every
age, since the times of the ancient prophets, has depended on more volitions,
or acts of the wills of men, than there are sands on the seashore.
And therefore, unless God does most
exactly and perfectly foresee the future acts of men’s wills, all the
predictions which he ever uttered concerning David, Hezekiah, Josiah,
Nebuchadnezzar, Cyrus, Alexander;
concerning the four monarchies, and the revolutions in them; and concerning all the wars, commotion,
victories, prosperity, and calamities, of any kingdoms, nations, or communities
in the world, have all been without knowledge.
So that, according to this notion, God
not foreseeing the volitions and free actions of men, he could foresee nothing
appertaining to the state of the world of mankind in future ages. Not so much as the being of one person that
should live in it. And [he] could foreknow
no events, but only such as he would bring to pass himself by the extraordinary
interposition of his immediate power.
Or things which should come to pass in the natural material world, by
the laws of motion, and course of nature, wherein that is independent on the
actions or works of mankind. That is,
as he might, like a very able mathematician and astronomer, with great
exactness calculate the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the greater
wheels of the machine of the external creation.
And if we closely consider the matter,
there will appear reason to convince us, that he could not, with any absolute
certainty, foresee even these. As to
the first, namely, things done by the immediate and extraordinary
interposition of God’s power, these cannot be foreseen, unless it can be
foreseen when there shall be occasion for such extraordinary
interposition. And that cannot be
foreseen, unless the state of the moral world can be foreseen. For whenever God thus interposes, it is with
regard to the state of the moral world, requiring such divine
interposition. Thus God could not
certainly foresee the universal deluge, the calling of Abraham, the destruction
of Sodom and Gomorrah, the plagues on Egypt, and Israel’s redemption out of it,
the expelling of the seven nations of Canaan, and the bringing Israel into that
land; for these all are represented as
connected with things belonging to the state of the moral world. Nor can God foreknow the most proper and
convenient time of the day of judgment and general conflagration; for that chiefly depends on the course and
state of things in the moral world.
Nor, secondly, can we on this
supposition reasonably think, that God can certainly foresee what things shall
come to pass, in the course of things, in the natural and material world, even
those which in an ordinary state of things might be calculated by a good
astronomer. For the moral world is the
end of the natural world; and the
course of things in the former, is undoubtedly subordinate to God’s designs with
respect to the latter. Therefore he has
seen [the] cause, regarding the state of things in the moral world. Extraordinarily to interpose, to interrupt,
and lay an arrest on the course of things in the natural world. And unless he can foresee the volition of
men, and so know something of the future state of the moral world, he cannot
know but that he may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner,
as ever he had. Nor can he foresee how,
or when, he shall have occasion thus to interpose.
Corol. 1. It appears from the things observed, that
unless God foresees the volition of moral agents, that cannot be true which is
observed by the apostle James (Acts 15:18), “Known unto God are all his works
from the beginning of the world.”
Corol. 2. It appears, that unless God foreknows the
volition of moral agents, all the prophecies of Scripture have no better
foundation than mere conjecture. And that,
in most instances, a conjecture which most have the utmost uncertainty,
depending on an innumerable multitude of volitions, which are all, even to God,
uncertain events. However, these
prophecies are delivered as absolute predictions, and very many of them in the
most positive manner, with asseverations;
and some of them with the most solemn oaths.
Corol. 3. It also follows, that if this notion of
God’s ignorance of future volition be true, in vain did Christ say, after
uttering many great and important predictions, depending on men’s moral actions
(Matt. 24:35), “Heaven and earth shall pass away; but my words shall not pass away.”
Corol. 4. From the same notion of God’s ignorance, it
would follow, that in vain has he himself often spoken of the predictions of
his Word, as evidences of foreknowledge;
of that which is his prerogative as GOD, and his peculiar glory, greatly
distinguishing him from all other beings (as in Isa. 41:22-26, Isa. 43:9, 10,
Isa. 44:8, Isa. 45:21, Isa. 46:10 and 48:14).
ARG.
II. If God does not foreknow the
volitions of moral agents, then he did not foreknow the fall of man, nor
of angels, and so could not foreknow the great things which are consequent
on these events. Such as his sending
his Son into the world to die for sinners, and all things pertaining to the
great work of redemption; all the
things which were done for four thousand years before Christ came, to prepare
the way for it; and the incarnation,
life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Christ; setting him at the head of the universe as King of heaven and
earth, angels and men; and setting up
his church and kingdom in this world, and appointing him the Judge of the
world; and all that Satan should do in
the world in opposition to the kingdom of Christ: and the great transactions of the day of judgment, etc. And if God was thus ignorant, the following
Scriptures, and others like them, must be without any meaning, or contrary to
truth. (Eph. 1:4) “According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation
of the world.” (1 Pet. 1:20) “Who verily was foreordained before
the foundation of the world.” (2
Tim. 1:9) “who hath saved us, and
called us with an holy calling; not
according to our works, but according to his own purpose, and grace, which was
given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.” So (Eph. 3:11) speaking
of the wisdom of God in the work of redemption, “according to the eternal
purpose which he purposed in Christ Jesus.”
(Tit. 1:2) “In hope of eternal
life, which God that cannot lie, promised before the world began.” (Rom. 8:29) “Whom he did foreknow, them he
also did predestinate,” etc. (1
Pet. 1:2) “Elect, according to the
foreknowledge of God the Father.”
If God did not foreknow the fall of
man, nor the redemption by Jesus Christ, nor the volitions of man since the
fall, then he did not foreknow the saints in any sense. Neither as particular persons, nor as
societies or nations; either by
election, or by mere foresight of their virtue or good works; or any foresight of anything about them relating
to their salvation; or any benefit they
have by Christ, or any manner of concern of theirs with a Redeemer.
ARG.
III. On the supposition of God’s
ignorance of the future volitions of free agents, it will follow, that God must
in many cases truly repent what he has done, so as properly to wish he
had done otherwise. By reason that the event
of things in those affairs which are most important, viz. the affairs of his moral kingdom, being
uncertain and contingent, often happens quite otherwise than he was before
aware of. And there would be reason to
understand that, in the most literal sense (Gen. 6:6), “It repented the Lord,
that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart,” (and 1
Sam. 15:11) contrary to Num. 23:19,
“God is not the son of Man, that he should repent;” and 1 Sam. 15:29, “Also the
strength of Israel will not lie, nor repent;
for he is not a man that he should repent.” Yea, from this notion it would follow, that God is liable to
repent and be grieved at his heart, in a literal sense, continually, and
[he] is always exposed to an infinite number of real disappointments in
governing the world, and to manifold, constant, great perplexity and
vexation. But this is not very
consistent with his title of “God over all, blessed for evermore;” which
represents him as possessed of perfect, constant, and uninterrupted
tranquillity and felicity, as God over the universe, and in his management of
the affairs of the world, as supreme and universal ruler (See Rom. 1:25; 9:5;
2 Cor. 11:31; 1 Tim. 6:15).
ARG.
IV. It will also follow from
this notion, that as God is liable to be continually repenting of what he has
done. So he must be exposed to be
constantly changing his mind and intentions, as to his future
conduct; altering his measures,
relinquishing his old designs, and forming new schemes and projects. For his purposes, even as to the main parts
of his scheme, such as belong to the state of his moral kingdom, must be always
liable to be broken, through want of foresight. And he must be continually putting his system to rights, as it
gets out of order, through the contingence of the actions of moral agents. He must be a Being, who, instead of being
absolutely immutable, must necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most
numerous acts of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being whatsoever. For this plain reason, that his vastly
extensive charge comprehends an infinitely greater number of those things which
are to him, contingent and uncertain.
In such a situation, he must have little else to do, but to mend broken
links as well as he can, and be rectifying his disjointed frame and disordered
movements in the best manner the case will allow. The Supreme Lord of all things must needs be under great and
miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and of which
he has the care, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief
importance, which hereafter shall befall his system, for which, if he did but
know, he might make seasonable provision.
In many cases, there may be very great necessity that he should make
provision, in the manner of his ordering and disposing things, for some great
events which are to happen, of vast and extensive influence, and endless
consequence to the universe; which he
may see afterwards, when it is too late, and may wish in vain that he had known
before, that he might have ordered his affairs accordingly. And it is in the power of man, on these
principles, by his devices, purposes, and actions, thus to disappoint God,
break his measures, make him continually change his mind, subject him to
vexation, and bring him into confusion.
But how do these things consist with
reason, or with the Word of God? Which represents, that all God’s works,
all that he has ever to do, the whole scheme and series of his operations, are from
the beginning perfectly in his view;
and declares, that whatever devices and designs are in the hearts of
men, “the counsel of the Lord shall stand, and the thoughts of his heart to all
generations,” (Pro. 19:21, Psa. 33:10,
11). And a “that which the Lord of hosts
hath purposed, none shall disannul,” (Isa. 14:27). And that he cannot be frustrated in one design or thought
(Job 42:2). And “that which God doth,
it shall be forever, that nothing can be put to it, or taken from it,”
(Ecc. 3:14). The stability and perpetuity of God’s counsels are expressly
spoken of as connected with his foreknowledge (Isa. 46:10), “Declaring the end
from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet
done; saying, My counsel shall stand,
and I will do my pleasure.” — And how
are these things consistent with what the Scripture says of God’s immutability,
which represents him as “without variableness, or shadow of turning;” and
speaks of him, most particularly, as unchangeable with regard to his purposes
(Mal. 3:6), “I am the Lord; I change not; therefore ye sons of Jacob are not consumed.” (Exo.
3:14), “I AM THAT I AM.” (Job
23:13, 14), “He is in one mind; and who
can turn him? And what his soul desireth, even that he doth: for he performeth the thing that is
appointed for me.”
ARG.
V. If this notion of God’s
ignorance of future volitions of moral agents be thoroughly considered in its
consequences, it will appear to follow from it, that God, after he had made the
world, was liable to be wholly frustrated of his end in the creation of
it. And so has been, in like manner,
liable to be frustrated of his end in all the great works he had wrought. It is manifest, the moral world is the end of
the natural. The rest of the creation
is but a house which God has built, with furniture, for moral agents. And the good or bad state of the moral world
depends on the improvement they make of their natural agency, and so depends on
their volitions. And therefore, if
these cannot be foreseen by God, because they are contingent, and subject to no
kind of necessity, then the affairs of the moral world are liable to go wrong,
to any assignable degree; yea, liable
to be utterly ruined. As on this
scheme, it may well be supposed to be literally said, when mankind, by the
abuse of their moral agency, became very corrupt before the flood, “that the
Lord repented that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his
heart;” so, when he made the universe, he did not know but that he might be so
disappointed in it, that it might grieve him at his heart that he had made
it. It actually proved, that all
mankind became sinful, and a very great part of the angels apostatized, and how
could God know before, that all of them would not? And how could God know but
that all mankind, notwithstanding means used to reclaim them, being still left
to the freedom of their own will, would continue in their apostasy, and grow
worse and worse, as they of the old world before the flood did?
According to the scheme I am
endeavoring to confute, the fall of neither men nor angels could be foreseen,
and God must be greatly disappointed in these events. And so the grand contrivance for our redemption, and destroying
the works of the devil, by the Messiah, and all the great things God has done in
the prosecution of these designs, must be only the fruits of his own
disappointment. Contrivances to mend,
as well as he could, his system, which originally was all very good, and
perfectly beautiful, but was broken and confounded by the free will of angels
and men. And still he must be liable to
be totally disappointed a second time.
He could not know, that he should have his desired success, in the
incarnation, life, death, resurrection, and exaltation of his only begotten
Son, and other great works accomplished to restore the state of things. He could not know, after all, whether there
would actually be any tolerable measure of restoration, for this depended on
the free will of man. There has been a
general great apostasy of almost all the Christian world, to that which was
worse than heathenism, which continued for many ages. And how could God, without foreseeing men’s volitions, know
whether ever Christendom would return from this apostasy? And which way would
he foretell how soon it would begin? The apostle says, it began to work in his
time; and how could it be known how far
it would proceed in that age? Yea, how could it be known that the gospel which
was not effectual for the reformation of the Jews, would ever be effectual for
the turning of the heathen nations from their heathen apostasy, which they had
been confirmed in for so many ages?
It is represented often in Scripture,
that God, who made the world for himself, and created it for his pleasure,
would infallibly obtain his end in the creation, and in all his works. That as all things are of him, so
they would all be to him, and that in the final issue of things, it
would appear that he is “the first, and the last.” (Rev. 21:6) “And he said
unto me, It is done. I am Alpha and
Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last.” But, these things are not consistent with
God’s liability to be disappointed in all his works, nor indeed, with his
failing of his end in anything that he has undertaken.
Having proved, that GOD has a certain
and infallible prescience of the voluntary acts of moral agents, I come now, in
the second place, to show the consequence; how it follows from hence, that these events are necessary,
with a necessity of connection or consequence.
The chief Arminian divines, so far as
I have had opportunity to observe, deny this consequence; and affirm, that if such foreknowledge be
allowed, it is no evidence of any necessity of the event foreknown. Now I desire, that this matter may be
particularly and thoroughly inquired into.
I cannot but think that on particular and full consideration, it may be
perfectly determined, whether it be indeed so or not.
In order to a proper consideration of
this matter, I would observe the following things.
I.
It is very evident, that, with regard to a thing whose existence is
infallibly and indissolubly connected with something, which already has, or has
had existence, the existence of that thing is necessary. Here may be noted the following particulars:
1.
I observed before, in explaining the nature of necessity, that in things
which are past, their past existence is now necessary. Having already made sure of existence,
it is too late for any possibility of alteration in that respect, it is now impossible
that it should be otherwise than true, that the thing has existed.
2.
If there be any such thing as a divine foreknowledge of the volitions of
free agents, that foreknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which already has,
and long ago had existence. And
now its existence is necessary; it is
now utterly impossible to be otherwise, than that this foreknowledge should be
or should have been.
3.
It is also very manifest, that those things which are indissolubly
connected with other things that are necessary, are themselves necessary. As that proposition whose truth is
necessarily connected with another proposition, which is necessarily true, is
itself necessarily true. To say
otherwise would be a contradiction: it
would be in effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble, and yet was
not so, but might be broken. If that,
the existence of which is indissolubly connected with something whose existence
is now necessary, is itself not necessary, then it may possibly not exist,
notwithstanding that indissoluble connection of its existence. — Whether the absurdity be not glaring, let
the reader judge.
4.
It is no less evident, that if there be a full, certain, and infallible
foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of moral agents, then
there is a certain, infallible, and indissoluble connection between those
events and that foreknowledge; and that
therefore, by the preceding observations, those events are necessary events; being infallibly and indissolubly connected
with that, whose existence already is, and so is now necessary, and cannot but
have been.
To say, the foreknowledge is certain
and infallible, and yet the connection of the event with that foreknowledge is
dissoluble and fallible, is very absurd.
To affirm it, would be the same thing as to affirm, that there is no
necessary connection between a proposition being infallibly known to be true,
and its being true indeed. So that it
is perfectly demonstrable, that if there be any infallible knowledge of future
volitions, the event is necessary; or,
in other words, that it is impossible but the event should come to
pass. For if it be not impossible but
that it may be otherwise, then it is not impossible but that the proposition
which affirms its future coming to pass, may not now be true. There is this absurdity in it, that it is
not impossible, but that there now should be no truth in that proposition,
which is now infallibly known to be true.
II.
That no future event can be certainly foreknown, whose existence is contingent,
and without all necessity, may be proved thus;
it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to any intellect
without evidence. To suppose
otherwise, implies a contradiction:
because for a thing to be certainly known to any understanding, is for
it to be evident to that understanding.
For a thing to be evident to any understanding is the same thing, as for
that understanding to see evidence of it. But no understanding, created or uncreated, can see evidence
where there is none; for that is the
same thing, as to see that to be which is not.
And therefore, if there be any truth which is absolutely without
evidence, that truth is absolutely unknowable, insomuch that it implies a
contradiction to suppose that it is known.
But if there be any future event,
whose existence is contingent, without all necessity, the future existence of
the event is absolutely without evidence. If there be any evidence of it, it must be one of these two
sorts, either self-evidence or proof; an evident thing must be either evident in itself; or evident in something else: that is, evident by connection
with something else. But a future
thing, whose existence is without all necessity, can have neither of these
sorts of evidence. It cannot be self-evident: for if it be, it may be now known, by
what is now to be seen in the thing itself;
its present existence, or the necessity of its nature: but both these are contrary to the supposition. It is supposed, both that the thing has no
present existence to be seen; and also
that it is not of such a nature as to be necessarily existent for the
future: so that its future existence is
not self-evident. Secondly,
neither is there any proof, or evidence in anything else, or
evidence of connection with something else that is evident; for this is also contrary to the
supposition. It is supposed that there
is now nothing existent, with which the future existence of the contingent
event is connected. For such a
connection destroys its contingence, and supposes necessity. Thus, it is demonstrated that there is, in
the nature of things, absolutely no evidence at all of the future existence of
that event, which is contingent, without all necessity (if any such event there
be), neither self-evidence nor proof.
Therefore the thing in reality is not evident; and so cannot be seen to be evident, or, which is the same thing,
cannot be known.
Let us consider this in an
example. Suppose that five thousand
seven hundred and sixty years ago, there was no other being but the Divine
Being. And then this world, or some
particular body or spirit, all at once starts out of nothing into being, and
takes on itself a particular nature and form.
All in absolute contingence, without any concern of God, or any
other cause, in the matter; without any
manner of ground or reason of its existence, or any dependence upon, or
connection at all with anything foregoing.
I say that if this be supposed, there was no evidence of that event
beforehand, and there was no evidence of it to be seen in the thing
itself. For the thing itself as yet
was not, and there was no evidence of it to be seen in anything else; for evidence in something else,
is connection with something else, but such connection is contrary to
the supposition. There was no evidence
before that this thing would happen;
for by the supposition, there was no reason why it should happen,
rather than something else, or rather than nothing. And if so, then all things before were exactly equal, and the
same, with respect to that and other possible things; there was no preponderation, no superior weight or value; and therefore, nothing that could be of
weight or value to determine any understanding. The thing was absolutely without evidence, and absolutely
unknowable. An increase of
understanding, or of the capacity of discerning, has no tendency, and makes no
advance, inwards discerning any signs or evidences of it, let it be increased
never so much; yea, if it be increased
infinitely. The increase of the
strength of sight may have a tendency to enable to discern the evidence which
is far off, and very much hid, and deeply involved in clouds and darkness; but it has no tendency to enable to discern
evidence where there is none. If the
sight be infinitely strong, and the capacity of discerning infinitely great, it
will enable to see all that there is, to see it perfectly, and with ease. Yet it has no tendency at all to enable a
being to discern that evidence which is not;
but on the contrary, it has a tendency to enable to discern with great
certainty that there is none.
III.
To suppose the future volitions of moral agents not to be necessary
events; or, which is the same thing,
events which it is not impossible but that they may not come to pass; and yet to suppose that God certainly
foreknows them, and knows all things;
is to suppose God’s knowledge to be inconsistent with itself. For to say, that God certainly, and without
all conjecture, knows that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time
he knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is to suppose
his knowledge inconsistent with itself;
or that one thing he knows, is utterly inconsistent with another thing
he knows. It is the same as to say he
now knows a proposition to be of certain infallible truth, which he knows to be
of contingent uncertain truth. If a
future volition is so without all necessity, that nothing hinders but it may
not be, then the proposition, which asserts its future existence, is so
uncertain, that nothing hinders, but that the truth of it may entirely
fail. And if God knows all things, he
knows this proposition to be thus uncertain.
And that, is inconsistent with his knowing that it is infallibly
true; and so inconsistent with his
infallibly knowing that it is true. If
the thing be indeed contingent, God views it so, and judges it to be contingent
if he views things as they are. If the
event be not necessary, then it is possible it may never be. And if it be possible it may never be, God
knows it may possibly never be; and
that is to know that the proposition, which affirms its existence, may possibly
not be true. And that is to know that
the truth of it is uncertain; which
surely is inconsistent with his knowing it as a certain truth. If volitions are in themselves contingent
events, without all necessity, then it is no argument of perfection of
knowledge in any being to determine peremptorily that they will be; but on the contrary, an argument of
ignorance and mistake. Because it would
argue, that he supposes that proposition to be certain, which in its own
nature, and all things considered, is uncertain and contingent. To say, in such a case, that God may have
ways of knowing contingent events which we cannot conceive of, is
ridiculous; as much so, as to say, that
God may know contradictions to be true, for ought we know. Or that he may know a thing to be certain,
and at the same time know it not to be certain, though we cannot conceive how; because he has ways of knowing which we
cannot comprehend.
Corol. 1. From what has been observed it is evident,
that the absolute decrees of God are no more inconsistent with human
liberty on account of any necessity of the event, which follows from such
decrees, than the absolute foreknowledge of God. Because the connection between the event and
certain foreknowledge, is as infallible and indissoluble, as between the event
and an absolute decree. That is, it is
no more impossible, that the event and decree should not agree together, than
that the event and absolute knowledge should disagree. The connection between the event and
foreknowledge is absolutely perfect, by the supposition: because it is supposed, that the certainty
and infallibility of the knowledge is absolutely perfect. And it being so, the certainty cannot be
increased; and therefore the
connection, between the knowledge and thing known, cannot be increased; so that if a decree be added to the
foreknowledge, it does not at all increase the connection, or make it more
infallible and indissoluble. If it were
not so, the certainty of knowledge might be increased by the addition of a
decree; which is contrary to the
supposition, which is, that the knowledge is absolutely perfect, or perfect to
the highest possible degree.
There is as much impossibility but
that the things which are infallibly foreknown, should be, or, which is the
same thing, as great a necessity of their future existence, as if the event
were already written down, and was known and read by all mankind, through all
preceding ages. And there was the most
indissoluble and perfect connection possible between the writing and the thing
written. In such a case, it would be as
impossible the event should fail of existence, as if it had existed
already; and a decree cannot make an
event surer or more necessary than this.
And therefore, if there be any such
foreknowledge, as it has been proved there is, then necessity of connection and
consequence is not at all inconsistent with any liberty which man, or any other
creature, enjoys. And from hence it may
be inferred, that absolute decrees, which do not at all increase the necessity,
are not inconsistent with the liberty which man enjoys, on any such account, as
that they make the event decreed necessary, and render it utterly impossible but
that it should come to pass. Therefore,
if absolute decrees are inconsistent with man’s liberty as a moral agent, or
his liberty in a state of probation, or any liberty whatsoever that he enjoys,
it is not on account of any necessity which absolute decrees infer.
Dr. Whitby supposes there is a great
difference between God’s foreknowledge, and his decrees, with regard to
necessity of future events. In his
Discourse on the five points (p. 474, etc.), he says, God’s prescience has no
influence at all on our actions. —
Should God, says he, by immediate revelation, give me the knowledge of the
event of any man’s state or actions, would my knowledge of them have any
influence upon his actions? Surely none at all. — Our knowledge does not affect the things we know, to make them
more certain, or more future, than they could be without it. Now, foreknowledge in God is knowledge. As therefore knowledge has no influence on
things that are, so neither has foreknowledge on things that shall be. Consequently, the foreknowledge of any
action that would be otherwise free cannot alter or diminish that freedom. Whereas God’s decree of election is powerful
and active, and comprehends the preparation and exhibition of such means, as
shall unfrustrably produce the end. —
Hence God’s prescience renders no actions necessary.” And to this purpose (p. 473), he cites Origen, where he says,
“God’s prescience is not the cause of things future, but their being future is
the cause of God’s prescience that they will be”. And Le Blanc, where he says, “This is the truest resolution of
this difficulty, that prescience is not the cause that things are future; but their being future is the cause they are
foreseen”. In like manner, Dr. Clark,
in his Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God (p. 95-99), and
the author of The Freedom of the Will, in God and Creation, speaking to
the like purpose with Dr. Whitby, represents “foreknowledge as having no more
influence on things known, to make them necessary, than after-knowledge.” or to that purpose.
To all which I would say; that what is said about knowledge, its not
having influence on the thing known to make it necessary, is nothing to the
purpose, nor does it in the least affect the foregoing reasoning. Whether prescience be the thing that makes
event necessary or no, it alters not the case.
Infallible foreknowledge may prove the necessity of the event
foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes the necessity.
[This
distinction is of great importance in the present controversy; and the want of attending to the true ground
on which it stands, has been, we presume, the principal cause of Dr. Whitby’s
objections, and those of most, if not all, other Arminian writers. They seem to consider, in this argument, no
other necessity but the decretive, as maintained by their opponents; and therefore infer, that to allow any kind
of necessity, is the same as to allow an infallible decree. From this view the transition is easy to
another conclusion, viz. that if
anything is foreknown because it is decreed, everything is foreknown on the
same ground, or for the same reason.
And then, this proving too much:
the decretive appointment of all the evil in the universe, which they
are sure is incompatible with the divine character, and therefore
impossible: they reject the whole
doctrine of necessity as a ground of foreknowledge; and suppose that, though they cannot clearly disprove what is
advanced against them, they infer that there is somehow a sophism in the
reasoning of their opponents, or some false principle assumed, were they but
happy enough to detect it.
But
our author, in this reasoning, does not maintain, that the connection by which
every event is evidently certain, and therefore necessary, is so because
decreed. The truth is, that some events
are foreknown to be certain because foreordained; and others, because of the tendency there is in the nature of the
things themselves. Should any, in the
way of objection, assert, that the nature of things is itself derived from the
divine will, or decree; we apprehend
there is no evidence to support such an assertion. For instance. is it owing
to a decree that the nature of any created being is dependent on the first
cause? That a creature, however exalted, is not infinite? That any relation
should subsist between the Creator and a creature? Or that, if equal quantities
be taken from equal quantities, the remainders will be equal? Is there any
room, in thought, for a supposition of any decree in the case. Nay more, does it appear possible for a
decree to have made such things otherwise.
Let
it be observed, however, that God is the Almighty Sovereign over nature, not
indeed so far as to alter the nature of things, which in reality is no object
of power, any more than to make spirit to be the same thing as matter, and vice
versa, or the working of contradictions is an object of power, but by the
position of antecedents, and establishing premises. To illustrate this, let it be supposed, if God create a world,
that world must depend upon him, as a necessary consequence. To deny this, is to deny the nature and
identity of things. For what is to
create, but for an independent cause to impart ad extra a dependent existence?
So that to deny dependence, is to deny creation. But though the consequence be necessary, if the antecedent be
established; yet the antecedent itself
is not necessary, except from decree;
for there is not, in the nature of things, any antecedent necessity that
a world be created. That is, to suppose
its non-existence implies no contradiction, it being evidently the effect of
sovereign pleasure. Hence to deny the
consequence, on supposition of the antecedent, is to deny the nature of things,
and to assert a contradiction, though the antecedent itself be not necessary. And hence also, in the instance now
specified among others innumerable, the antecedent is an object of decree, but
not the consequence. It is absurd to
say , that God decreed the dependence of the world upon himself, as it is to
say, he decreed that two and two shall be equal to four, rather than to five.
These
remarks, duly considered in their just consequences, will abundantly show, that
some things are necessary because decreed, as the creation, the preservation,
and the government of the world; the
redemption, the purification, and the salvation of the church: and that other things as all imperfections,
dependence, relations, and especially moral evils, come to be necessary, and so
capable of being foreknown, only by connection, or consequence. That is, if the antecedent, which is under
the control of the Almighty Sovereign, be admitted, the consequence follows
infallibly from the nature of things.
But if another antecedent be established, another consequence will
follow, with equal certainty, also from the nature of things. For instance, if holiness be given and
continued to a redeemed creature, as an antecedent, excellence, honor, and
happiness are the necessary consequences.
But if sin operate without control, as the antecedent, dishonor and
misery must be the necessary consequences from the same cause. W.]
If the foreknowledge be absolute, this
proves the event known to be necessary, or proves that it is impossible
but that the event should be, by some means or other, either by a decree, or
some other way, if there be any other way:
because, as was said before, it is absurd to say, that a proposition is
known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not
true.
The whole of the seeming force of this
evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as
certain foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary, as a
decree does; therefore it does not prove
it to be necessary, as a decree does.
But there is no force in this arguing:
for it is built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove
or be an evidence of a thing being necessary, but that which has a
causal influence to make it so. But
this can never be maintained. If
certain foreknowledge of the future existence of an event be not the thing
which first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does demonstrate,
that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility
comes. If foreknowledge be not the
cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that there is such an
impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect to the cause, as from the
cause to the effect. It is enough, that
an existence, which is infallibly foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility
arises from the foreknowledge, or is prior to it. It is as evident as anything can be, that it is impossible a
thing, which is infallibly known to be true, should prove not to be true. Therefore, there is a necessity that
it should be otherwise; whether the
knowledge be the cause of this necessity, or the necessity the cause of the
knowledge.
All certain knowledge, whether it be
foreknowledge or after-knowledge, or concomitant knowledge, proves the thing
known now to be necessary, by some means or other; or proves that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than
true. — I freely allow, that
foreknowledge does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than after-knowledge: but then after-knowledge, which is certain
and infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that the
proposition known should be true.
Certain after-knowledge proves that, it is now by some means or
other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates past
existence on the event, should be true.
And so does certain foreknowledge prove, that now in the time of the
knowledge, it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the
proposition, which predicates future existence on the event, should be
true. The necessity of the truth of the
propositions, consisting in the present impossibility of the nonexistence of
the event affirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of
the knowledge; there can be no
certainty of knowledge without it.
There must be a certainty in things
themselves, before they are certainly known, or which is the same thing, known
to be certain. For certainty of
knowledge is nothing else, but knowing or discerning the certainty there is, in
the things themselves, which are known.
Therefore, there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of
certainty of knowledge, and to render things capable of being known to be
certain. And there is nothing but the
necessity of truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be
true; or, in other words, the firm and
infallible connection between the subject and predicate of the proposition that
contains that truth. All certainty of
knowledge consists in the view of the firmness of that connection. So God’s certain foreknowledge of the future
existence of any event, is his view of the firm and indissoluble connection of
the subject and predicate of the proposition that affirms its future
existence. The subject is that possible
event; the predicate is its future
existence, but if future existence be firmly and indissolubly connected with
that event, then the future existence of that event is necessary. If God certainly knows the future existence
of an event which is wholly contingent, and may possibly never be, then, he
sees a firm connection between a subject and predicate that are not firmly
connected; which is a contradiction.
I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be
true, that mere knowledge does not affect the thing known, to make it more
certain or more future. But, yet I
say, it supposes and proves the thing to be already, both future
and certain; i. e.
necessarily future. Knowledge of
futurity supposes futurity; and certain
knowledge of futurity, supposes certain futurity, antecedent to that
certain knowledge. But, there is no other
certain futurity of a thing, antecedent to certainty of knowledge, than a prior
impossibility but that the thing should prove true; or, which is the same thing, the necessity of the event.
I would observe one thing further,
that if it be as those aforementioned writers suppose, that God’s foreknowledge
is not the cause but the effect of the existence of the event foreknown; this is so far from showing that this
foreknowledge does not infer the necessity of the existence of that event, that
it rather shows the contrary the more plainly.
Because it shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm,
that it is as if it had already been;
inasmuch as in effect it actually exists already. Its future existence has already had actual influence
and efficiency, and has produced an effect, viz. prescience:
the effect exists already; and
as the effect supposes the cause, and depends entirely upon it, therefore it is
as if the future event, which is the cause, had existed already. The effect is firm as possible, it having
already the possession of existence, and has made sure of it. But the effect cannot be more firm and
stable than its cause, ground, and reason.
The building cannot be firmer than the foundation.
To illustrate this matter; let us suppose the appearances and images of
things in a glass, for instance, a reflecting telescope, to be the real effects
of heavenly bodies (at a distance, and out of sight) which they resemble. If it be so, then, as these images in the
telescope have had a past actual existence, and it is become utterly impossible
now that it should be otherwise than that they have existed; so they being the true effects of the
heavenly bodies they resemble, this proves the existence of those heavenly
bodies to be as real, infallible, firm, and necessary, as the existence of
these effects; the one being connected
with, and wholly depending on the other.
— Now let us suppose future existences, some way or other, to have
influence back, to produce effects beforehand, and cause exact and perfect
images of themselves in a glass, a thousand years before they exist, yea, in
all preceding ages. But yet that these
images are real effects of these future existences, perfectly dependent on, and
connected with their cause. These effects
and images having already had actual existence, render that matter of their
existence perfectly firm and stable, and utterly impossible to be
otherwise. And this proves, as in the
other instance, that the existence of the things, which are their causes, is
also equally sure, firm, and necessary;
and that it is alike impossible but that they should be, as if they had
been already, as their effects have.
And if instead of images in a glass, we suppose the antecedent effects
to be perfect ideas of them in the divine mind, which have existed there from
all eternity, which are as properly effects, as truly and properly connected
with their cause, the case is not altered.
Another thing which has been said by some
Arminians, to take off the force of what is urged from God’s prescience,
against the continuance of the volitions of moral agents, is to this
purpose; “That when we talk of
foreknowledge in God, there is no strict propriety in our so speaking; and that although it be true, that there is
in God the most perfect knowledge of all events from eternity to eternity, yet
there is no such thing as before and after in God, but he sees
all things by one perfect unchangeable view, without any succession.” — To this I answer,
1.
It has been already shown, that all certain knowledge proves the
necessity of the truth known; whether
it be before, after, or at the same time. — Though it be true, that there is no
succession in God’s knowledge, and the manner of his knowledge is to us
inconceivable, yet thus much we know concerning it, that there is no event,
past, present, or to come, that God is ever uncertain of. He never is, never was, and never will be
without infallible knowledge of it; he
always sees the existence of it to be certain and infallible. And as he always sees things just as they
are in truth; hence there never is in
reality anything contingent in such a sense, as that possibly it may happen
never to exist. If, strictly speaking,
there is no foreknowledge in God, it is because those things, which are future
to us, are as present to God, as if they already had existence. And that is as much as to say, that future
events are always in God’s view as evident, clear, sure, and necessary, as if
they already were. If there never is a
time wherein the existence of the event is not present with God, then there
never is a time wherein it is not as much impossible for it to fail of
existence, as if its existence were present, and were already come to pass.
God viewing things so perfectly and
unchangeably, as that there is no succession in his ideas or judgment, does not
hinder but that there is properly now, in the mind of God, a certain and
perfect knowledge of the moral actions of men, which to us are an hundred years
hence. Yea the objection supposes
this; and therefore it certainly does
not hinder but that, by the foregoing arguments, it is now impossible these
moral actions should not come to pass.
We know, that God foreknows the future
voluntary actions of men, in such a sense, as that he is able particularly to
foretell them, and cause them to be recorded, as he often has done. And therefore that necessary connection
which there is between God’s knowledge and the event known, as much proves the
event to be necessary beforehand, as if the divine knowledge were in the
same sense before the event, as the prediction or writing is. If the knowledge be infallible, then the
expression of it in the written prediction is infallible; that is, there is an infallible connection
between that written prediction and the event.
And if so, then it is impossible it should ever be otherwise, than that
the prediction and the event should agree:
and this is the same thing as to say, it is impossible but that the event
should come to pass: and this is the
same as to say that its coming to pass is necessary. — So that it is manifest, that there being
no proper succession in God’s mind, makes no alteration as to the necessity of
the existence of the events known. Yea,
2.
This is so far from weakening the proof, given of the impossibility of
future events known, not coming to pass, as that it establishes the foregoing
arguments, and shows the clearness of the evidence. For,
(1.) The very reason, why God’s
knowledge is without succession, is because it is absolutely perfect to the
highest possible degree of clearness and certainty. All things, whether past, present, or to come, being viewed with
equal evidence; fullness, and future
things being seen with as much clearness, as if they were present. The view is always in absolute
perfection; and absolute constant
perfection admits of no alteration, and so no succession. The actual existence of the thing known does
not at all increase or add to the clearness or certainty of the thing
known. God calls the things that are
not, as though they were; they are all
one to him as if they had already existed.
But herein consists the strength of the demonstration before given; that it is as impossible they should fail of
existence, as if they existed already.
This objection, instead of weakening the argument, sets it in the
strongest light; for it supposes it to
be so indeed, that the existence of future events is in God’s view so much as
if it already had been. That when they
come actually to exist, it makes not the least alteration or variation in his
knowledge of them.
(2.) The objection is founded on the immutability
of God’s knowledge. For it is the
immutability of knowledge that makes it to be without succession. But this most directly and plainly
demonstrates the thing I insist on, viz.
that it is utterly impossible the known events should fail of
existence. For if that were possible, then
a change in God’s knowledge and view of things, were possible. For if the known event should not come into
being, as God expected, then he would see it, and so would change his mind, and
see his former mistake; and thus there
would be change and succession in his knowledge. But as God is immutable, and it is infinitely impossible that his
view should be changed; so it is, for
the same reason, just so impossible that the foreknown event should not
exist; and that is to be impossible in
the highest degree; and therefore the
contrary is necessary. Nothing is more
impossible than that the immutable God should be changed, by the succession of
time; who comprehends all things, from
eternity to eternity, in one, most perfect, and unalterable view; so that his whole eternal duration is vitae
interminabilis, tota, simul et perfecta possessio.
On the whole, I need not fear to say,
that there is no geometrical theorem or proposition whatsoever, more capable of
strict demonstration, than that God’s certain prescience of the volitions of
moral agents is inconsistent with such a contingence of these events, as is
without all necessity; and so is
inconsistent with the Arminian notion of liberty.
Corol. 2. Hence the doctrine of the Calvinists,
concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not all infer any more fatality in
things, than will demonstrably follow from the doctrine of the most Arminian
divines, who acknowledge God’s omniscience, and universal prescience. Therefore all objections they make against
the doctrine of the Calvinists, as implying Hobbes’s doctrine of necessity, or
the stoical doctrine of fate, lie no more against the doctrine of Calvinists,
than their own doctrine. Therefore, it
does not become those divines, to raise such an outcry against the Calvinists,
on this account.
Corol. 3. Hence all arguments of Arminians, who own
God’s omniscience, against the doctrine of the inability of unregenerate men to
perform the conditions of salvation, and the commands of God requiring
spiritual duties, and against the Calvinistic doctrine of efficacious grace; on this ground, that those doctrines, though
they do not suppose men to be under any constraint or coaction, yet suppose
them under necessity, must fall to the ground. And their arguments against the necessity of men’s volitions,
taken from the reasonableness of God’s commands, promises, and threatenings,
and the sincerity of his counsels and invitations; and all objections against any doctrines of the Calvinists as
being inconsistent with human liberty, because they infer necessity; I say, all these arguments and objections
must be justly esteemed vain and frivolous, as coming from them; being leveled against their own doctrine, as
well as against that of the Calvinists.
Every act of the will has a cause, or
it has not. If it has a cause, then,
according to what has already been demonstrated, it is not contingent, but
necessary; the effect being necessarily
dependent and consequent on its cause, let that cause be what it will. If the cause is the will itself by
antecedent acts [of] choosing and determining, still the determined caused
act must be a necessary effect. The
act, that is the determined effect of the foregoing act which is its cause,
cannot prevent the efficiency of its cause;
but must be wholly subject to its determination and command, as much as
the motions of the hands and feet. The
consequent commanded acts of the will are as passive and as necessary, with
respect to the antecedent determining acts, as the parts of the body are to the
volitions which determine and command them.
And therefore, if all the free acts of the will are all determined
effects, determined by the will itself, that is by antecedent choice, then they
are all necessary. They are all subject
to, and decisively fixed by, the foregoing act, which is their cause. Yea, even the determining act itself; for that must be determined and fixed by
another act preceding, if it be a free and voluntary act; and so must be necessary. So that by this, all the free acts of the
will are necessary, and cannot be free unless they are necessary. Because they cannot be free, according to
the Arminian notion of freedom, unless they are determined by the will; and this is to be determined by antecedent
choice, which being their cause proves them necessary. And yet they say, necessity is utterly
inconsistent with liberty, so that, by their scheme, the acts of the will
cannot be free unless they are necessary, and yet cannot be free if they be
necessary !
If the other part of the dilemma be
taken; that the free acts of the will,
have no cause and are connected with nothing whatsoever that goes before, and
determines them, in order to maintain their proper and absolute contingence,
and [if] this should be allowed to be possible, still it will not serve their
turn. For if the volition come to pass
by perfect contingence, and without any cause at all, then it is certain, no
act of the will, no prior act of the soul, was the cause, no determination or
choice of the soul had any hand in it.
The will, or the soul, was indeed the subject of what happened to it
accidentally, but was not the cause.
The will is not active in causing or determining, but purely the passive
subject; at least, according to their
notion of action and passion. In this
case, contingence as much prevents the determination of the will, as a proper
cause; and as to the will, it was
necessary, and could be no otherwise.
For to suppose that it could have been otherwise, if the will or soul
had pleased, is to suppose that the act is dependent on some prior act of
choice or pleasure contrary to what is now supposed. It is to suppose that it might have been otherwise, if its cause
had ordered it otherwise. But this does
not agree to it having no cause or order at all. That must be necessary as to the soul, which is dependent on no
free act of the soul: but that which is
without a cause, is dependent on no free act of the soul; because, by the supposition, it is dependent
on nothing, and is connected with nothing.
In such a case, the soul is necessarily subjected to what accident
brings to pass, from time to time, as much as the earth that is inactive, is
necessarily subjected to what falls upon it.
But this does not consist with the Arminian notion of liberty, which is
the will’s power of determining itself in its own acts, and being wholly active
in it, without passiveness, and without being subject to necessity. — Thus, contingence belongs to the Arminian
notion of liberty, and yet is inconsistent with it.
I would here observe, that the author
of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will, in God and the Creature (p. 76,
77), says as follows. “The word chance
always means something done without design.
Chance and design stand in direct opposition to each other. And chance can never be properly applied to
acts of the will, which is the spring of all design, and which designs to
choose whatsoever it does choose, whether there be any superior fitness in the
thing which it chooses, or no. And it
designs to determine itself to one thing, where two things, perfectly equal,
are proposed, merely because it will.”
But herein appears a very great inadvertence. For if the will be the spring of all design, as he says,
then certainly it is not always the effect of design. The acts of the will themselves must
sometimes come to pass, when they do not spring from design; and consequently come to pass by chance,
according to his own definition of chance.
And if the will designs to choose whatever it does choose, and designs
to determine itself, as he says, then it designs to determine all its
designs. Which carries us back from one
design, to a foregoing design determining that, to another determining that and
so on in infinitum? The very first design must be the effect of
foregoing design; or else, it must be
by chance, in his notion of it.
Here another alternative may be
proposed, relating to the connection of the acts of the will with something
foregoing that is their cause. Not much
unlike to the other; which is
this: either human liberty may well
stand with volitions being necessarily connected with the views of the
understanding, and so is consistent with necessity; or it is inconsistent with and contrary to such a connection and
necessity. The former is directly
subversive of the Arminian notion of liberty, consisting in freedom from all
necessity. If the latter be chosen, and
it be said, that liberty is inconsistent with any such necessary connection of
volition with foregoing views of the understanding; it consisting in freedom from any such necessity of the will as
that would imply; then the liberty of
the soul consists, partly at least, in freedom from restraint, limitation, and
government, in its actings, by the understanding, and in liberty and liableness
to act contrary to the views and dictates of the understanding and
consequently, the more the soul has of this disengagedness in its acting, the
more liberty. Now let it be considered
to what this brings the noble principle of human liberty, particularly when it
is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection, viz. a full and perfect freedom and liableness to act altogether at
random, without the least connection with, or restraint or government by, any
dictate of reason, or anything whatsoever apprehended, considered, or viewed by
the understanding; as being
inconsistent with the full and perfect sovereignty of the will over its own
determinations. — The notion mankind
has conceived of liberty, is some dignity or privilege, something worth
claiming. But what dignity or privilege
is there, in being given up to such a wild contingence as this, to be perfectly
and constantly liable to act unreasonably, and as much without the guidance of
understanding, as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception, as the
smoke that is driven by the wind!
God’s Moral Excellency necessary, yet
virtuous and praiseworthy. Having considered the first thing that was proposed to be inquired into, relating to that
freedom of Will which Arminians maintain;
namely, Whether any such thing does, ever did, or ever can exist, or be
conceived of; I come now to the second thing
proposed to be the subject of inquiry, viz., Whether any such kind of liberty
be requisite to moral agency, virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and
punishment, &c.
I shall begin with some consideration
of the virtue and agency of the Supreme moral agent, and fountain of all agency
and virtue. Dr. Whitby, in his discourses on the Five Points, p. 14, says, “If
all human actions are necessary, virtue and vice must be empty names; we being
capable of nothing that is blameworthy, or deserveth praise; for who can blame
a person for doing only what he could not help, or judge that he deserveth
praise only for what he could not avoid?” To the like purpose he speaks in
places innumerable; especially in his discourse on the Freedom o f the Will; constantly maintaining, that a freedom not only from coaction, but
necessity, is absolutely requisite, in order to actions being either worthy
of blame, or deserving of praise. And to this agrees, as is well known, the
current doctrine of Arminian writers,
who, in general, hold, that there is no virtue or vice, reward or punishment,
nothing to be commended or blamed, without this freedom. And yet Dr. Whitby, p.
300, allows, that God is without this freedom; and Arminians, so far as I have had opportunity to observe, generally
acknowledge that God is necessarily holy, and his Will necessarily determined
to that which is good.
So that putting these things together,
the infinitely holy God, who used always to be esteemed by God’s people not
only virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, and every virtue in
the most absolute purity and perfection, and in infinitely greater brightness
and amiableness than in any creature; the most perfect pattern of virtue, and
the fountain from whom all others’ virtue is as beams from the sun; and who has
been supposed to be, on the account of his virtue and holiness, infinitely more
worthy to be esteemed, loved, honored, admired, commended, extolled and
praised, than any creature: and He, who is thus everywhere represented in
Scripture; I say, this Being, according to this notion of Dr. Whitby, and other
Arminians, has no virtue at all:
virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an
empty name; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise: because he is
under necessity. He cannot avoid being holy and good as he is; therefore no
thanks to him for it. It seems, the holiness, justice, faithfulness, &c.,
of the Most High, must not be accounted to be of the nature of that which is
virtuous and praiseworthy. They “‘ill not deny, that these things in God are
good; but then we must understand them, that they are no more virtuous, or of
the nature of any thing commendable, than the good that is in any other being
that is not a moral agent; as the brightness of the sun, and the fertility of
the earth, are good, but not virtuous, because these properties are necessary
to these bodies, and not the fruit of self-determining power.
There needs no other confutation of
this notion of God’s not being virtuous or praiseworthy, to Christians
acquainted with the Bible, but only stating and particularly representing it.
To bring
c. texts of Scripture, wherein God is
represented as in every respect, in the highest manner virtuous, and supremely
praiseworthy, would r: be endless, and is altogether needless to such as have
been brought up in the light of the gospel.
It were to be wished that Dr. Whitby
and other divines of the same sort had explained themselves, when they have
asserted, that that which is
necessary is not deserving of praise; at
the same time that they have owned God’s perfection to be necessary, and so in
effect representing God as not deserving praise. Certainly, if their words have
any meaning at all, by praise, they
must mean the exercise or testimony of some sort of esteem, respect and
honorable regard. And will they then say, that men are worthy of that esteem,
respect and honor for their virtue, small and imperfect as it is, which yet God
is not worthy of, for his infinite righteousness, holiness and goodness? If
so, it must be, because of some sort of peculiar excellency in the virtuous
man, which is his prerogative, wherein he really has the preference; some
dignity, that is entirely distinguished from any excellency, amiableness, or
honorableness in God: not in imperfection and dependence, but in pre-eminence:
which therefore he does not receive from God, nor is God the fountain or pattern
of it; nor can God, in that respect, stand in competition with him, as the
object of honor and regard; but man may claim a peculiar esteem, commendation
and glory, that God can have no pretension to. Yea, God has no right, by virtue
of his necessary holiness, to intermeddle with that grateful respect and praise
due to the virtuous man, who chooses virtue, in the exercise of a freedom ad atrumaque; any more than a precious
stone, which cannot avoid being hard and beautiful.
And if it be so, let it be explained
what that peculiar respect is, that is due to the virtuous man, which differs
in nature and kind, in some way of pre-eminence from all that is due to God.
What is the name or description of that peculiar affection? Is it esteem, love,
admiration, honor, praise or gratitude? The Scripture everywhere represents
God as the highest object of all these: there we read of the soul’s magnifying the Lord, o f loving Him with all the heart, with
all the soul, with all the mind, and with all the strength; admiring Him, and his
righteous acts, or greatly regarding them, as marvellous and wonderful; honoring, glorifying, exalting, extolling,
blessing, thanking and praising Him;
giving unto Him all the glory of the
good which is done or received, rather than unto men; that no flesh should glory in his presence; but that He should be
regarded as the Being to whom all glory is due. What then is that respect?
What passion, affection or exercise is it, that Arminians call praise, diverse
from all these things, which men are worthy of for their virtue, and which God
is not worthy of, in any degree?
If that necessity which attends God’s
moral perfections and actions, be as inconsistent with a being worthy of
praise as a necessity of coaction; as is plainly implied in, or inferred from
Dr. Whitby’s discourse; then why should we thank God for his goodness, any more
than if he were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of our
fellow creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or from any
kindness of heart, but from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity? Arminians suppose, that God is
necessarily a good and gracious Being: for this they make the ground of some of
their main arguments against many doctrines maintained by Calvinists; they say,, these are certainly false, and it is impossible
they should be true, because they are not consistent with the goodness of
God. This supposes, that it is impossible
but that God should be good: for if it be possible that he should be
otherwise, then that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases,
according to their own argument.
I have already considered how Dr.
Whitby insists upon it, that a freedom, not only from coaction, but necessity,
is requisite either to virtue or vice, praise or dispraise, reward or
punishment. He also insists on the
same freedom as absolutely requisite to a person being the subject of a law,
of precepts, or prohibitions;
in the book before mentioned (p. 301, 314, 328, 339, 340, 341, 342,
347, 361, 373, 410). And of promises
and threatenings (p. 298, 301, 305, 311, 339, 340, 363). And as requisite to a state of trial,
p. 297, etc.
Now, therefore, with an eye to these things,
I would inquire into the moral conduct and practices of our Lord Jesus Christ,
which he exhibited in his human nature, in his state of humiliation. And, first, I would show, that his
holy behavior was necessary; or
that it was impossible it should be otherwise, than that he should
behave himself holily, and that he should be perfectly holy in each individual
act of his life. And secondly,
that his holy behavior was properly of the nature of virtue, and was worthy
of praise; and that he was the subject
of law, precept, or commands, promises and rewards; and that he was in a state of trial.
I.
It was impossible, that the acts of the will of Christ’s human
soul should, in any instance, degree, or circumstance, be otherwise than holy,
and agreeable to God’s nature and will.
The following things make this evident.
1.
God had promised so effectually to preserve and up hold him by his
Spirit, under all his temptations, that he could not fail of the end for which
he came into the world; but he would have
failed, had he fallen into sin. We have
such a promise (Isa. 42:1-4). “Behold
my Servant, whom I uphold; mine Elect,
in whom my soul delighteth: I have put
my Spirit upon him: he shall bring
forth judgment to the Gentiles: he
shall not cry, nor lift up, nor cause his voice to be heard in the street. — He shall bring forth judgment unto
truth. He shall not fail, nor be
discouraged, till he have set judgment in the earth; and the isles shall wait his law.” This promise of God’s Spirit put upon him, and his not crying and
lifting up his voice, etc. relates to
the time of Christ’s appearance on earth;
as is manifest from the nature of the promise, and also the application
of it in the New Testament (Mat. 12:18).
And the words imply a promise of his being so upheld by God’s Spirit,
that he should be preserved from sin;
particularly from pride and vain-glory.
And from being overcome by any temptations he should be under, to affect
the glory of this world, the pomp of an earthly prince, or the applause and
praise of men. And that he should be so
upheld, that he should by no means fail of obtaining the end of his earning
into the world, of bringing forth judgment unto victory, and establishing his
kingdom of grace in the earth. And in
the following verses, this promise is confirmed, with the greatest imaginable
solemnity. “Thus saith the Lord, he
that created the heavens, and stretched them out; he that spread forth the earth, and that which cometh out of
it; he that giveth breath unto the people
upon it, and spirit to them that walk therein:
I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine
hand; and will keep thee, and give thee
for a Covenant of the people, for a Light of the Gentiles, to open the blind
eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness
out of the prison-house. I am JEHOVAH,
that is my name,” etc.
Very parallel with these promises is
another (Isa. 49:7, 8, 9), which also has an apparent respect to the time of
Christ’s humiliation on earth. — “Thus
saith the Lord, the Redeemer of Israel, and his Holy One, to him whom man
despiseth, to him whom the nation abhorreth, to a servant of rulers; kings shall see and arise, princes also
shall worship; because of the Lord that
is faithful, and the Holy One of Israel, and he shall choose thee. Thus saith the Lord, in an acceptable time
have I heard thee; in a day of
salvation have I helped thee; and I
will preserve thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, to establish
the earth,” etc.
And in Isa. 50:5, 6, we have the
Messiah expressing his assurance, that God would help him, by so opening his
ear, or inclining his heart to God’s commandments, that he should not be
rebellious, but should persevere, and not apostatize, or turn his back. That through God’s help, he should be
immovable in obedience, under great trials of reproach and suffering; setting his face like a flint: so that he knew he should not be ashamed, or
frustrated in his design; and finally
should be approved and justified, as having done his work faithfully. “The Lord hath opened mine ear; so that I was not rebellious, neither turned
away my back: I gave my back to the
smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair; I hid not my face from shame and spitting. For the Lord God will help me; therefore shall I not be confounded: therefore have I set my face as a flint, and
I know that I shall not be ashamed. He
is near that justifieth me: who will
contend with me? Let us stand together.
Who is mine adversary? Let him come near to me. Behold the Lord God will help me: who is he that shall condemn me? Lo, they
shall all wax old as a garment, the moth shall eat them up.”
2.
The same thing is evident from all the promises which God made to the
Messiah, of his future glory, kingdom, and success, in his office and character
of a Mediator: which glory could not
have been obtained, if his holiness had failed, and he had been guilty of sin. God’s absolute promise makes the things
promised necessary, and their failing to take place absolutely impossible: and, in like manner, it makes those
things necessary, on which the thing promised depends, and without which it
cannot take effect. Therefore it
appears, that it was utterly impossible that Christ’s holiness should fail,
from such absolute promises as these (Psa. 110:4), “The Lord hath sworn, and
will not repent, thou art a priest forever, after the order of
Melchizedek.” And from every other
promise in that psalm, contained in each verse of it (And Psa. 2:6, 7). “I will declare the decree: The Lord hath said unto me, Thou art my Son,
this day have I begotten thee: Ask of
me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance,” etc. (Psa. 45:3, 4, etc.) “Gird thy sword on thy
thigh, O most mighty, with thy glory and thy majesty; and in thy majesty ride prosperously.” And so everything that is said from thence to the end of the
psalm. (See Isa. 3:13-15, and
53:10-12). And all those promises which
God makes to the Messiah, of success, dominion, and glory in the character of a
Redeemer (Isa. chap. 49).
3.
It was often promised to the church of God of old, for their comfort,
that God would give them a righteous, sinless Savior (Jer. 23:5, 6). “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that
I will rise up unto David a righteous branch;
and a king shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and
justice in the earth. In his days shall
Judah be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely.
And this is the name whereby he shall be called, The Lord our righteousness.” (So, Jer. 33:15) “I will cause the branch of
righteousness to grow up unto David, and he shall execute judgment and
righteousness in the land.” (Isa. 9:6,
7) “For unto us a child is born; — upon
the throne of David and of his kingdom, to order it and to establish it with
judgment and justice, from henceforth, even forever: the zeal of the Lord of hosts will do this.” (Isa. 11:1, etc.) “There shall come forth a
rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon
him, — the spirit of knowledge, and the fear of the Lord: — with righteousness shall he judge the
poor, and reprove with equity: — Righteousness
shall be the girdle of his loins, and faithfulness the girdle of his reins.” (Isa. 52:13) “My servant shall deal
prudently.” (Isa. 53:9) “Because he had
done no violence, neither was guile found in his mouth.” If it be impossible, that these promises
should fail, and it be easier for heaven and earth to pass away, than for one
jot or tittle of them to pass away, then it was impossible that Christ should
commit any sin. — Christ himself
signified, that it was impossible but that the things which were spoken
concerning him, should be fulfilled (Luke 24:44). “That all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the law
of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning me.” (Matt. 26:53, 54) “But how then shall the
Scripture be fulfilled, that thus it must be?” Mark 14:49) “But the Scriptures
must be fulfilled.” And so the apostle
(Acts 1:16, 17), “This Scripture must needs have been fulfilled.”
4.
All the promises, which were made to the church of old, of the Messiah
as a future Savior, from that made to our first parents in paradise, to that
which was delivered by the prophet Malachi show it to be impossible that Christ
should not have persevered in perfect holiness. The ancient predictions given to God’s church, of the Messiah as
a Savior, were of the nature of promises;
as is evident by the predictions themselves, and the manner of
delivering them. But they are expressly
and very often called promises in the New Testament (as in Luke 1:54,
55, 72, 73; Acts 13:32, 33; Rom. 1:1-3, and chap. 15:8; Heb. 6:13, etc.); These promises were often made with great solemnity, and
confirmed with an oath; as (Gen. 22:16,
17), “By myself have I sworn, saith the Lord, that in blessing I will bless
thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed, as the stars of heaven, and
as the sand which is upon the seashore:
— And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.” (Compare Luke 1:72, 73, and Gal. 3:8, 15,
16). The apostle in Heb. 6:17, 18,
speaking of this promise to Abraham, says, “Wherein God willing more abundantly
to show to the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it
by an oath; that by two IMMUTABLE
things, in which it was IMPOSSIBLE for God to lie, we might have strong
consolation.” In which words, the necessity
of the accomplishment, or (which is the same thing) the impossibility of
the contrary, is fully declared. So God
confirmed the promise of the Messiah’s great salvation, made to David, by an
oath (Psa. 89:3, 4); “I have made a
covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David my servant; thy seed will I establish forever, and build
up thy throne to all generations.”
There is nothing so abundantly set forth in Scripture, as sure and
irrefragable, as this promise and oath to David (See Psalm 89:34-36; 2 Sam. 23:5; Isa. 55:4; Acts 2:29,
30; and 13:34). The Scripture expressly speaks of it as
utterly impossible that this promise and oath to David, concerning the
everlasting dominion of the Messiah, should fail (Jer. 33:15, etc.). “In those days, and at that time, I will
cause the Branch of righteousness to grow up unto David. — For thus saith the Lord, David shall never
want a man to sit upon the throne of the house of Israel.” (Jer. 33:20, 21) “If you can break my
covenant of the day, and my covenant of the night, and that there should not be
day and night in their season; then may
also my covenant be broken with David my servant, that he should not have a son
to reign upon his throne.” (So in Jer.
33:25, 26.) Thus abundant is the Scripture in representing how impossible
it was, that the promises made of old concerning the great salvation and
kingdom of the Messiah should fail.
Which implies that, it was impossible that this Messiah, the second
Adam, the promised seed of Abraham, and of David, should fall from his integrity,
as the first Adam did.
5.
All the promises that were made to the church of God under the Old
Testament, of the great enlargement of the church, and advancement of her
glory, in the days of the gospel, after the coming of the Messiah; the increase of her light, liberty,
holiness, joy, triumph over her enemies, etc.
of which so great a part of the Old Testament consists; which are repeated so often, are so
variously exhibited, so frequently introduced with great pomp and solemnity,
and are so abundantly sealed with typical and symbolical representations; I say, all these promises imply, that the
Messiah should perfect the work of redemption.
And this implies, that he should persevere in the work, which the Father
had appointed him, beings in all things conformed to his will. These promises were often confirmed by an
oath (See Isa. 54:9 with the context;
chap. 62). And it is represented
as utterly impossible that these promises should fail. (Isa. 44:15, with the context, chap. 54:10,
with the context; chap. 51:4-8; chap. 40:8, with the context). And therefore, it was impossible that
the Messiah should fail, or commit sin.
6.
It was impossible, that the Messiah should fail of persevering in
integrity and holiness, as the first Adam did.
Because, this would have been inconsistent with the promises, which God
made to the blessed Virgin, his mother, and to her husband; implying, that he should “save his people
from their sins.” That God would “ give
him the throne of his father David,” that he should “reign over the house of
Jacob forever;” and that “of his kingdom there shall be no end.” These promises were sure, and it was
impossible they should fail, and therefore the Virgin Mary, in trusting fully
to them, acted reasonably, having an immovable foundation of her faith. As Elizabeth observe (Luke 1:45), “And
blessed is she that believeth; for
there shall be a performance of those things which were told her from the
Lord.”
7.
That it should have been possible that Christ should sin, and so fail in
the work of our redemption, does not consist with the eternal purpose and
decree of God, revealed in the Scriptures, that he would provide salvation for
fallen man in and by Jesus Christ, and that salvation should be offered to
sinners through the preaching of the gospel.
Thus, much is implied in many Scriptures (as 1 Cor. 2:7; Eph.
1:4, 5; and chap. 3:9-11; 1 Pet.
1:19, 20). Such an absolute
decree as this, Arminians allow to be signified in many texts; their election of nations and societies, and
general election of the Christian church, and conditional election of
particular persons, imply this. God
could not decree before the foundation of the world, to save all that should
believe in and obey Christ, unless, he had absolutely decreed, that salvation
should be provided, and effectually wrought out by Christ. And since (as the Arminians themselves
strenuously maintain) a decree of God infers necessity; hence it became necessary, that Christ
should persevere and actually work out salvation for us, and that he should not
fail by the commission of sin.
8.
That it should have been possible for Christ’s holiness to fail is not
consistent with what God promised to his Son, before all ages. For that salvation should be offered to men,
through Christ, and bestowed on all his faithful followers, is at least implied
in that certain and infallible promise spoken of by the apostle (Tit. 1:2), “In hope of eternal life; which God, that cannot lie, promised before
the world began.” This does not seem to
be controverted by Arminians.
[See
Dr. Whitby on the five Points, p. 48, 49, 50.]
9.
That it should be possible for Christ to fail of doing his Father’s
will, is inconsistent with the promise made to the Father by the Son, the Logos
that was with the Father from the beginning, before he took the human
nature. [This] may be seen in Ps. 40:6-8 (compared with the apostle’s
interpretation, Heb. 10:5-9).
“Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire: mine ears hast thou opened (or bored); burnt-offering and sin-offering thou hast not required. Then said I, Lo, I come; in the volume of the book it is written of
me, I delight to do thy will, O my God, yea, thy law is within my heart.” Where is a manifest allusion to the
covenant, which the willing servant, who loved his master’s service, made with
his master? To be his servant forever, on the day wherein he had his ear
bored; which covenant was probably
inserted in the public records, called the VOLUME OF THE BOOK, by the judges,
who were called to take cognizance of the transaction (Exo. 21).
If the Logos, who was with the Father before the world, and who
made the world, thus engaged in covenant to do the will of the Father, in the
human nature, and the promise was as it were recorded, that it might be made
sure, doubtless it was impossible that it should fail. And so, it was impossible that Christ should
fail of doing the will of the Father in the human nature.
10.
If it was possible for Christ to have failed of doing the will of his
Father, and so to have failed of effectually working out redemption for
sinners; then the salvation of all the
saints, who were saved from the beginning of the world to the death of Christ,
was not built on a firm foundation. The
Messiah, and the redemption, which he was to work out by his obedience unto
death, was the saving foundation of all that ever were saved. Therefore, if when the Old Testament saints
had the pardon of their sins and the favor of God promised them, and salvation
bestowed upon them, still it was possible that the Messiah, when he came, might
commit sin, then all this was on a foundation that was not firm and stable, but
liable to fail; something which it was
possible might never be. God did as it
were trust to what his Son had engaged and promised to do in future time, and depended
so much upon it, that he proceeded actually to save men on the account of it,
though it had been already done. But
this trust and dependence of God, on the supposition of Christ’s being liable
to fail of doing his will, was leaning on a staff that was weak, and might
possibly break. The saints of old
trusted on the promises of a future redemption to be wrought out and completed
by the Messiah, and built their comfort upon it: Abraham saw Christ’s day, and rejoiced; and he and the other Patriarchs died in the faith of the promise
of it (Heb. 11:13). But on this
supposition, their faith, their comfort, and their salvation, was built on a
fallible foundation. Christ was not to
them “a tried stone, a sure foundation” (Isa. 28:16). David entirely rested on the covenant of God
with him, concerning the future glorious dominion and salvation of the
Messiah. and [he] said it was all his
salvation, and all his desire; and comforts
himself that this covenant was an “everlasting covenant, ordered in all things
and sure” (2 Sam. 23:5). But if
Christ’s virtue might fail, he was mistaken.
His great comfort was not built so “sure” as he thought it was, being
founded entirely on the determinations of the Free will of Christ’s human soul,
which was subject to no necessity, and might be determined either one way or
the other. Also the dependence of
those, who “looked for redemption in Jerusalem, and wailed for the
consolation of Israel,” (Luke 2:25, 38) and the confidence of the disciples
of Jesus, who forsook all and followed him, that they might enjoy the benefits
of his future kingdom, were built on a sandy foundation.
11.
The man Christ Jesus, before he had finished his course of obedience,
and while in the midst of temptations and trials, was abundant in positively
predicting his own future glory in his kingdom, and the enlargement of his
church, the salvation of the Gentiles through him, etc. and in promises of blessings he would bestow
on his true disciples in his future kingdom;
on which promises he required the full dependence of his disciples (John
14). But the disciples would have no
ground for such dependence, if Christ had been liable to fail in his work. And Christ himself would have been guilty of
presumption, in so abounding in peremptory promises of great things, which
depended on a mere contingence;
viz. the determinations of his
Free will, consisting in a freedom ad ulrumque, to either sin or
holiness, standing in indifference, and incident, in thousands of future
instances, to go either one way or the other.
Thus it is evident, that it was impossible
that the acts of the will of the human soul of Christ should be otherwise than
holy, and conformed to the will of the Father;
or, in other words, they were necessarily so conformed.
I have been the longer in the proof of
this matter, it being a thing denied by some of the greatest Arminians, by
Episcopius in particular; and because I
look upon it as a point clearly and absolutely determining the controversy
between Calvinists and Arminians, concerning the necessity of such a freedom of
will as is insisted on by the latter, in order to moral agency, virtue, command
or prohibition, promise or threatening, reward or punishment, praise or
dispraise, merit or demerit. I now
therefore proceed,
II.
To consider whether Christ, in his holy behavior on earth, was not thus
a moral agent, subject to commands, promises, etc.
Dr. Whitby very often speaks of what
he calls a freedom ad utrumlibet, without necessity, as requisite to law and
commands: and speaks of necessity
as entirely inconsistent with injunctions and prohibitions. But yet we read of Christ being the subject
of his Father’s commands (John 10:18;
and 15:10). And Christ tells us,
that everything that he said, or did, was in compliance with
“commandments he had received of the Father;” (John 12:49, 50; and 14:31).
And we often read of Christ’s obedience to his Father’s commands
(Rom. 5:19; Phil. 2:18;
Heb. 5:8).
The aforementioned writer represents promises
offered as motives to persons to do their duty, or a being moved and
induced by promises, as utterly inconsistent with a state wherein persons
have not a liberty ad utrumlibet, but are necessarily determined to one
(See particularly, p. 298, and 311).
But the thing, which this writer asserts, is demonstrably false, if the
Christian religion be true. If there be
any truth in Christianity or the Holy Scriptures, the man Christ Jesus had his
will infallibly and unalterably determined to good, and that alone. But yet he had promises of glorious rewards
made to him, on condition of his persevering in and perfecting the work which
God had appointed him (Isa. 53:10, 11, 12;
Psa. 2 and 110; Isa. 49:7, 8,
9). In Luke 22:28, 29, Christ says to
his disciples, “Ye are they which have continued with me in my
temptations; and I appoint unto you a
kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me.”
The word most properly signifies to appoint by covenant, or promise. The plain meaning of Christ’s words is
this: “As you have partaken of my
temptations and trials, and have been steadfast, and have overcome; I promise to make you partakers of my
reward, and to give you a kingdom; as
the Father has promised me a kingdom for continuing steadfast and overcoming in
those trials.” And the words are well explained
by those in Rev. 3:21, “To him that
overcometh, will I grant to sit with me on my throne; even as I also overcame, and am set down with my Father in his
throne.” And Christ had not only
promises of glorious success and rewards made to his obedience and sufferings,
but the Scriptures plainly represent him as using these promises for motives
and inducements to obey and suffer. And
particularly that promise of a kingdom which the Father had appointed him, or
sitting with the Father on his throne (as in Heb. 12:1, 2); “Let us lay aside every weight, and the sin
which doth easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set
before us, looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith; who for the joy that was set before him, endured
the cross, despising the shame, and is set down on the right hand of the throne
of God.”
And how strange would it be to hear
any Christian assert, that the holy and excellent temper and behavior of Jesus
Christ, and that obedience which he performed under such great trials, was not virtuous
or praiseworthy; because his
will was not free ad utrumque, to either holiness or sin, but was
unalterably determined to one. That
upon this account, there is no virtue at all in all Christ’s humility,
meekness, patience, charity, forgiveness of enemies, contempt of the world,
heavenly-mindedness, submission to the will of God, perfect obedience to his
commands unto death, even the death of the cross, his great compassion to the
afflicted, his unparalleled love to mankind, his faithfulness to God and man,
under such great trials; his praying
for his enemies, even when nailing him to the cross. That virtue, when applied to these things, is but an
empty name. That there was no merit
in any of these things; that is, that
Christ was worthy of nothing at all on account of them, worthy of no
reward, no praise, no honor or respect from God or man; because his will was not indifferent, and
free either to these things, or the contrary;
but under such a strong inclination or bias to the things that were
excellent, as made it impossible that he should choose the
contrary; that upon this account, to
use Dr. Whitby’s language, it would be sensibly unreasonable that the
human nature should be rewarded for any of these things.
According to this doctrine, that
creature who is evidently set forth in Scripture as the firstborn of every
creature, as having in all things the preeminence, and as the
highest of all creatures in virtue, honor, and worthiness of esteem, praise,
and glory, on account of his virtue, is less worthy of reward or praise, than
the very least of saints. Yea, no more
worthy than a clock or mere machine, that is purely passive, and moved by
natural necessity.
If we judge by scriptural
representations of things, we have reason to suppose, that Christ took on him
our nature, and dwelt with us in this world, in a suffering state, not only to
satisfy for our sins; but that he,
being in our nature and circumstances, and under our trials, might be our most
fit and proper example, leader, and captain, in the exercise of glorious
and victorious virtue, and might be a visible instance of the glorious end and
reward of it. That we might see in him
the beauty, amiableness, and true honor and glory, and exceeding benefit, of
that virtue, which it is proper for us human beings to practice. And might thereby learn, and be animated, to
seek the like glory and honor, and to obtain the like glorious reward (See Heb.
2:9-14; with 5:8, 9; and 12:1, 2, 3; John 15:10; Rom. 8:17; 2 Tim.
2:11, 12; 1 Pet. 2:19, 20;
and 4:13). But if there was
nothing of any virtue or merit, or worthiness of any reward, glory, praise, or
commendation at all, in all that he did, because it was all necessary, and he
could not help it; then how is here
anything so proper to animate and incite us, free creatures, by patient
continuance in well-doing, to seek for honor glory, and virtue?
God speaks of himself as peculiarly
well pleased with the righteousness of this distinguished servant (Isa. 42:21). “The Lord is well pleased for his
righteousness’ sake.” The sacrifices of
old are spoken of as a sweet savor to God, but the obedience of Christ as far
more acceptable than they (Psa. 40:6, 7).
“Sacrifice and offering thou didst not desire: mine ear hast thou opened [as thy servant performing willing
obedience;] burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not required. Then said I, Lo, I come, [as a servant that
cheerfully answers the calls of his master:] I delight to do thy will, O my
God, and thy law is within mine heart.”
(Matt. 17:5) “This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well-pleased.” And Christ tells us expressly, that the
Father loves him for that wonderful instance of his obedience, his voluntary
yielding himself to death, in compliance with the Father’s command (John 10:17,
18), “Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life: — No man taketh it from me; but I lay it down of myself — This commandment
received I of my Father.”
And if there was no merit in Christ’s
obedience unto death, if it was not worthy of praise, and of the most glorious
rewards, the heavenly hosts were exceedingly mistaken, by the account that is
given of them (Rev. 5:8-12), “The four
beasts, and the four and twenty elders, fell down before the Lamb, having
everyone of them carps, and golden vials full of odors; — and they sung a new song, saying, Thou art
worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof; for thou wast slain. — And I beheld, and I heard the voice of
many angels round about the throne, and the beasts, and the elders, and the
number of them was ten thousand times ten thousand, and thousands of thousands,
saving with a loud voice, Worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power,
and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honor, and glory, and blessing.”
Christ speaks of the eternal life
which he was to receive, as the reward of his obedience to the Father’s
commandments (John 12:49, 50). “I have
not spoken of myself; but the Father
which sent me, he gave me a commandment what I should say, and what I should
speak: and I know that his commandment
is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak
therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak.” — God promises to divide him a portion with
the great, etc. for his being his
righteous servant, for his glorious virtue under such great trials and
afflictions (Isa. 53:11, 12). “He shall
see the travail of his soul and be satisfied;
by his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I divide him a portion with
the great, and he shall divide the spoil with the strong, because he hath
poured out his soul unto death.” The
Scriptures represent God as rewarding him far above all his other servants
(Phil. 2:7-9). “He took on him the form of a servant, and
was made in the likeness of men: and
being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto
death, even the death of the cross:
wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name above
every name.” (Psa. 45:7) “Thou lovest
righteousness, and hatest wickedness;
therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness
above thy fellows.”
There is no room to pretend that the
glorious benefits bestowed in consequence of Christ’s obedience, are not
properly of the nature of a reward.
What is a reward, in the most proper sense, but a benefit bestowed in
consequence of something morally excellent in quality or behavior, in testimony
of well-blessedness in that moral excellency, and of respect and favor on that
account? If we consider the nature of a reward most strictly, and make the
utmost of it, and add to the things contained in this description proper merit
or worthiness, and the bestowment of the benefit in consequence of a promise; still it will be found, there is nothing
belonging to it, but what the Scripture most expressly ascribes to the glory
bestowed on Christ, after his sufferings;
as appears from what has been already observed. There was a glorious benefit bestowed in
consequence of something morally excellent, being called righteousness
and obedience. There was great
favor, love, and well-pleasedness, for this righteousness and obedience, in the
bestower; there was proper merit, or
worthiness of the benefit, in the obedience;
it was bestowed in fulfillment of promises, made to that obedience; and was bestowed therefore, or because
he had performed that obedience.
I may add to all these things, that
Jesus Christ, while here in the flesh, was manifestly in a state of trial. The last Adam, as Christ is called (1 Cor.
15:45; Rom. 5:14), taking on him the
human nature, and so the form of a servant, and being under the law, to stand
and act for us, was put into a state of trial, as the first Adam was. — Dr. Whitby mentions these three things as
evidences of persons being in a state of trial (Disc. on the Five Points, p. 298, 299), namely, their afflictions being
spoken of as their trials or temptations, their being the subjects of promises,
and their being exposed to Satan’s temptations. But Christ was apparently the subject of each of these,
concerning promises made to him, I have spoken already. The difficulties and afflictions he
met with in the course of his obedience, are called his temptations or trials
(Luke 22:28). Ye are they which have
continued with me in my temptations or trials.” (Heb. 2:18) “For in that he himself hath
suffered, being tempted [or tried], he is able to succor them that are
tempted.” And (Heb 4:15), “ We have not
an high priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of our
infirmities; but was in all points
tempted like as we are, yet without sin.”
And as to his being tempted by Satan it is what none will dispute.
Dr. Whitby asserts freedom, not only
from coaction, but necessity, to be essential to anything deserving the name of
sin, and to an action being culpable;
in these words (Discourse on Five Points, edit. 3.
p. 348). “If they be thus necessitated,
then neither their sins of omission or commission could deserve that name: it being essential to the nature of sin,
according to St. Austin’s definition,
that it be an action a duo liberum est abstinere. Three things seem plainly necessary to make
an action or omission culpable; 1. That it be in our power to perform or
forbear it: for, as Origen, and all the
fathers, say, no man is blameworthy for not doing what he could not do.” And elsewhere the doctor insists, that “when
any do evil of necessity, what they do is no vice, that they are guilty of no
fault, [Discourse on the five Points, p. 347, 360, 361, 377.] are worthy of no blame, dispraise, [Discourse on
the five Points, p. 303, 326, 329.], and many other places.or dishonor, [Discourse on
the five Points, p. 371.] but
are unblamable.” [Discourse on
the five Points, p. 304, 361.]
If these things are true, in Dr.
Whitby’s sense of necessity, they will prove all such to be blameless, who are
given up of God to sin, in what they commit after they are thus given up, —
That there is such a thing as men being judicially given up to sin, is certain,
if the Scripture rightly informs us;
such a thing being often there spoken of: as in Psa. 81:12. “So I
gave them up to their own hearts’ lust, and they walked in their own
counsels.” (Acts 7:42) “Then God
turned, and gave them up to worship the host of heaven.” (Rom. 1:24) “Wherefore, God also gave them
up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonor their own
bodies between themselves.” (Rom. 1:26)
“For this cause God gave them up to vile affections.” (Rom. 1:28) “And even as they did not like to retain God in their
knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things that are
not convenient.”
It is needless to stand particularly
to inquire, what God’s “giving men up to their own hearts’ lusts”
signifies. It is sufficient to observe,
that hereby is certainly meant God so ordering or disposing things, in some respect
or other, either by doing or forbearing to do, as that the consequence should
be men continuing in their sins. So
much as men are given up to; so much is
the consequence of their being given up, whether that be less or more. If God does not order things so, by action
or permission, that sin will be the consequence, then the event proves that
they are not given up to that consequence.
If good be the consequence, instead of evil, then God’s mercy is to be
acknowledged in that good; which mercy
must be contrary to God’s judgment in giving up to evil. If the event must prove, that they are given
up to evil as the consequence, then the persons, who are the subjects of this
judgment, must be the subjects of such an event, and so the event is necessary.
If not only coaction, but all
necessity, will prove men blameless, then Judas was blameless, after Christ
had given him over, and had already declared his certain damnation, and that he
should verily betray him. He was guilty
of no sin in betraying his Master, on this supposition; though his so doing is spoken of by Christ
as the most aggravated sin, more heinous than the sin of Pilate in crucifying
him. And the Jews in Egypt, in
Jeremiah’s time, were guilty of no sin, in their not worshipping the true God,
after God had “sworn by his great name, that his name should be no more named
in the mouth of any man of Judah, in all the land of Egypt,” (Jer. 44:26).
Dr. Whitby (Disc. on Five Points, p. 302, 303) denies, that
men, in this world, are ever so given up by God to sin, that their wills should
be necessarily determined to evil.
Though he owns, that hereby it may become exceeding difficult for
men to do good, having a strong bent and powerful inclination to what is
evil. But if we should allow the case
to be just as he represents, the judgment of giving up to sin will no better
agree with his notions of that liberty, which is essential to praise or blame,
than if we should suppose it to render the avoiding of sin impossible. For if an impossibility of avoiding
sin wholly excuses a man; then for the
same reason, its being difficult to avoid it, excuses him in part; and this just in proportion to the degree of
difficulty. — If the influence of moral
impossibility or inability be the same, to excuse persons in not doing or not
avoiding anything, as that of natural inability (which is supposed),
then undoubtedly, in like manner, moral difficulty has the same
influence to excuse with natural difficulty. But all allow, that natural impossibility wholly excuses, also,
that natural difficulty excuses in part, and makes the act or omission less
blamable in proportion to the difficulty.
All natural difficulty, according to the plainest dictates of the light
of nature, excuses in some degree, so that the neglect is not so blamable, as
if there had been no difficulty in the case.
And so the greater the difficulty is, still the more excusable, in
proportion to the increase of the difficulty.
And as natural impossibility wholly excuses, and excludes all blame, so
the nearer the difficulty approaches to impossibility, still the nearer a
person is to blamelessness in proportion to that approach. If the case of moral impossibility or
necessity, be just the same with natural necessity or coaction, as to its
influence to excuse a neglect, then also, for the same reason, the case of
natural difficulty does not differ in influence, to excuse a neglect, from
moral difficulty, arising from a strong bias or bent to evil, such as Dr.
Whitby owns in the case of those that are given up to their own hearts’ lusts. So that the fault of such persons must be
lessened, in proportion to the difficulty, and approach to impossibility. If ten degrees of moral difficulty make the
action quite impossible, and so wholly excuse, then if there be nine degrees of
difficulty, the person is in great part excused, and is nine degrees in ten
less blameworthy, than if there had been no difficulty at all; and he has but one degree of
blameworthiness. The reason is plain,
on Arminian principles; viz. because as difficulty, by antecedent bent
and bias on the will, is increased, liberty of indifference, and
self-determination in the will, is diminished;
so much hindrance, impediment is there, in the way of the will acting
freely, by mere self-determination. And
if ten degrees of such hindrance take away all such liberty, then nine degrees
take away nine parts in ten, and leave but one degree of liberty. And therefore there is but one degree of
blameableness, caeteris paribus in the neglect; the man being no further blamable in what he
does, or neglects, than he has liberty in that affair: for blame or praise (say they) arises wholly
from a good use or abuse of liberty.
From all which it follows, that a
strong bent and bias one way, and difficulty of going the contrary, never
causes a person to be at all more exposed to sin, or anything blamable: because, as the difficulty is increased, so
much the less is required and expected.
Though, in one respect, exposedness to sin is increased, viz. by an increase of exposedness to the evil action
or omission; yet it is diminished in
another respect, to balance it; namely,
as the sinfulness or blameableness of the action or omission is diminished in
the same proportion. So that, on the
whole, the affair, as to exposedness to guilt or blame, is left just as it was.
To illustrate this, let us suppose a
scale of a balance to be intelligent, and a free agent, and indued with a
self-moving power, by virtue of which it could act and produce effects to a
certain degree, ex. gr. to move itself up or down with a force equal
to a weight of ten pounds; and that it
might therefore be required of it, in ordinary circumstances, to move itself
down with that force; for which it has
power and full liberty, and therefore would be blameworthy if it failed of
it. But then let us suppose a weight of
ten pounds to be put in the opposite scale, which in force entirely
counterbalances its self-moving power, and so renders it impossible for it to
move down at all; and therefore wholly
excuses it from any such motion. But if
we suppose there to be only nine pounds in the opposite scale, this renders its
motion not impossible, but yet more difficult, so that it can now only move
down with the force of one pound, however, this is all that is required of it
under these circumstances; it is wholly
excused from nine parts of its motion.
And if the scale, under these circumstances, neglect to move, and remain
at rest, all that it will be blamed for, will be its neglect of that one tenth
part of its motion; for which it had as
much liberty and advantage, as in usual circumstances it has for the greater
motion, which in such a case would be required. So that this new difficulty does not at all increase its
exposedness to anything blameworthy.
And thus the very supposition of
difficulty in the way of a man’s duty, or proclivity to sin, through a
being given up to hardness of heart, or indeed by any other means whatsoever,
is an inconsistency, according to Dr. Whitby’s notions of liberty, virtue and
vice, blame and praise. The avoiding of
sin and blame, and the doing of what is virtuous and praiseworthy, most be
always equally easy.
Dr. Whitby’s notions of liberty,
obligation, virtue. sin, etc. led him into another great
inconsistency. He abundantly insists,
that necessity is inconsistent with the nature of sin or fault. He says, in the forementioned treatise (p.
14), “Who can blame a person for doing what he could not help?” And (p. 15),
“It being sensibly unjust, to punish any man for doing that which was never in
his power to avoid.” And (p. 341) to
confirm his opinion, he quotes one of the fathers, saying, “Why doth God
command, if man hath not free will and power to obey?” And again, in the same
and the next page, “Who will not cry out, that it is folly to command him, that
hath not liberty to do what is commanded;
and that it is unjust to condemn him, that has it not in his power to do
what is required?” And (p. 373) he cites another saying, “A law is given to him
that can turn to both parts; I. e.
obey or transgress it; but no
law can be against him who is bound by nature.”
And yet the same Dr. Whitby asserts,
that fallen man is not able to perform perfect obedience. In p. 165, he has these words: “The nature of Adam had power to continue
innocent, and without sin; whereas, it
is certain our nature never had.” But
if we have not power to continue innocent and without sin, then sin is not
inconsistent with necessity, and we may be sinful in that which we have not
power to avoid. And those things cannot
be true, which he asserts elsewhere, namely, “That if we be necessitated,
neither sins of omission nor commission, would deserve that name,” (p.
348). If we have it not in our power to
be innocent, then we have it not in our power to be blameless; and if so, we are under a necessity
of being blameworthy. And how does this
consist with what he so often asserts, that necessity is inconsistent with
blame or praise? If we have it not in our power to perform perfect obedience to
all the commands of God, then we are under a necessity of breaking some
commands, in some degree; having no
power to perform so much as is commanded.
And if so, why does he cry out of the unreasonableness and folly of
commanding beyond what men have power to do?
Arminians in general are very
inconsistent with themselves, in what they say of the inability of fallen man
in this respect. They strenuously
maintain, that it would be unjust in God, to require anything of us beyond our
present power and ability to perform.
And also hold that we are now unable to perform perfect obedience, and
that Christ died to satisfy for the imperfections of our obedience and
has made way, that our imperfect obedience might be accepted instead of
perfect; wherein they seem insensibly
to run themselves into the grossest inconsistency. For (as I have observed elsewhere), “they hold that God, in mercy
to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution or law, that they were
under originally, and instead of it, has introduced a more mild
constitution. And [he] put us under a
new law, which requires no more than imperfect sincere obedience, in compliance
with our poor infirm impotent circumstances since the fall.”
Now how can these things be made
consistent? I would ask, of what law are these imperfections of our obedience a
breach? If they are a breach of no law that we were ever under, then they are
not sins. And if they be not sins, what
need of Christ dying to satisfy for them? But if they are sins, and the breach
of some law, what law is it? They cannot be a breach of their new law, for that
requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with
imperfections: and therefore to have
obedience attended with imperfections, is no breach of it; for it is as much as it requires. And they cannot be a breach of their old
law: for that, they say, is entirely
abolished; and we never were under
it. — They say, it would not be just in
God to require of us perfect obedience, because it would not be just to
require more than we can perform, or to punish us for failing of it. And, therefore, by their own scheme, the
imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ dying, to
satisfy for them? What need of his suffering, to satisfy for that which
is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no suffering? What need of Christ
dying, to purchase, that our imperfect obedience should be accepted,
when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself, that any other
obedience than imperfect should be required? What need of Christ dying to make
way for God’s accepting of such obedience, as it would be unjust in him not to
accept? Is there any need of Christ dying to prevail with God not to do
unrighteously? — If it be said, that Christ died to satisfy that old law for
us, that so we might not be under it, but that there might be room for our
being under a more mild law; still I
would inquire, what need of Christ dying, that we might not be under a law,
which (by their principles) it would be in itself unjust that we should be
under, whether Christ had died or no, because, in our present state, we are not
able to keep it?
So the Arminians are inconsistent with
themselves, not only, in what they say of the need of Christ’s satisfaction to
atone for those imperfections, which we cannot avoid, but also in what they say
of the grace of God, granted to enable men to perform the sincere obedience of
the new law. “I grant indeed (says Dr.
Stebbing), *26* that by original sin, we are utterly disabled for the
performance of the condition, without new grace from God. But I say then, that he gives such a grace
to all of us, by which the performance of the condition, is truly
possible; and upon this ground he may
and doth most righteously require it.”
If Dr. Stebbing intends to speak properly, by grace he must mean,
that assistance which is of grace, or of free favor and kindness. But yet in the same place he speaks of it as
very unreasonableness, unjust, and cruel, for God to require
that, as the condition of pardon, that is become impossible by original
sin. If it be so, what grace is
there in giving assistance and ability to perform the condition of pardon? Or
why is that called by the name of grace, that is an absolute debt, which God is
bound to bestow, and which it would be unjust and cruel in him to withhold,
seeing he requires that, as the condition of pardon, which he cannot
perform without it?
It being so much insisted on by
Arminian writers, that necessity is inconsistent with law or command, and
particularly, that it is absurd to suppose God by his command should require
that of men which they are unable to do;
not allowing in this case for any difference between natural and moral
inability; I would therefore now
particularly consider this matter. —
And for greater clearness I would distinctly lay down the following things.
I.
The will itself, and not only those actions which are the
effects of the will, is the proper object of precept or command. That is, such a state or acts of men’s
wills, are in many cases properly required of them by commands; and not only those alterations in the state
of their bodies or minds that are the consequences of volition. This is most manifest; for, it is the soul only, that is properly
and directly the subject of precepts or commands, that only being capable of
receiving or perceiving commands. The
motions or state of the body are matter of command, only as they are subject to
the soul, and connected with its acts.
But now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the most direct
and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply with any command, but the
faculty of the will. And it is by this
faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey, or refuse compliance: for the very notions of consenting,
yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, etc. are, according to the meaning of the terms,
nothing but certain acts of the will.
Obedience, in the primary nature of it, is the submitting and yielding
of the will of one, to the will of another.
Disobedience is the not consenting, not complying of the will of the
commanded, to the manifested will of the commander. Other acts that are not the acts of the will, as certain motions
of the body and alterations in the soul, are obedience or disobedience only
indirectly, as they are connected with the state or actions of the will,
according to an established law of nature.
So that it is manifest, the will itself may be required: and the being of a good will is the most
proper, direct, and immediate subject of command; and if this cannot be prescribed or required by command or
precept, nothing can. For other things
can be required no otherwise than as they depend upon, and are the fruits of a
good will.
Corol. 1. If there be several acts of the will, or a
series of acts, one following another, and one the effect of another, the first
and determining act is properly the subject of command, and not only the
consequent acts, which are dependent upon it.
Yea, this more especially is that to which command or precept has a
proper respect; because it is this act
that determines the whole affair: in this
act the obedience or disobedience lies, in a peculiar manner; the consequent acts being all governed and
determined by it. This governing act
must be the proper object of precept, or none.
Corol. 2. It also follows, from what has been observed,
that if there be any act, or exertion of the soul, prior to all free acts of
choice in the case, directing and determining what the acts of the will shall
be; that act of the soul cannot
properly be subject to any command or precept, in any respect whatsoever,
either directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely. Such acts cannot be subject to commands directly,
because they are no acts of the will;
being by the supposition prior to all acts of the will, determining and
giving rise to all its acts: they not
being acts of the will, there can be in them no consent to or compliance with
any command. Neither can they be
subject to command or precept indirectly or remotely; for they are not so much as the effects
or consequences of the will, being prior to all its acts. So that if there be any obedience in that
original act of the soul, determining all volitions, it is an act of obedience
wherein the will has no concern at all;
it preceding every act of will.
And therefore, if the soul either obeys or disobeys in this act, it is
wholly involuntarily; there is no
willing obedience or rebellion, no compliance or opposition of the will in the
affair: and what sort of obedience or
rebellion is this?
And thus the Arminian notion of the
freedom of the will consisting in the soul’s determining its own acts of will,
instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men being the subjects of
moral government, is utterly inconsistent with it. For if the soul determines all its acts of will, it is
therein subject to no command or moral government, as has been now
observed; because its original
determining act is no act of will or choice, it being prior, by the
supposition, to every act of will.
And the soul cannot be the subject of command in the act of the will
itself, which depends on the foregoing determining act, and is determined by
it; in as much as this is necessary,
being the necessary consequence and effect of that prior determining act, which
is not voluntary. Nor can the man be
the subject of command or government in his external actions; because these are all necessary, being the
necessary effects of the acts of the will themselves. So that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects of
command or moral government in nothing at all; and all their moral agency is entirely excluded, and no room is
left for virtue or vice in the world.
So that the Arminian scheme, and not
that of the Calvinists, is utterly inconsistent with moral government, and with
all use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promises, or threatenings. Neither is there any way whatsoever to make
their principles consist with these things.
For if it be said, that there is no prior determining act of the soul,
preceding the acts of the will, but that volitions are events that come to pass
by pure accident, without any determining cause, this is most palpably
inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts. For nothing is more plain than that laws can be of no use to
direct and regulate perfect accident:
which, by the supposition of its being pure accident, is in no case
regulated by anything preceding; but
happens, this way or that, perfectly by chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect uselessness of laws and precepts
also follows from the Arminian notion of indifference, as essential to that
liberty, which is requisite to virtue or vice.
For the end of laws is to bind to one side; and the end of commands is to turn the will one way: and therefore they are of no use, unless
they turn or bias the will that way. But
if liberty consists in indifference, then their biasing the will one way only,
destroys liberty; as it puts the will
out of equilibrium. So that the will,
having a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon it, is not
wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it will, without influence
from without.
II.
Having shown that the will itself, especially in those acts which are
original, leading and determining in any case, is the proper subject of precept
and command — and not only those alterations in the body, etc. which are the effects of the will — I now
proceed, in the second place, to observe, that the very opposition or
defect of the will itself, in its original and determining act in the
case, to a thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compliance, implies a
moral inability to that thing. In other
words, whenever a command requires a certain state or act of the will, and the
person commanded, notwithstanding the command and the circumstances under which
it is exhibited, still finds his will opposite or wanting, in that,
belonging to its state or acts, which is original and determining in the
affair, that man is morally unable to obey that command.
This is manifest from what was
observed in the first part concerning the nature of moral inability, as
distinguished from natural: where
it was observed, that a man may then be said to be morally unable to do a
thing, when he is under the influence or prevalence of a contrary inclination,
or has a want of inclination, under such circumstances and views. It is also evident, from what has been
before proved, that the will is always, and in every individual act,
necessarily determined by the strongest motive; *28* and so is always unable to go against the motive, which, all
things considered, has now the greatest strength and advantage to move the
will. — But not further to insist on
these things, the truth of the position now laid down, viz. that when the will is opposite to, or
failing of a compliance with, a thing, in its original determination or act,
it is not able to comply, appears by the consideration of these two things.
1.
The will in the time of that diverse or opposite leading act or
inclination, and when actually under its influence, is not able to exert itself
to the contrary, to make an alteration, in order to a compliance. The inclination is unable to change
itself; and that for this plain reason,
that it is unable to incline to change itself.
Present choice cannot at present choose to be otherwise: for that would be at present to
choose something diverse from what is at present chosen. If the will, all things now considered,
inclines or chooses to go that way, then it cannot choose, all things now
considered, to go the other way, and so cannot choose to be made to go the
other way. To suppose that the mind is
now sincerely inclined to change itself to a different inclination, is to
suppose the mind is now truly inclined otherwise than it is now inclined. The will may oppose some future remote act
that it is exposed to, but not its own present act.
2.
As it is impossible that the will should comply with the thing
commanded, with respect to its leading act, by any act of its own, in
the time of that diverse or opposite leading and original act, or after
it has actually come under the influence of that determining choice or inclination. So it is impossible it should be
determined to a compliance by any foregoing act; for, by the very supposition, there is no foregoing act; the opposite or noncomplying act being that
act which is original and determining in the case. Therefore it must be so, that if this first
determining act be found non-complying, on the proposal of the command, the
mind is morally unable to obey. For to
suppose it to be able to obey, is to suppose it to be able to determine and
cause its first determining act to be otherwise. And that it has power better to govern and
regulate its first governing and regulating act, which is absurd; for it is to suppose a prior act of the
will, determining its first determining act.
That is, an act prior to the first, and leading and governing the
original and governing act of all;
which is a contradiction.
Here if it should be said, that
although the mind has not any ability to will contrary to what it does will, in
the original and leading act of the will, because there is supposed to be no
prior act to determine and order it otherwise, and the will cannot immediately
change itself, because it cannot at present incline to a change; yet the mind has an ability for the present
to forbear to proceed to action, and taking time for deliberation; which may be an occasion of the change of
the inclination.
I answer, (1.) In this objection, that
seems to be forgotten which was observed before, viz. that the determining to take the matter into consideration, is
itself an act of the will. If this be
all the act wherein the mind exercises ability and freedom, then this, by the
supposition, must be all that can be commanded or required by precept. And if this act be the commanding act, then
all that has been observed concerning the commanding act of the will remains
true, that the very want of it is a moral inability to exert it, etc. (2.) We are speaking concerning the first
and leading act of the will about the affair;
and if determining to deliberate, or, on the contrary, to proceed
immediately without deliberating, be the first and leading act; or whether it be or no, if there be another
act before it, which determines that;
or whatever be the original and leading act. Still the foregoing proof stands good, that the noncompliance of
the leading act implies moral inability to comply.
If it should be objected, that these
things make all moral inability equal, and suppose men morally unable to will
otherwise than they actually do will, in all cases, and equally so in every
instance. — In answer to this
objection, I desire two things may be observed.
First, that if by being equally unable, be meant,
as really unable; then, so far
as the inability is merely moral, it is true.
The will, in every instance, acts by moral necessity, and is morally
unable to act otherwise, as truly and properly in one case as another; as, I humbly conceive, has been perfectly
and abundantly demonstrated by what has been said in the preceding part of this
essay. But yet, in some respect, the
inability may be said to be greater in some instances than others: though the man may be truly unable (if moral
inability can truly be called inability), yet he may be further from being able
to do some things than others. As it is
in things, which men are naturally unable to do. A person, whose strength is no more than sufficient to lift the
weight of one hundred pounds, is as truly and really unable to lift one hundred
and one pounds, as ten thousand pounds.
Yet he is further from being able to lift the latter weight than the
former; and so, according to the common
use of speech, has a greater inability for it.
So it is in moral inability. A
man is truly morally unable to choose contrary to a present inclination, which
in the least degree prevails; or,
contrary to that motive, which, all things considered, has strength and
advantage now to move the will, in the least degree, superior to all other motives
in view. Yet, he is further from ability
to insist a very strong habit, and a violent and deeply rooted inclination, or
a motive vastly exceeding all others in strength. Again, the inability may, in some respects, be called greater in
some instances than others, as it may be more general and extensive
to all acts of that kind. So men
may be said to be unable in a different sense, and to be further from moral
ability, who have that moral inability which is general and habitual,
than they who have only that inability which is occasional and particular. *29* Thus in cases of natural
inability; he that is born blind may be
said to be unable to see, in a different manner, and is, in some respects,
further from being able to see, than he whose sight is hindered by a transient
cloud or mist.
And besides, that which was observed
in the first part of this discourse, concerning the inability which attends a strong
and settled habit, should be there remembered. That a fixed habit is attended with this peculiar moral
inability, by which it is distinguished from occasional volition,
namely, that endeavors to avoid future volitions of that kind, which are
agreeable to such a habit, much more frequently and commonly prove vain and
insufficient. For though it is
impossible there should be any sincere endeavors against a present choice, yet
there may be against volitions of that kind, when viewed at a distance. A person may desire and use means to prevent
future exercises of a certain inclination;
and, in order to it, may wish the habit might be removed; but his desires and endeavors may be
ineffectual. The man may be said in
some sense to be unable; yea, even as
the word unable is a relative term, and has relation to
ineffectual endeavors; yet not with
regard to present, but remote endeavors.
Secondly, it must be borne in mind, according to what was
observed before, that indeed no inability whatsoever, which is merely
moral, is properly called by the name of inability. And;
in the strictest propriety of speech, a man may be said to have a thing in
his power, if he has it at his election.
And; he cannot be said to be
unable to do a thing, when he can, if he now pleases, or whenever he has a
proper, direct, and immediate desire for it.
As to those desires and endeavors that may be against the exercises of a
strong habit, with regard to which men may be said to be unable to avoid those
exercises, they are remote desires and endeavors in two respects. First, as to time; they are never against present
volitions, but only against volitions of such a kind, when viewed at a
distance. Secondly, as to their nature,
these opposite desires are not directly and properly against the habit and
inclination itself, or the volitions in which it is exercised. For these, in themselves considered, are
agreeable. But against something else
that attends them, or is their consequence;
the opposition of the mind is leveled entirely against this; the volitions themselves are not at all
opposed directly, and for their own sake;
but only indirectly and remotely, on the account of something foreign.
III.
Though the opposition of the will itself, or the very want of will to a
thing commanded, implies a moral inability to that thing; yet, if it be, as has been already shown,
that the being of a good state or act of will, is a thing most properly
required by command; then, in some
cases, such a state or act of will may properly be required, which at present
is not, and which may also be wanting after it is commanded. Therefore, those things may properly be
commanded, for which men have a moral inability.
Such a state or act of the will may be
required by command, as does not already exist. For, if that volition only may be commanded to be, which already
is, there could be no use of precept:
commands in all cases would be perfectly vain and impertinent. And not only may such a will be required, as
is wanting before the command is given, but also such as may possibly be
wanting afterwards; such as the
exhibition of the command may not be effectual to produce or excite. Otherwise, no such thing as disobedience to
a proper and rightful command is possible in any case; and there is no case possible, wherein there
can be a faulty disobedience. Which
Arminians cannot affirm, consistently with their principle: for this makes obedience to just and proper
commands always necessary, and disobedience impossible. And so the Arminian would overthrow himself,
yielding the very point we are upon, which he so strenuously denies, viz. that law and command are consistent with
necessity.
If merely that inability will excuse
disobedience, which is implied in the opposition or defect of inclination,
remaining after the command is exhibited, then wickedness always carries that
in it which excuses it. By how much the
more wickedness there is in a man’s heart, by so much is his inclination to
evil the stronger, and by so much the more, therefore, has he of moral
inability to the good required. His
moral inability consisting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the very
thing wherein his wickedness consists.
And yet, according to Arminian principles, it must be a thing
inconsistent with wickedness; and by
how much the more he has of it, by so much is he the further from wickedness.
Therefore, on the whole, it is
manifest, that moral inability alone (which consists in disinclination) never
renders anything improperly the subject matter of precept or command, and never
can excuse any person in disobedience, or want of conformity to a command.
Natural inability, arising from the
want of natural capacity, or external hindrance (which alone is properly called
inability), without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a thing improperly the
matter of command. If men are excused
from doing or acting any good thing, supposed to be commanded, it must be
through some defect or obstacle that is not in the will itself, but either in
the capacity of understanding, or body, or outward circumstances. — Here two or three things may be observed,
1.
As to spiritual acts, or any good thing in the state or imminent acts of
the will itself, or of the affections (which are only certain modes of the
exercise of the will), if persons are justly excused, it must be through want
of capacity in the natural faculty of understanding. Thus the same spiritual duties, or holy affections and exercises
of heart, cannot be required of men, as may be of angels; the capacity of understanding being so much
inferior. So men cannot be required to
love those amiable persons, whom they have had no opportunity to see, or hear
of, or know in any way agreeable to the natural state and capacity of the human
understanding. However, the
insufficiency of motives will not excuse unless their being insufficient arises
not from the moral state of the will or inclination itself, but from the state
of the natural understanding. The great
kindness and generosity of another may be a motive insufficient to excite
gratitude in the person that receives the kindness, through his vile and
ungrateful temper. In this case, the
insufficiency of the motive arises from the state of the will or inclination of
heart, and does not at all excuse. But
if this generosity is not sufficient to excite gratitude, being unknown, there
being no means of information adequate to the state and measure of the person’s
faculties, this insufficiency is attended with a natural inability, which
entirely excuses it.
2.
As to such motions of body, or exercises and alterations of mind, which
do not consist in the imminent acts or state of the will itself — but are
supposed to be required as effects of the will, in cases wherein there is no
want of a capacity of understanding that — inability, and that only, excuses,
which consists in want of connection between them and the will. If the will fully complies, and the proposed
effect does not prove, according to the laws of nature, to be connected with
his volition, the man is perfectly excused;
he has a natural inability to the thing required. For the will itself, as has been observed,
is all that can be directly and immediately required by command; and other things only indirectly, as
connected with the will. If therefore,
there be a full compliance of will, the person has done his duty; and if other things do not prove to be
connected with his volition, that is not criminally owing to him.
3.
Both these kinds of natural inability, and all inability that excuses,
may be resolved into one thing; namely,
want of natural capacity or strength;
either capacity of understanding, or external strength. For when there are external defects and
obstacles, they would be no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and
limitations of understanding and strength.
Corol. If
things for which men have a moral inability may properly be the matter of
precept or command, then they may also of invitation and counsel, commands and
invitations come very much to the same thing.
The difference is only circumstantial:
commands are as much a manifestation of the will of him that speaks, as
invitations, and as much testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing
that touches the affair in hand. The
main difference between command and invitation consists in the enforcement of
the will of him who commands or invites.
In the latter it is his kindness, the goodness from which his
will arises. In the former it is his authority. But whatever be the ground of will in
him that speaks, or the enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither
his will, nor his expectation, is any more testified in the one case than the
other. Therefore, a person being
directed by invitation, is no more an evidence of insincerity in him
that directs — in manifesting either a will or expectation which he has not —
than a person being known to be morally unable to do what he is directed by
command is an evidence of insincerity.
So that all this grand objection of Arminians against the inability of
fallen men to exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual duties, from
the sincerity of God’s counsels and invitations, must be without force.
It is much insisted on by many, that
some men, though they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as
repentance of sin, love to God, a cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and
offered in the gospel, etc. yet may
sincerely desire and endeavor after these things; and therefore must be excused.
It being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things,
which they sincerely desire and endeavor to do, but cannot. Concerning this matter, the following things
may be observed.
1.
What is here supposed, is a great mistake, and gross absurdity. That men may sincerely choose and desire
those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, etc. consisting in the exercise of the will
itself, or in the disposition and inclination of the heart; and yet not able to perform or exert
them. This is absurd, because it is
absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly, and sincerely incline
to have an inclination, which at the same time is contrary to his
inclination: for that is to suppose him
not to be inclined to that which he is inclined to. If a man, in the state and acts of his will and inclination,
properly and directly falls in with those duties, he therein performs them: for the duties, themselves consist in that
very thing; they consist in the state
and acts of the will being so formed and directed. If the soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain
proposed act of will or choice, the soul therein makes that choice its
own. Even as when a moving body falls
in with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to move
in that direction.
2.
That which is called a desire and willingness for those
inward duties in such as do not perform them, has respect to these duties only
indirectly and remotely, and is improperly so called. Not only because (as was observed before) it respects those good
volitions only in a distant view, and with respect to future time; but also because evermore, not these things
themselves, but something else that is foreign, is the object that terminates
these volitions and desires.
A drunkard, who continues in his
drunkenness, being under the power of a violent appetite to strong drink, and
without any love to virtue; but being
also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved at the
diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in a sort desire
the virtue of temperance; and though
his present will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had
a heart to forbear future acts of intemperance, and forsake his excesses,
through an unwillingness to part with his money. Still he goes on with his drunkenness; his wishes and endeavors are insufficient and ineffectual. Such a man has no proper, direct, sincere
willingness to forsake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to
it. For he acts voluntarily in
continuing to drink to excess, his desire is very improperly called a
willingness to be temperate. It is no
true desire of that virtue; for it is
not that virtue, that terminates his wishes;
nor have they any direct respect at all to it. It is only the saving of his money, or the avoiding of
poverty, that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his desire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only
very indirectly and improperly, even as a necessary means of gratifying the
vice of covetousness.
So, a man of an exceedingly corrupt
and wicked heart, who has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the
contrary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste
of the things of religion, and enmity against them. Yet being of a family, that, from one generation to another, have
most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption, and so having little
hope of living long; and having been instructed
in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and gratitude for his death and
sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal misery; if under these circumstances he should,
through fear of eternal torments, wish he had such a disposition; but his profane and carnal heart remaining,
he continues still in his habitual distaste of, and enmity to God
and religion, and wholly without any exercise of that love and gratitude (as
doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of
their temper, would wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out
of hell). In this case, there is no
sincere willingness to love Christ and choose him as his chief good. These holy dispositions and exercises are
not at all the direct object of the will.
They truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul, but
all is terminated on deliverance from torment.
And these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced
consent, are looked upon as in themselves undesirable; as when a sick man desires a dose he greatly
abhors, in order to save his life. From
these things it appears,
3.
That this indirect willingness is not that exercise of the will which
the command requires; but is entirely a
different one; being a volition of a
different nature, and terminated altogether on different objects; wholly falling short of that virtue of will,
to which the command has respect,
4.
This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the duty
required, cannot excuse for the want of that goodwill itself, which is
commanded; being not the thing which
answers and fulfills the command, and being wholly destitute of the virtue
which the command seeks.
Further to illustrate this
matter: if a child has a most excellent
father that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has
every way, in the highest degree, merited his love and dutiful regard, and is
withal very wealthy; but the son is of
so vile a disposition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him
is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to those abject
circumstances, which are exceedingly adverse to his avarice and ambition; he, therefore, wishes it were
otherwise: but yet remaining under the
invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in
his settled hatred of his father. Now,
if such a son’s indirect willingness to love and honor his father, at all
acquits or excuses before God, for his failing of actually exercising these
dispositions towards him, which God requires, it must be on one of these
accounts. (1.) Either, that it answers
and fulfills the command. But this it
does not by the supposition; because
the thing commanded is love and honor to his worthy parent. If the command be proper and just, as is
supposed, then it obliges to the thing commanded; and so nothing else but that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there
is that virtue or goodness in his indirect willingness, that is equivalent to
the virtue required; and so balances or
countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The willingness the son has merely from a
regard to money and honor, has no goodness in it, to countervail the want of
the pious filial respect required.
Sincerity and reality, in that
indirect willingness, which has been spoken of, does not make it the
better. That which is real and hearty
is often called sincere; whether it be
in virtue or vice. Some persons are
sincerely bad; others are
sincerely good; and others may
be sincere and hearty in things, which are in their own nature indifferent; as a man may be sincerely desirous of
eating when he is hungry. But being
sincere, hearty, and in good earnest, is no virtue, unless it be in a thing
that is virtuous. A man may be sincere
and hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and besought
Christ not to torment them, it was no mere pretense; they were very hearty in their desires not to be tormented: but this did not make their will or desire
virtuous. And if men have sincere
desires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for
the want of any required virtue.
And as a man’s sincerity in such an
indirect desire or willingness to do his duty, as has been mentioned,
cannot excuse for the want of performance;
so it is with endeavors arising from such a willingness. The endeavors can have no more goodness in
them, than the will of which they are the effect and expression. And, therefore, however sincere and real,
and however great a person’s endeavors are;
yea, though they should be to the utmost of his ability; unless the will from which they proceed be
truly good and virtuous, they can be of no avail or weight whatsoever in a
moral respect. That which is not truly
virtuous is, in God’s sight, good for nothing:
and so can be of no value, or influence, in his account, to make up for
any moral defect. For nothing can
counterbalance evil, but good. If evil
be in one scale, and we put a great deal into the other of sincere and earnest
desires, and many and great endeavors;
yet, if there be no real goodness in all, there is no weight in
it; and so it does nothing towards
balancing the real weight, which is in the opposite scale. It is only like subtracting a thousand
noughts from before a real number, which leaves the sum just as it was.
Indeed such endeavors may have a negatively
good influence. Those things, which
have no positive virtue, have no positive moral influence; yet they may be an occasion of persons
avoiding some positive evils. As if a
man were in the water with a neighbor to whom he had ill will, and who could
not swim, holding him by his hand; this
neighbor was much in debt to him, — the man is tempted to let him sink and
drown — but refuses to comply with the temptation; not from love to his neighbor, but from the love of money, and
because by his drowning he should lose his debt; that which he does in preserving his neighbor from drowning, is
nothing good in the sight of God: yet
hereby he avoids the greater guilt that would have been contracted, if he had
designedly let his neighbor sink and perish.
But when Arminians, in their disputes with Calvinists, insist so much on
sincere desires and endeavors, as what must excuse men, must be accepted of
God, etc. it is manifest they have
respect to some positive moral weight or influence of those desires and endeavors. Accepting, justifying, or excusing on the
account of sincere endeavors (as they are called), and men doing what they can,
etc. has relation to some moral value,
something that is accepted as good, and as such, countervailing some defect.
But there is a great and unknown
deceit, arising from the ambiguity of the phrase, sincere endeavors. Indeed, there is a vast indistinctness and
unfixedness in most or at least very many of the terms used to express things
pertaining to moral and spiritual matters.
Whence arise innumerable mistakes, strong prejudices, inextricable
confusion, and endless controversy. —
The word sincere is most commonly used to signify something that is
good: men are habituated to understand
by it the same as honest and upright; which terms excite an idea of something good in the strictest
and highest sense; good in the sight of
him, who sees not only the outward appearance, but the heart. And, therefore, men think that if a person
be sincere, he will certainly be accepted. If it be said that anyone is sincere in his endeavors, this
suggests, that his heart is good, that there is no defect of duty, as to
virtuous inclination; he honestly
and uprightly desires and endeavors to do as he is required; and this leads them to suppose, that it
would be very hard and unreasonable to punish him, only because he is
unsuccessful in his endeavors, the thing endeavored after being beyond his
power. — Whereas it ought to be
observed, that the word sincere has these different significations.
1.
Sincerity, as the word is sometimes used, signifies no more than reality
of will and endeavor, with respect to anything that is professed or
pretended; without any consideration of
the nature of the principle or aim, whence this real will and true endeavor
arises. If a man has some real desire
either direct or indirect to obtain a thing, or does really endeavor
after it, he is said sincerely to desire or endeavor, without any
consideration of the goodness of the principle from which he acts, or any excellency
or worthiness of the end for which he acts.
Thus a man who is kind to his neighbor’s wife, who is sick and
languishing, and very helpful in her case, makes a show of desiring and
endeavoring her restoration to health and vigor; and not only makes such a show, but there is a reality in his
pretense, he does heartily and earnestly desire to have her health restored,
and uses his true and utmost endeavors for it.
He is said sincerely to desire and endeavor after it, because he
does so truly or really; though perhaps
the principle he acts from, is no other than a vile and scandalous
passion; having lived in adultery with
her, he earnestly desires to have her health and vigor restored, that he may
return to his criminal pleasures. Or,
2.
By sincerity is meant, not merely a reality of will and
endeavor of some sort, and from some consideration or other, but a virtuous
sincerity. That is, that in the
performance of those particular acts, that are the matter of virtue or duty,
there be not only the matter, but the form and essence of virtue, consisting in
the aim that governs the act, and the principle exercised in it. There is not only the reality of the act,
that is as it were the body of the duty; but also the soul, which should properly belong to such a
body. In this sense, a man is said to
be sincere, when he acts with a pure intention; not from sinister views.
He not only in reality desires and seeks the thing to be done, or
qualification to be obtained, for some end or other; but he wills the thing directly and properly, as neither forced
nor bribed; the virtue of the thing is
properly the object of the will.
In the former sense, a man is said to
be sincere, in opposition to a mere pretense, and show of the particular
thing to be done or exhibited, without any real desire or endeavor at
all. In the latter sense, a man is said
to be sincere, in opposition to that show of virtue there is in merely doing
the matter of duty, without the reality of the virtue itself in the
soul. A man may be sincere in the
former sense, and yet in the latter be in the sight of God, who searches the
heart, a vile hypocrite.
In the latter kind of sincerity, only,
is there anything truly valuable or acceptable in the sight of God. And this is what in Scripture is called sincerity,
uprightness, integrity,
“ truth in the inward parts,” and
“heirs of a perfect heart.” And if
there be such a sincerity, and such a degree of it as there ought to be, and
there be anything further that the man is not able to perform, or which does
not prove to be connected with his sincere desires and endeavors, the man is
wholly excused and acquitted in the sight of God. His will shall surely be accepted for his deed: and such a sincere will and endeavor is all
that in strictness is required of him, by any command of God. But as to the other kind of sincerity of
desires and endeavors, having no virtue in it (as was observed before), it can
be of no avail before God, in any case, to recommend, satisfy, or excuse, and
has no positive moral weight or influence whatsoever.
Corol. 1. Hence it may be inferred, that nothing in
the reason and nature of things appears from the consideration of any moral
weight in the former kind of sincerity, leading us to suppose, that God has made
any positive promises of salvation, or grace, or any saving assistance, or any
spiritual benefit whatsoever, to any desires, prayers, endeavors, striving, or
obedience of those, who hitherto have no true virtue or holiness in their
hearts. Though we should suppose all
the sincerity, and the utmost degree of endeavor, that is possible to be in
person without holiness.
Some object against God requiring, as
the condition of salvation, those holy exercises, which are the result of a
supernatural renovation; such as a
supreme respect to Christ, love to God, loving holiness for its own sake,
etc. That these inward dispositions and
exercises are above men’s power, as they are by nature; and therefore that we may conclude, that
when men are brought to be sincere in their endeavors, and do as well as they
can, they are accepted. And that this
must be all that God requires, in order to their being received as the objects
of his favor, and must be what God has appointed as the condition of
salvation. Concerning this, I would
observe, that in such manner of speaking as “men being accepted because they
are sincere, and do as well as they can,” there is evidently a supposition of
some virtue, some degree of that which is truly good; though it does not go so far as were to be wished. For if men do what they can, unless
their so doing be from some good principle, disposition, or exercise of heart,
some virtuous inclination or act of the will;
their so doing what they can, is in some respect not a whit better than
if they did nothing at all. In such a
case, there is no more positive, moral goodness in a man doing what he can,
than in a windmill doing what it can.
Because the action does no more proceed from virtue. And there is nothing in such sincerity of
endeavor, or doing what we can, that should render it any more a fit
recommendation to positive favor and acceptance, or the condition of any reward
or actual benefit, than doing nothing.
For both the one and the other are alike nothing as to any, true moral weight
or value.
Corol. 2. Hence also it follows, there is nothing that
appears in the reason and nature of things, which can justly lead us to
determine, that God will certainly give the necessary means of salvation, or
some way or other bestow true holiness and eternal life on those heathens,
who are sincere (in the sense above explained) in their endeavors to find out
the will of the Deity, and to please him, according to their light, that they
may escape his future displeasure and wrath, and obtain happiness in the future
state, through his favor.
To suppose such a freedom of will, as
Arminians talk of, to be requisite to virtue and vice, is many ways contrary to
common sense.
If indifferences belong to liberty of
will, as Arminians suppose, and it be essential to a virtuous action that it be
performed in a state of liberty, as they also suppose; it will follow; that it is essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed
in a state of indifference. And if it
be performed in a state of indifference, then doubtless it must be
performed in the time of indifference.
And so it will follow, that in order to the virtue of an act, the heart
must be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act, and the more
indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act performed, so much
the better; because the act is
performed with so much the greater liberty.
But is this agreeable to the light of nature? Is it agreeable to the notions
which mankind in all ages have of virtue, that it lies in what is contrary to
indifference, even in the tendency and inclination of the heart
to virtuous action. And that the
stronger the inclination, and so the further from indifference, the more virtuous
the heart, and so much the more praiseworthy the act which
proceeds from it?
If we should suppose (contrary to what
has been before demonstrated) that there may be an act of will in a state of
indifference; for instance, this act,
viz. The will determining to put itself
out of a state of indifference, and to give itself a preponderation one
way; then it would follow, on Arminian
principles, that this act or determination of the will is that alone wherein virtue
consists, because this only is performed, while the mind remains in a state of
indifference, and so in a state of liberty:
for when once the mind is put out of its equilibrium, it is no longer in
such a state; and therefore all the
acts, which follow afterwards, proceeding from bias, can have the nature
neither of virtue nor vice. Or if the
thing which the will can do, while yet in a state of indifference, and so of
liberty, be only to suspend acting, and determine to take the matter into
consideration; then this determination
is that alone wherein virtue consists, and not proceeding to action after the
scale is turned by consideration. So
that it will follow, from these principles, that whatever is done after the
mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium, and arises from an inclination,
has nothing of the nature of virtue or vice, and is worthy of neither blame or
praise. But how plainly contrary is
this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of
sincerely virtuous actions! Which is, that they proceed from a heart well
disposed and well inclined; and
the stronger, the more fixed and determined, the good
disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of virtue, and so the more
of its truth and reality. But if there
be any acts, which are done in a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately
from perfect indifference and coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any
good principle or disposition in the heart.
Consequently, according to common sense, have no sincere goodness in
them, having no virtue of heart in them.
To have a virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favors virtue, and is
friendly to it, and not one perfectly cold and indifferent about it.
And besides, the actions that are done
in a state of indifference, or that arise immediately out of such a state,
cannot be virtuous, because, by the supposition, they are not determined by any
preceding choice. For if there be
preceding choice, then choice intervenes between the act and the state of
indifference; which is contrary to the
supposition of the act arising immediately out of indifference. But those acts, which are not determined by
preceding choice, cannot be virtuous or vicious, by Arminian principles,
because they are not determined by the will.
So that neither one way, nor the other, can any actions be virtuous or
vicious, according to those principles.
If the action be determined by a preceding act of choice, it
cannot be virtuous, because the action is not done in a state of indifference,
nor does immediately arise from such a state.
And so is not done in a state of liberty, If the action be not
determined by a preceding act of choice, then it cannot be virtuous; because then the will is not self-determined
in it. So that it is made certain, that
neither virtue nor vice can ever find any place in the universe!
Moreover, that it is necessary to a
virtuous action that it be performed in a state of indifference, under a notion
of that being a state of liberty, is contrary to common sense; as it is a dictate of common sense, that indifference
itself, in many cases, is vicious, and so to a high degree. As if when I see my neighbor or near friend,
and one who has in the highest degree merited of me, in extreme distress, and
ready to perish, I find an indifference in my heart with respect to anything
proposed to be done, which I can easily do, for his relief. So if it should be proposed to me to
blaspheme God, or kill my father, or do numberless other things, which might be
mentioned; the being indifferent, for a
moment, would be highly vicious and vile.
And it may be further observed, that
to suppose this liberty of indifference is essential to virtue and vice,
destroys the great difference of degrees of the guilt of different crimes, and
takes away the heinousness of the most flagitious, horrid iniquities; such as adultery, bestiality, murder,
perjury, blasphemy, etc. For, according
to these principles, there is no harm at all in having the mind in a state of
perfect indifference with respect to these crimes; nay, it is absolutely necessary in order to any virtue in
avoiding them, or vice in doing them.
But for the mind to be in a state of indifference with respect to them,
is to be next door to doing them. It is
then infinitely near to choosing, and so committing the fact: for equilibrium is the next step to a degree
of preponderation; and one, even the
least degree of preponderation (all things considered) is choice. And not only so, but for the will to be in a
state of perfect equilibrium with respect to such crimes, is for the mind to be
in such a state, as to be full as likely to choose them as to refuse them, to
do them as to omit them. And if our
minds must be in such a state, wherein it is as near to choosing as refusing,
and wherein it must of necessity, according to the nature of things, be as
likely to commit them, as to refrain from them; where is the exceeding heinousness of choosing and committing
them? If there be no harm in often being in such a state, where in the probability
of doing and forbearing are exactly equal, there being an equilibrium, and no
more tendency to one than the other;
then, according to the nature and laws of such a contingence, it may be
expected, as an inevitable consequence of such a disposition of things,
that we should choose them as often as reject them: that it should generally so fall out is necessary, as equality in
the effect is the natural consequence of the equal tendency of the cause, or of
the antecedent state of things from which the effect arises. Why then should we be so exceedingly to
blame, if it does so fall out?
It is many ways apparent, that the
Arminian scheme of liberty is utterly inconsistent with the being of any such
things as either virtuous or vicious habits or dispositions. If liberty of indifference be
essential to moral agency, then there can be no virtue in any habitual
inclinations of the heart; which are
contrary to indifference, and imply in their nature the very destruction and
exclusion of it. They suppose nothing
can be virtuous in which no liberty is exercised; but how absurd is it to talk of exercising indifference under
bias and preponderation!
And if self-determining power
in the will be necessary to moral agency, praise, blame, etc. then nothing done by the will can be any
further praiseworthy or blameworthy, than so far as the will is moved, swayed,
and determined by itself, and the scales turned by the sovereign power the will
has over itself. And therefore the will
must not be out of its balance, preponderation must not be determined and effected
beforehand; and so the self-determining
act anticipated. Thus it appears
another way, that habitual bias is inconsistent with that liberty, which
Arminians suppose to be necessary to virtue or vice; and so it follows, that habitual bias itself cannot be either
virtuous or vicious.
The same thing follows from their
doctrine concerning the Inconsistency of necessity with liberty, praise,
dispraise, etc. None will deny, that
bias and inclination may be so strong as to be invincible, and leave no possibility
of the will determining contrary to it;
and so be attended with necessity.
This Dr. Whitby allows concerning the will of God, angels, and glorified
saints, with respect to good; and the
will of devils, with respect to evil.
Therefore, if necessity be inconsistent with liberty, then, when fixed
inclination is to such a degree of strength, it utterly excludes all virtue,
vice, praise, or blame. And, if so,
then the nearer habits are to this strength, the more do they impede liberty,
and so diminish praise and blame. If
very strong habits destroy liberty, the lesser ones proportionally hinder it,
according to their degree of strength.
And therefore it will follow, that then is the act most virtuous or
vicious, when performed without any inclination or habitual bias at all; because it is then performed with most
liberty.
Every prepossessing fixed bias on the
mind brings a degree of moral inability for the contrary; because so far as the mind is biased and
prepossessed, so much hindrance is there of the contrary. And therefore if moral inability be
inconsistent with moral agency, or the nature of virtue and vice, then, so far
as there is any such thing as evil disposition of heart, or habitual depravity
of inclination; whether covetousness,
pride, malice, cruelty, or whatever else;
so much the more excusable persons are;
so much the less have their evil acts of this kind the nature of vice. And on the contrary, whatever excellent
dispositions and inclinations they have so much are they the less virtuous.
It is evident, that no habitual
disposition of heart can be in any degree virtuous or vicious, or the
actions, which proceed from them at all praiseworthy or
blameworthy. Because, though we should
suppose the habit not to be of such strength, as wholly to take away all moral
ability and self-determining power; or
may be partly from bias, and in part from self-determination; yet in this case, all that is from antecedent
bias must be set aside, as of no consideration; and in estimating the degree of virtue or vice, no more must be
considered than what arises from self-determining power, without any influence
of that bias, because liberty is exercised in no more: so that all that is the exercise of habitual
inclination is thrown away, as not belonging to the morality of the
action. By which it appears, that no
exercise of these habits, let them be stronger or weaker, can ever have
anything of the nature of either virtue or vice.
Here if anyone should say that,
notwithstanding all these things, there may be the nature of virtue and vice in
the habits of the mind, because these habits may be the effects of those acts,
wherein the mind exercised liberty.
That however the aforementioned reasons will prove that no habits, which
are natural, or that are born or created with us, can be either virtuous or
vicious; yet they will not prove this
of habits, which have been acquired and established by repeated free acts.
To such an objector I would say, that
this evasion will not at all help the matter.
For if freedom of will be essential to the very nature of virtue
and vice, then there is no virtue or vice but only in that very thing, wherein
this liberty is exercised. If a man in
one or more things, that he does, exercises liberty, and then by those acts is
brought into such circumstances, that his liberty ceases, and there follows a
long series of acts or events that come to pass necessarily; those consequent acts are not virtuous or
vicious, rewardable or punishable; but
only the free acts that established this necessity. For in them alone was the man free. The following effects, that are necessary, have no more of the
nature of virtue or vice, than health or sickness of body have properly the
nature of virtue or vice, being the effects of a course of free acts of
temperance or intemperance; or than the
good qualities of a clock are of the nature of virtue, which are the effects of
free acts of the artificer. Or the
goodness and sweetness of the fruits of a garden are moral virtues, being the
effects of the free and faithful acts of the gardener. If liberty be absolutely requisite to the
morality of actions, and necessity wholly inconsistent with it, as Arminians
greatly insist; then no necessary
effects whatsoever, let the cause be never so good or bad, can be virtuous
or vicious; but the virtue or vice must
be only in the free cause.
Agreeably to this, Dr. Whitby supposes, the necessity that attends the
good and evil habits of the saints in heaven, and damned in hell, which are the
consequence of their free acts in their state of probation, are not rewardable
or punishable.
On the whole, it appears, that if the
notions of Arminians concerning liberty and moral agency be true, it will
follow, that there is no virtue in any such habits or qualities as humility,
meekness, patience, mercy, gratitude, generosity, heavenly-mindedness; nothing at all praiseworthy in loving Christ
above father and mother, wife and children, or our own lives; or in delight in holiness, hungering and
thirsting after righteousness, love to enemies, universal benevolence to
mankind. And, on the other hand, there
is nothing at all vicious, or worthy of dispraise, in the most sordid, beastly,
malignant, devilish dispositions; in being
ungrateful, profane, habitually hating God, and things sacred and holy; or in being most treacherous, envious, and
cruel towards men. For all these things
are dispositions and inclinations of the heart. In short, there is no such thing as any
virtuous or vicious quality of mind.
No such thing, as inherent virtue and holiness, or vice and
sin. The stronger those habits or
dispositions are, which used to be called virtuous and vicious, the further
they are from being so indeed; the more
violent men’s lusts are, the more fixed their pride, envy, ingratitude, and
maliciousness, still the further are they from being blameworthy. If there be a man that by his own repeated
acts, or by any other means, is come to be of the most hellish disposition,
desperately inclined to treat his neighbors with injuriousness, contempt, and
malignity, the further they should be from any disposition to be angry with
him, or in the least to blame him. So,
on the other hand, if there be a person, who is of a most excellent spirit,
strongly inclining him to the most amiable actions, admirably meek, benevolent,
etc. so much is he further from
anything rewardable or commendable. On
which principles, the man Jesus Christ was very far from being praiseworthy for
those acts of holiness and kindness which he performed, these propensities
being strong in his heart. And, above
all, the infinitely holy and gracious God is infinitely remote from anything
commendable, his good inclinations being infinitely strong, and he, therefore,
at the utmost possible distance from being at liberty. And in all cases, the stronger the
inclinations of any are to virtue, and the more they love it, the less
virtuous, and the more they love wickedness, the less vicious they are. — Whether these things are agreeable to
Scripture, let every Christian, and every man who has read the Bible,
judge: and whether they are agreeable
to common sense, let everyone judge, that has human understanding in exercise.
And, if we pursue these principles, we
shall find that virtue and vice are wholly excluded out of the world; and that there never was, nor ever can be,
any such thing as one or the other;
either in God, angels, or men.
No propensity, disposition, or habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has
been shown; because they, so far as
they take place, destroy the freedom of the will, the foundation of all moral
agency, and exclude all capacity of either virtue or vice. — And if habits and dispositions themselves
be not virtuous nor vicious, neither can the exercise of these dispositions be
so: for the exercise of bias is
not the exercise of free self-determining will, and so there is no
exercise of liberty in it.
Consequently, no man is virtuous or vicious, either in being well or ill
disposed, nor in acting from a good or bad disposition. And whether this bias or disposition be
habitual or not, if it exists but a moment before the act of will which is the
effect of it, it alters not the case, as to the necessity of the effect. Or if there be no previous disposition at
all, either habitual or occasional, that determines the act, then it is not
choice that determines it. It is
therefore a contingence, that happens to the man, arising from nothing in him
and is necessary, as to any inclination or choice of his. Therefore, cannot make him either the better
or worse; any more than a tree is
better than other trees, because it oftener happens to be lighted upon by a
nightingale; or a rock more vicious
than other rocks, because rattlesnakes have happened oftener to crawl over
it. So, that there is no virtue nor
vice in good or bad dispositions, either fixed or transient; nor any virtue or vice in acting from any
good or bad previous inclination; nor
yet any virtue or vice in acting wholly without any previous inclination. Where then shall we find room for virtue or
vice?
As Arminian notions of that liberty
which is essential to virtue or vice, are inconsistent with common sense, in
their being inconsistent with all virtuous or vicious habits and
dispositions; so they are no less inconsistent
with all influence of motives in moral actions. — Such influence equally against those
notions of liberty, whether there be, previous to the act of choice, a
preponderancy of the inclination, or a preponderancy of those circumstances,
which have a tendency to move the inclination.
And, indeed, it comes to just the same thing: to say, the circumstances of the mind are such as tend to sway
and turn its inclination one way, is the same thing, as to say, the
inclination of the mind, as under such circumstances, tends that way.
Or if any think it most proper to say,
that motives do alter the inclination, and give a new bias to the mind, it will
not alter the case, as to the present argument. For if motives operate by giving the mind an inclination, then
they operate by destroying the mind’s indifference, and laying it under a
bias. But to do this, is to destroy the
Arminian freedom: it is not to leave
the will to its own self-determination, but to bring it into subjection to the
power of something extrinsic, which operates upon it, sways and determines it,
previous to its own determination. So
that what is done from motive, cannot be either virtuous or vicious. Besides, if the acts of the will are excited
by motives, those motives are the causes of those acts of the will; which makes the acts of the will
necessary; as effects necessarily
follow the efficiency of the cause. And
if the influence and power of the motive causes the volition, then the
influence of the motive determines volition, and volition does not determine
itself; and so is not free, in the
sense of Arminians (as has been largely shown already), and consequently can be
neither virtuous nor vicious.
The supposition which has already been
taken notice of as an insufficient evasion in other cases, would be, in like
manner, impertinently alleged in this case;
namely, the supposition that liberty consists in a power of suspending
action for the present, in order to deliberation. If it should be said, Though it be true, that the will is under a
necessity of finally following the strongest motive; yet it may, for the present, forbear to act upon the motive
presented, till there has been opportunity thoroughly to consider it, and
compare its real weight with the merit of other motives. I answer as follows:
Here again, it must be remembered,
that if determining thus to suspend and consider, be that act of the will,
wherein alone liberty is exercised, then in this all virtue and vice must
consist. And the acts that follow this
consideration, and are the effects of it, being necessary, are no more virtuous
or vicious than some good or bad events, which happen when they are fast
asleep, and are the consequences of what they did when they were awake. Therefore, I would here observe two things:
1.
To suppose, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consists in
determining, whether to take time for consideration or not, is not agreeable to
common sense. For, according to such a
supposition, the most horrid crimes, adultery, murder, sodomy, blasphemy,
etc. do not at all consist in the
horrid nature of the things themselves, but only in the neglect of thorough
consideration before they were perpetrated, which brings their viciousness to a
small matter, and makes all crimes equal.
If it be said, that neglect of consideration, when such heinous evils
are proposed to choice, is worse than in other cases: I answer, this is inconsistent, as it supposes the very thing to
be, which, at the same time, is supposed not to be; it supposes all moral evil, all viciousness and heinousness, does
not consist merely in the want of consideration. It supposes some crimes in themselves, in their own
nature, to be more heinous than others, antecedent to consideration, or
inconsideration, which lays the person under a previous obligation to consider
in some cases more than others.
2.
If it were so, that all virtue and vice, in every case, consisted only
in the act of the will, whereby it determines whether to consider or no, it
would not alter the case in the least, as to the present argument. For still in this act of the will on this
determination, it is induced by some motive, and necessarily follows the
strongest motive; and so is
necessarily, even in that act wherein alone it is either virtuous or vicious.
One thing more I would observe,
concerning the inconsistency of Arminian notions of moral agency with the
Influence of motives. — I suppose none
will deny, that it is possible for such powerful motives to be set before the
mind, exhibited in so strong a light, and under such advantageous
circumstances, as to be invincible; and
such as the mind cannot but yield to.
In this case, Arminians will doubtless say, liberty is destroyed. And if so, then if motives are exhibited
with half so much power, they hinder liberty in proportion to their strength,
and go halfway towards destroying it.
If a thousand degrees of motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred
take it half away. If one degree of the
influence of motive does not at all infringe or diminish liberty, then no more
do two degrees; for nothing doubled, is
still nothing. And if two degrees do
not diminish the will’s liberty, no more do four, eight, sixteen, or six thousand. For nothing however multiplied comes to but
nothing. If there be nothing in the
nature of motive or moral suasion, that is at all opposite to liberty, then the
greatest degree of it cannot hurt liberty.
But if there be somewhat, in the nature of the thing, against liberty,
then the least degree of it hurts in some degree; and consequently diminishes virtue. If invincible motives to that action which
is good, take away all the freedom of the act, and so all the virtue of
it; then the more forcible the motives
are, so much the worse, so much the less virtue; and the weaker the motives are, the better for the cause of
virtue; and none is best of all.
Now let it be considered, whether
these things are agreeable to common sense.
If it should be allowed, that there are some instances, wherein the soul
chooses without any motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice? I am
sure there is no prudence or wisdom in it.
Such a choice is made for no good end; being made for no end at all.
If it were for any end, the view of the end would be the motive exciting
to the act. And if the act be for no
good end, and so from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it. Therefore, according to all our natural
notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke, which is
driven to and fro by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved, and
which knows not whither, nor wherefore, it is moved.
Corol. 1. By these things it appears, that the
argument against the Calvinists, taken from the use of counsels, exhortations,
invitations, expostulations, etc. so
much insisted on by Arminians, is truly against themselves. For these things can operate no other way to
any good effect, than as in them is exhibited motive and Inducement, tending to
excite and determine the acts of the will.
[The
true reasons WHY counsels, exhortations, etc.
commonly called motives are consistent with the doctrine of necessity
held by Calvinists, may be here noticed, in addition to some hints before
given. In order to this, we must guard
against ambiguity in the word “motive,” which at one time is intended for the
object exhibited, abstractedly considered;
at another, the object concretively, as it stands in the view of the
mind. The opposers of that necessity
for which our author pleads must in order to make even a show of consistency,
understand the word “motive” in the first of these acceptations. And if so, it is nothing marvelous that they
should maintain the existence of a power in the human mind which can, on the one
hand, successfully oppose the strongest possible motive; and on the other, be determined by a weaker,
and even sometimes by the weakest motive.
For how often is the most insignificant bawble preferred to infinite
excellence! But consistent Calvinists do not understand the term in any such manner,
but rather as an effect compounded of the state of the mind and the real
object. And, seeing the object, in
itself considered, is not changed by mental perception, the difference of the
effect, or change of mental view, must arise from the mind itself. Hence one motive, in the Arminian sense, may
produce, in the other acceptation of the term, a thousand different motives,
according to the different mental states to which the object is presented.
Therefore
counsels, exhortation, invitation, etc.
are most rationally employed by Calvinists; for that which determines the human will to action, is the motive
as it is perceived, or that which results from an application of the object to
the mind. According to them, without an
object presented there can be no motive, any more than there can be a motive
without a mind to which it is presented.
Without evangelical truth, and an evangelical mind, or disposition,
there can be no evangelical determining motive. Consequently, if the mind be at all roused from ignorance and
apathy, determining motives must be produced in it by a representation of
objects, by counsels, exhortations, invitation, expostulations, etc. These will succeed, or fail of success,
morally according to the state of the mind.
But as the agent is free from coaction, constraint, and compulsion, in
the act of choosing, the true inference is-not that such use of the means is
unsuitable or inconsistent, but-that here is clearly implied the great
necessity, the rationality, and the perfect consistency of prayer to the God of
grace, for success on the use of means.
Paul may plant, and Apollos may water, but God giveth the increase. To influence the mind without moral motives,
is the prerogative of God. All hearts
are in his hand to form them as he pleases.
If the tree be good by sovereign influence, or a new birth, the fruit of
love to God and hatred to sin, holy fear, unfeigned faith, humble hope,
etc. will follow according to the
objects presented. A crop will not
follow without the union of two things, seed and soil. If both be good, the crop will be good, but
not otherwise. That motive which
determines the will cannot arise from any other cause than the object and the
disposition united. And then only can
the determining motive be good, when it results from a good object applied to a
good disposition, or state of mind, These things duly considered will
sufficiently prove why Calvinists use counsels, exhortations, invitation,
etc. — W.]
But it follows, on their principles,
that the acts of will excited by such causes, cannot be virtuous; because, so far as they are from these, they
are not from the will’s self-determining power. Hence it will follow, that it is not worth while to offer any
arguments to persuade men to any virtuous volition or voluntary action; it is in vain to set before them the wisdom
and amiableness of ways of virtue, or the odiousness and folly of way of
vice. This notion of liberty and moral
agency frustrates all endeavors to draw men to virtue by instruction or persuasion,
precept or example. For though these
things may induce them to what is materially virtuous, yet at the same
time they take away the form of virtue, because they destroy
liberty; as they, by their own power,
put the will out of its equilibrium, determine and turn the scale, and take the
work of self-determining power out of its hands. And the clearer the instructions given, the more powerful the
arguments used, and the more moving the persuasions or examples, the more
likely they are to frustrate their own design;
because they have so much the greater tendency to put the will out of
its balance, to hinder its freedom of self-determination; and so to exclude the very form of virtue,
and the essence of whatsoever is praiseworthy.
So it clearly follows, from these
principles, that God has no hand in any man’s virtue, nor does at all promote
it, either by a physical or moral influence;
that none of the moral methods he uses with men to promote virtue in the
world, have any tendency to the attainment of that end; that all the instructions he has given men,
from the beginning of the world to this day, by prophets or apostles, or by his
Son Jesus Christ; that all his counsels,
invitations, promises, threatenings, warnings, and expostulations; that all means he has used with men, in
ordinances, or providences; yea, all
influences of his Spirit, ordinary and extraordinary, have had no tendency at
all to excite any one virtuous act of the mind, or to promote anything morally
good and commendable, in any respect. —
For there is no way that these or any other means can promote virtue, but one
of these three. Either, (1.) By a
physical operation on the heart. But
all effects that are wrought in men in this way, have no virtue in them, by the
concurring voice of all Arminians. Or,
(2.) Morally, by exhibiting motives to the understandings, to excite good acts
in the will. But it has been
demonstrated, that volitions excited by motives, are necessary, and not excited
by a self-moving power; and therefore,
by their principles, there is no virtue in them. Or, (3.) By merely giving the will an opportunity to determine
itself concerning the objects proposed, either to choose or reject, by its own
uncaused, unmoved, uninfluenced self-determination. And if this be all, then all those means do no more to promote
virtue than vice: for they do nothing
but give the will opportunity to determine itself either way, either to
good or bad, without laying it under any bias to either: and so there is really as much of an
opportunity given to determine in favor of evil, as of good.
Thus that horrid blasphemous
consequence will certainly follow from the Arminian doctrine, which they charge
on others; namely, that God acts an
inconsistent part in using so many counsels, warnings, invitations, entreaties,
etc. with sinners, to induce them to
forsake sin, and turn to the ways of virtue;
and that all are insincere and fallacious. It will follow, from their doctrine, that God does these things
when he knows, at the same time, that they have no manner of tendency to
promote the effect he seems to aim at;
yea, knows that if they have any influence, this very influence will be
inconsistent with such an effect, and will prevent it. But what an imputation of insincerity would
this fix on him, who is infinitely holy and true! — So that theirs is the
doctrine which, if pursued in its consequences, does horribly reflect on the
Most High, and fix on him the charge of hypocrisy; and not the doctrine of the Calvinist, according to their
frequent and vehement exclamations and invectives.
Corol. 2. From what has been observed in this section,
it again appears, that Arminian principles and notions, when fairly examined
and pursued in their demonstrable consequences, do evidently shut all virtue
out of the world, and make it impossible that there should ever be any such
thing, in any case; or that any such
thing should ever be conceived of. For,
by these principles, the very notion of virtue or vice implies absurdity and
contradiction. For it is absurd in
itself, and contrary to common sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind without
any good intention or aim. And, by
their principles, it is absurd to suppose a virtuous act with a good intention
or aim; for to act for an end, is to
act from a motive. So that if we rely
on these principles, there can be no virtuous act with a good design and
end; and it is self-evident, there can
be none without: consequently there can
be no virtuous act at all.
Corol. 3. It is manifest, that Arminian notions of
moral agency, and the being of a faculty of will, cannot consist
together. And that if there can be any
such thing as either a virtuous or vicious act, it cannot be an act of the
will. No will can be at all concerned
in it. For that act which is performed
without inclination, without motive, without end, must be performed without any
concern of the will. To suppose an act
of the will without these, implies a contradiction. If the soul in its act has no motive or end; then, in that act (as was observed before)
it seeks nothing, goes after nothing, exerts no inclination to anything; and this implies, that in that act it
desires nothing, and chooses nothing;
so that there is no act of choice in the case: and that is as much as to say, there is no act of will in the
case. Which very effectually shuts all
vicious and virtuous acts out of the universe;
inasmuch as, according to this, there can be no vicious or virtuous act
wherein the will is concerned: and
according to the plainest dictates of reason, and the light of nature, and also
the principles of Arminians themselves, there can be no virtuous or vicious act
wherein the will is not concerned. And
therefore there is no room for any virtuous or vicious acts at all.
Corol. 4. If none of the moral actions of intelligent
beings are influenced by either previous inclination or motive, another strange
thing will follow; and this is, that
God not only cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his creatures,
but he can make no conjecture, can give no probable guess concerning them. For all conjecture in things of this nature
must depend on some discerning or apprehension of these two things, previous
disposition and motive, which, as has been observed, Arminian
notions of moral agency, in their real consequence, altogether exclude.
One main foundation of the reasons,
which are brought to establish the aforementioned notions of liberty, virtue,
vice, etc., is a supposition, that the virtuousness of the dispositions, or
acts of the will, consists not in the nature of these dispositions or acts, but
wholly in the origin or cause of them.
So that if the disposition of the mind, or acts of the will, be never so
good, yet if the cause of the disposition or act be not our virtue, there is
nothing virtuous or praiseworthy in it.
On the contrary, if the will, in its inclination or acts, be never so
bad, yet unless it arises from something that is our vice or fault, there is
nothing vicious or blameworthy in it.
Hence their grand objection and pretended demonstration, or
self-evidence, against any virtue and commendableness, or vice and
blameworthiness, of those habits or acts of the will, which are not from some
virtuous or vicious determination of the will itself.
Now, if this matter be well
considered, it will appear to be altogether a mistake, yea, a gross
absurdity. That it is most certain,
that if there be any such things as a virtuous or vicious disposition, or
volition of mind, the virtuousness or viciousness of them consists not in the
origin or cause of these things, but in the nature of them.
If the essence of virtuousness or
commendableness, and of viciousness or fault, does not lie in the nature of the
dispositions or acts of mind, which are said to be our virtue or our fault, but
in their cause, then it is certain it lies no where at all. Thus, for instance, if the vice of a vicious
act of will lies not in the nature of the act, but the cause; so that its being of a bad nature will not
make it at all our fault, unless it arises from some faulty determination of
ours, as its cause, or something in us that is our fault; then, for the same reason, neither can the
viciousness of that cause lie in the nature of the thing itself, but in its
cause. That evil determination of ours
is not our fault, merely because it is of a bad nature, unless it arises from
some cause in us that is our fault. And
when we are come to this higher cause, still the reason of the thing holds
good; though this cause be of a bad
nature, yet we are not at all to blame on that account, unless it arises from
something faulty in us. Nor yet can
blameworthiness lie in the nature of this cause but in the cause of
that. And thus we must drive faultiness
back from step to step, from a lower cause to a higher, in infinitum; and that is thoroughly to banish it from
the world, and to allow it no possibility of existence anywhere in the
universality of things. On these
principles, vice, or moral evil cannot exist in anything that is an effect; because fault does not consist in
the nature of things, but in their cause;
as well as because effects are necessary, being unavoidably connected
with their cause: therefore the cause
only is to blame. And so it follows,
that faultiness can lie only in that cause, which is a cause only, and no
effect of anything. Nor yet can it lie
in this; for then it must lie in the
nature of the thing itself; not in its
being from any determination of ours, nor anything faulty in us, which is the
cause, nor indeed from any cause at all;
for, by the supposition, it is no effect, and has no cause. And thus he that will maintain it is not the
nature of habits or acts of will that makes them virtuous or faulty, but the
cause, must immediately run himself out of his own assertion; and, in maintaining it, will insensibly
contradict and deny it.
This is certain, that if [the] effects
are vicious and faulty, not from their nature, or from anything inherent in
them, but because they are from a bad cause, it must be, on account, of the badness
of the cause. A bad effect in the will
must be bad, because the cause is bad, or of an evil nature, or has
badness as a quality inherent in it.
And, a good effect in the will must be good, by reason, of the goodness
of the cause, or its being of a good kind and nature. And if this be what is meant, the very supposition of fault and
praise lying not in the nature of the thing, but the cause, contradicts itself,
and does at least resolve the essence of virtue and vice into the nature of
things, and supposes it originally to consist in that. — And if a caviler has a mind to run from the
absurdity, by saying, “No, the fault of the thing, which is the cause, lies not
in this, that the cause itself is of an evil nature, but that the cause is evil
in that sense, that it is from another bad cause,” — still the absurdity will
follow him; for if so, then the cause
before charged is at once acquitted, and all the blame must be laid to the
higher cause, and must consist in that’s being evil, or of an evil nature. So now we are come again to lay the blame of
the thing blameworthy, to the nature of the thing, and not to the cause. And if any is so foolish as to go higher
still, and ascend from step to step, till he is come to that which is the first
cause concerned in the whole affair, and will say, all the blame lies in
that; then, at last, he must be forced
to own, that the faultiness of the thing which he supposes alone blameworthy,
lies wholly in the nature of the thing, and not in the original or cause of
it. For the supposition is, that it has
no original, it is determined by no act of ours, is caused by nothing faulty in
us, being absolutely without any cause.
And so the race is at an end, but the evader is taken in his flight!
It is agreeable to the natural notions
of mankind, that moral evil, with its desert of dislike and abhorrence, and all
its other ill-deservings, consists in a certain deformity in the nature of
certain dispositions of the heart and acts of the will; and not in the deformity of something else,
diverse from the very thing itself;
which deserves abhorrence, supposed to be the cause of it; — which would be absurd, because that would
be to suppose a thing that is innocent and not evil, is truly evil and faulty,
because another thing is evil. It
implies a contradiction; for it would
be to suppose, the very thing which is morally evil and blameworthy, is innocent
and not blameworthy; but that something
else, which is its cause, is only to blame.
To say, that vice does not consist in the thing which is vicious, but in
its cause, is the same as to say, that vice does not consist in vice, but in
that which produces it.
It is true a cause may be to blame for
being the cause of vice. It may be
wickedness in the cause that it produces wickedness. But it would imply a contradiction, to suppose that these two are
the same individual wickedness. The
wicked act of the cause in producing wickedness, is one wickedness; and the wickedness produced, if there be any
produced, is another. And therefore,
the wickedness of the latter does not lie in the former, but is distinct from
it; and the wickedness of both lies in
the evil nature of the things which are wicked.
The thing, which makes sin hateful, is
that by which it deserves punishment, which is but the expression of
hatred. And that, which renders virtue
lovely, is the same with that on the account, of which, it is fit to receive
praise and reward; which are but the
expressions of esteem and love. But,
that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful nature; and that which renders virtue lovely, is its amiable nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are
inherent in that good or evil will, which is the soul of virtue and vice (and
not in the occasion of it), which is their worthiness of esteem or disesteem,
praise, or dispraise, according to the common sense of mankind. If the cause or occasion of the rise of a
hateful disposition or act of will, be also hateful, suppose another antecedent
evil will; that is entirely another
sin, and, deserves punishment by itself, under a distinct consideration. There is worthiness of dispraise in the
nature of an evil volition, and not wholly in some foregoing act, which is its
cause. Otherwise, the evil volition,
which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than sickness or some other
natural calamity, which arises from a cause morally evil.
Thus, for instance, ingratitude is
hateful and worthy of dispraise, according to common sense; not because something as bad, or worse than
ingratitude, was the cause that produced it;
but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent deformity. So, the love of virtue is amiable and worthy
of praise, not merely because something else went before this love of virtue in
our minds, which caused it to take place there; — for instance, our own choice;
we choose to love virtue, and, by some method or other, wrought
ourselves into the love of it; — but
because of the amiableness and condescendency of such a disposition and
inclination of heart. If that was the
case, that we did choose to love virtue, and so produced that love in
ourselves, this choice itself could be no otherwise amiable or praiseworthy,
than as love to virtue, or soma other amiable inclination, was exercised and
implied in it. If that choice was
amiable at all, it must be so on account of some amiable quality in the nature
of the choice. If we chose to love
virtue, not in love to virtue, or anything that was good and exercised no sort
of good disposition to the choice, the choice itself was not virtuous nor
worthy of any praise, according to common sense, because the choice was not of
a good nature.
It may not be improper here to take
notice of something said by an author, that has lately made a mighty noise in
America. “A necessary holiness (says
he) is no holiness. Adam could not be
originally created in righteousness and true holiness, because he must choose
to be righteous, before he could be righteous.
And therefore he must exist, he must be created; yea, he must exercise thought and
reflection, before he was righteous.”
There is much more to the same effect in that place, and in pp. 437,
438, 439, 440. If these things are so,
it will certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no
righteous choice; there is no
righteousness or holiness in it, because no choosing to be righteous goes
before it. For he plainly speaks of
choosing to be righteous, as what must go before righteousness. And that which follows the choice, being the
effect of the choice, cannot be righteousness or holiness. For an effect is a thing necessary, and
cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its cause; and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon
the cause; and he says a necessary
holiness is no holiness. So that
neither can a choice of righteousness be righteousness or holiness, nor can
anything that is consequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be
righteousness or holiness; nor can
anything that is without choice, be righteousness or holiness. So that by this scheme, all righteousness
and holiness is at once shut out of the world, and no door left open by which
it can ever possibly enter into the world.
I suppose, the way that men came to
entertain this absurd inconsistent notion, with respect to internal
inclinations and volitions themselves (or notions that imply it), viz. that the essence of their moral good or evil
lies not in their nature. But, their
cause, was, that it is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense. That it is so with respect to all outward
actions and sensible motions of the body;
that the moral good or evil of them does not lie at all in the motions
themselves, which, taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature. And the essence of all the moral good or
evil that concerns them lies in those internal dispositions and volitions,
which are the cause of them. Now, being
always used to determine this, without hesitation or dispute, concerning
external actions, which are the things that, in the common use of language, are
signified by such phrases as men’s actions, or their doings. Hence, when they came to speak of volitions,
and internal exercises of their inclinations, under the same denomination of
their actions, or what they do, they unwarily determined the case must also he
the same with these as with external actions, not considering the vast
difference in the nature of the case.
If any shall still object and say, why
is it not necessary that the cause should be considered in order to determine
whether anything be worthy of blame or praise? Is it agreeable to reason and
common sense, that a man is to be praised or blamed for that which he is not
the cause or author of, and has no hand in?
I answer: Such phrases as being the cause, being the author, having a hand,
and the like, are ambiguous. They are
most vulgarly understood for being the designing voluntary cause, or cause by
antecedent choice; and it is most certain,
that men are not, in this sense, the causes or authors of the first act of
their wills, in any case, as certain as anything is or ever can be; for nothing can be more certain than that a
thing is not before it is, nor a thing of the same kind before the first thing
of that kind, and so no choice before the first choice. — As the phrase, being the author, may be
understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of will, but as a
person may be said to be the author of the act of will itself, by his being the
immediate agent, or the being that is acting, or in exercise in that act; if the phrase of being the author is used to
signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men’s being the authors of
their own acts of will, in order to their being esteemed worthy of praise or
dispraise, on account of them. And
common sense teaches, that they must be the authors of external actions, in the
former sense. Namely, their being the
causes of them by an act of will or choice, in order to their being justly
blamed or praised: but it teaches no
such thing with respect to the acts of the will themselves. [However], this may appear more manifest by
the things, which will be observed in the following section.
One thing, that is made very much a
ground of argument and supposed demonstration by Arminians, in defense of the
fore-mentioned principles concerning moral agency, virtue, vice, etc., is their
metaphysical notion of agency and action.
They say, unless the soul has a self-determining power it has no power
of action. If its volitions be not
caused by itself, but are excited and determined by some extrinsic cause, they
cannot be the soul’s own acts. And that
the soul cannot be active, but must be wholly passive, in those effects, which
it is the subject of necessarily, and not from its own free determination.
Mr. Chubb lays the foundation of his
scheme of liberty, and of his arguments to support it, very much in this
position, that man is an agent, and capable of action, — which doubtless is
true: but self-determination belongs to
his notion of action, and is the very essence of it; whence he infers, that it is impossible for a man to act and be
acted upon, in the same thing, at the same time; and that nothing that is an action, can be the effect of the
action of another: and he insists, that
a necessary agent, or an agent that is necessarily determined to act, is a
plain contradiction.
But those are a precarious sort of
demonstrations, which men build on the meaning that they arbitrarily affix to a
word; especially when that meaning is
abstruse, inconsistent, and entirely diverse from the original sense of the
word in common speech.
That the meaning of the word action,
as Mr. Chubb and many others use it, is utterly unintelligible and
inconsistent, is manifest, because it belongs to their notion of an action,
that it is something wherein is no passion or passiveness. That is (according to their sense of
passiveness), it is under the power, influence, or action of no cause. And this implies, that action has no cause,
and is no effect; for to be an effect
implies passiveness, or the being subject to the power and action of its
cause. Yet, they hold that the mind’s
action is the effect of its own determination yea, the mind’s free and
voluntary determination, which is the same with free choice. So that action is the effect of something
preceding, even a preceding act of choice:
and consequently, in this effect, the mind is passive, subject to the
power and action of the preceding cause, which is the foregoing choice, and
therefore cannot be active. So that
here we have this contradiction, that action is always the effect of foregoing
choice, and therefore cannot be action;
because it is passive to the power of that preceding causal choice; and the mind cannot he active and passive in
the same thing, at the same time.
Again, they say, necessity is utterly inconsistent with action, and a
necessary action is a contradiction;
and so their notion of action implies contingence, and excludes all
necessity. And, therefore, their notion
of action implies, that it has no necessary dependence or connection with
anything foregoing; for such dependence
or connection excludes contingence, and implies necessity. Yet their notion of action implies
necessity, and supposes that it is necessary, and cannot he contingent. For they suppose, that whatever is properly
called action, must be determined by the will and free choice; and this is as much as to say, that it must
he necessary, being dependent upon, and determined by, something foregoing,
namely, a foregoing act of choice.
Again, it belongs to their notion of action, of that which is a proper
and mere act, that it is the beginning of motion, or of exertion of power. Yet it is implied in their notion of action,
that it is not the beginning of motion or exertion of power, but is consequent
and dependent on a preceding exertion of power, viz. the power of will and choice.
For they say there is no proper action but what is freely chosen, or,
which is the same thing, determined by a foregoing act of free choice. [However], if any of them shall see cause to
deny this, and say they hold no such thing, as every action is chosen or
determined by a foregoing choice, [or] the very first exertion of will only,
undetermined by any preceding act is properly called action; then I say, such a man’s notion of action
implies necessity. For what the mind is
the subject of, without the determination of its own previous choice, it is the
subject of, necessarily, as to any hand that free choice has in the affair, and
without any ability the mind has to prevent it by any will or election of its
own. Because, by the supposition, it
precludes all previous acts of will or choice in the case, which might prevent
it. So that, it is again, in this other
way, implied in their notion of act, that it is both necessary and not
necessary. Again, it belongs to their
notion of an act, that it is no effect of a predetermining bias or
preponderation. But springs immediately
out of indifference; and this implies,
that it cannot be from foregoing choice, which is foregoing preponderation: if it be not habitual, but occasional, yet
if it causes the act, it is truly previous, efficacious, and determining. And yet, at the same time, it is essential
to their notion of the act, that it is what the agent is the author of, freely
and voluntarily, and that is by previous choice and design.
So that, according to their notion of the
act, considered with regard to its consequences, these following things are all
essential to it: It should be
necessary, and not necessary; it should
be from a cause, and no cause; it
should be the fruit of choice and design, and not the fruit of choice and
design; it should he the beginning of
motion or exertion, and yet consequent on previous exertion; it should be before it is; that it should spring immediately out of
indifference and equilibrium, and yet be the effect of preponderation; it should be self-originated, and also have
its original from something else; it is
what the mind causes itself, of its own will, and can produce or prevent,
according to its choice or pleasure, and yet what the mind has no power to
prevent, precluding all previous choice in the affair.
So that an act, according to their
metaphysical notion of it, is something of which there is no idea; it is nothing but a confusion of the mind,
excited by words, without any distinct meaning, and is an absolute nonentity; and that in two respects. (1), there is nothing in the world that ever
was, is, or can be, to answer the things which must belong to its description,
according to what they suppose to be essential to it. (2), there neither is, nor ever was, nor can be, any notion or
idea to answer the word, as they use and explain it. For, if we should suppose any such notion, it would many ways
destroy itself. But it is impossible
any idea or notion should subsist in the mind, whose very nature and essence
which constitutes it, destroys it. If
some learned philosopher, who had been abroad, in giving an account of the
curious observations he had made in his travels, should say; “he had been in Terra del Fuego, and there
had seen an animal, which he calls by a certain name, that begat and brought
forth itself, and yet had a sire and dam distinct from itself; that it bad an appetite, and was hungry
before it had a being; that his master,
who led him, and governed him at his pleasure, was always governed by him, and
driven by him where he pleased; that
when he moved, he always took a step before the first step; that he went with his head first, and yet
always went tail foremost; and this,
though he had neither tail nor head:” it would be no impudence at all to tell
such a traveler, though a learned man, that he himself had no notion or idea of
such an animal as he gave an account of, and never had, nor ever should have.
As the aforementioned notion of action
is very inconsistent, so it is wholly diverse from the original meaning of the
word. The more usual signification of
it, in vulgar speech, seems to be some motion or exertion of power, that is
voluntary, or that is the effect of the will, and is used in the same sense as
doing; and most commonly, it is used to
signify outward actions. So thinking is
often distinguished from acting, and desiring and willing from doing.
Besides this more usual and proper
signification of the word action, there are other ways in which the word is
used, that are less proper, which yet have place in common speech. Oftentimes it is used to signify some motion
or alteration in inanimate things, with relation to some object and
effect. So, the spring of a watch is
said to act upon the chain and wheels;
the sunbeams, to act upon plants and trees; and the fire, to act upon wood.
Sometimes, the word is useful to signify motions, alterations, and
exertions of power, which are seen in corporeal things, considered absolutely. Especially when these motions seem to arise
from some internal cause which is hidden;
so that they have a greater resemblance of those motions of our bodies
which are the effects of natural volition, or invisible exertions of will. So, the fermentation of liquor, the
operations of the loadstone, and of electrical bodies, are called the action of
these things. And sometimes, the word
action is used to signify the exercise of thought, or of will and
inclination: so meditating, loving,
hating, inclining, disinclining, choosing, and refusing, may be sometimes
called acting; though more rarely
(unless it be by philosophers and metaphysicians) than in any of the other
senses.
But the word is never used in vulgar
speech in that sense which Arminian divines use it in, namely, for the
self-determinate exercise of the will, or an exertion of the soul, that arises
without any necessary connection with anything foregoing. If a man does something voluntarily, or as
the effect of his choice, then, in the most proper sense, and as the word is most
originally and commonly used, he is said to act. But whether that choice or volition be self-determined, or
no; whether it be connected with
foregoing, habitual bias; whether it be
the certain effect of the strongest motive, or some intrinsic cause, never
comes into consideration in the meaning of the word.
And if the word action is arbitrarily
used by some men otherwise, to suit some scheme of metaphysics or morality, no
argument can reasonably be founded on such a use of this term, to prove
anything but their own pleasure. For
divines and philosophers strenuously to urge such arguments, as though they
were sufficient to support and demonstrate a whole scheme of moral philosophy
and divinity, is certainly to erect a mighty edifice on the sand, or rather on
a shadow. And though it may now perhaps,
through custom, have become natural for them to use the word in this sense (if
that may be called a sense or meaning, which is inconsistent with itself), yet
this does not prove that it is agreeable to the natural notions men have of
things. Or, that there can be anything
in the creation that should answer such a meaning. [Moreover], though they appeal to experience, yet the truth is,
[those] men, are so far from experiencing any such thing, that it is impossible
for them to have any conception of it.
If it should be objected, that action
and passion are doubtless words of a contrary signification; but to suppose that the agent, in its
action, is under the power and influence of something intrinsic, is to confound
action and passion, and make them the same thing:
I answer, that action and passion are
doubtless, as they are sometimes used, words of opposite signification; but not as signifying opposite existences,
but only opposite relations. The words
cause and effect are terms of opposite signification; nevertheless, if I assert that, the same thing may, at the same
time, in different respects and relations, be both cause and effect, this will
not prove that I confound the terms.
The soul may be, both active and passive, in the same thing, in different
respects; [both] active with relation
to one thing, and passive with relation to another.
[This
distinction is of considerable moment.
The soul is passive, for instance, in reference to that necessity of
dependence which is inseparable from a created nature; and when the subject of providential energy
in natural acts; and also when the
subject of that divine influence which purifies and enables the mind, and whereby
holy effects are secured; and in all
these respects it is passive at the very time that it is active in its choice
or preference. In other words, the mind
is necessitated in some respects; as to
exist, to think, to will, to suffer, or to enjoy; at the same instant that it is free in other respects, as from
contingence (understanding thereby an event without any cause), and from
compulsion, or physical necessity in its acts as moral. W.]
The word passion, when set in
opposition to action, or rather activeness, is merely a relative. It signifies no effect or cause, nor any
proper existence; but is the same with
passiveness, or being passive, or being acted upon by something. [This] is a mere relation of a thing to some
power or force exerted by some cause, producing some effect in it or upon
it. And action, when set properly in
opposition to passion, or passiveness, is no real existence. It is not the same [as] an action, but is a
mere relation. It is the activeness of
something on another thing, being the opposite relation to the other, viz. a relation of power, or force, exerted by
some cause towards another thing, which is the subject of the effect of that
power. Indeed, the word action is
frequently used to signify something not merely relative, but more absolute,
and a real existence; as when we say an
action. When the word is not used
transitively, but absolutely, for some motion or exercise of body or mind,
without any relation to any object or effect, and as used thus, it is not
properly the opposite of passion, which ordinarily signifies nothing absolute,
but merely the relation of being acted upon.
Therefore, if the word action be useful in the like relative sense, then
action and passion are only two contrary relations. And it is no absurdity to suppose, that contrary relations may
belong to the same thing, at the same time, with respect to different
things. So, to suppose, that there are
acts of the soul, by which a man voluntarily moves and acts upon objects and
produces effects, which yet themselves, are effects of something else, and
wherein the soul itself is the object of something acting upon, and
influencing, that does not at all confound action and passion. The words may nevertheless be properly of
opposite signification: there may be as
true and real a difference between acting and being caused to act, though we
should suppose the soul to be both in the same volition, as there is between
living and being quickened, or made to live.
It is no more a contradiction, to suppose that action may be the effect
of some other cause besides the agent or being that acts, than to suppose, that
life may be the effect of some other cause, besides the liver, or the being
that lives, in whom life is caused to be.
The thing which has led men into this
inconsistent notion of action, when applied to volition, as though it were
essential to this internal action, that the agent should be self-determined in
it, and that the will should be the cause of it, its probably this, — that,
according to the sense of mankind, and the common use of language, it is so,
with respect to men’s external actions, which are what originally, and
according to the vulgar use and most proper sense of the word, are called
actions. Men in these, are
self-directed, self-determined and, their wills are the cause of the motions of
their bodies, and the external things that are done. So that unless men do them voluntarily, and of choice, and the
action be determined by their antecedent volition, it is no action or doing of
theirs. Hence some metaphysicians have
been led unwarily, but exceeding absurdly, to suppose the same concerning
volition itself, that that also must be determined by the will; which is to be determined by antecedent
volition, as the motion of the body is;
not considering the contradiction it implies.
But it is very evident, that in the
metaphysical distinction between action and passion (though long since become
common and the general vogue), due care has not been taken to conform language
to the nature of things, or to any distinct, clear ideas; — as it is in innumerable other philosophical,
metaphysical terms, used in these disputes;
which has occasioned inexpressible difficulty, contention, error, and
confusion.
Thus, probably, it came to be thought
that necessity was inconsistent with action, as these terms are applied to
volition. First, these terms, action
and necessity, are changed from their original meaning, as signifying external
voluntary action and constraint (in which meaning they are evidently
inconsistent), to signify quite other things, viz. volition itself, and certainty of existence. And when the change of signification is
made, care is not taken to make proper allowances and abatements for the
difference of sense; but still the same
things are unwarily attributed to action and necessity, in the new meaning of the
words, which plainly belonged to them in their first sense. And, on this ground, maxims are established
without any real foundation, as though they were the most certain truths, and
the most evident dictates of reason.
But, however strenuously it is maintained,
that what is necessary cannot he properly called action, and that a necessary
action is a contradiction, yet it is probable there are few Arminian divines,
who, if thoroughly tried, would stand to these principles. They will allow that God is in the highest
sense an active being, and the highest fountain of life and action. And, they would not probably deny, that
those that are called God’s acts of righteousness, holiness, and faithfulness,
are truly and properly God’s acts, and God is really a holy agent in them. And yet, I trust, they will not deny, that
God necessarily acts justly and faithfully, and that it is impossible for Him
to act unrighteously and unholy.
It is abundantly affirmed and urged by
Arminian writers, that it is contrary to common sense, and the natural notions
and apprehensions of mankind, to suppose otherwise than that necessity (making
no distinction between natural and moral necessity) is inconsistent, with
virtue and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment. And their arguments from hence have been
greatly triumphed in; and have been not
a little perplexing to many, who have been friendly to the truth, as clearly
revealed in the Holy Scriptures. It has
seemed to them indeed difficult, to reconcile Calvinistic doctrines with the
notions men commonly have of justice and equity. And, the true reasons of it seem to be these that follow.
I.
It is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that natural
necessity is wholly inconsistent with just praise or blame. If men do things which in themselves are
very good, fit to be brought to pass, and very happy effects, properly against
their wills, and cannot help it; or do
them from a necessity that is without their wills, or with which their wills
have no concern or connection; then it
is a plain dictate of common sense, that it is none of their virtue, nor any
moral good in them. [That] that they
are not worthy to be rewarded or praised, or at all esteemed, honored, or loved
on that account. On the other hand, if
from like necessity, they do those things, which in themselves are very unhappy
and pernicious, and do them because they cannot help it, the necessity is such,
that it is all one, whether they will them or no. And the reason why they are done, is from necessity only, and not
from their wills. It is a very plain
dictate of common sense, that they are not at all to blame. There is no vice, fault, or moral evil at
all in the effect done; nor are they
who are thus necessitated, in any wise worthy to be punished, hated, or in the
least disrespected, on that account.
In like manner, if things, in them
selves good and desirable, are absolutely impossible, with a natural
impossibility, the universal reason of mankind teaches, that this wholly and
perfectly excuses persons in their not doing them.
And it is also a plain dictate of
common sense, that if the doing things in themselves good, or avoiding things
in themselves evil, is not absolutely impossible, with such a natural
impossibility, but very difficult, with a natural difficulty, that is, a
difficulty prior to, and not at all consisting in, will and inclination itself,
and which would remain the same, let the inclination be what it will; then a person’s neglect or omission is excused
in some measure, though not wholly. His
sin, [then], is less aggravated than if the thing to be done were easy. And if instead of difficulty and hindrance,
there be a contrary natural propensity in the state of things, to the thing to
be done, or effect to he brought to pass, abstracted from any consideration of
the inclination of the heart; though
the propensity be not so great as to amount to a natural necessity, yet being
some approach to it, so that the doing the good thing be very much from this
natural tendency in the state of things, and but little from a good
inclination. Then it is a, dictate of
common sense, that there is so much the less virtue in what is done and so it
is less praiseworthy and rewardable.
The reason is easy, viz. because
such a natural propensity or tendency is an approach to natural necessity; and the greater the propensity, still so
much the nearer is the approach to necessity.
And, therefore, as natural necessity takes away or shuts out all virtue,
so, this propensity approaches to an abolition of virtue; that is, it diminishes it. And, on the other hand, natural difficulty,
in the state of things, is an approach to natural impossibility. And as the latter, when it is complete and
absolute, wholly takes away blame, so such difficulty takes away some blame, or
diminishes blame; and makes the thing
done to be less worthy of punishment.
II.
Men, in their first use of such phrases as these, must cannot, cannot
help it, cannot avoid it, necessary, unable, impossible, unavoidable,
irresistible, etc., use them to signify a necessity of constraint or restraint,
a natural necessity or impossibility;
or some necessity that the will has nothing to do in; which may be, whether men will or no; and which may be supposed to be just the
same, let men’s inclinations and desires be what they will. Such kind of terms, in their original use, I
suppose, among all nations, are relative;
carrying in their signification (as was before observed) a reference or
respect to some contrary will, desire, or endeavor, which, it is supposed, is,
or may be, in the case. All men find,
and begin to find in early childhood, that there are innumerable things that
cannot be done, which they desire to do;
and innumerable things, which they are averse to, that must be, — they
cannot avoid them, they will be, whether they choose them or no. It is to express this necessity, which men
so soon and so often find, and which so greatly and early affects them in
innumerable cases, that such terms and phrases are first formed. And it is to signify such a necessity, that
they are first used, and that they are most constantly used, in the common
affairs of life. And not to signify any
such metaphysical, speculative, and abstract notion, as that connection in the
nature or course of things, which is between the subject and predicate of a
proposition, and which is the foundation of the certain truth of that
proposition; to signify which, they who
employ themselves in philosophical inquiries into the first origin and
metaphysical relations and dependencies of things, have borrowed these terms,
for want of others. But, we grow up
from our cradles in a use of such terms and phrases entirely different from
this, and carrying a sense exceeding diverse from that in which they are
commonly used in the controversy between Arminians and Calvinists. And it being, as was said before, a dictate
of the universal sense of mankind, [and] evident to us as soon as we begin to
think; that the necessity signified by
these terms, in the sense in which we first learn them, does excuse persons and
free them from all fault or blame.
Hence our idea of excusableness or faultlessness is tied to these terms
and phrases by a strong habit, which is begun in childhood, as soon as we begin
to speak, and grows up with us, and is strengthened by constant use and custom,
the connection growing stronger and stronger.
The habitual connection which is in
men’s minds between blamelessness and those aforementioned terms, must, cannot,
unable, necessary, impossible, unavoidable, etc. becomes very strong;
because as soon as ever men begin to use reason and speech, they have
occasion to excuse themselves, from the natural necessity signified by these
terms, in numerous instances. I cannot
do it; I could not help it. And all mankind have constant and daily
occasion to use such phrases in this sense.
To excuse themselves and others, in almost all the concerns of life,
with respect to disappointments and things that happen, which concern and
affect ourselves and others, that are hurtful, or disagreeable to us or them,
or things desirable, that we or others fail of.
That a being accustomed to an union of
different ideas, from early childhood, makes the habitual connection exceeding
strong, as though such connection were owing to nature, is manifest in
innumerable instances. It is altogether
by such an habitual connection of ideas, that men judge of the bigness or
distance of the objects of sight, from their appearance. Thus, it is owing to such a connection early
established, and growing up with a person, that he judges a mountain, which he
sees at ten miles distance, to be bigger than his nose, or further off than the
end of it. Having been used so long to
join a considerable distance and magnitude with such an appearance, men imagine
it is by a dictate of natural sense.
Whereas, it would be quite otherwise with one that had his eyes newly
opened, who had been born blind: he
would have the same visible appearance, but natural sense would dictate no such
thing, concerning the magnitude or distance of what appeared.
III.
When men, after they had been so habituated to connect ideas of
innocence or blamelessness with such terms, that the union seems to be the
effect of mere nature, come to hear the same terms used, and learn to use them
themselves, in the fore-mentioned new and metaphysical sense, to signify quite
another sort of necessity, which has no such kind of relation to a contrary
supposable will and endeavor; the
notation of plain and manifest blamelessness, by this means, is, by a strong
prejudice, insensibly and unwarily transferred to a case to which it by no
means belongs. The change, of the use
of the terms, to a signification, which is very diverse, not being taken notice
of, or adverted to, and there are several reasons why it is not.
l.
The terms, as used by philosophers, are not very distinct and clear in
their meaning. Few use them in a fixed,
determined sense. On the contrary,
their meaning is very vague and confused, which is what commonly happens to the
words used to signify things intellectual and moral, and to express what Mr.
Locke calls mixed modes. If men had a
clear and distinct understanding of what is intended by these metaphysical
terms, they would be able more easily to compare them with their original and
common sense. And [they] would not be
so easily led into delusion by any sort of terms in the world, as by words of
this sort.
2.
The change of the signification of the terms, is the more insensible,
because the things signified, though indeed very different, yet do in some
generals agree. In necessity, that
which is vulgarly so called, there is a strong connection between the thing
said to be necessary, and some thing antecedent to it in the order of nature; so there is also in philosophical
necessity. Though in both kinds of
necessity the connection cannot be called by that name, with relation to an
opposite will or endeavor, to which it is superior, which is the case in vulgar
necessity. Yet, in both, the connection
is prior to will and endeavor, and so, in some respect, superior. In both kinds of necessity, there is a
foundation for some certainty of the proposition, which affirms the event. The terms used, being the same, and the
things signified, agreeing in these and some other general circumstances and
the expressions, as used by philosophers, being not well defined, and so of
obscure and loose signification. Hence,
persons are not aware of the great difference and the notions of innocence or
faultiness, [which] were so strongly associated with them, and were strictly
united in their minds, ever since they can remember. [They] remain united with them still, as if the union was
altogether natural and necessary and [when] they that go about to make a separation,
seem to them, to do great violence, even to nature itself.
IV.
Another reason why it appears difficult to reconcile it with reason,
that men should be blamed for that which is necessary with a moral necessity
(which, as was observed before, is a species of philosophical necessity) is,
that for want of due consideration, men inwardly entertain that apprehension,
that this necessity may be against men’s wills and sincere endeavors. They go away with that notion, that men may
truly will, and wish, and strive, that it may be otherwise, but that invincible
necessity stands in the way. And many
think thus concerning themselves: some,
that are wicked men, think they wish that they were good, that they love God
and holiness; but yet do not find that
their wishes produce the effect. — The
reasons why men think so, are as follow:
(1). They find what may be
called an indirect willingness to have a better will, in the manner before
observed. For it is impossible, and a
contradiction, to suppose the will to be directly and properly against itself. And they do not consider, that this indirect
willingness is entirely a different thing from properly willing the thing that
is the duty and virtue required; and
that there is no virtue in that sort of willingness which they have. They do not consider that the volitions,
which a wicked man may have that he loved God, are no acts of the will at all
against the moral evil of not loving God, but only some disagreeable
consequences. But the making the
requisite distinction requires more care of reflection and thought than most
men are used to. And men, through a
prejudice in their own favor, are disposed to think well of their own desires
and dispositions, and to account them good and virtuous, though their respect to
virtue be only indirect and remote. And
it is nothing at all that is virtuous that truly excites or terminates their
inclinations. (2). Another thing that insensibly lends and
beguiles men into a supposition that this moral necessity or impossibility is,
or may be, against men’s wills and true endeavors, is the derivation and
formation of the terms themselves, that are often used to express it, which is
such as seems directly to point to, and holds this forth. Such words, for instance, as unable, unavoidable,
impossible, irresistible, which carry a plain reference to a supposable
power exerted, endeavors used, resistance made, in opposition to the
necessity. And the persons that hear
them, not considering nor suspecting but that they are used in their proper
sense. That sense being therefore
understood, there does naturally, and as it inhere necessarily, arise in their
minds a supposition, that it may be so indeed, that true desires and endeavors
may take place, but that invincible necessity stands in the way, and renders
them vain and to no effect.
V.
Another thing, which makes persons more ready to suppose it to be
contrary to reason, that men should be exposed to the punishments threatened to
sin, for doing those things which are morally necessary, or not doing those
things morally impossible, is, that imagination strengthens the argument, and
adds greatly to the power and influence of the seeming reasons against it, from
the greatness of that punishment. To
allow that they may be justly exposed to a small punishment, would not be so
difficult. Whereas, if there were any
good reason in the case, if it were truly a dictate of reason, that such
necessity was inconsistent with faultiness, or just punishment, the
demonstration would be equally certain with respect to a small punishment, or
any punishment at all, as a very great one;
but it is not equally easy to the imagination. They that argue against the justice of damning men for those
things that are thus necessary, seem to make their argument the stronger, by
setting forth the greatness of the punishment in strong expressions: — “That a man should be cast into eternal
burnings, that he should be made to fry in hell to all eternity, for those
things which he had no power to avoid, and was under a fatal, unfrustrable,
invincible necessity of doing.”
Whether the reasons that have been
given, why it appears difficult to some persons to reconcile with common sense
the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing those things which are morally
necessary, are thought satisfactory, or not;
yet it most evidently appears, by the following things, that if this
matter be rightly understood, setting aside all delusion arising from the
impropriety and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconsistent with the
natural apprehensions of mankind. And
that sense of things which is found everywhere in the common people, who are
furthest from having their thoughts perverted from their natural channel, by
metaphysical and philosophical subtleties;
but, on the contrary, altogether agreeable to, and the very voice and
dictate of, this natural and vulgar sense.
1.
This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar notion of
blameworthiness is. The idea which the
common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to be
plainly this; a person’s being or doing
wrong, with his own will and pleasure;
containing these two things: 1. His doing wrong when he does as he
pleases. 2. His pleasures, being wrong.
Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their notion, a
person’s having his heart wrong; and
doing wrong from his heart. And this is
the sum total of the matter.
The common people do not ascend up in
their reflections and abstractions to the metaphysical sources, relations, and
dependencies of things, in order to form their notion of faultiness or
blameworthiness. They do not wait till
they have decided by their refinings, what first determines the will. Whether it be determined by something
extrinsic or intrinsic, whether volition determines volition, or whether the
understanding determines the will.
Whether there be any such thing as metaphysicians mean by contingence
(if they have any meaning); whether
there be a sort of a strange, unaccountable sovereignty in the will, in the
exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all its own
sovereign acts. They do not take any
part of their notion of fault or blame from the resolution of any such
question. If this were the case, there
are multitudes, yea, the far greater part of mankind, nine hundred and
ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die without having any such
notion as that of fault ever entering into their heads, or without so much as
one having any conception that anybody was to be either blamed or commended for
anything. To be sure, it would be a
long time before men came to have such notions. Whereas it is manifest, they are some of the first notions that
appear in children; who discover, as
soon as they can think, or speak, or act at all as rational creatures, a sense
of desert. And certainly, in forming
their notion of it, they make no use of metaphysics. All the ground they go upon consists in these two things,
experience, and a natural sensation of a certain fitness or agreeableness which
there is in uniting such moral evil as is above described, viz. a being or doing wrong with the will, and
resentment in others, and pain inflicted on the person in whom this moral evil
is. Which natural sense is what we call
by the name of conscience.
It is true, the common people and
children, in their notion of any faulty act or deed, of any person, do suppose
that it is the person’s own act and deed.
But this is all that belongs to what they understand by a thing’s being
a person’s own deed or action; even
that it is something done by him of choice.
That some exercise or motion should begin of itself, does not belong to
their notion of an action or doing. If
so, it would belong to their notion of it, that it is something which is the
cause of its own beginning; and that is
as much as to say, that it is before it begins to be. Nor is their notion of an action, some motion or exercise that
begins accidentally, without any cause or reason; for that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common
sense, namely, that everything that begins to be, has some cause or reason why
it is.
The common people, in their notion of
a faulty or praiseworthy deed or work done by anyone, do suppose that the man
does it in the exercise of liberty. But
then their notion of liberty is only a person’s having opportunity of doing as
he pleases. They have no notion of
liberty consisting in the will’s first acting, and so causing its own
acts; and determining, and so causing
its own determinations; or choosing,
and so causing its own choice. Such a
notion of liberty is what none have, but those that have darkened their own
minds with confused metaphysical speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous
terms. If a man is not restrained frown
acting as his will determines, or constrained to act otherwise, then he has
liberty, according to common notions of liberty, without taking into the idea
that grand contradiction of all, the determinations of a man’s free will being
the effects of the determinations of his free will. — Nor have men commonly any notion of freedom consisting in
indifference. Fox if so, then it would
he agreeable to their notion, that the greater indifference men act with, the
more freedom they act with; whereas the
reverse is true. He that, in acting,
proceeds with the fullest inclination does what he does with the greatest
freedom, according to common sense. And
so far is it from being agreeable to common sense, that such liberty as
consists in indifference is requisite to praise or blame, that, on the
contrary, the dictate of every man’s natural sense through the world is, that
the further he is from being indifferent in His acting good or evil, and the
more he does either with full and strong inclination, the more is he esteemed
or abhorred, commended or condemned.
II.
If it were inconsistent with the common sense of mankind, that men
should be either to be blamed or commended in any volitions they have or fail
of, in case of moral necessity or impossibility; then it would surely also be agreeable to the same sense and
reason of mankind, that the nearer the case approaches to such a moral
necessity or impossibility, either through a strong antecedent moral
propensity, on the one hand, [It is here argued, on supposition that
not all propensity implies moral necessity, but only some very high degree,
which none will deny.] or a
great antecedent opposition and difficulty on the other, the nearer does it
approach to a being neither blamable nor commendable; so that acts exerted with such preceding propensity, would be worthy
of proportionably less praise. And when
omitted, the act being attended with such difficulty, the omission would be
worthy of less blame. It is so, as was
observed before, with natural necessity and impossibility, propensity and
difficulty. As it is a plain dictate of
the sense of all mankind, that natural necessity and impossibility take away
all blame and praise; and therefore,
that the nearer the approach is to these, through previous propensity or difficulty,
so praise and blame are proportionably diminished. And if it were as much a dictate of common sense, that moral
necessity of doing or impossibility of avoiding takes away all praise and
blame, as that natural necessity or impossibility does this; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it would
be as much the dictate of common sense, that an approach to moral necessity of
doing, or impossibility of avoiding, diminishes praise and blame, as that an
approach to natural necessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the voice of common sense,
that persons are excusable in part in neglecting things difficult against their
wills, as that they are excusable wholly in neglecting things impossible
against their wills. And if it made no
difference, whether the impossibility were natural and against the will, or
moral lying in the will, with regard to excusableness; so neither would it make any difference,
whether the difficulty, or approach to necessity, be natural against the will,
or moral, lying in the propensity of the will.
But it is apparent, that the reverse
of these things is true. If there be an
approach to a moral necessity in a man’s exertion of good acts of will, they
being the exercise of a strong propensity to good, and a very powerful love to
virtue; it is so far from being the
dictate of common sense, that he is less virtuous, and the less to be esteemed,
loved, and praised; that it is
agreeable to the natural notions of all mankind, that he is so much the better
man, worthy of greater respect, and higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination is, and the
nearer it approaches to necessity in that respect; or to impossibility of neglecting the virtuous act, or of doing a
vicious one; still the more virtuous,
and worthy of higher commendation. And,
on the other hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind; as for instance, acts of pride or malice, from a rooted and
strong habit or principle of haughtiness and maliciousness, and a violent
propensity of heart to such acts;
according to the natural sense of men, he is so far from being the less
hateful and blamable on that account, that he is so much the more worthy to be
detested and condemned by all that observe him.
Moreover, it is manifest that it is no
part of the notion, which mankind commonly has of a blamable or praiseworthy
act of the will, that it is an act which is not determined by an antecedent
bias or motive, but by the sovereign power of the will itself. Because, if so, the greater hand such causes
have in determining any acts of the will, so much the less virtuous or vicious
would they be accounted; and the less
hand, the more virtuous or vicious.
Whereas the reverse is true: men
do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy for the agent’s being much
determined in it by a good inclination or a good motive, but the more. And if good inclination or motive has but
little influence in determining the agent, they do not think his act so much
the more virtuous, but the less. And
so, concerning evil acts, which are determined by evil motives or inclinations.
Yea, if it be supposed, that good or
evil dispositions are implanted in the hearts of men by nature itself (which,
it is certain, is vulgarly supposed in innumerable cases), yet it is not
commonly supposed, that men are worthy of no praise or dispraise for such
dispositions; although what is natural
is undoubtedly necessary, nature being prior to all acts of the will
whatsoever. Thus, for instance, if a
man appears to be of a very haughty or malicious disposition, and is supposed
to be so by his natural temper, it is no vulgar notion, no dictate of the
common sense and apprehension of men, that such dispositions are no vices or
moral evils, or that such persons are not worthy of disesteem, or odium and
dishonor; or that the proud or
malicious acts which flow from such natural dispositions, are worthy of no
resentment. Yea, such vile natural
dispositions, and the strength of them will commonly be mentioned rather as an
aggravation of the wicked acts that come from such a fountain, than an
extenuation of them. Its being natural
for men to act thus, is often observed by men in the height of their
indignation: they will say, “It is his
very nature; he is of a vile natural
temper; it is as natural to him to act
so, as it is to breathe; he cannot help
serving the devil,” etc. But it is not
thus with regard to hurtful, mischievous things, that any are the subjects or
occasions of, by natural necessity, against their inclinations. In such a case, the necessity, by the common
voice of mankind, will be spoken of as a full excuse. — Thus, it is very plain, that common sense makes a vast
difference between these two kinds of necessity, as to the judgment it makes of
their influence on the moral quality and desert of men’s actions.
And these dictates of men’s minds are
so natural and necessary, that it may be very much doubted whether, the
Arminians themselves have ever got rid of them. Yea, their greatest doctors, that have gone furthest in defense
of their metaphysical notions of liberty, and have brought their arguments to
their greatest strength, and, as they suppose, to a demonstration, against the
consistence of virtue and vice with any necessity. It is to be questioned, whether there is so much as one of them,
but that, if he suffered very much from the injurious acts of a man under the
power of an invincible haughtiness and malignancy of temper, would not, from
the fore-mentioned natural sense of mind, resent it far otherwise, than if as
great sufferings came upon him from the wind that blows, and fire that burns,
by natural necessity; and otherwise
than he would, if he suffered as much from the conduct of a man perfectly
delirious; yea, though he first brought
his distraction upon him some way by his own fault.
Some seem to disdain the distinction
that we make between natural and moral necessity, as though it were altogether
impertinent in this controversy: “that
which is necessary (say they) is necessary;
it is that which must be, and cannot be prevented. And that which is impossible, is impossible,
and cannot be done: and therefore none
can be to blame for not doing it.” And
such comparisons are made use of, as the commanding of a man to walk who has
lost his legs, and condemning and punishing him for not obeying; inviting and calling upon a man who is shut
up in a strong prison, to come forth, etc.
But, in these things, Arminians are very unreasonable. Let common sense determine whether there be
not a great difference between these two cases. The one, that of a man who has offended his prince, and is cast
into prison; and after he has laid
there a while, the king comes to him, calls him to come forth to him; and tells him, that if he will do so, and
will fall down before him, and humbly beg his pardon, he shall be forgiven and
set at liberty, and also be greatly enriched, and advanced to honor. The prisoner heartily repents of the folly
and wickedness of his offense against his prince, is thoroughly disposed to
abase himself, and accept of the king’s offer, but is confined by strong walls,
with gates of brass, and bars of iron.
The other case is, that of a man who is of a very unreasonable spirit,
of a haughty, ungrateful, willful disposition;
and, moreover, has been brought up in traitorous principles, and has his
heart possessed with an extreme and inveterate enmity to his lawful
sovereign; and for his rebellion is
cast into prison, and lies long there, loaded with heavy chains, and in
miserable circumstances. At length the
compassionate prince comes to the prison, orders his chains to be knocked off,
and his prison-doors to be set wide open;
calls to him, and tells him, if he will come forth to him, and fall down
before him, acknowledge that he has treated him unworthily, and ask his
forgiveness, he shall be forgiven, set at liberty, and set in a place of great
dignity and profit in his court. But he
is stout and stomach full, and full of haughty malignity, that he cannot be
willing to accept the offer: his rooted
strong pride and malice have perfect power over him, and as it were bind him,
by binding his heart: the opposition of
his heart has the mastery over him, having an influence on his mind far
superior to the king’s grace and condescension, and to all his kind offers and
promises. Now, is it agreeable to
common sense to assert, and stand to it, that there is no difference between
these two cases, as to any worthiness of blame in the prisoners; because, forsooth, there is a necessity in
both, and the required act in each case is impossible? It is true [that] a
man’s evil dispositions may be as strong and immovable as the bars of a
castle. But who cannot see, that when a
man, in the latter case, is said to be unable to obey the command, the
expression is used improperly, and not in the sense it has originally, and in
common speech. And that it may properly
be said to be in the rebel’s power to come out of prison, seeing he can easily
do it if he pleases; though by reason
of his vile temper of heart, which is fixed and rooted, it is impossible that
it should please him?
Upon the whole, I presume there is no
person of good understanding, who impartially considers the things which have
been observed, but will allow, that it is not evident, from the dictates of the
common sense, or natural notions of mankind, that moral necessity is inconsistent
with praise and blame. And, therefore,
if the Arminians would prove any such inconsistency, it must be by some
philosophical and metaphysical arguments, and not common sense.
There is a grand illusion in the
pretended demonstration of Arminians from common sense. The main strength of all these
demonstrations lies in that prejudice, that arises through the insensible
change of the use and meaning of such terms as liberty, able, unable,
necessary, impossible, unavoidable, invincible, action, etc. from their original and vulgar sense, to a
metaphysical sense, entirely diverse.
And the strong connection of the ideas of blamelessness, etc. with some of these terms, by a habit
contracted and established while these terms were used in their first meaning. This prejudice and delusion is the
foundation of all those positions they lay down as maxims, by which most of the
Scriptures, which they allege in this controversy, are interpreted, and on
which all their pompous demonstrations from Scripture and reason depend. From this secret delusion and prejudice they
have almost all their advantages. It is
the strength of their bulwarks, and the edge of their weapons. And this is the main ground of all the right
they have to treat their neighbors in so assuming a manner, and to insult
others, perhaps as wise and good as themselves, as weak bigots, men that dwell
in the dark caves of superstition, perversely set, obstinately shutting their
eyes against the noon-day light, enemies to common sense, maintaining the
first-born of absurdities, etc.
etc. But perhaps an impartial
consideration of the things which have been observed in the preceding parts of
this Inquiry, may enable the lovers of truth better to judge, whose doctrine is
indeed absurd, abstruse, self-contradictory, and inconsistent with common
sense, and many ways repugnant to the universal dictates of the reason of
mankind.
Corol. From things which have been observed, it will follow, that it is
agreeable to common sense, to suppose that the glorified saints have not their
freedom, at all diminished in any respect.
That God himself has the highest possible freedom according to the true
and proper meaning of the term. And
that he is, in the highest possible respect, an agent and active in the exercise
of his infinite holiness; though he
acts therein, in the highest degree necessarily: and his actions of this kind, are in the highest, most absolutely
perfect manner, virtuous and praiseworthy;
and are so, for that very reason, because they are most perfectly
necessary.
Arminians say, if it be so, that sin
and virtue come to pass by a necessity consisting in a sure connection of
causes and effects, antecedents and consequents. It can never be worth the while to use any means or endeavors to
obtain the one, and avoid the other;
seeing no endeavors can alter the futurity of the event, which is become
necessary by a, connection already established.
But I desire that this matter may be
fully considered. And that it may be
examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow, that endeavors and
means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on
the supposition of such a connection of antecedents and consequents than if the
contrary be supposed.
For endeavors to be in vain is for
them not to be successful. That is to
say, for them not eventually to be the means of the thing aimed at, which
cannot be but in one of these two ways.
First, that although the means are used, yet the event aimed at does not
follow. Secondly, if the event does
follow, it is not because of the means or from any connection or dependence of
the event on the means: the event would
have come to pass as well without the means as with them. If either of these two things is the case,
then the means are not properly successful, and are truly in vain. The successfulness or unsuccessfulness of
means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, consists
in those means being connected or not connected with the effect, in such a
manner as this, viz. that the effect is
with the means, and not without them;
or, that the being of the effect is, on the one band, connected with means,
and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the want of
the means. If there he such a
connection, as this between means and end, the means are not in vain; the more there is of such a connection, the
further they are from being in vain;
and the less of such a connection, the more they are in vain.
Now, therefore, the question to be
answered (in order to determine, whether it follows from this doctrine of the
necessary connection between foregoing things and consequent ones, that means
used in order to any effect are more in vain than they would be otherwise), is,
whether it follows from it that there is less of the aforementioned connection
between means and effect; that is,
whether, on the supposition of there being a real and true connection between
means and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connection
between antecedent things and consequent ones;
and the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to everyone that will open
his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed without the grossest absurdity
and inconsistency. Means are foregoing
things, and effects are following things.
And if there were no connection between foregoing things and following
ones, there could be no connection between means and end; and so all means would be wholly vain and
fruitless. For it is by virtue of some
connection only, that they become successful.
It is some connection observed or revealed, or otherwise known, between
antecedent things and following ones, that is what directs in the choice of
means. And if there were no such thing
as an established connection, there could be no choice as to means; one thing would have no more tendency to an
effect than another; there would he no
such thing as tendency in the case. All
those things, which are successful means of other things, do therein prove
connected antecedents of them.
Therefore, to assert that a fixed connection between antecedents and
consequents makes means vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the
connection between means and end, is just as ridiculous as to say, that a
connection between antecedents and consequents stands in the way to hinder a
connection between antecedents and consequents.
Nor can any supposed connection of the
succession or train of antecedents and consequents, from the very beginning of
all things, the connection being made already sure and necessary, either by
established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign
immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions, or any
other way (if any other there be). I
say, no such necessary connection of a series of antecedents and consequents
can in the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the
series; and so may be some of those
antecedents which are connected with the consequents we aim at in the
established course of things. Endeavors
which we use, are things that exist;
and therefore they belong to the general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are supposed to
be connected; and so endeavors are
supposed to be connected with some effects, or some consequent things or
other. And certainly this does not
hinder but that the events they are connected with, may be those which we aim
at, and which we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a connection
with those events from the established order and course of things which we
observe, or from something in divine revelation.
Let us suppose a real and true
connection between a man’s having his eyes open in the clear daylight, with
good organs of sight, and seeing; so
that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not
opening his eyes. And also, the like
connection between such a man’s attempting to open his eyes, and his actually
doing it. The supposed established
connection between these antecedents and consequents, let the connection be
never so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain for a
man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to see. His aiming at that event, and the use of the
means, being the effect of his will, does not break the connection, or hinder
the success.
So that the objection we are upon does
not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of
connection and consequence; on the
contrary, it is truly forcible against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and
self-determination; which is
inconsistent with such a connection. If
there be no connection between those events wherein virtue and vice consist,
and anything antecedent; then there is
no connection between these events and any means or endeavors used in order to
them; and if so, then those means must
be in vain. The less there is of
connection between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less there
is between means and end, endeavors and success; and in the same proportion are means and endeavors ineffectual
and in vain.
It will follow from Arminian
principles that there is no degree of connection between virtue or vice, and
any foregoing event or thing. In other
words, that the determination of the existence of virtue or vice does not in
the least depend on the influence of anything that comes to pass antecedently,
from which the determination of its existence is, as its cause, means, or
ground. Because so far as it is so, it
is not from self-determination and therefore, so far there is nothing of the
nature of virtue or vice. And so it
follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent upon, or
connected with, any foregoing event or existence, as its cause, ground, or
means. And if so, then all foregoing
means must be totally in vain.
Hence it follows, that there cannot,
in any consistence with the Arminian scheme, be any reasonable ground of so
much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any means and endeavors, in
order to escaping vice, or obtaining virtue.
Or any choice or preference of means, as having a greater probability of
success by some than others. Either
from any natural connection or dependence of the end on the means, or through
any divine constitution, or revealed way of God’s bestowing or bringing to pass
these things, in consequence of any means, endeavors, prayers, or deeds. Conjectures in this latter ease, depend on a
supposition, that God himself is the giver, or determining cause, of the events
sought. But, if they depend on
self-determination, then God is not the determining or disposing author of
them; and if these things are not of
his disposal, then no conjecture can be made, from any revelation he has given,
concerning any way or method of his disposal of them.
Yea, on these principles, it will not
only follow, that men cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or
conjecture that their means and endeavors to obtain virtue, or avoid vice, will
be successful, but they may be sure they will not. They may be certain that they will be in vain. And that if ever the thing, which they seek,
comes to pass, it will not be at all owing to the means they use. For means and endeavors can have no effect
at all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of those two ways. Either, (1), through a natural tendency and
influence to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts, either by causing
the disposition of the heart to be more in favor of such acts, or by bringing
the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements. Or, (2), by putting persons more in the way
of God’s bestowment of the benefit. But
neither of these, can be the case. Not
the latter; for, as has been just
observed, it does not consist with the Arminian notion of self-determination,
which they suppose essential to virtue, that God should be the bestower, or
(which is the same thing) the determining disposing author of virtue. Not the form; for natural influence and tendency supposes causality and
connection, and supposes necessity of event, which is inconsistent with
Arminian liberty. A tendency of means,
by biasing the heart in favor of virtue, or by bringing the will under the
influence and power of motives in its determinations, are both inconsistent
with Arminian liberty of will, consisting in indifference, and sovereign
self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.
But for the more full removal of this
prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as
though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all endeavors as vain; the following things may be considered: —
The question is not, Whether men may
not thus improve this doctrine, — we know that many true and wholesome
doctrines are abused; but, whether the
doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement; or whether, on the supposition of the truth
of the doctrine, such a use of it would be unreasonable? If any shall affirm,
that it would not, but that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives
just occasion for it, it must be on this supposition; namely, that such an invariable necessity of all things already
settled, must render the interposition of all means, endeavors, conclusions, or
actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end whatsoever, perfectly
insignificant. Because they cannot in
the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in any event or
circumstance; all being already fixed
unutterably by necessity. And that
therefore it is folly for men to use any means for any end; but their wisdom to save themselves the
trouble of endeavors, and take their ease.
No person can draw such all inference from this doctrine, and come to
such a conclusion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very
principles he pretends to act upon. For
he comes to a conclusion and takes a course, in order to an end, even his case,
or the saving himself from trouble he seeks something future, and uses means in
order to a future thing. Even in his
drawing up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing and use no means in order
to anything in future. He seeks his
future ease, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior necessity, that determines all
things, makes vain, all actions or conclusions of ours, in order to anything
future; then it makes vain all
conclusions and conduct of ours, in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the time,
manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-determining
necessity, as much as anything else. If
he says within himself, “What future happiness or misery I shall have, is
already, in effect, determined by the necessary course and connection of things; therefore, I will save myself the trouble of
labor and diligence which cannot add to my determined degree of happiness, or
diminish my misery; but will take my
ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negligence.” Such a man contradicts himself. He says, the measure of his future happiness
and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one, nor add
to the other; but yet, in his very
conclusion, he contradicts this. He
takes up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness, by the ease and
comfort of his negligence, and to diminish his future trouble and misery by
saving himself the trouble of using means and taking pains.
Therefore, persons cannot reasonably
make this improvement of the doctrine of necessity, which they will go into a
voluntary negligence of means for their own happiness. For the principles they must go upon, in
order to this, are inconsistent with they’re making any improvement at all of
the doctrine. For to make some
improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to some voluntary
conclusion, in regard to their own conduct, with some view or aim; but this, as has been shown, is inconsistent
with the principles they pretend to act upon.
In short, the principles are such as cannot be acted upon at all, or, in
any respect, consistently. Therefore,
in every pretense of acting upon them, or making any improvement at all of
them, there is a self-contradiction.
As to that objection against the
doctrine, which I have endeavored to prove, that it makes men no more than mere
machines; I would say, that
notwithstanding this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably
different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has
a faculty of will. [He] is so capable
of volition and choice; and in that his
will, is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding. And in that his external actions and
behavior, and in many respects also his thoughts, and the exercises of his
mind, are subject to his will; so that
he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases. And, by means of these things, is capable of
moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations and actions, as, according to
the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love, and reward; or, on the contrary, of disesteem,
detestation, indignation, and punishment.
In these things is all the difference
from mere machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection,
dignity, or privilege, in any respect;
all the difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived
of; and indeed all that the pretensions
of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain
themselves. (Though their explications
overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended to be explained.) For
they are forced to explain a self-determining power of will, by a power in the
soul to determine as it chooses or wills;
which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of choosing,
and in many instances, can do as he chooses, — which is quite a different thing
from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice
in the case.
Or, if their scheme makes any other
difference than this between men and machines, it is for the worse; it is so far from supposing men to have a
dignity and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner of their being
determined still more unhappy. Whereas
machines are guided by an understanding cause, by the skillful hand of the
workman or owner; the will of man is
left to the guidance of nothing but absolute blind contingence.
Arminians say, if it be so, that sin
and virtue come to pass by a necessity consisting in a sure connection of
causes and effects, antecedents and consequents. It can never be worth the while to use any means or endeavors to
obtain the one, and avoid the other;
seeing no endeavors can alter the futurity of the event, which is become
necessary by a, connection already established.
But I desire that this matter may be
fully considered. And that it may be
examined with a thorough strictness, whether it will follow, that endeavors and
means, in order to avoid or obtain any future thing, must be more in vain, on
the supposition of such a connection of antecedents and consequents than if the
contrary be supposed.
For endeavors to be in vain is for
them not to be successful. That is to
say, for them not eventually to be the means of the thing aimed at, which
cannot be but in one of these two ways.
First, that although the means are used, yet the event aimed at does not
follow. Secondly, if the event does
follow, it is not because of the means or from any connection or dependence of
the event on the means: the event would
have come to pass as well without the means as with them. If either of these two things is the case,
then the means are not properly successful, and are truly in vain. The successfulness or unsuccessfulness of
means, in order to an effect, or their being in vain or not in vain, consists
in those means being connected or not connected with the effect, in such a
manner as this, viz. that the effect is
with the means, and not without them;
or, that the being of the effect is, on the one band, connected with
means, and the want of the effect, on the other hand, is connected with the
want of the means. If there he such a
connection, as this between means and end, the means are not in vain; the more there is of such a connection, the
further they are from being in vain;
and the less of such a connection, the more they are in vain.
Now, therefore, the question to be
answered (in order to determine, whether it follows from this doctrine of the
necessary connection between foregoing things and consequent ones, that means
used in order to any effect are more in vain than they would be otherwise), is,
whether it follows from it that there is less of the aforementioned connection
between means and effect; that is,
whether, on the supposition of there being a real and true connection between
means and effect, than on the supposition of there being no fixed connection
between antecedent things and consequent ones;
and the very stating of this question is sufficient to answer it. It must appear to everyone that will open
his eyes, that this question cannot be affirmed without the grossest absurdity
and inconsistency. Means are foregoing
things, and effects are following things.
And if there were no connection between foregoing things and following
ones, there could be no connection between means and end; and so all means would be wholly vain and
fruitless. For it is by virtue of some
connection only, that they become successful.
It is some connection observed or revealed, or otherwise known, between
antecedent things and following ones, that is what directs in the choice of
means. And if there were no such thing
as an established connection, there could be no choice as to means; one thing would have no more tendency to an
effect than another; there would he no
such thing as tendency in the case. All
those things, which are successful means of other things, do therein prove connected
antecedents of them. Therefore, to
assert that a fixed connection between antecedents and consequents makes means
vain and useless, or stands in the way to hinder the connection between means
and end, is just as ridiculous as to say, that a connection between antecedents
and consequents stands in the way to hinder a connection between antecedents
and consequents.
Nor can any supposed connection of the
succession or train of antecedents and consequents, from the very beginning of
all things, the connection being made already sure and necessary, either by
established laws of nature, or by these together with a decree of sovereign
immediate interpositions of divine power, on such and such occasions, or any
other way (if any other there be). I
say, no such necessary connection of a series of antecedents and consequents
can in the least tend to hinder, but that the means we use may belong to the
series; and so may be some of those
antecedents which are connected with the consequents we aim at in the
established course of things. Endeavors
which we use, are things that exist;
and therefore they belong to the general chain of events; all the parts of which chain are supposed to
be connected; and so endeavors are
supposed to be connected with some effects, or some consequent things or
other. And certainly this does not
hinder but that the events they are connected with, may be those which we aim
at, and which we choose, because we judge them most likely to have a connection
with those events from the established order and course of things which we
observe, or from something in divine revelation.
Let us suppose a real and true
connection between a man’s having his eyes open in the clear daylight, with
good organs of sight, and seeing; so
that seeing is connected with his opening his eyes, and not seeing with his not
opening his eyes. And also, the like
connection between such a man’s attempting to open his eyes, and his actually
doing it. The supposed established
connection between these antecedents and consequents, let the connection be
never so sure and necessary, certainly does not prove that it is in vain for a
man in such circumstances to attempt to open his eyes, in order to see. His aiming at that event, and the use of the
means, being the effect of his will, does not break the connection, or hinder
the success.
So that the objection we are upon does
not lie against the doctrine of the necessity of events by a certainty of
connection and consequence; on the
contrary, it is truly forcible against the Arminian doctrine of contingence and
self-determination; which is inconsistent
with such a connection. If there be no
connection between those events wherein virtue and vice consist, and anything
antecedent; then there is no connection
between these events and any means or endeavors used in order to them; and if so, then those means must be in
vain. The less there is of connection
between foregoing things and following ones, so much the less there is between
means and end, endeavors and success; and
in the same proportion are means and endeavors ineffectual and in vain.
It will follow from Arminian
principles that there is no degree of connection between virtue or vice, and
any foregoing event or thing. In other
words, that the determination of the existence of virtue or vice does not in
the least depend on the influence of anything that comes to pass antecedently,
from which the determination of its existence is, as its cause, means, or
ground. Because so far as it is so, it
is not from self-determination and therefore, so far there is nothing of the
nature of virtue or vice. And so it
follows, that virtue and vice are not at all, in any degree, dependent upon, or
connected with, any foregoing event or existence, as its cause, ground, or
means. And if so, then all foregoing
means must be totally in vain.
Hence it follows, that there cannot,
in any consistence with the Arminian scheme, be any reasonable ground of so
much as a conjecture concerning the consequence of any means and endeavors, in
order to escaping vice, or obtaining virtue.
Or any choice or preference of means, as having a greater probability of
success by some than others. Either
from any natural connection or dependence of the end on the means, or through
any divine constitution, or revealed way of God’s bestowing or bringing to pass
these things, in consequence of any means, endeavors, prayers, or deeds. Conjectures in this latter ease, depend on a
supposition, that God himself is the giver, or determining cause, of the events
sought. But, if they depend on
self-determination, then God is not the determining or disposing author of
them; and if these things are not of
his disposal, then no conjecture can be made, from any revelation he has given,
concerning any way or method of his disposal of them.
Yea, on these principles, it will not
only follow, that men cannot have any reasonable ground of judgment or
conjecture that their means and endeavors to obtain virtue, or avoid vice, will
be successful, but they may be sure they will not. They may be certain that they will be in vain. And that if ever the thing, which they seek,
comes to pass, it will not be at all owing to the means they use. For means and endeavors can have no effect
at all, in order to obtain the end, but in one of those two ways. Either, (1), through a natural tendency and
influence to prepare and dispose the mind more to virtuous acts, either by
causing the disposition of the heart to be more in favor of such acts, or by
bringing the mind more into the view of powerful motives and inducements. Or, (2), by putting persons more in the way
of God’s bestowment of the benefit. But
neither of these, can be the case. Not
the latter; for, as has been just
observed, it does not consist with the Arminian notion of self-determination,
which they suppose essential to virtue, that God should be the bestower, or
(which is the same thing) the determining disposing author of virtue. Not the form; for natural influence and tendency supposes causality and
connection, and supposes necessity of event, which is inconsistent with
Arminian liberty. A tendency of means,
by biasing the heart in favor of virtue, or by bringing the will under the
influence and power of motives in its determinations, are both inconsistent
with Arminian liberty of will, consisting in indifference, and sovereign
self-determination, as has been largely demonstrated.
But for the more full removal of this
prejudice against the doctrine of necessity, which has been maintained, as
though it tended to encourage a total neglect of all endeavors as vain; the following things may be considered: —
The question is not, Whether men may
not thus improve this doctrine, — we know that many true and wholesome
doctrines are abused; but, whether the
doctrine gives any just occasion for such an improvement; or whether, on the supposition of the truth
of the doctrine, such a use of it would be unreasonable? If any shall affirm,
that it would not, but that the very nature of the doctrine is such as gives
just occasion for it, it must be on this supposition; namely, that such an invariable necessity of all things already
settled, must render the interposition of all means, endeavors, conclusions, or
actions of ours, in order to the obtaining any future end whatsoever, perfectly
insignificant. Because they cannot in
the least alter or vary the course and series of things, in any event or
circumstance; all being already fixed
unutterably by necessity. And that
therefore it is folly for men to use any means for any end; but their wisdom to save themselves the
trouble of endeavors, and take their ease.
No person can draw such all inference from this doctrine, and come to
such a conclusion, without contradicting himself, and going counter to the very
principles he pretends to act upon. For
he comes to a conclusion and takes a course, in order to an end, even his case,
or the saving himself from trouble he seeks something future, and uses means in
order to a future thing. Even in his
drawing up that conclusion, that he will seek nothing and use no means in order
to anything in future. He seeks his
future ease, and the benefit and comfort of indolence. If prior necessity, that determines all
things, makes vain, all actions or conclusions of ours, in order to anything
future; then it makes vain all
conclusions and conduct of ours, in order to our future ease. The measure of our ease, with the time,
manner, and every circumstance of it, is already fixed, by all-determining
necessity, as much as anything else. If
he says within himself, “What future happiness or misery I shall have, is
already, in effect, determined by the necessary course and connection of
things; therefore, I will save myself
the trouble of labor and diligence which cannot add to my determined degree of
happiness, or diminish my misery; but
will take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negligence.” Such a man contradicts himself. He says, the measure of his future happiness
and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one, nor add
to the other; but yet, in his very
conclusion, he contradicts this. He
takes up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness, by the ease and
comfort of his negligence, and to diminish his future trouble and misery by
saving himself the trouble of using means and taking pains.
Therefore, persons cannot reasonably
make this improvement of the doctrine of necessity, which they will go into a
voluntary negligence of means for their own happiness. For the principles they must go upon, in
order to this, are inconsistent with they’re making any improvement at all of
the doctrine. For to make some
improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to some voluntary
conclusion, in regard to their own conduct, with some view or aim; but this, as has been shown, is inconsistent
with the principles they pretend to act upon.
In short, the principles are such as cannot be acted upon at all, or, in
any respect, consistently. Therefore,
in every pretense of acting upon them, or making any improvement at all of
them, there is a self-contradiction.
As to that objection against the doctrine,
which I have endeavored to prove, that it makes men no more than mere
machines; I would say, that
notwithstanding this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly, and unspeakably
different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has
a faculty of will. [He] is so capable
of volition and choice; and in that his
will, is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding. And in that his external actions and
behavior, and in many respects also his thoughts, and the exercises of his
mind, are subject to his will; so that
he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases. And, by means of these things, is capable of
moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations and actions, as, according to
the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love, and
reward; or, on the contrary, of
disesteem, detestation, indignation, and punishment.
In these things is all the difference
from mere machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity,
or privilege, in any respect; all the
difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the
Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain
themselves. (Though their explications
overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended to be explained.) For
they are forced to explain a self-determining power of will, by a power in the
soul to determine as it chooses or wills;
which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of choosing,
and in many instances, can do as he chooses, — which is quite a different thing
from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice
in the case.
Or, if their scheme makes any other
difference than this between men and machines, it is for the worse; it is so far from supposing men to have a
dignity and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner of their being
determined still more unhappy. Whereas
machines are guided by an understanding cause, by the skillful hand of the
workman or owner; the will of man is
left to the guidance of nothing but absolute blind contingence.
Some may possibly object against what
has been supposed of the absurdity and inconsistency of a self-determining
power in the will, and the impossibility of its being otherwise than that the
will should be determined in every case by some motive, and by a motive which
(as it stands in the view of the understanding) is of superior strength to any
appearing on the other side; that if
these things are true, it will follow, that not only the will of created minds,
but the will of God himself, is necessary in all its determinations. Concerning which says the author of the Essay
on the Freedom of Will in God and in the Creature (pp. 85, 86) “What
strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of the dominion of God?
Does it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the
Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and sovereign
agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom? Does it not seem to make him a
kind of mechanical medium of fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbe’s doctrine of
fatality and necessity into all things that God hath to do with? Does it not
seem to represent the blessed God as a being of vast understanding, as well as
power and efficiency, but still to leave him without a will to choose among all
the objects within his view? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort
of almighty minister of fate, under its universal and supreme influence; as it was the professed sentiment of some of
the ancients, that fate was above the gods.”
This is declaiming, rather than
arguing; and an application to men’s
imaginations and prejudices, rather than to mere reason. But I would calmly endeavor to consider,
whether there be any reason in this frightful representation. — But before I enter upon a particular
consideration of the matter, I should observe this: that it is reasonable to suppose, it should be much more
difficult to express or conceive things according to exact metaphysical truth,
relating to the nature and manner of the existence of things in the divine
understanding and will, and the operation of these faculties (if I may so call
them) of the divine mind, than in the human mind; which is infinitely more within our view, and nearer to a proportion
to the measure of our comprehension, and more commensurate to the use and
import of human speech. Language is
indeed very deficient in regard of terms to express precise truth concerning
our own minds, and their faculties and operations. Words were first formed to express external things; and those that are applied to express things
internal and spiritual, are almost all borrowed, and used in a sort of
figurative sense. Whence they are, most
of them, attended with a great deal of ambiguity and unfixedness in their
signification, occasioning innumerable doubts, difficulties, and confusions, in
inquiries and controversies about things of this nature. However, language is much less adapted to
express things in the mind of the incomprehensible Deity precisely as they are.
We find a great deal of difficulty in
conceiving exactly of the nature of our own souls. And notwithstanding all the progress which has been made in past
and present ages, in this kind of knowledge, whereby our metaphysics, as it
relates to these things, is brought to greater perfection than once it
was. Yet, here is still work enough
left for future inquiries and researches, and room for progress still to be
made, for many ages and generations.
But we had need to be infinitely able metaphysicians, to conceive with
clearness, according to strict, proper, and perfect truth, concerning the
nature of the divine Essence, and the modes of the action and operation of the
powers of the divine mind.
And it may be noted particularly, that
though we are obliged to conceive of some things in God as consequent and
dependent on others, and of some things pertaining to the divine nature and
will as the foundation of others, and so before others in the order of
nature; as, we must conceive of the knowledge
and holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness. The perfection of his understanding, as the
foundation of his wise purposes and decrees [and] the holiness of his nature,
as the cause and reason of his holy determinations. And yet, when we speak of cause and effect, antecedent and
consequent, fundamental and dependent, determining and determined, in the first
Being, who is self-existent, independent, of perfect and absolute simplicity
and immutability, and the first cause of all things; doubtless there must be less propriety in such representations,
than when we speak of derived dependent beings, who are compounded, and liable
to perpetual mutation and succession.
Having premised this, I proceed to
observe concerning the fore-mentioned author’s exclamation about the necessary
determination of God’s will, in all things, by what he sees to be fittest and
best.
That all the seeming force of such
objections and exclamations must arise from an imagination that there is some
sort of privilege or dignity in being without such a moral necessity as will
make it impossible to do any other than always choose what is wisest and
best. [It is] as though there were some
disadvantage, meanness, and subjection, in such a necessity. A thing by which the will was confined, kept
under, and held in servitude by something, which, as it were, maintained a
strong and invincible power and dominion over it, by bonds that held him fast,
and that he could, by no means, deliver himself from. Whereas, this must be all mere imagination and delusion. It is no disadvantage or dishonor to a
being, necessarily to act in the most excellent and happy manner, from the
necessary perfection of his own nature.
This argues no imperfection, inferiority, or dependence, nor any avant
of dignity, privilege, or ascendancy.
[“It
might have been objected, with more plausibleness, that the Supreme Cause
cannot be free, because he must needs do always what is best in the whole. But this would not at all serve Spinoza’s
purpose; for this is consistent with
the greatest freedom, and most perfect choice.
For the only foundation of this necessity is such an unalterable
rectitude of will, and perfection of wisdom, as makes it impossible for a wise
being to act foolishly.” Clark’s
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God. Edit. 6. P. 64.
“Though
God is a most perfect free Agent, yet he cannot but do always what is best and
wisest in the whole. The reason is
evident: because perfect wisdom and
goodness are as steady and certain principles of action, as necessity
itself; and an infinitely wise and good
Being, indued with the most perfect liberty, can no more choose to act in
contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary
to the necessity by which it is acted;
it being as great an absurdity and impossibility in choice, for infinite
wisdom to choose to act unwisely, or infinite goodness to choose what is not
good, as it would be in nature, for absolute necessity to fail of producing its
necessary effect. There was, indeed, no
necessity in nature, that God should at first create such beings as he has
created, or indeed any being at all;
because he is, in himself, infinitely happy and all-sufficient. There was, also, no necessity in nature,
that he should preserve and continue things in being, after they were
created; because he would be
self-sufficient without their continuance, as he was before their
creation. But it was fit and wise and
good, that infinite wisdom should manifest, and infinite goodness communicate
itself: and therefore it was necessary,
in the sense of necessity I am now speaking of, that things should be made at
such a time, and continued so long, and indeed with various
perfections in such degrees, as infinite wisdom and goodness saw it wisest and
best that they should.” Ibid. p.112, 113.
“It
is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to desire, will, and act,
according to the last result of a fair examination. This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom,
that it is the very improvement and benefit of it: it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our
liberty; and the further we are removed
from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind, not
determinable by its last judgment, of the good or evil that is thought to
attend it choice, would be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any
intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of
indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an
imperfection on the other side. It is
as much a perfection, that desire or the power of preferring should be
determined by good, as that the power of acting should be determined by the will: and the certainer such determination is, the
greater the perfection. Nay, were we
determined by anything but the last result of our own minds, judging of the
good or evil of any action, we were not free.
This very end of our freedom being, that we might attain the good we
choose; and, therefore, every man is
brought under a necessity by his constitution, as an intelligent being, to be
determined in willing by his own thought and judgment, what is best for him to
do; else he would be under the determination
of some other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man’s will, in every determination, follows
his own judgment, is to say, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would
not have, at the same time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present
thoughts, before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would
have it before any other; unless he can
have and not have it, will and not will it, at the same time; a contradiction too manifest to be
admitted. If we look upon those
superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason to
judge, that they are more steadily determined in their choice of good than
we; and yet we have no reason to think
they are less happy, or less free, than we are. And if it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are, to
pronounce what infinite wisdom and goodness could do, I think we might say,
that God himself cannot choose what is not good. The freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined
by what is best. But to give a
right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me ask. Would anyone be a changeling, because he is
less determined by wise determination, than a wise man? Is it worth the name of
freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw shame and misery upon a
man’s self? If to break loose from the conduct of reason, and to want that
restraint of examination and judgment, that keeps us from doing or choosing the
worse, be liberty, true liberty, mad men and fools are the only free men. Yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad,
for the sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already.” Locke Hum.
Und. Vol. I.
Edit. 7. P. 215, 216.
“This
Being, having all things always necessarily in view, must always and eternally
will, according to his infinite comprehension of things; that is, must will all things that are
wisest and best to be done. There is no
getting free of this consequence. If it
can will at all, it must will this way.
To be capable of knowing, and not capable of willing, is not to be
understood. And to be capable of
willing otherwise than what is wisest and best, contradicts that knowledge
which is infinite. Infinite knowledge
must direct the will without error.
Here then, is the origin of moral necessity; and that is, really, of freedom.
Perhaps it may be said, when the divine will is determined, from the
consideration of the eternal aptitudes of things, it is as necessarily
determined, as if it were physically impelled, if that were possible. But it is unskillfulness, to suppose this an
objection. The great principle is once
established, viz. That the
divine will is determined by the eternal reason and aptitudes of things,
instead of being physically impelled;
and after that, the more strong and necessary this determination is, the
more perfect the Deity must be allowed to be:
it is this that makes him an amiable and adorable Being, whose will and
power are constantly, immutably determined, by the consideration of what is
wisest and best; instead of a surd
Being, with power, but without discerning and reason. It is beauty of this necessity, that it is strong as fate itself,
with all the advantage of reason and goodness.
It is strange, to see men contend, that the Deity is not free, because
he is necessarily rational, immutably good and wise; when a man is allowed still the perfecter being, the more fixedly
and constantly his will is determined by reason and truth.” Inquiry into the Nature of the Hum. Soul.
Edit. 3. Vol.
II. P. 403, 404.]
It is not inconsistent with the
absolute and most perfect sovereignty of God.
The sovereignty of God is his ability and authority to do whatever
pleases him. Whereby “he doth according
to his will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants of the
earth; and none can stay his hand, or
say unto him, What dost thou?” — The following things belong to the sovereignty
of God: viz.
(1).
Supreme, universal, and infinite power:
whereby he is able to do what he pleases, without control, without any
confinement of that power, without any subjection, in the least measure, to any
other power; and so without any
hindrance or restraint, that it should be either impossible, or at all
difficult, for him to accomplish his will;
and without any dependence of his power on any other power, from whence
it should be derived, or which it should stand in any need of; so far from this, that all other power is
derived from him, and is absolutely dependent on him.
(2).
That he has supreme authority.
[An] absolute and most perfect right to do what he wills, without
subjection to any superior authority, or any derivation of authority from any
other, or limitation by any distinct independent authority, either superior,
equal, or inferior. He being the head
of all dominion, and fountain of all authority; and also without restraint by any obligation, implying either
subjection, derivation, or dependence, or proper limitation.
(3).
That his will is supreme, underived, and independent on anything without
himself; being in everything determined
by his own counsel, having no other rule but his own wisdom; his will not being subject to, or restrained
by, the will of any other, and other wills being perfectly subject to his.
(4).
That his wisdom, which determines his will, is supreme, perfect,
underived, self-sufficient, and independent.
So that it may be said, as in Isaiah 40:14, “With whom took he counsel,
and who instructed him, and taught him in the path of judgment, and taught him
knowledge, and showed to him the way of understanding?” There is no other
divine sovereignty but this; and this
is properly absolute sovereignty. No
other is desirable; nor would any other
be honorable or happy and, indeed, there is no other conceivable or
possible. It is the glory and greatness
of the Divine Sovereign, that God’s will is determined by his own infinite,
all-sufficient wisdom in everything.
And in nothing at all, is [it] either directed by any inferior wisdom,
or by no wisdom; whereby it would
become senseless arbitrariness, determining and acting without reason, design,
or end.
If God’s will is steadily and surely
determined in everything by supreme wisdom, then it is in everything
necessarily determined to that which is most wise. And, certainly, it would he a disadvantage and indignity to be
otherwise. For if the divine will was
not necessarily determined to that which, in every case, is wisest and best, it
must be subject, to some degree of undesigning contingence; and so in the same degree liable to
evil. To suppose the divine will liable
to be carried hither and thither at random, by the uncertain wind of blind
contingence, which is guided by no wisdom, no motive, no intelligent dictate
whatsoever (if any such thing were possible), would certainly argue a great degree
of imperfection and meanness, infinitely unworthy of the Deity. If it be a disadvantage for the divine will
to be attended with this moral necessity, then the more free from it, and the
more left at random, the greater dignity and advantage. And, consequently, to be perfectly free from
the direction of understanding, and universally and entirely left to senseless,
unmeaning contingence, to act absolutely at random, would he the supreme glory.
It no more argues any dependence of
God’s will, that his supremely wise volition is necessary, than it argues a
dependence of his being, that his existence is necessary. If it be something too low for the Supreme
Being to have his will determined by moral necessity, so as necessarily, in
every case, to will in the highest degree holy and happily; then why is it not also something too low
for him to have his existence, and the infinite perfection of his nature, and
his infinite happiness, determined by necessity? It is no more to God’s
dishonor to be necessarily wise, than to be necessarily holy. And if neither of them be to his dishonor,
then it is not to his dishonor necessarily to act holily and wisely. And if it be not dishonorable to be
necessarily holy and wise, in the highest possible degree, no more is it mean
and dishonorable, necessarily to act holily and wisely in the highest possible
degree; or, which is the same thing, to
do that, in every case, which, above all other things, is wisest and best.
The reason why it is not dishonorable
to be necessarily most holy, is, because holiness in itself is an excellent and
honorable thing. For the same reason,
it is no dishonor to be necessarily most wise, and, in every case, to act most
wisely, or do the thing which is the wisest of all; for wisdom is also in itself excellent and honorable.
The aforementioned author of the Essay
on the Freedom of Will, etc. as has
been observed, represents that doctrine of the divine will’s being in
everything necessarily determined by a superior fitness, as making the blessed God
a kind of almighty minister and mechanical medium of fate. And he insists (pp. 93, 94), that this moral
necessity and impossibility is, in effect, the same thing with physical and
natural necessity and impossibility.
And in pp. 54, 55, he says, “The scheme which determines the will always
and certainly by the understanding, and understanding by the appearance of
things, seems to take away the true nature of vice and virtue. For the sublimest of virtues, and the vilest
of vices, seem rather to be matters of fate and necessity, flowing naturally
and necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and present situation of
persons and things; for this existence
and situation necessarily makes such an appearance to the mind. From this appearance flows a necessary
perception and judgment concerning these things: this judgment necessarily determines the will; and thus, by this chain of necessary causes,
virtue and vice would lose their nature, and become natural ideas, and
necessary things, instead of moral and free actions.”
And yet this same author allows (pp.
30, 31), that a perfectly wise being will constantly and certainly choose what
is most fit; and says, pp. 102, 103, “I
grant, and always have granted, that wheresoever there is such antecedent superior
fitness of things, God acts according to it, so as never to contradict it; and, particularly, in all his judicial
proceedings as a governor, and distributor of rewards and punishments.” Yea, he says expressly (p. 42), “That it is
not possible for God to act otherwise than according to this fitness and
goodness in things.”
So that, according to this author,
putting these several passages of this essay together, there is no virtue, nor
anything of a moral nature, in the most sublime and glorious acts and exercises
of God’s holiness, justice, and faithfulness;
and he never does anything which is in itself supremely worthy, and,
above all other things, fit and excellent, but only as a king of mechanical
medium of fate. And in what he does as
the judge and moral governor of the world, he exercises no moral excellency,
exercising no freedom in these things, because he acts by moral necessity,
which is, in effect, the same with physical or natural necessity; and therefore he only acts by an Hobbistical
fatality; “as a being indeed of vast
understanding, as well as power and efficiency (as he said before), but without
a will to choose, being a kind of almighty administer of fate, acting under its
supreme influence.” For he allows, that
in all these things, God’s will is determined constantly and certainly by a
superior fitness and that it is not possible for him to act otherwise. And if these things are so, what glory or
praise belongs to God for doing holily and justly; or taking the most fit, holy, wise, and excellent course, in any
one instance? Whereas, according to the Scriptures, and also the common sense
of mankind, it does not, in the least, derogate from the honor of any being,
that through the moral perfection of his nature he necessarily acts with
supreme wisdom and holiness; but on the
contrary, his praise is the greater;
herein consists the height of his glory.
The same author (p. 56) supposes that
herein appears the excellent “character of a wise and good man, that though he
can choose contrary to the fitness of things, yet he does not. But [he] suffers himself to be directed by
fitness;” and that, in this conduct, “he imitates the blessed God.” And yet he supposes it is contrariwise with
the blessed God; not that he suffers
himself to be directed by fitness, when he can choose, contrary to the fitness
of things, but that he cannot choose contrary to the fitness of things. As he says (p. 42), “that it is not possible
for God to act otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any
fitness or goodness in things.” Yea, he
supposes (p. 31), that if a man “were perfectly wise and good, he could not do
otherwise than be constantly and certainly determined by the fitness of
things.”
One thing more I would observe, before
I conclude this section; and that is,
that if it derogates nothing from the glory of God to be necessarily determined
by superior fitness in some things, then neither does it to be thus determined
in all things; from anything in the
nature of such necessity, as at all detracting from God’s freedom,
independence, absolute supremacy, or any dignity or glory of his nature, state,
or manner of acting; or as implying any
infirmity, restraint, or subjection.
And if the thing be such as well consists with God’s glory, and has
nothing tending at all to detract from it;
then we need not be afraid of ascribing it to God in too many things,
lest thereby we should detract from God’s glory too much.
The author last cited, as has been
observed, owns that God, being wise, will constantly and certainly choose what
appears most fit, where there is a superior fitness and goodness in
things. And that it is in effect
confessed, that in those things where there is any real preferableness, it is
no dishonor, nothing in any respect unworthy of God, for him to act from
necessity; notwithstanding all that can
be objected from the agreement of such a necessity with the fate of the Stoics,
and the necessity maintained by Mr. Hobbes.
From which it will follow, that if in all the different things, among
which God chooses, there were evermore a superior fitness or preferableness on
one side, then it would be no dishonor, or anything unbecoming, for God’s will
to be necessarily determined in everything.
And if this be allowed, it is giving up entirely the argument, from the
unsuitableness of such a necessity to this liberty, supremacy, independence,
and glory of the divine Being. Resting
the whole weight of the affair on the decision of another point wholly
diverse; viz. Whether it be so indeed, that in all the
various possible things, which are in God’s view, and may be considered as
capable objects of his choice, there is not evermore a preferableness in one
thing above another. This is denied by
this author; who supposes, that in many
instances, between two or more possible things, which come within the view of
the divine mind, there is a perfect indifference and inequality, as to fitness
or tendency, to attain any good end which God can have in view, or to answer
any of his designs. Now, therefore, I
would consider whether this be evident.
The arguments brought to prove this
are of two kinds. (1.) It is urged,
that, in many instances, we must suppose there is absolutely no difference
between various possible objects of choice, which God has in view. (2.) that the difference between many things
is so inconsiderable, or of such a nature, that it would be unreasonable to
suppose it to be of any consequence; or
to suppose that any of God’s wise designs would not be answered in any one way
as well as the other.
Therefore,
I.
The first thing to be considered is, whether there are any instances
wherein there is a perfect likeness, and absolutely no difference, between
different objects of choice, that are proposed to the divine understanding?
And here, in the first place,
it may be worthy to be considered, whether the contradiction there is in the terms
of the question proposed, does not give reason to suspect, that there is an
inconsistency in the thing supposed.
It is inquired whether different objects of choice may not be
absolutely without difference? If they are absolutely without
difference, then how are they different objects of choice? If there
be absolutely no difference, in any respect, then there is no variety
or distinction: for distinction
is only be some difference. And if
there be no variety among proposed objects of choice, then there
is no opportunity for variety of choice, or difference of
determination. For that determination
of a thing, which is not different in any respect, is not a different
determination, but the same. That this
is no quibble may appear more fully in a short time.
The arguments to prove that the Most
High, in some instances, chooses to do one thing rather than another, where the
things themselves are perfectly without difference, are two.
1.
That the various parts of infinite time and space, absolutely
considered, are perfectly alike, and do not differ at all one from
another. And therefore, when God
determined to create the world in such a part of infinite duration and space,
rather than others, he determined and preferred, among various objects, between
which there was no preferableness, and absolutely no difference.
Answ. This
objection supposes an infinite length of time before the world was created,
distinguished by successive parts, properly and truly so. Or a succession of limited and unmeasurable
periods, following one another, in an infinitely long series. Which must needs be a groundless world,
being only the eternity of God’s existence;
which is nothing else but his immediate, perfect, and invariable
possession of the whole of his unlimited life, together and at once; Vitae interminabilis, tota, simul et
perfecta posessio. Which is so
generally allowed, that I need not stand to demonstrate it? So this objection
supposes an extent of space beyond the limits of the creation, of an infinite
length, breadth, and depth, truly and properly distinguished into different
measurable parts, limited at certain stages, one beyond another, in an infinite
series. Which notion of absolute and
infinite space is doubtless as unreasonable, as that now mentioned, of absolute
and infinite duration. It is as
improper, to imagine that the immensity and omnipresence of God is
distinguished by a series of miles and leagues, one beyond another; as that the infinite duration of God is
distinguished by months and years, one after another. A diversity and order of distinct parts, limited by certain
periods, is as conceivable, and does as naturally obtrude itself on our
imagination, in one case as the other;
and there is equal reason in each case, to suppose that our imagination
deceives us. It is equally improper to
talk of months and years of the divine existence, as of square miles of
Deity: and we equally deceive
ourselves, when we talk of the world being differently fixed, with respect to
either of these sorts of measures. I
think we know not what we mean, if we say, the world might have been
differently placed from what it is, in the broad expanse of infinity; or, that it might have been differently
fixed in the long line of eternity: and
all arguments and objections, which are built on the imaginations we are apt to
have of infinite extension or duration, are buildings founded on shadows, or
castles in the air.
2.
The second argument, to prove that the Most High will one thing rather
than another, without any superior fitness or preferableness in the thing
preferred, is God’s actually placing in different parts of the world,
particles, or atoms of matter, that are perfectly equal and alike. The aforementioned author says (p. 78, etc.)
“If one would descend to the minute specific particles, of which different
bodies are composed, we should see abundant reason to believe, that these are
thousands of such little particles, or atoms of matter, which are perfectly
equal and alike, and could give no distinct determination to the will of God,
where to place them.” [There are]
instances in particles of water, of which there are such immense numbers, which
compose the rivers and oceans of this world;
and in infinite myriads of the luminous and fiery particles, which
compose the body of the sun; so many,
that it would be very unreasonable to suppose no two of them should be exactly
equal and alike.
Answ. (1.) To this
I answer: that as we must suppose
matter to be infinitely divisible. It
is very unlikely, that any two of all these particles are exactly equal and
alike; so unlikely, that it is a
thousand to one, yea, an infinite number to one, but it is otherwise. And that although we should allow a great
similarity between the different particles of water and fire, as to their
general nature and figure; and however
small we suppose those particles to be, it is infinitely unlikely, that any two
of them should be exactly equal in dimensions and quantity of matter. — If we should suppose a great many globes
of the same nature with the globe of the earth, it would be very strange, if
there were any two of them that had exactly the same number of particles of
dust and water in them. But infinitely
less strange, than that two particles of light should have just the same
quantity of matter. For a particle of
light, according to the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, is
composed of infinitely more assignable parts, than there are particles of dust
and water in the globe of the earth.
And as it is infinitely unlikely, that any two of these particles should
be equal; so it is, that they
should be alike in other respects:
to instance in the configuration of their surfaces. If there were very many globes, of the nature
of the earth, it would be very unlikely that any two should have exactly the
same number of particles of dust, water, and stone, in their surfaces, and all
posited exactly alike, one with respect to another, without any difference, in
any part discernible either by the naked eye or microscope; but infinitely less strange, than that two
particles of light should be perfectly of the same figure. For there are infinitely more assignable
real parts on the surface of a particle of light, than there are particles of
dust, water, and stone, on the surface of the terrestrial globe.
Answ. (2.) But
then, supposing that there are two particles, or atoms of matter, perfectly
equal and alike, which God has placed in different parts of the creation; as I will not deny it to be possible for God
to make two bodies perfectly alike, and put them in different places. Yet it will not follow, that two different
or distinct acts or effects of the divine power have exactly the same fitness
for the same ends. For these two
different bodies are not different or distinct, in any other respects than
those wherein they differ: they are two
in no other respects than those wherein there is a difference. If they are perfectly equal and alike in
themselves, then they can be distinguished, or be distinct, only in those
things which are called circumstances;
as place, time, rest, motion, or some other present or past
circumstances or relations. For it is
difference only that constitutes distinction.
If God makes two bodies, in themselves every way equal and alike,
and agreeing perfectly in all other circumstances and relations, but only their
place; then in this only is there
any distinction or duplicity. The
figure is the same, the measure is the same, the solidity and resistance are
the same, and everything the same but only the place. Therefore, what the will of God determines is this, that there
should be the same figure, the same extension, the same resistance, etc. in two different places. And for this determination he has some
reason. There is some end, for which
such a determination and act has a peculiar fitness, above all other acts. Here is no one thing determined without an
end, and no one thing without a fitness for that end, superior to anything
else. If it be the pleasure of God to
cause the same resistance, and the same figure, to be in two different places
and situations, we cans no more justly argue from it, that here must be some
determination or act of God’s will that is wholly without motive or end, than we
can argue, that whenever, in any case, it is a man’s will to speak the same
words, or make the same sounds, at two different times, there must be some
determination or act of his will, without any motive or end. The difference of place, in the former case,
proves no more than the difference of time does in the other. If anyone should say, with regard to the
former case, that there must be something determined without an end; viz.
that of those two similar bodies, this in particular should be made
in this place, and the other in the other, and should inquire, why the Creator
did not make them in a transposition, when both are alike, and each would
equally have suited either place? The inquiry supposes something that is not
true; namely, that the two bodies
differ and are distinct in other respects besides their place. So that with this distinction inherent
in them, they might, in their first creation, have been transposed, and each
might have begun its existence in the place of the other.
Let us, for clearness sake, suppose,
that God had, at the beginning, made two globes, each of an inch diameter, both
perfect spheres, and perfectly solid, without pores, and perfectly alike in
every respect, and placed them near one to another, one towards the right hand,
and the other towards the left, without any difference as to time, motion, or
rest, past or present, or any circumstance, but only their place; and the question should be asked, why God in
their creation placed them so? Why, that which is made on the right hand, was
not made on the left, and vice versa? Let it be well considered, whether
there be any sense in such a question;
and whether the inquiry does not suppose something false and
absurd. Let it be considered, what the
Creator must have done otherwise than he did, what different act of will or
power he must have exerted, in order to the thing proposed. All that could have been done, would have
been to have made two spheres, perfectly alike, in the same places where he has
made them, without any difference of the things made, either in themselves or
in any circumstance; so that the whole
effect would have been without any difference, and, therefore, just the
same. By the supposition, the two
spheres are different in no other respect but their place; and therefore in other respects they are the
same. Each has the same roundness; it is not a distinct rotundity, in any other
respect but its situation. There are,
also, the same dimensions, differing in nothing but their place. And so, of their resistance, and everything
else that belongs to them.
Here, if any chooses to say, “that
there is a difference in another respect, viz. that they are not numerically the same: that it is thus with all the qualities that
belong to them: that it is confessed,
they are, in some respects, the same:
that is, they are both exactly alike;
but yet numerically they differ.
Thus the roundness of one is not the same numerical, individual
roundness with that of the other.” Let
this be supposed; then the question
about the determination of the divine will in the affair, is, why did God will,
that this individual roundness should be at the right hand, and the
other individual roundness at the left? Why did not he make them in a
contrary position? Let any rational person consider, whether such questions be
not words without meaning. As much as
if God should see fit for some ends, to cause the same sounds to be repeated,
or made at two different times; the
sounds being perfectly the same in every other respect, but only one was a
minute after the other; and it should
be asked, upon it, why God caused these sounds, numerically different, to
succeed one the other in such a manner? Why he did not make that individual
sound, which was in the first minute, to be in the second, and the individual
sound of the last minute to be in the first? Which inquiries would be even
ridiculous; as, I think, every person
must see, in the case proposed of two sounds, being only the same repeated,
absolutely without any difference, but that one circumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer some
good end, that the same sound be made thunder at two distinct times, and
therefore wills that it should be so, must it needs therefore be, that herein
there is some act of God’s will without any motive or end? God saw fit often,
at distinct times, and on different occasions, to say the very same words to
Moses; namely, those, I am Jehovah. And would it not be unreasonable to infer,
as a certain consequence, from this, that here must be some act or acts of the
divine will, in determining and disposing the words exactly alike, at different
times, wholly without aim or inducement? But it would be no more unreasonable
than to say, that there must be an act of God without any inducement, if he
sees it best, and, for some reasons, determines that there shall be the same
resistance, the same dimensions, and the same figure, in several distinct
places.
If, in the instance of the two
spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible that God might have made them
in a contrary position; that which is
made at the right hand, being made at the left; then I ask whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God
had made but one of them, and that in the place of the right hand globe, that
he might have made that numerically different from what it is, and numerically
different from what he did make it;
thought perfectly alike, and in the same place; and at the same time, and in every respect,
in the same circumstances and relations? Namely, whether he might not have made
it numerically the same with that which he has now made at the left hand; and so have left that which is now created
at the right hand, in a state of non-existence? And , if so, whether it would
not have been possible to have made one in that place, perfectly like these,
and yet numerically differing from both? And let it be considered, whether,
from this notion of a numerical difference in bodies, perfectly equal and
alike, which numerical difference is something inherent in the bodies
themselves, and diverse from the difference of place or time, or any
circumstance whatsoever; it will not
follow, that there is an infinite number of numerically different possible
bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining power,
when he goes about to create bodies.
Therefore let us put the case
thus: Supposing that God, in the
beginning, had created but one perfectly solid sphere, in a certain place: and it should be inquired, Why God created
that individual sphere, in that place, at that time? And why he did not create
another sphere perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the same place,
at the same time? Or why he chose to bring into being there, that very body,
rather than any of the infinite number of other bodies, perfectly like it; either of which he could have made there as
well, and would have answered his end as well? Why he caused to exist, at that
place and time, that individual roundness, rather than any other of the
infinite number of individual rotundities, just like it? Why that individual
resistance, rather than any other of the infinite number of possible
resistances, just like it? And it might as reasonably be asked, Why, when God
first caused it to thunder, he caused that individual sound then to be made,
and not another just like it? Why did he make choice of this very sound, and
reject all the infinite number of other possible sounds just like it, but
numerically differing from it, and all differing one from another? I think,
everybody must be sensible of the absurdity and nonsense of what is supposed in
such inquiries. And, if we calmly
attend to the matter, we shall be convinced, that all such kind of objection as
I am answering, are founded on nothing but the imperfection of our manner of
conceiving things, and the obscureness of language, and great want of clearness
and precision in the signification of terms.
[If
any should find fault with this reasoning, that it is going a great length into
metaphysical niceties and subtleties; I
answer, the objection to which they are a reply, is a metaphysical subtlety,
and must be treated according to the nature of it. [“For men to have recourse to subtleties, in raising
difficulties, and then complain, that they should be taken off by minutely
examining these subtleties, is a strange kind of procedure.” Nature of the Human Soul, Vol. 2.
P. 331.]
II.
Another thing alleged is, that innumerable things which are determined by
the divine will, and chosen and done by God rather than others, differ from
those that are not chosen in so inconsiderable a manner, that it would be
unreasonable to suppose the difference to be of any consequence, or that there
is any superior fitness or goodness, that God can have respect to in the
determination.
To which I answer; it is impossible for us to determine, with
any certainty or evidence, that because the difference is very small, and
appears to us of no consideration, therefore there is absolutely no superior
goodness, and no valuable end, which can be proposed by the Creator and
Governor of the world, in ordering such a difference. The aforementioned author mentions many instances. One is, there being one atom in the whole
universe more, or less. But, I think,
it would be unreasonable to suppose, that God made one atom in vain, or without
any end or motive. He made not one
atom, but what was a work of his Almighty Power, as much as the whole globe of
the earth, and requires as much of a constant exertion of Almighty Power to
uphold it; and was made and is upheld
with understanding and design, as much as if no other had been made but
that. And it would be as unreasonable
to suppose, that he made it without anything really aimed at in so doing, as
much as to suppose, that he made the planet Jupiter without aim or design.
If is possible, that the most minute
effects of the Creator’s power, the smallest assignable difference between the
things which God has made, may be attended, in the whole series of events, and
the whole compass and extent of their influence, with very great and important
consequences. If the laws of motion,
and gravitation, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, hold universally, there is not
one atom, nor the least assignable part of an atom, but what has influence,
every moment, throughout the whole material universe, to cause every part to be
otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that particular corporeal
existence. And however the effect is
insensible for the present, yet it may, in length of time, become great and
important.
To illustrate this, let us suppose two
bodies moving the same way, in straight lines, perfectly parallel one to
another; but to be diverted from this
parallel course, and drawn one from another, as much as might be, by the
attraction of an atom, at the distance of one of the furthest of the fixed
stars from the earth; these bodies
being turned out of the lines of their parallel motion, will, by degrees, get
further and further distant, one from the other; and though the distance may be imperceptible for a long time, yet
at length it may become very great. So
the revolution of a planet round the sun being retarded or accelerated, and the
orbit of its revolution made greater or less, and more or less elliptical, and
so its periodical time longer or shorter, no more than may be by the influence
of the least atom, might, in length of time, perform a whole revolution sooner
or late than otherwise it would have done;
which might make a vast alteration with regard to millions of important
events. So the influence of the least
particle may, for ought we know, have such effect on something in the
constitution of some human body, as to cause another thought to arise in the
mind at a certain time (yea, and that not very great), might occasion a vast
alteration through the whole world of mankind.
And so innumerable other ways might be mentioned, wherein the least
assignable alteration may possibly be attended with great consequences.
Another argument, which the
aforementioned author brings against a necessary determination of the divine
will, by a superior fitness, is that such a doctrine derogates from the freeness
of God’s grace and goodness, in choosing the objects of his favor
and bounty, and from the obligation upon men to thankfulness for
special benefits. (p.89, etc.) In
answer to this objection, I would observe,
1.That it derogates no more from the
goodness of God, to suppose that exercise of the benevolence of his nature to
be determined by wisdom, than to suppose it determined by chance, and that his
favors are bestowed altogether at random, his will being determined by nothing
but perfect accident, without any end or design whatsoever; which must be the case, as has been
demonstrated, if volition be not determined by a prevailing motive. That which is owing to perfect contingence,
wherein neither previous inducement nor antecedent choice has any hand, is not
owing more to goodness or benevolence, than that which is owing to the
influence of a wise end.
2.
It is acknowledged, that if the motive that determines the will of God,
in the choice of the objects of his favors, be any moral quality in the object,
recommending that object to his benevolence above others, his choosing that
object is not so great a manifestation of the freeness and sovereignty of his
grace, as if it were otherwise. But
there is no necessity for supposing this, in order to our supposing that he has
some wise end in view, in determining to bestow his favors on one person rather
than another. We are to distinguish
between the merit of the object of God’s favor, or a moral qualification
of the object attracting that favor and recommending to it, and the natural
fitness of such a determination of the act of God’s goodness, to answer
some wise design of his own, some end in the view of God’s omniscience. — It is God’s own act, that is the proper
and immediate object of his volition.
3.
I suppose that none will deny, but that, in some instances, God acts
from wise design in determining the particular subjects of his favors. None will say, I presume, that when God
distinguishes, by his bounty, particular societies or persons, he never, in any
instance, exercises any wisdom in so doing, aiming at some happy
consequence. And, if it be not denied
to be so in some instances, then I would inquire, whether in these instances
God’s goodness is less manifested, than in those wherein God has no aim or end
at all? And whether the subjects have less cause of thankfulness? And if so,
who shall be thankful for the bestowment of distinguishing mercy, with that
enhancing circumstance of the distinction being made without an end? How shall
it be known when God is influenced by some wise aim, and when not? It is very
manifest, with respect to the apostle Paul, that God had wise ends in choosing
him to be a Christian and an apostle, who had been a persecutor, etc. The apostle himself mentions one end. (1 Tim.
1:15, 16) “Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of whom I
am chief. Howbeit, for this cause I
obtained mercy, that in me first, Jesus Christ might show forth all
long-suffering, for a pattern to them who should hereafter believe on him to
life everlasting.” But yet the apostle
never looked on it as a diminution of the freedom and riches of divine grace in
his election, which he so often and so greatly magnifies. This brings me to observe,
4.
Our supposing such a moral necessity in the acts of God’s will, as has
been spoken of, is so far from necessarily derogating from the riches of God’s
grace to such as are the chosen objects of his favor, that, in many instances,
this moral necessity may arise from goodness, and from the great degree of
it. God may choose this object rather
than another, as having a superior fitness to answer the ends, designs, and
inclinations of his goodness; being
more sinful, and so more miserable and necessitous than others, the
inclinations of infinite mercy and benevolence may be more gratified, and the
gracious design of God in sending his Son into the world, may be more
abundantly answered, in the exercises of mercy towards such an object, rather
than another.
One thing more I would observe, before
I finish what I have to say on the head of the necessity of the acts of God’s
will; and that is, that something much
more like a servile subjection of the divine Being to fatal necessity, will
follow from Arminian principles, than from the doctrines which they
oppose. For they (at least most of
them) suppose, with respect to all events that happen in the moral world,
depending in the volitions of moral agents, which are the most important events
of the universe, to which all other are subordinate; I say, they suppose, with respect to these, that God has a
certain foreknowledge of them, antecedent to any purposes or decrees of his
about them. And if so, they have a
fixed certain futurity, prior to any design or volitions of his, and
independent on them, and to which his volitions must be subject, as he would
wisely accommodate his affairs to this fixed futurity of the state of things in
the moral world. So that here, instead
of a moral necessity of God’s will, arising from, or consisting in, the
infinite perfection and blessedness of the divine Being, we have a fixed
unalterable state of things, properly distinct from the perfect nature of the
divine mind, and the state of the divine will and design, and entirely
independent on these things, and which they have no hand in, because they are
prior to them; and to which God’s will
is truly subject, being obliged to conform or accommodate himself to it, in all
his purposes and decrees, and in everything he does in his disposals and
government of the world. The moral
world being the end of the natural; so
that all is in vain, that is not accommodated to that state of the moral world,
which consists in, or depends upon, the acts and state of the wills of moral
agents, which had a fixed futurition from eternity. Such a subjection to necessity as this, would truly argue an
inferiority and servitude, that would be unworthy of the Supreme Being; and is much more agreeable to the notion
which many of the heathen had of fate, as above the gods, than that moral
necessity of fitness and wisdom which has been spoken of; and is truly repugnant to the absolute
sovereignty of God, and inconsistent with the supremacy of his will; and really subjects the will of the Most
High to the will of his creatures, and brings him into dependence upon them.
It is urged by Arminians, that the
doctrine of the necessity of men’s volitions, or their necessary connection with
antecedent events and circumstances, makes the First Cause, and Supreme Orderer
of all things, the Author of Sin; in
that he has so constituted the state and course of things, that sinful
volitions become necessary, in consequence of his disposal. Dr. Whitby, in his Discourse on the Freedom
of the Will,
[On the five Points, p. 361].cites one
of the ancients, as on his side, declaring that this opinion of the necessity
of the will “absolves sinners, as doing nothing of their own accord which was
evil, and would cast all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the
world, upon God, and upon his providence, if that were admitted by the
assertors of this fate; whether he
himself did necessitate them to do these things, or ordered matters so, that
they should be constrained to do them by some other cause.” And the Doctor says, in another place, [On the five
Points, p. 486.] “In the
nature of the thing, and in the opinion of philosophers, cause deficiens, in
rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem reducendaest. in things necessary, the deficient cause
must be reduced to the efficient. And
in this case the reason is evident;
because the not doing what is required, or not avoiding what is
forbidden, being a defect, must follow from the position of the necessary cause
of that deficiency.” — Concerning this,
I would observe the following things.
I.
If there be any difficulty in this matter, it is nothing peculiar to
this scheme; it is no difficulty or
disadvantage wherein it is distinguished from the scheme of Arminians; and, therefore, not reasonably objected by
them.
Dr. Whitby supposes that if sin
necessarily follows from God withholding assistance, or if that assistance be
not given, which is absolutely necessary to the avoiding of evil; then, in the nature of the thing, God must
be as properly the author of that evil, as if he were the efficient cause of
it. From whence, according to what he
himself says of the devils and damned spirits, God must be the proper author of
their perfect unrestrained wickedness.
He must be the efficient cause of the great pride of the devils, and of
their perfect malignity against God, Christ, his saints, and all that is good,
and of the insatiable cruelty of their disposition. For he allows, that God has so forsaken them, and does so
withhold his assistance from them, that they are incapacitated from doing good,
and determined only to evil. [On the five
Points, p. 302, 303.] Our
doctrine, in its consequence, makes God the author of men’s sin in this world,
no more, and in no other sense, than his doctrine, in its consequence, makes
God the author of the hellish pride and malice of the devils. And doubtless the latter is as odious an
effect as the former.
Again, if it will follow at all,
that God is the Author of Sin, from what has been supposed of a sure and
infallible connection between antecedents and consequents, it will follow
because of this, viz. that
for God to be the author or orderer of those things which, he knows beforehand,
will infallibly be attended with such a consequence, is the same thing, in
effect, as for him to be the author of that consequence. But, if this be so, this is a difficulty
which equally attends the doctrine of Arminians themselves; at least, of those of them who allow God’s certain
foreknowledge of all events. For, on
the supposition of such a foreknowledge, this is the case with respect to every
sin that is committed: God knew, that
if he ordered and brought to pass such and such events, such sins would
infallibly follow. As for instance, God
certainly foreknew, long before Judas was born, that if he ordered things so,
that there should be such a man born, at such a time, and at such a place, and
that his life should be preserved, and that he should, in divine providence, be
led into acquaintance with Jesus; and
that his heart should be so influenced by God’s Spirit or providence, as to be
inclined to be a follower of Christ;
and that he should be one of those twelve, which should be chosen
constantly to attend him as his family;
and that his health should be preserved, so that he should go up to
Jerusalem, at the last passover in Christ’s life. And it should be so ordered, that Judas should see Christ’s kind
treatment of the woman which anointed him at Bethany, and have that reproof
from Christ which he had at that time, and see and hear other things which
excited his enmity against his Master, and other circumstances should be
ordered, as they were ordered; it would
most certainly and infallibly follow, that Judas would betray his Lord, and
would soon after hang himself, and die impenitent, and be sent to hell, for his
horrid wickedness.
Therefore, this supposed difficulty
ought not to be brought as an objection against the scheme which has been
maintained, as disagreeing with the Arminian scheme, seeing it is
no difficulty owing to such a disagreement, but a difficulty wherein the
Arminians share with us. That
must be unreasonably made an objection against our differing from them, which
we should not escape or avoid at all by agreeing with them. — And therefore I would observe,
II.
They who object, that this doctrine makes God the Author of Sin, ought
distinctly to explain what they mean by that phrase, The Author of Sin. I know the phrase, as it is commonly
used, signifies something very ill. If
by the Author of Sin, be meant the Sinner, the Agent, or Actor
of Sin, or the Doer of a wicked thing, so it would be a reproach and
blasphemy, to suppose God to be the Author of Sin. In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin; rejecting such an imputation on the Most
High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred;
and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down. But if, by the Author of Sin, is
meant the permitter, or not a hinderer of Sin; and, at the same time, a disposer of the state of events, in such
a manner, for wise, holy, and most excellent ends and purposes, that Sin, if it
be permitted or not hindered, will most certainly and infallibly follow: I say, if this be all that is meant, by
being the Author of Sin, I do not deny that God is the Author of Sin (though I
dislike and reject the phrase, as that which by use and custom is apt to carry
another sense), it is no reproach for the Most High to be thus the Author of
Sin. This is not to be the Actor of
Sin, but, on the contrary, of holiness. What God doth herein, is holy;
and a glorious exercise of the infinite excellency of his nature. And, I do not deny, that God being thus the
Author of Sin, follow from what I have laid down; and, I assert, that it equally follows from the doctrine which is
maintained by most of the Arminian divines.
That it is most certainly so, that God
is in such a manner the Disposer and Orderer of Sin, is evident, if any credit
is to be given to the Scripture; as
well as because it is impossible, in the nature of things, to be
otherwise. In such a manner God ordered
the obstinacy of Pharaoh, in his refusing to obey God’s commands, to let the
people go. (Exo. 4:21) “I will harden his heart, and he shall
not let the people go.” (Exo. 7:2-5) “Aaron thy brother shall speak unto
Pharaoh, that he send the children of Israel out of his land. And I will harden Pharaoh’s heart, and
multiply my signs and my wonders in the land of Egypt. But Pharaoh shall not hearken unto you; that I may lay mine hand upon Egypt, by
great judgments,” etc. (Exo. 9:12) “And the Lord hardened the heart of
Pharaoh, and he hearkened not unto them, as the Lord had spoken unto
Moses.” (Exo. 10:1, 2) “And the Lord said unto Moses, Go in unto Pharaoh; for I have hardened his heart, and the heart
of his servants, that I might show these my signs before him, and that thou
mayest tell it in the ears of they son, and thy son’s son, what things I have
wrought in Egypt, and my signs which I have done amongst them, that ye may know
that I an the Lord.” (Exo. 14:4) “And I will harden Pharaoh’s heart,
that he shall follow after them: and I
will be honoured upon Pharaoh, and upon all his host.” (Exo.
14:8) “And the Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh king of Egypt, and he
pursued after the children of Israel.”
And it is certain, that in such a manner God, for wise and good ends,
ordered that event, Joseph being sold into Egypt by his brethren. (Gen. 45:5) “Now, therefore, be not grieved,
not angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you to preserve life.” (Gen. 45:7, 8) “God did send me before you
to preserve a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great
deliverance: so that now it was not you
that sent me hither, but God.” (Psa.
105:17) “He sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a
servant.” It is certain, that thus God
ordered the Sin and folly of Sihon king of the Amorites, in refusing to let the
people of Israel pass by him peaceably (Deu.
2:30). “But Sihon king of
Heshbon would not let us pass by him;
for the Lord thy God hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate,
that he might deliver him into thine hand.”
It is certain, that God thus ordered the Sin and folly of the kings of
Canaan, that they attempted not to make peace with Israel, but, with a stupid
boldness and obstinacy, set themselves violently to oppose them and their God
(Jos. 11:20). “For it was of the Lord, to harden their hearts, that they should
come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, and that
they might have no favour; but that he
might destroy them, as the Lord commanded Moses.” It is evident, that thus God ordered the treacherous rebellion of
Zedekiah against the king of Babylon.
(Jer. 52:3) “For through the anger of the Lord it came to pass in
Jerusalem, and Judah, until he had cast them out from his presence, that
Zedekiah rebelled against the king of Babylon.” (So 2 Kin. 24:20) and it
is exceeding manifest, that God thus ordered the rapine and unrighteous ravages
of Nebuchadnezzar, in spoiling and ruining the nations round about. (Jer. 25:9) “Behold, I will send and take
all the families of the north, saith the Lord, and Nebuchadnezzar my servant,
and will bring them against this land, and against all the nations round
about; and will utterly destroy them,
and make them an astonishment, and an hissing, and perpetual desolations.” (Jer. 43:10, 11) “I will send and take
Nebuchadnezzar the king of Babylon, my servant: and I will set his throne upon these stones that I have hid, and
he shall spread his royal pavilion over them.
And when he cometh, he shall smite the land of Egypt, and deliver such
as are for death to death, and such as are for captivity to captivity, and such
as are for the sword to the sword.”
Thus God represents himself as sending for Nebuchadnezzar, and taking
him and his armies, and bringing him against the nations, which were to be
destroyed by him, to that very end, that he might utterly destroy them, and
make them desolate; and as appointing
the work that he should do so particularly, that the very persons were designed
that he should kill with the sword, and those that should be killed with famine
and pestilence, and those that should be carried into captivity; and that in doing all these things, he
should act as his servant; by which,
less cannot be intended, than that he should serve his purposes and designs. And in (Jer. 27:4-6) God declares, viz. by bringing this to pass in his sovereign
disposals, as the great Possessor and Governor of the universe, that disposes
all things just as pleases him. “Thus
saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel;
I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground,
by my great power, and my stretched out arm, and have given it unto whom it
seemed meet unto me; and now I have
given all these lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar my servant, and the
beasts of the field have I given also to serve him.” And Nebuchadnezzar is spoken of as doing these things, by having
his arms strengthened by God, and having God’s sword put into his
hands, for this end. (Eze. 30:24, 25, 26) Yea, God speaks of his
terribly ravaging and wasting the nations, and cruelly destroying all sorts,
without distinction of sex or age, as the weapon in God’s hand, and the
instrument of his indignation, which God makes use of to fulfill his own
purposes, and execute his own vengeance.
(Jer. 51:20, etc.) “Thou art my battle-axe, and weapons of war. For with thee will I break in pieces the
nations, and with thee I will destroy kingdoms, and with thee I will break in
pieces the horse and his rider, and with thee I will break in pieces the
chariot and his rider; with thee also
will I break in pieces man and woman; and with thee I will break in pieces old and young; and with thee will I break in pieces the
young men and the maid,” etc. It is
represented, that the designs of Nebuchadnezzar and those that destroyed
Jerusalem, never could have been accomplished, had not God determined
them. (Lam. 3:37) “Who is he that saith, and it cometh to pass, and the Lord
commandeth it not?” Any yet the king of Babylon thus destroying the nations, and
especially the Jews, is spoken of as his great wickedness, for which God finally
destroyed him. (Isa. 14:4-6, 12; Hab 2:5-12, and Jer. 50 and 51) It is most
manifest, that God, to serve his own designs, providentially ordered Shimei’s
cursing of David. (2 Sam. 16:10, 11)
“The Lord hath said unto him, Curse David.
— Let him curse, for the Lord hath bidden him.”
It is certain, that God thus, for
excellent, holy, gracious ends, ordered the fact which they committed, who were
concerned in Christ’s death; and that
therein they did but fulfill God’s designs.
As, I trust, no Christian will deny it was the design of God, that
Christ should be crucified, and that for this end he came into the world. It is very manifest by many scriptures, that
the whole affair of Christ’s crucifixion, with its circumstances, and the
treachery of Judas, that made way for it, was ordered in God’s providence, in
pursuance of his purpose;
notwithstanding the violence that is used with those plain scriptures,
to obscure and pervert the sense of them (Acts 2:23). “Him being delivered, by the determinate counsel and
foreknowledge of God
[“Grotius, as well as Rexa, observes,
must here signify decree; and Elsner
has shown that it has that signification in approved Greek writers. And it is certain signifies one given up
into the hands of the enemy:” Dodd. In
Loc.]
ye have taken, and
with wicked hands have crucified and slain.”
Luke 22:21, 22.
[“As
this passage is not liable to the ambiguities which some have apprehended in
Acts 2:23 and 4:28. (which yet seem on
the whole to be parallel to it, in their most natural construction) I look upon
it as an evident proof, that these things are, in the language of Scripture,
said to be determined or decreed (or exactly bounded and marked out by God, as
the word most naturally signifies) which he sees in fact will happen, in
consequence of his volitions, without any necessitating agency; as well as those events, of which he is
properly the author.” Dodd. In Loc.]
“But behold the hand of him that
betrayeth me, is with me on the table: and
truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined.” (Acts 4:27, 28) “For of a truth, against the holy child Jesus,
whom thou hast anointed, both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and
the people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and
thy counsel determined before to be done.”
(Acts 3:17, 18) “And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did
it, as did also your rulers; but these
things, which God before had showed by the mouth of all his prophets, that Christ
should suffer, he hath fulfilled.” So
that what these murderers of Christ did, is spoken of as what God brought to
pass or ordered, and that by which he fulfilled his own word.
In Rev. 17:17, “The agreeing of the kings of the earth to give their kingdom
to the beast;” though it was a very wicked thing in them, is spoken of as
“fulfilling God’s will,” and what “God had put into their hearts to do.” It is manifest, that God sometimes permits
sin to be committed, and at the same time orders things so, that if he permits
the fact, it will come to pass, because on some accounts, he sees it needful
and of importance, that it should come to pass. (Matt. 18:7) “It must needs be, that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence
cometh.” With 1 Cor. 11:19, “For there
must also be heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made
manifest among you.”
Thus it is certain and demonstrable,
from the Holy Scriptures, as well as the nature of things, and the principles
of Arminians, that God permits sin; and
at the same time, so orders things, in his providence, that it certainly and
infallibly will come to pass, in consequence of his permission. I proceed to observe in the next place,
III.
That there is a great difference between God being concerned thus, by
his permission, in an event and act, which, in the inherent subject and
agent of it, is sin (though the event will certainly follow on his permission),
and his being concerned in it by producing it and exerting the act of
sin; or between his being the orderer
of its certain existence, by not hindering it, under certain
circumstances, and his being the proper actor or author of it, by
a positive agency or efficiency.
And this, notwithstanding what Dr. Whitby offers about a saving of philosophers,
that causa deficiens, in rebus necessariis, ad causam per se efficientem
reducenda est. as there is a vast
difference between the sun being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of
the atmosphere, and the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and
positive influence; and its being the
occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby it
descends below the horizon. The motion
of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but it is not the proper cause, efficient,
or producer of them; though they are
necessarily consequent on that motion, under such circumstances: no more is any action of the divine Being
the cause of the evil of men’s wills.
If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would
be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and
heat. And then something might be
argued from the nature of cold and darkness, to a likeness of nature in the
sun; and it might be justly inferred,
that the sun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams are black and
frosty. But from its being the cause no
otherwise than by its departure, no such thing can be inferred, but the
contrary; it may justly be argued, that
the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the
consequence of its withdrawment; and
the move constantly and necessarily these effects are connected with and
confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the
fountain of light and heat. So,
inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the
Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and
energy, and, under certain circumstances, necessarily follows on the want of
his influence; this is no argument that
he is sinful, or his operation evil, or has anything of the nature of
evil; but, on the contrary, that he,
and his agency, are altogether good and holy, and that he is the fountain of
all holiness. It would be strange
arguing, indeed, because men never commit sin, but only when God leaves them to
themselves, and necessarily sin when he does so, that therefore their sin
is not from themselves, but from God;
and so, that God must be a sinful being: as strange as it would be to argue, because it is always dark when
the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is present, that therefore all
darkness is from the sun, and that his disk and beams must needs be black.
IV.
It properly belongs to the supreme and absolute Governor of the
universe, to order all important events within his dominion, by his
wisdom: but the events in the moral
world are of the most important kind;
such as the moral actions of intelligent creatures, and their consequences.
These events will be ordered by
something. They will either be disposed
by wisdom, or they will be disposed by chance;
that is, they will be disposed by blind and undesigning causes, if that
were possible, and could be called a disposal.
Is it not better, that the good and evil which happen in God’s world,
should be ordered, regulated, bounded, and determined by the good pleasure of
an infinitely wise Being, who perfectly comprehends within his understanding
and constant view, the universality of things, in all their extent and
duration, and sees all the influence of every event, with respect to every
individual thing and circumstance, throughout the grand system, and the whole
of the eternal series of consequences;
than to leave these things to fall out by chance, and to be determined
by those causes which have no understanding or aim? Doubtless, in these
important events, there is a better and a worse, as to the time, subject,
place, manner, and circumstances of their coming to pass, with regard to their
influence on the state and course of things.
And if there be, it is certainly best that they should be determined to
that time, place, etc. which is
best. And therefore it is in its own
nature fit, that wisdom, and not chance, should order these things. So that it belongs to the Being, who is the
possessor of infinite wisdom, and is the creator and owner of the whole system
of created existences, and has the care of all; I say, it belongs to him, to take care of this matter; and he would not do what is proper for him,
if he should neglect it. And it is so
far from being unholy in him, to undertake this affair, that it would rather
have been unholy to neglect it; as it
would have been a neglecting what fitly appertains to him; and so it would have been a very unfit and
unsuitable neglect.
Therefore the sovereignty of God
doubtless extends to this matter.
Especially considering, that if God should leave men’s volitions, and
all moral events, to the determination and disposal of blind unmeaning causes, or
they should be left to happen perfectly without a cause; this would be no more consistent with
liberty, in any notion of it, and particularly not in the Arminian notion of
it, than if these events were subject to the disposal of divine providence, and
the will of man were determined by circumstances which are ordered and disposed
by divine wisdom; as appears by what
has been already observed. But it is
evident, that such a providential disposing, and determining of men’s moral
actions, though it infers a moral necessity of those actions, yet it does not
in the least infringe the real liberty of mankind; the only liberty that common sense teaches to be necessary to
moral agency, which, as has been demonstrated, is not inconsistent with such
necessity.
On the whole, it is manifest, that God
may be, in the manner which has been described, the Orderer and Disposer of
that event, which, in the inherent subject and agent, is moral evil; and yet his so doing may be no moral evil. He may will the disposal of such an event,
and its coming to pass for good ends, and his will not be an immoral or sinful
will, but a perfect, holy will. And he
may actually, in his providence, so dispose and permit things, that the event
may be certainly and infallibly connected with such disposal and permission,
and his act therein not be an immoral or unholy, but a perfectly holy act. Sin may be an evil thing, and yet that there
should be such a disposal and permission, as that it should come to pass, may
be a good thing. This is no
contradiction, or inconsistency. Joseph’s
brethren selling him into Egypt, consider it only as it were acted by them, and
with respect to their views and aims, which were evil, was a very bad
thing; but it was a good thing, as it
was an event of God’s ordering, and considered with respect to his views and
aims, which were good (Gen. 50:20). “As
for you, ye thought Evil against me;
but God meant it unto Good.” So
the crucifixion of Christ, if we consider only those things which belong to the
event as it proceeded from his murderers, and are comprehended within the
compass of the affair considered as their act, their principles, dispositions,
views, and aims; so it was one of the
most heinous things that ever was done;
in many respects the most horrid of all acts; but consider it as it was willed and ordered of God, in the
extent of his designs and views, it was the most admirable and glorious of all
events; and God willing the event was
the most holy volition of God, that ever was made known to men; and God’s act in ordering it, was a divine
act, which, above all others, manifests the moral excellency of the divine
Being.
The consideration of these things may
help us to a sufficient answer to the cavils of Arminians, concerning what has
been supposed by many Calvinists, of a distinction between a secret and revealed
will of God, and their diversity one from the other. Supposing that the Calvinists herein ascribe inconsistent wills
to the Most High: which is without any
foundation. God’s secret and revealed
will, or, in other words, his disposing and preceptive will, may
be diverse, and exercised in dissimilar acts, the one in disapproving and
opposing, the other in willing and determining, without any inconsistency. Because, although these dissimilar exercises
of the divine will may, in some respects, relate to the same things, yet, in
strictness, they have different and contrary objects, the one evil and the
other good. Thus, for instance, the
crucifixion of Christ was a thing contrary to the revealed or preceptive will
of God. Because, as it was viewed and
done by his malignant murderers, it was a thing infinitely contrary to the holy
nature of God, and so necessarily contrary to the holy inclination of his heart
revealed in his law. Yet this does not
at all hinder but that the crucifixion of Christ, considered with all those
glorious consequences, which were within the view of the divine omniscience,
might be indeed, and therefore might appear to God to be, a glorious
event; and consequently be agreeable to
his will, though this will may be secret, i.e.
not revealed in God’s law. Thus,
considered, the crucifixion of Christ was not evil, but good. If the secret exercises of God’s will were
of a kind that is dissimilar, and contrary to his revealed will, respecting the
same, or like objects; if the objects
of both were good, or both evil; then,
indeed, to ascribe contrary kinds of volition or inclination to God, respecting
these objects, would be to ascribe an inconsistent will of God. But to ascribe to Him different and opposite
exercises of heart, respecting different objects, and objects contrary one to
another, is so far from supposing God’s will to be inconsistent with
itself, that it cannot be supposed consistent with itself any other
way. For any being to have a will of choice
respecting good, and, at the same time, a will of rejection and refusal
respecting evil, is to be very consistent:
but the contrary, viz. to have
the same will towards these contrary objects, and to choose and love both good
and evil, at the same time, is to be very inconsistent.
There is no inconsistency in
supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and considered simply
as evil, and yet that it may be his will it should come to pass, considering
all consequences. I believe, there is
no person of good understanding, who will venture to say, he is certain that it
is impossible it should be best, taking in the whole compass and extent of
existence, and all consequences in the endless series of events, that there
should be such a thing as moral evil in the world.
Here are worthy to be observed some
passages of a late noted writer, of our nation, that nobody who is acquainted
with him, will suspect to be very favorable to Calvinism. “It is difficult, says he, to handle the necessity
of evil in such a manner, as not to stumble such as are not above being
alarmed at propositions which have an uncommon sound. But if philosophers will but reflect calmly on the matter, they
will find, that consistently with the unlimited power of the supreme cause, it
may be said, that in the best ordered system, evils must have
place.” Turnbull’s Principles of Moral
Philosophy, p. 327, 328. He is there
speaking of moral evils, as may be seen.
Again the same author, in his second
vol. entitled, Christian Philosophy
(p.35), has these words: “If the Author
and Governor of all things be infinitely perfect, then whatever is, is
right; of all possible systems he hath
chosen the best: and, consequently,
there is no absolute evil in the universe.
This being the case, all the seeming imperfections or evils in it are
such only in a partial view; and, with
respect to the whole system, they are goods.”
Ibid.
p. 37. “Whence then comes evil,
is the question that hath, in all ages, been reckoned the Gordian knot in
philosophy. And, indeed, if we own the
existence of evil in the world in an absolute sense, we diametrically
contradict what hath been just now proved of God. For if there by any evil in the system, that is not good with
respect to the whole, then is the whole not good, but evil: or, at best, very imperfect: and an author must be as his workmanship
is; as is the effect, such is the cause. But the solution of this difficulty is at
hand; That there is no evil in the
universe. What! Are there no pains, no
imperfections? Is there no misery, no vice in the world? Or are not these
evils? Evils indeed they are; that is,
those of one sort are hurtful, and those of the other sort are equally hurtful,
and abominable: but they are not evil
or mischievous with respect to the whole? Ibid. p. 42. “But he is, at the
same time, said to create evil, darkness, confusion; and yet to do no evil, but to be the author of good only. He is called the “Father of lights,” the
Author of “every perfect and good gift, with whom there is no variableness nor
shadow of turning,” who “tempteth no man,” but “giveth to all men liberally,
and upbraideth not.” And yet, by the
prophet (Isa. 45:7) he is introduced saying of himself, “I for light and create
darkness; I make peace, and create
evil: I the Lord, do all these
things.” What is the meaning, the plain
language of all this, but that the Lord delighteth in goodness, and (as the
scripture speaks) evil is “his strange work?” He intends and pursues the
universal good of his creation: and the
evil which happens, is not permitted for its own sake, or through any pleasure
in evil, but because it is requisite to the greater good pursued.”
And, if so, it will certainly follow,
that an infinitely wise Being, who always chooses what is best, must choose
that there should be such a thing. And
if so, then such a choice is not evil, but a wise and holy choice. And if so, then that providence, which is
agreeable to such a choice, is a wise and holy providence. Men do will sin as sin, and so are
the authors and actors of it: they love
it as sin, and for evil ends and purposes.
God does not will sin as sin, or for the sake of anything evil; though it be his pleasure so to order
things, that, he permitting, sin will come to pass, for the sake of the great
good that by his disposal shall be the consequence. His willing to order things so that evil should come to pass, for
the sake of the contrary good, is no argument that he does not hate evil, as
evil; and if so, then it is no reason why
he may not reasonably forbid evil as evil, and punish it as such.
The Arminians themselves must be
obliged, whether they will or no, to allow a distinction of God’s will,
amounting to just the same thing that Calvinists intend by their distinction of
a secret and revealed will. They
must allow a distinction of those things which God thinks best should be,
considering all circumstances and consequences, and so are agreeable to his
disposing will, and those things which he loves, and are agreeable to his
nature, in themselves considered. Who
is there that will dare to say, that the hellish pride, malice, and cruelty of
devils, are agreeable to God, and what he likes and approves? And yet, I trust,
there is no Christian divine but will allow, that it is agreeable to God’s will
so to order and dispose things concerning them, so to leave them to themselves,
and give them up to their own wickedness, that this perfect wickedness should
be a necessary consequence. Dr. Whitby’s
words plainly suppose and allow it.
[Whitby
on the five Points, Edit. 2. 300, 305, 309.]
These following things may be laid
down as maxims of plain truth, and indisputable evidence.
1.
That God is a perfectly happy Being, in the most absolute and
highest sense possible.
2.
That it will follow from hence, that God is free from everything that is
contrary to happiness; and so,
that in strict propriety of speech, there is no such thing as any pain, grief,
or trouble, in God.
3.
When any intelligent being is really crossed and disappointed, and
things are contrary to what he truly desires, he is less pleased, or has
less pleasure. His pleasure
and happiness is diminished, and he suffers what is disagreeable to him, or
is the subject of something that is of a nature contrary to joy and happiness,
even pain and grief.
[Certainly
it is not less absurd and unreasonable, to talk of God’s will and Desires being
truly and properly crossed, without his suffering any uneasiness, or anything
grievous or disagreeable, than it is to talk of something that may be called a revealed
will, which may, in some respect, be different from a secret
purpose, which purpose may be fulfilled, when the other is opposed.]
From this last axiom it follows, that
if no distinction is to be admitted between God’s hatred of sin, and his will
with respect to the event and the existence of sin, as the all-wise Determiner
of all events, under the view of all consequences through the whole compass and
series of things; I say, them it
certainly follows, that the coming to pass of every individual act of sin is
truly, all things considered, contrary to his will, and that his will is really
crossed in it; and this in proportion
as he hates it. And as God’s hatred of
sin is infinite, by reason of, the infinite contrariety of his holy nature to
sin; so his will is infinitely crossed,
in every act of sin that happens. Which
is as much as to say, he endures that which is infinitely disagreeable to him,
by means of every act of sin that he sees committed. And therefore, as appears by the preceding positions, he endures
truly and really, infinite grief or pain from every sin. And so he must be infinitely crossed, and
suffer infinite pain, every day, in millions of millions of instances: he must continually be the subject of an
immense number of real, and truly infinitely great crosses and
vexations. Which would be to make him
infinitely the most miserable of all beings.
If any objector should say; all that these things amount to, is, that God
may do evil that good may come; which
is justly esteemed immoral and sinful in men;
and therefore may be justly esteemed inconsistent with the moral
perfections of God. I answer, that for
God to dispose and permit evil, in the manner that has been spoken of, is not
to do evil that good may come; for it
is to do evil at all. — In order to a
thing being morally evil, there must be one of these things belonging to it,
either it must be a thing unfit and unsuitable in its own
nature; or it must have a bad
tendency; or it must proceed from
an evil disposition, and be done for an evil end. But neither of these things can be
attributed to God’s ordering and permitting such events, as the immoral acts of
creatures, for good ends. (1.) It is
not unfit in its own nature, that he should do so. For it is in its own nature fit, that
infinite wisdom, and not blind chance, should dispose moral good and
evil in the world. And it is fit, that
the Being who has infinite wisdom, and is the Maker, Owner, and Supreme
Governor of the world, should take care of that matter. And, therefore, there is no unfitness
or unsuitableness in his doing it. It
may be unfit, and so immoral, for any other beings to go about to order this
affair; because they are not possessed
of a wisdom that in any manner fits them for it; and, in other respects, they are not fit to be trusted with this
affair; nor does it belong to them,
they not being the owners and lords of the universe.
We need not be afraid to affirm, that
if a wise and good man knew with absolute certainty it would be best, all
things considered, that there should be such a thing as moral evil in the
world, it would not be contrary to his wisdom and goodness, for him to choose
that it should be so. It is no evil
desire, to desire good, and to desire that which, all things considered, is
best. And it is no unwise choice, to
choose that that should be, which it is best should be. And to choose the existence of that thing
concerning which this is known, viz.
that it is best it should be, and so is known in the whole to be
most worthy to be chosen. On the
contrary, it would be a plain defect in wisdom and goodness, for him not to
choose it. And the reason why he might
not order it, if he were able, would not be because he might not desire
it, but only the ordering of that matter does not belong to him. But it is no harm for him who is, by right,
and in the greatest propriety, the Supreme Orderer of all things, to order
everything in such a manner, as it would be a point of wisdom in him to choose
that they should be ordered. If it
would be a plain defect of wisdom and goodness in a being, not to choose that
that should be, which he certainly knows it would, all things considered, be
best should be (as was but now observed), then it must be impossible for a
Being who has no defect of wisdom and goodness, to do otherwise than choose it
should be; and that, for this very
reason, because he is perfectly wise and good.
And if it be agreeable to perfect wisdom and goodness for him to choose
that it should be, and the ordering of all things supremely and perfectly
belongs to him, it must be agreeable to infinite wisdom and goodness, to order
that it should be. If the choice is
good, the ordering and disposing things according to that choice must also be
good. It can be no harm in one to whom
it belongs “to do his will in the armies of heaven, and amongst the inhabitants
of the earth,” to execute a good volition.
If this will be good, and the object of his will be, all things
considered, good and best, then the choosing or willing it is not willing
evil that good may come. And if so,
then his ordering, according to that will, is not doing evil that good
may come.
2.
It is not of a bad tendency, for the Supreme Being thus to order
and permit that moral evil to be, which it is best should come to pass. For that it is of good tendency, is the very
thing supposed in the point now in question.
— Christ’s crucifixion, though a most horrid fact in them that
perpetrated it, was of a most glorious tendency as permitted and ordered by
God.
3.
Nor is there any need of supposing, it proceeds from any evil
disposition or aim; for by the
supposition, what is aimed at is good, and good is the actual issue, in the
final result of things.
The things which have already been
offered, may serve to obviate or clear many of the objections which might be
raised concerning sin’s first coming into the world; as though it would follow from the doctrine maintained, that God
must be the author of the first sin, through his so disposing things, that it
should necessarily follow from his permission, that the sinful act should be
committed, etc. I need not, therefore,
stand to repeat what has been said already, about such a necessity not proving
God to be the author of sin, in any ill sense, or in any such sense as to
infringe any liberty of man, concerned in his moral agency, or capacity of
blame, guilt, and punishment.
But, should it nevertheless be said,
that if God, when he had made man, might so order his circumstances, that from
these, together with his withholding further assistance and divine influence,
his sin would infallibly follow, why might not God as well have made man with a
fixed prevailing principle of sin in his heart?
I answer, 1. It was meet, if sin did come into existence, and appear in the
world, it should arise from the imperfection which properly belongs to a
creature, as such, and should appear so to do, that it might appear not to be
from God as the efficient or fountain.
But this could not have been, if man had been made at first with sin in
his heart; nor unless the abiding
principle and habit of sin were first introduced by an evil act of the
creature. If sin had not arisen from
the imperfection of the creature, it would not have been so visible, that it
did not arise from God, as the positive cause, and real source of it. — And therefore,
2.
I would observe, that objections against the doctrine that has been laid
down, in opposition to the Arminian notion of liberty, from these difficulties,
are altogether impertinent; because no
additional difficulty is incurred, by adhering to a scheme in this manner
differing from theirs, and none would be removed or avoided, by agreeing with,
and maintaining theirs. Nothing that
the Arminians say, about the contingence, or self-determining power of man’s
will, can serve to explain, with less difficulty, how the first sinful volition
of mankind could take place, and man be justly charged with the blame of
it. To say, the will was
self-determined, or determined by free choice, in that sinful volition — which
is to say, that the first sinful volition was determined by a foregoing sinful
volition — is no solution of the difficulty.
It is an odd way of solving difficulties, to advance greater, in order
to it. To say, two and two make nine,
or, that a child begat his father, solves no difficulty: no more does it, to say, the first sinful
act of choice was before the first sinful act of choice, and chose and
determined it, and brought it to pass.
Nor is it any better solution, to say, the first sinful volition arose accidentally,
without any cause at all; any more than
it will solve that difficult question, How the world could be made out of
nothing? to say, it came into being out of nothing, without any cause; as has been already observed. And if we should allow, that the first evil
volition should arise by perfect accident, without any cause; it would relieve no difficulty, about God
laying the blame of it to man. For how
was man to blame for perfect accident, which had no cause, and which,
therefore, he was not the cause of, any more than if it came by some external
cause? — Such kind of solutions are no better, than if some person, going about
to solve some of the strange mathematical paradoxes, about infinitely great and
small quantities — as, that some infinitely small quantities, are infinitely less
than others, which yet are infinitely little — should say, that mankind have
been under a mistake, in supposing a greater quantity to exceed a smaller; and that a hundred, multiplied by ten, makes
but a single unit.
The things which have been already
observed, may be sufficient to answer most of the objection, and silence the
great exclamations of Arminians against the Calvinists, from the supposed
inconsistency of Calvinistic principles with the moral perfections of God, as
exercised in his government of mankind.
The consistence of such a doctrine of necessity as has been maintained,
with the fitness and reasonableness of God’s commands, promises and
threatenings, rewards and punishments, has been particularly considered. The cavils of our opponents, as though our
doctrine of necessity made God the author of sin, have been answered. And also their objections against these
principles, as inconsistent with God’s sincerity, in his counsels, invitations
and persuasions, has been already obviated, in what has been observed
respecting the consistence of what Calvinists suppose, concerning the secret
and revealed will of God. By that it
appears, there is no repugnance in supposing it may be the secret will of God,
that it shall be a certain consequence, that a thing never will come to pass; which yet it is man’s duty to do, and so
God’s preceptive will, that he should do;
and this is the same thing as to say, God may sincerely command and
require him to do it. And if he may be
sincere in commanding him, he may, for the same reason, be sincere in
counseling, inviting, and using persuasions with him to do it. Counsels and invitations are manifestations
of God’s preceptive will, or of what God loves, and what is in itself, and as
man’s act, agreeable to his heart; and
not of his disposing will, and what he chooses as a part of his own infinite
scheme of things. It has been
particularly shown, Part III.
Sect. IV, that such a necessity
as has been maintained, is not inconsistent with the propriety and fitness of
divine commands; and for the same
reason, not inconsistent with the sincerity of invitations and counsels, in the
Corollary at the end of that Section.
Yea, it has been shown, Part III.
Sect. VII. Corol.
1, that this objection of Arminians, concerning the sincerity and use of
divine exhortations, invitations, and counsels, is demonstrably against
themselves.
Notwithstanding, I would further
observe, that the difficulty of reconciling the sincerity of counsels,
invitations, and persuasions with such an antecedent known fixedness of all
events, as has been supposed, is not peculiar to this scheme, as distinguished
from that of the generality of Arminians, which acknowledge the absolute
foreknowledge of God. And therefore, it
would be unreasonably brought as an objection against my differing from
them. The main seeming difficulty in
the case is this: that God, in
counseling, inviting, and persuading, makes a show of aiming at, seeking, and
using endeavors for the thing exhorted and persuaded to. Whereas, it is impossible for any
intelligent being truly to seek, or use endeavors for a thing, which he at the
same time knows, most perfectly, will not come to pass. And that it is absurd to suppose, he makes
the obtaining of a thing his end, in his calls and counsels, which he, at the
same time, infallibly knows will not be obtained by these means. Now, if God knows this, in the utmost
certainty and perfection, the way by which he comes by this knowledge makes no
difference. If he knows it is by the
necessity which he sees in things, or by some other means; it alters not the case. But it is in effect allowed by Arminians
themselves, that God’s inviting and persuading men to do things, which he, at
the same time, certainly knows will not be done, is no evidence of insincerity; because they allow, that God has a certain foreknowledge
of all sinful actions and omissions.
And as this is implicitly allowed by most Arminians, so all that pretend
to own the Scriptures to be the Word of God, must be constrained to allow it. — God commanded and counseled Pharaoh to let
his people go, and used arguments and persuasions to induce him to it; he laid before him arguments taken from his
infinite greatness and almighty power (Exo.
7:16), and forewarned him of the fatal consequences of his refusal, from
time to time (Exo. 8:1, 2, 20, 21; 9:1-5, 13-17, and Exo. 10:3, 6).
He commanded Moses, and the elders of Israel, to go and beseech Pharaoh
to let the people go; and at the same
time told them, he knew surely that he would not comply with it (Exo. 3:18, 19).
“And thou shalt come, thou and the elders of Israel, unto the king of
Egypt, and you shall say unto him, The Lord God of the Hebrews hath met with
us; and now let us go, we beseech thee,
three days’ journey into the wilderness, that we may sacrifice unto the Lord
our God:” and, “I am sure, that the king of Egypt will not let you go.” So our blessed Savior, the evening wherein
he was betrayed, knew that Peter would shamefully deny him, before the morning; for he declares it to him with
asseverations, to show the certainty of it;
and tells the disciples, that all of them should be offended because of
him that night (Matt. 26:31-35; John
13:38; Luke 22:31-34; John 16:32). And yet it was their duty to avoid these things. They were very sinful things, which God had
forbidden, and which it was their duty to watch and pray against; and they were obliged to do so from the counsels
and persuasions Christ used with them, at that very time, so to do
(Matt. 26:41). “Watch and pray, that ye
enter not into temptation.” So that whatever
difficulty there can be in this matter, it can be no objection against any
principles which have been maintained in opposition to the principles of
Arminians; nor does it them, or indeed
all, that call themselves Christians, and acknowledge the divine authority of
the Scriptures. — Nevertheless, this
matter may possibly (God allowing) be more particularly and largely considered,
in some future discourse on the doctrine of predestination.
But I would here observe, that however
the defenders of that notion of liberty which I have opposed, exclaim against
the doctrine of Calvinists, as tending to bring men into doubts concerning the
moral perfections of God; it is their
scheme, and not the scheme of Calvinists, that indeed is justly chargeable with
this. For it is one of their most
fundamental points, that a freedom of will consisting in self-determination,
without all necessity, is essential to moral agency. This is the same thing as to say, that
such a determination of the will, without all necessity, must be in all
intelligent beings, in those things wherein they are moral agents, or in
their moral acts. And from this
it will follow, that God’s will is not necessarily determined, in anything he
does, as a moral agent, or in any of his acts that are of a moral
nature. So that in all things,
wherein he acts holily, justly, and truly, he does not act
necessarily. Or, his will is not
necessarily determined to act holily and justly; because, if it were necessarily determined, he would not be a moral
agent in thus acting. His will
would be attended with necessity;
which, they say, is inconsistent with moral agency. “He can act no otherwise; he is at no liberty on the affair; he is determined by unavoidable, invincible necessity. Therefore such agency is no moral
agency; yea, no agency at all, properly
speaking, a necessary agent is no agent, he being passive, and subject to
necessity, what he does is no act of his, but an effect of a necessity prior to
any act of his.” This is agreeable to
their manner of arguing. Now then, what
is become of all our proof of the moral perfections of God? How can we prove
that God certainly will, in any one instance, do that which is just and
holy; seeing his will is determined in
the matter by no necessity? We have no other way of proving that anything certainly
will be, but only by the necessity of the event. Where we can see no necessity, but that the thing may be, or may
not be, there we are unavoidably left at a loss. We have no other way properly and truly to demonstrate the moral
perfections of God, but the way that Mr. Chubb proves them (p. 252, 261-263 of
his Tracts). That God, must,
necessarily, perfectly know what is most worthy and valuable in itself, which,
in the nature of things, is best and fittest to be done. And, as this is most eligible in itself, he,
being omniscient, must see it to be so;
and being both omniscient and self-sufficient, cannot have any
temptation to reject it; and so must
necessarily will that which is best.
And thus, by this necessity of the determination of God’s will to what
is good and best, we demonstrably establish God’s moral character.
Corol. From what
has been observed, it appears that most of the arguments from Scripture, which
Arminians make use of to support their scheme, are no other than begging the
question. For in these they
determine in the first place, that without such a freedom of will as they hold,
men cannot be proper moral agents, nor the subjects of command, counsel, persuasion,
invitation, promises, threatenings, expostulations, rewards, and
punishments. And that without such
freedom it is to no purpose for men to take any care, or use any diligence,
endeavors, or means, in order to their avoiding sin, or becoming holy, escaping
punishment, or obtaining happiness.
Having supposed these things, which are grand things in question in the
debate, then they heap up scriptures, containing commands, counsels, calls,
warnings, persuasions, expostulations, promises, and threatenings (as doubtless
they may find enough such; the Bible
being confessedly full of them, from the beginning to the end). And then they glory, how full the Scripture
is on their side, how many more texts there are that evidently favor their
scheme, than such as seem to favor the contrary. But let them first make manifest the things in question, which
they suppose and take for granted, and show them to be consistent with
themselves; and produce clear evidence
of their truth; and they have gained
their point, as all will confess, without bringing one scripture. For none denies that there are commands,
counsels, promises, threatenings, etc.
in the Bible. [However], unless
they do these things, their multiplying such texts of Scripture is
insignificant and vain.
It may further be observed, that such
scriptures as they bring, are really against them, and not for them. As it has been demonstrated, that it is their
scheme, and not ours, is inconsistent with the use of motives and persuasives,
or any moral means whatsoever, to induce men to the practice of virtue, or
abstaining from wickedness. Their
principles, and not ours, are repugnant to moral agency, and inconsistent with
the moral government, with law or precept, with the nature of virtue or vice,
reward or punishment, and with everything whatsoever of a moral nature, either
on the part of the moral governor, or in the state, actions, or conduct of the
subject.
If any object against what has been
maintained, that it tends to atheism; I
know not on what grounds such an objection can be raised, unless it be, that
some atheists have held a doctrine of necessity which they suppose to be like
this. But if it be so, I am persuaded
the Arminians would not look upon it just, that their notion of freedom and
contingence should be charged with a tendency to all the errors that ever any embraced,
who have held such opinions. The Stoic
philosophers, whom the Calvinists are charged with agreeing with, were no
atheists, but the greatest theists, and nearest akin to Christians in their
opinions concerning the unity and the perfections of the Godhead, of all the
heathen philosophers. And Epicurus,
that chief father of atheism, maintained no such doctrine of necessity, but was
the greatest maintainer of contingence.
The doctrine of necessity, which
supposes a necessary connection of all events, on some antecedent ground and
reason of their existence, is the only medium we have to prove the being of
God. And the contrary doctrine of
contingence, even as maintained by Arminians (which certainly implies, or
infers, that events may come into existence, or begin to be, without dependence
on anything foregoing, as their cause, ground, or reason), takes away all proof
of the being of God; which proof is
summarily expressed by the apostle, in Rom. 1:20. And this is a tendency to atheism with a witness. So that, indeed, it is the doctrine of
Arminians, and not of the Calvinists, that is justly charged with a tendency to
atheism; it being built on a foundation
that is the utter subversion of every demonstrative argument for the proof of a
Deity; as has been shown, Part II. Sect.
III.
And whereas it has often been said,
that the Calvinistic doctrine of necessity saps the foundations of all religion
and virtue, and tends to the greatest licentiousness of practice: this objection is built on the pretense,
that our doctrine renders vain all means and endeavors, in order to be virtuous
and religious. Which pretense has been
already particularly considered in the 5th Section of this Part; where it has been demonstrated, that this
doctrine has no such tendency. But that
such a tendency is truly to be charged on the contrary doctrine, inasmuch as
the notion of contingence, which their doctrine implies, in its certain
consequences, overthrows all connection in every degree, between endeavor and
event, means and end.
And besides, if many other things,
which have been observed to belong to the Armenian doctrine, or to be
plain consequences of it, be considered, there will appear just reason to
suppose, that it is that which must rather tend to licentiousness. Their doctrine excuses all evil
inclinations, which men find to be natural;
because, in such inclinations, they are not self-determined, as such
inclinations are not owing to any choice or determination of their own
wills. [This] leads men wholly to justify
themselves in all their wicked actions, so far as natural inclination has had a
hand in determining their wills, to the commission of them. Yea, these notions, which suppose moral
necessity and inability to be inconsistent with blame or moral obligation, will
directly lead men to justify the vilest acts and practices, from the strength
of their wicked inclinations of all sorts.
Strong inclinations inducing a moral necessity, yea, to excuse every
degree of evil inclination, so far as this has evidently prevailed, and been
the things, which has determined their wills.
Because, so far as antecedent inclination determined the will, so far
the will was without liberty of indifferent and self-determination, which, at
last, will come to this, that men will justify themselves in all the wickedness
they commit. It has been observed
already, that this scheme of things exceedingly diminishes the guilt of sin,
and the difference between the greatest and smallest offenses; (Part III.
Sect. VI) and if it be pursued
in its real consequences, it leaves room for no such thing, as either virtue or
vice, blame or praise in the world.
(Part III. Sect. VI.
Ibid. Sect. VII) And again, how naturally does this
notion of sovereign self-determining power of the will, in all things virtuous
or vicious, and whatsoever deserves either reward or punishment, tend to
encourage men to put off the work of religion and virtue, and turning from sin
to God; since they have a sovereign power
to determine themselves, just when they please; or if not, they are wholly excusable in going on in sin, because
of their inability to do any other.
If it should be said, that the
tendency of this doctrine of necessity to licentiousness, appears by the
improvement many at this day actually make of it, to justify themselves in
their dissolute courses; I will not
deny that some men do unreasonably abuse this doctrine, as they do many other
things, which are true and excellent in their own nature. But I deny, that this proves the doctrine
itself has any tendency to licentiousness.
I think, the tendency of doctrines, by what now appears in the world,
and in our nation in particular, may much more justly be argued, from the
general effect which has been seen to attend the prevailing of the principles
of Arminians, and the contrary principles;
as both have had their turn of general prevalence in our nation. If it be indeed, as is pretended, that Calvinistic
doctrines undermine the very foundation of all religion and mortality, and
enervate and disannul all rational motives to holy and virtuous practice; and that the contrary doctrines give the
inducements to virtue and goodness their proper force, and exhibit religion in
a rational light, tending to recommend it to the reason of mankind, and enforce
it in a manner that is agreeable to their natural notions of things: I say, if it be thus, it is remarkable, that
virtue and religious practice should prevail most, when the former doctrines,
so inconsistent with it, prevailed almost universally. And that ever since the latter doctrines, so
happily agreeing with it, and of so proper and excellent a tendency to promote
it, have been gradually prevailing, vice, profaneness, luxury, and wickedness
of all sorts, and contempt of all religion, and of every kind of seriousness
and strictness of conversation, should proportionally prevail. That these things should thus accompany one
another, and rise and prevail one with another, now for a whole age together!
It is remarkable, that this happy remedy (discovered by the free inquiries and
superior sense and wisdom of this age) against the pernicious effects of Calvinism,
so inconsistent with religion, and tending so much to banish all virtue from
the earth, should, on so long a trial, be attended with no good effect; but that the consequence should be the
reverse of amendment; that in
proportion as the remedy takes place, and is thoroughly applies, so the disease
should prevail. And the very same
dismal effect takes place, to the highest degree, which Calvinistic
doctrines are supposed to have so great a tendency to; even the banishing of religion and virtue,
and the prevailing of unbounded licentiousness of manners! If these things are
truly so, they are very remarkable, and matter of very curious speculation.
It has often been objected against the
defenders of Calvinistic principles, that in their reasonings, they run
into nice scholastic distinctions, and abstruse metaphysical subtleties, and
set these in opposition to common sense.
And it is possible, that after the former manner, it may be alleged
against the reasoning by which I have endeavored to confute the Arminian
scheme of liberty and moral agency, that it is very abstracted and
metaphysical. Concerning this, I would
observe the following things:
I.
If that be made an objection against the foregoing reasoning, that it is
metaphysical, or may properly be reduced to the science of metaphysics,
it is a very impertinent objection;
whether it be so or no, is not worthy of any dispute or
controversy. If the reasoning be good,
it is as frivolous to inquire what science it is properly reduced to, as what
language it is delivered in. And for a
man to go about to confute the arguments of his opponent, by telling him, his
arguments are metaphysical, would be as weak as to tell him, his arguments
could not be substantial, because they were written in French or Latin. The question is not, whether what is said be
metaphysics, physics, logic, or mathematics, Latin, French, English, or Mohawk?
But whether the reasoning be good, and the arguments truly conclusive? The
foregoing arguments are no more metaphysical, than those which we use against
the papists, to disprove their doctrine of transubstantiation; alleging it is inconsistent with the notion
of corporeal identity, that it should be in ten thousand places at the same
time. It is by metaphysical arguments
only we are able to prove, that the rational soul is not corporeal, that lead
or sand cannot think; that thoughts are
not square or round, or do not weigh a pound.
The arguments by which we prove the being of God, if handled closely and
distinctly, so, as to show their clear and demonstrative evidence, must be
metaphysically treated. It is by
metaphysics only that we can demonstrate that God is not limited to a place, or
is not mutable. That he is not
ignorant, or forgetful; that it is
impossible for him to lie, or be unjust;
and that there is one God only, and not hundreds or thousands. And, indeed, we have no strict
demonstration of anything, excepting mathematical truths, but by metaphysics,
we can have no proof, that is properly demonstrative, of any one proposition,
relating to the being and nature of God, his creation of the world, the
dependence of all things on him, the nature of bodies or spirits, the nature of
our own souls, or any of the great truths of morality and natural religion, but
what is metaphysical. I am willing my
arguments should be brought to the test of the strictest and justest reason,
and that a clear, distinct, and determinate meaning of the terms I use should
be insisted on; but let not the whole
be rejected, as if all were confuted, by fixing on it the epithet, metaphysical.
II.
If the reasoning, which has been made use of, be in some sense
metaphysical, it will not follow, that therefore it must need be abstruse,
unintelligible, and akin to the jargon of the schools. I humbly conceive, the foregoing reasoning,
at least to those things which are most material belonging to it, depends on no
abstruse definitions or distinctions, or terms without a meaning, or of very
ambiguous and undetermined signification, or any points of such abstraction and
subtlety, as tends to involve the attentive understanding in clouds and
darkness. There is no high degree of
refinement and abstruse speculation, in determining that a thing is not before
it is, and so cannot be the cause of itself.
Or that the first act of free choice, has not another act of free choice
going before that, to excite or direct it;
or in determining, that no choice is made, while the mind remains in a
state of absolute indifference. That
preference and equilibrium never coexist and that therefore no choice is made
in a state of liberty, consisting in indifference. And that so far as the will is determined by motives, exhibiting
and operating previous to the act of the will, so far it is not determined by
the act of the will itself. That
nothing can begin to be, which before was not, without a cause, or some
antecedent ground or reason, why it then begins to be; that effects depend on their causes, and are
connected with them. That virtue is not
the worse, nor sin the better, for the strength of inclination with which it is
practiced, and the difficulty, which thence arises of doing otherwise. That when it is already infallibly known
that the thing will be, it is not contingent whether it will ever be or
no; or that it can be truly said,
notwithstanding, that it is not necessary it should be, but it either may be,
or may not be. And the like might be
observed of many other things, which belong to the foregoing reasoning.
If any shall still stand to it, that
the foregoing reasoning is nothing but mere metaphysical sophistry. And that it must be so, that the seeming
force of the arguments all depends on some fallacy and while that is hid in the
obscurity which always attends a great degree of metaphysical abstraction and
refinement; and shall be ready to say,
“Here is, indeed, something tends to confound the mind, but not to satisfy it. For who can ever be truly satisfied in it,
that men are fitly blamed or commended, punished or rewarded, for those
volition’s which are not from themselves, and of whose existence they are not
the causes. Men may refine, as much as
they please, and advance the abstract notions, and make out a thousand seeming
contradictions, to puzzle our understandings;
yet there can be no satisfaction in such doctrine as this: the natural sense of the mind of man will
always resist it.”
[A
certain noted author of the present age says, the arguments for necessity
are nothing but quibbling, or logomachy, using words without a
meaning, or begging the question. I
do not know what kind of necessity any authors to whom he may have reference
are advocates for; or whether they
managed their arguments well or ill. As
to the arguments I have made use, if they are quibbles they may be shown
to be so; such knots are capable of
being untied, and the trick and cheat may be detected and plainly laid
open. If this be fairly done, with
respect to the grounds and reasons I have relied upon, I shall have just
occasion, for the future, to be silent, if not to be ashamed of my
argumentations. I am willing my proofs
should be thoroughly examined; and if
there be nothing but begging the question, or mere logomachy, or
dispute of words, let it be made manifest and shown how the seeming strength of
the argument depends on my using words without a meaning, or arises from
the ambiguity of terms, or my making use of words in an indeterminate and
unsteady manner; and that the weight of
my reasons rest mainly on such a foundation:
and then, I shall either be ready to retract what I have urged, and
thank the man that has done the kind part, or shall be justly exposed for my
obstinacy.
The
same author is abundant in appealing, in this affair, from what he calls logomachy
and sophistry, to experience. A
person can experience only what passes in his own mind. But yet, as we may well suppose, that all
men have the same human faculties; so a
man may well argue from his own experience to that of others, in things that
show the nature of these faculties, and the manner of their operation. But then one has as good a right to allege
his experience as another. As to my own
experience, I find, that in innumerable things I can do as I will; that the motions of my body, in many
respects, instantaneously follow the acts of my will concerning those
motions; and that my will has some
command of my thoughts; and that the
acts of my will are my own, i.e. that
they are acts of my will, the volitions of my own mind; or, in other words, that what I will, I
will. Which, I presume, is the sum of
what others experience in this affair.
But as to finding by experience, that my will is originally determined
by itself: or that, my will first
choosing what volition there shall be, the chosen volition accordingly
follows; and that this is the first
rise of the determination of my will in any affair; or that any volition arises in my mind contingently; I declare, I know nothing in myself, by
experience, of this nature: and nothing
that ever I experienced, carries the least appearance or shadow of any such
thing, or gives me any more reason to suppose that my volitions existed twenty
years before they existed. It is true,
I find myself possessed of my volitions, before I can see the effectual power
of any cause to produce them, for the power and efficacy of the cause is not
seen but by the effect, and this, for ought I know, may make some imagine, that
volition has no cause, or that it produces itself. But I have no more reason from hence to determine any such thing,
than I have to determine that I gave myself my own being, or that I came into
being accidentally without a cause because I first found myself possessed of
being, I had knowledge of a cause of my being.]
I humbly conceive, that such an
objector, if he has capacity, and humility, and calmness of spirit sufficient,
impartially and thoroughly to examine himself, will find that he knows not
really what he would be at. And indeed,
his difficulty is nothing but a mere prejudice, from an inadvertent customary
use of words, in a meaning that is not clearly understood, nor carefully
reflected upon. Let the objector
reflect again, if he has candor and patience enough, and does not scorn to be
at the trouble of close attention in the affair. — He would have a man’s volition be from himself. Let it be from himself, most
primarily and originally of any way conceivable; that is, from its own choice;
how will that help the matter, as to his being justly blamed or praised,
unless that choice itself (an ill choice, for instance) blameworthy, according
to these principles, unless that be from himself too, in the same manner; that is, from his own choice? But the original
and first determining choice in the affair is not from his choice: his choice is not the cause of it. And if it be from himself some other way,
and not from his choice, surely that will not help the matter. If it be not from himself of choice, then it
is not from himself voluntarily: and if
so, he is surely no more to blame, than if it were not from himself at
all. It is vanity to pretend, it is a
sufficient answer to this, to say, that it is nothing but metaphysical
refinement and subtlety, and so attended with obscurity and uncertainly.
If it be the natural sense of our
minds, that what is blameworthy in a man must be from himself, then it
doubtless is also, that it must be from something bad in himself, a bad
choice, or bad disposition.
But then our natural sense is, that this bad choice or disposition going
before this, from whence this arises:
for that is a ridiculous absurdity, running us into an immediate
contradiction, which our natural sense of blameworthiness has nothing to do
with, and never comes into the mind, nor is supposed in the judgment we
naturally make of the affair. As was
demonstrated before, natural sense does not place the moral evil of volition’s
and dispositions in the cause of them, but the nature of them. An evil thing being FROM a man, or from
something antecedent in him, is not essential to the original notion we have of
blameworthiness. It is its being the
choice of the heart; as appears by
this, that if a thing be from us, and not from our choice, it has not the
nature of blameworthiness or ill desert, according to our natural sense. When a thing is from a man, in that
sense, that it is from his will or choice, he is to blame for it, because his
will IS IN IT: so far as the will is in
it, blame is in it, and no further.
Neither do we go any further in our notion of blame, to inquire whether
the bad will be FROM a bad will: there
is no consideration of the original of that bad will; because according to our natural apprehension, blame originally
consists in it. Therefore a thing
being from a man, is a secondary consideration, in the notion of blame or ill
desert. Because those things, in our
external actions, are most properly said to be from us, which are from our
choice; and no other external actions,
but those that are from us in this sense, have the nature of blame; and they indeed, not so properly because
they are from us, as because we are in them, i.e. our wills are in them; not so much because they are from some property
of ours, as because they are our properties.
However, all these external actions
being truly from us as their cause, and we being so used, in ordinary speech,
and in the common affairs of life, to speak of men’s actions and conduct which
we see, and which affect human society, as deserving ill or well, as worthy of
blame or praise; hence it is come to
pass, that philosophers have incautiously taken all their measures of good and
evil, praise and blame, from the dictates of common sense, about these overt
acts of men; to the running of
everything into the most lamentable and dreadful confusion. And, therefore, I observe,
III.
It is so far from being true (whatever may be pretended), that the proof
of the doctrine which has been maintained, depends on certain abstruse,
unintelligible, metaphysical terms and notions; and that the Arminian scheme, without needing such clouds and
darkness for its defense, is supported by the plain dictates of common
sense; that the very reverse is most
certainly true, and that to a great degree.
It is fact, that they, and not we, have confounded things with
metaphysical, unintelligible notions and phrases, and have drawn them from the
light of plain truth, into the gross darkness of abstruse metaphysical
propositions, and words without a meaning.
Their pretended demonstrations depend very much on such unintelligible,
metaphysical phrases, as self-determination, and sovereignty of the
will. And the metaphysical sense
they put on such terms, as necessity, contingency, action, agency, etc. quite diverse from their meaning as used
in common speech; and which, as they
use them, are without any consistent meaning, or any manner of distinct
consistent ideas. [It is] as far from
it as any of the abstruse terms and perplexed phrases of the peripatetic
philosophers, or the most unintelligible jargon of the schools, or the cant of
the wildest fanatics. Yea, we may be
bold to say, these metaphysical terms, on which they build so much, are what
they use without knowing what they mean themselves. They are pure metaphysical sounds, without any ideas whatsoever
in their minds to answer them; inasmuch
as it has been demonstrated, that there cannot be any notion in the mind
consistent with these expressions, as they pretend to explain them; because their explanations destroy
themselves. No such notions as imply
self-contradiction, and self-abolition, and this a great many ways, can subsist
in the mind; as there can be no idea of
a whole which is less than any of its parts, or of solid extension without
dimensions, or of any effect which is before its cause. — Arminians improve these terms, as terms of
art, and in their metaphysical meaning, to advance and establish those things
which are contrary to common sense, in a high degree. Thus, instead of the plain vulgar notion of liberty, which all
mankind, in every part of the face of the earth and in all ages, have,
consisting in opportunity to do as one pleases; they have introduced a new strange liberty, consisting in
indifference, contingence, and self-determination; by which they involve themselves and others in great obscurity,
and manifold gross inconsistency. So,
instead of placing virtue and vice, as common sense places them very much, in
fixed bias and inclination, and greater virtue and vice in stronger and more
established inclination; these, through
their refinings and abstruse notions, suppose a liberty consisting in
indifference to be essential to all virtue and vice. So they have reasoned themselves, not by metaphysical
distinctions, but metaphysical confusion, into many principles about moral
agency, blame praise, reward, and punishment, which are, as has been shown,
exceeding contrary to the common sense of mankind; and perhaps to their own sense, which governs them in common
life.
Whether the things which have been
alleged, are liable to any tolerable answer in the way of calm, intelligible,
and strict reasoning, I must leave others to judge: but I am sensible they are liable to one sort of answer. It is not unlikely, that some, who value
themselves on the supposed rational and generous principles of the modern
fashionable divinity, will have their indignation and disdain raised at the
sight of this discourse, and on perceiving what things are pretended to be
proved in it. And if they think it
worthy of being read, or of so much notice as to say much about it, they may
probably renew the usual exclamations, with additional vehemence and contempt,
about the fate of the heathen, Hobbes’s necessity, and making
men mere machines. Accumulating the
terrible epithets of fatal, unfrustrable, inevitable, irresistible,
etc. and perhaps much skill may be
used to set forth things, which have been said, in colors which shall be shocking
to the imaginations, and moving to the passions of those, who have either too
little capacity, or too much confidence of the opinions they have imbibed, and
contempt of the contrary, to try the matter by any serious and circumspect
examination.
Or difficulties may be stated and
insisted on, which do not belong to the controversy; because, let them be more or less real, and hard to be resolved,
they are not what are owing to anything distinguishing of this scheme, from
that of the Arminians, and would not be removed nor diminished by
renouncing the former, and adhering to the latter. Or some particular things may be picked out, which they may think
will sound harshest in the ears of the generality; and these may be glossed and descanted on, with tart and
contemptuous words; and from thence,
the whole discourse may be treated with triumph and insult.
It is easy to see, how the decision of
most of the points in controversy between Calvinists and Arminians, depends on
the determination of this grand article concerning The Freedom of the Will
Requisite to Moral Agency. And that
by clearing and establishing the Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the chief
arguments are obviated by which Arminian doctrines in general are supported,
and the contrary doctrines in general are supported, and the contrary doctrines
demonstratively confirmed. Hereby it
becomes manifest, that God’s moral government over mankind, his treating them
as moral agents, making them the objects of his commands, counsels, calls, warnings,
expostulations, promises, threatenings, rewards, and punishments, is not
inconsistent with a determining disposal of all events, of every kind,
throughout the universe, in his providence;
either by positive efficiency, or permission. Indeed, such an universal determining
providence, infers some kind of necessity of moral events, or volition’s of
intelligent agents, is needful in order to this, than moral necessity; which does as much ascertain the futurity of
the event as any other necessity. But,
as has been demonstrated, such a necessity is not at all repugnant to moral
agency, and a reasonable use of commands, calls, rewards, punishments,
etc. Yea, not only are objections of
this kind against the doctrine of an universal determining providence,
removed by what has been said; but the
truth of such a doctrine is demonstrated.
As it has been demonstrated, that the futurity of all future events is
established by previous necessity, either natural or moral. So it is manifest, that the sovereign Creator
and Disposer of the world has ordered this necessity, by ordering his own
conduct, either in designedly acting, or forbearing to act. For, as the being of the world is from God,
so the circumstances in which it had its being at first, both negative and
positive, must be ordered by him, in one of these ways; and all the necessary consequences of these
circumstances, must be ordered by him.
And God’s active and positive interpositions, after the world was
created, and the consequences of these interpositions; also every instance of his forbearing to
interpose, and the sure consequences of this forbearance, must all be
determined according to his pleasure.
And therefore every event, which is the consequence of anything
whatsoever, or that is connected with any foregoing thing or circumstances,
either positive or negative, as the ground or reason of its existence, must be
ordered of God; either by a designing
efficiency and interposition, or a designed forbearing to operate or
interpose. But, as has been proved, all
events whatsoever, are necessarily connected with something foregoing, either
positive or negative, which is the ground of its existence. It follows, therefore, that the whole series
of events is thus connected with something in the state of things either
positive or negative, which is original in the series; i.e.
something which is connected with nothing preceding that, but God’s
own immediate conduct, either his acting or forbearing to act. From whence it follows, that as God designedly
orders his own conduct, and its connected consequences, it must necessarily be,
that he designedly orders all things.
The things which have been said,
obviate some of the chief objections of Arminians against the Calvinistic
doctrine of the total depravity and corruption of man’s nature, whereby
his heart is wholly under the power of sin, and he is utterly unable, without
the interposition of sovereign grace, savingly to love God, believe in Christ,
or do anything that is truly good and acceptable in God’s sight. For the main objection against this
doctrine, that it is inconsistent with the freedom of man’s will, consisting in
indifference and self-determining power.
Because it supposes man to be under a necessity of sinning, and that God
requires things of him, in order to his avoiding eternal damnation, which he is
unable to do and that this doctrine is wholly inconsistent with the sincerity
of counsels, invitations, etc. Now,
this doctrine supposes no other necessity of sinning, than a moral
necessity, which, as has been shown, does not at all excuse sin. And [it] supposes no other inability
to obey any command, or perform any duty, even the most spiritual and
exalted. But a moral inability, which,
as has been proved, does not excuse persons in the non-performance of any good
thing, or make them not to be the proper objects of commands, counsels, and
invitations. And, moreover, it has been
shown, or so much as in idea, any such freedom of will, consisting in
indifference and self-determination, for the sake of which, this doctrine of
original sin is cast out: and that no
such freedom is necessary, in order to the nature of sin, and a just desert of
punishment.
The things which have been observed,
do also take off the main objections of Arminians against the doctrine of efficacious
grace; and, at the same time, prove
the grace of God in a sinner’s conversion (if there be any grace or divine
influence in the affair) to be efficacious, yea, and irresistible
too, if by irresistible is meant, that which is attended with a moral
necessity, which it is impossible should ever be violated by any
resistance. The main objection of
Arminians against this doctrine is, that it is inconsistent with their
self-determining freedom of will; and
that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that is should be wrought in the
heart by the determining efficacy and power of another, instead of its being
owing to a self-moving power. [Which],
in that case, the good which is wrought, would not be our virtue, but
rather God’s virtue, because not the person in whom it is wrought is the
determining author of it, but God that wrought it in him. But the things which are the foundation of
these objections, have been considered;
and it has been demonstrated, that the liberty of moral agents does not
consist in self-determining freedom of will;
and that it is repugnant to the nature of virtue, that it should be
wrought in the heart by the determining efficacy and power of another, instead of
its being owing to a self-moving power.
[Which], in that case, the good which is wrought, would not be our
virtue, but rather God’s virtue;
because not the person in whom it is wrought is the determining author
of it, but God that wrought it in him.
But, the things which are the foundation of these objections, have been
considered; and it has been
demonstrated, that the liberty of moral agents does not consist in
self-determining power. And that there
is no need of any such liberty, in order to the nature of virtue. Nor does it at all hinder, but that the
state or act of the will may be the virtue of the subject, though it be not
from self-determination, but the determination of an intrinsic cause, even so
as to cause the event to be morally necessary to the subject of it. And as it has been proved, that nothing in
the state or acts of the will of man is contingent; but on the contrary, every event of this kind is necessary, but a
moral necessity. And has also been now
demonstrated, that the doctrine of an universal determining Providence, follows
from that doctrine of necessity, which was proved before. And so, that God does decisively, in his
providence, order all the volition’s of moral agents, either by positive
influence or permission. And it being
allowed, on all hands, that what God does in the affair of man’s virtuous
volition’s, whether it be more or less, is by some positive influence, and not
by mere permission, as in the affair of a sinful volition. If we put these things together, it will
follow that God’s assistance or influence must be determining and decisive, or
must be attended with a moral necessity of the event. And so, that God gives virtue, holiness, and conversion to
sinners, by an influence which determines the effect, in such a manner, that
the effect will infallibly follow by a moral necessity; which is what Calvinists mean by efficacious
and irresistible grace.
The things which have been said, do
likewise answer the chief objections against the doctrine of God’s universal
and absolute decree, and afford infallible proof of this doctrine; and of the doctrine of absolute, eternal,
personal election in particular.
The main objections against these doctrines are, that they infer a
necessity of the volition’s of moral agents, and of the future and moral state
and acts of men; and so are not
consistent with those eternal rewards and punishments, which are connected with
conversion and impenitence; nor can be
made to agree with the reasonableness and sincerity of the precepts, calls,
counsels, warnings, and expostulations of the Word of God; or with the various methods and means of
grace, which God uses with sinners to bring them to repentance; and the whole of that moral government, which
God exercises towards mankind. And that
they infer an inconsistency between the secret and revealed will of
God; and make God the author of
sin. But all these things have been
obviated in the preceding discourse.
And the certain truth of these doctrines, concerning God’s eternal
purposes, will follow from what was just now observed concerning God’s
universal providence. How it infallibly
follows from what has been proved, that God orders all events, and the
volition’s of moral agents amongst others, by such a decisive disposal, that the
events are infallibly connected with his disposal. For if God disposes all events, so that the infallible existence
of the events is decided by his providence, then, doubtless, he thus orders and
decides things knowingly, and on design. God does not do what he does, nor order what
he orders, accidentally and unawares;
either without or beside his intention. And if there be a foregoing design of
doing and ordering as he does, this is the same with a purpose or degree. And as it has been shown, that nothing
is new to God, in any respect, but all things are perfectly and equally in his
view from eternity. Hence, it will
follow, that his designs or purposes are not things formed anew, founded on any
new views or appearances, but are all eternal purposes. And as it has been now shown, how the doctrine
of determining efficacious grace certainly follows from things proved in the
foregoing discourse; hence will
necessarily follow the doctrine of particular, eternal, absolute election. For if men are made true saints, no
otherwise than as God makes them so, and distinguishes them from others, by his
efficacious power and influence, that decides and fixes the event; and God thus makes some saints, and not
others, on design or purpose, and (as has been now observed) no designs of God
are new; it follows, that God thus
distinguished from others, all that every become true saints, by his eternal
design or decree. I might also show,
how God’s certain foreknowledge must suppose an absolute decree, and how such a
decree can be proved to a demonstration from it: but that this discourse may not be lengthened out too much, that
must be omitted for the present.
[Certain foreknowledge does imply some necessity. But our author is not sufficiently guarded,
or else not sufficiently explicit, when he says, that foreknowledge must
suppose an absolute decree. For
certainty, or hypothetical necessity, may arise from the nature of things,
and from negative causes, as well as from a decree. If, indeed, the remark be limited to the
subject immediately preceding, it is an important truth. — W.]>From these things it will
inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense may be said to die for
all, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea, the whole world, by his
death; yet there must be something particular
in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should actually
be saved thereby. As appears by what
has been now shown, God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain
number in his proper absolute design, and of a certain number only; and therefore such a design only can be
prosecuted in anything God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the salvation
of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design with respect
to no other, most strictly speaking;
for it is impossible, that God should prosecute any other design than
only such as he has. He certainly does
not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he
has not. And, indeed, such a
particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow, from the
doctrine of God’s foreknowledge, as from that of the decree. For it is as impossible, in strictness of
speech, that God should prosecute a design, or aim at a thing, which he at the
same time most perfectly knows will not be accomplished, as that he should use
endeavors for that which is beside his decree.
By the things which have been proved,
are obviated some of the main objections against the doctrine of the infallible
and necessary perseverance of saints, and some of the main foundations
of this doctrine are established. The
main prejudices of Arminians against this doctrine seem to be these; they suppose such a necessary, infallible
perseverance to be repugnant to the freedom of the will. That it must be owing to man’s own
self-determining power he first becomes virtuous and holy. And so, in like manner, it must be left a
thing contingent, to be determined by the same freedom of will, whether he will
persevere in virtue and holiness.
And that otherwise his continuing steadfast in faith and obedience would
not be his virtue, or at all praiseworthy and rewardable; nor could his perseverance be properly the
matter of divine commands, counsels, and promises, nor his apostasy be properly
threatened, and men warned against it.
Whereas, we find all these things in Scripture: there we find steadfastness and perseverance
in true Christianity, represented as the virtue of the saints, spoken of as
praiseworthy in them, and glorious rewards promised to it. And also find, that God makes it the subject
of his commands, counsels, and promises;
and the contrary, of threatenings and warnings. But the foundation of these objections has
been removed, by showing that moral necessity and infallible certainty of
events is not inconsistent with these things.
That, as to freedom of will, lying in the power of the will to determine
itself, there neither is any such thing, nor is there any need of it, in order
to virtue, reward, commands, counsels, etc.
And as the doctrines of efficacious
grace and absolute election do certainly follow from the things proved in the
preceding discourse; so some of the
main foundations of the doctrine of perseverance, are thereby established. If the beginning of true faith and holiness,
and a man becoming a true saint at first, does not depend on the
self-determining power of the will, but on the determining efficacious grace of
God; it may well be argued, that it is
also with respect to men being continued saints, or persevering in faith and
holiness. The conversion of a sinner
being not owing to a man’s self-determination, but to God’s determination and
eternal election, which is absolute, and depending on the sovereign will of
God, and not on the free will of man;
as is evident from what has been said.
And it being very evident from the Scriptures, and the eternal election
of saints to faith and holiness, is also an election of them to eternal
salvation; hence their appointment to
salvation must also be absolute, and not depending on their contingent,
self-determining will. From all which
it follows, that it is absolutely fixed in God’s decree, that all true saints
shall persevere to actual eternal salvation.
But I must leave all these things to the
consideration of the impartial reader;
and when he has maturely weighed them, I would propose it to his
consideration, whether many of the first reformers, and others that succeeded
them, whom God in their day made the chief pillars of his church, and the
greatest instruments of their deliverance from error and darkness, and of the
support of the cause of piety among them, have not been injured, in the
contempt with which they have been treated by many late writers, for their
teaching and maintaining such doctrines as are commonly called
Calvinistic. Indeed, some of these new
writers, at the same time that they have represented the doctrines of these
ancient and eminent divines, as in the highest degree ridiculous, and contrary
to common sense, in an ostentation of a very generous charity, have allowed
that they were honest well-meaning men.
Yea, it may be some of them, as though it were in great condescension
and compassion to them, have allowed, that they did pretty well for the day in
which they lived, and considering the great disadvantages they labored
under: when, at the same time, their
manner of speaking has naturally and plainly suggested to the minds of their
readers, that they were persons, who — through the lowness of their genius, and
the greatness of the bigotry with which their minds were shackled, and their
thoughts confined, living in the gloomy caves of superstition — fondly
embraced, and demurely and zealously taught, the most absurd, silly, and
monstrous opinions, worthy of the greatest contempt of gentlemen possessed of
that noble and generous freedom of thought, which happily prevails in this age
of light and inquiry. When, indeed,
such is the case that we might, if so disposed, speak as big words as they, and
on far better grounds. And really all
the Arminians on earth might be challenged without arrogance or vanity, to make
these principles of theirs, wherein they mainly differ from their fathers, whom
they so much despise, consistent with common sense. Yea, and perhaps to produce any doctrine ever embraced by the
blindest bigot of the church of Rome, or the most ignorant Mussulman, or
extravagant enthusiast, that might be reduced to more demonstrable
inconsistencies, and repugnancies to common sense, and to themselves; though their inconsistencies indeed may not
lie so deep, or be so artfully veiled by a deceitful ambiguity of words, and an
indeterminate signification of phrases.
I will not deny, that these gentlemen, many of them, are men of great
abilities, and have been helped to higher attainments in philosophy, than those
ancient divines, and have done great service to the church of God in some
respects. But I humbly conceive, that
their differing from their fathers, with such magisterial assurance, in these
points in divinity, must be owing to some other cause than superior wisdom.
It may also be worthy of
consideration, whether the great alteration which has been made in the state of
things in our nation, and some other parts of the Protestant world, in this and
the past age, by exploding so generally Calvinistic doctrines — an
alteration so often spoken of as worthy to be greatly rejoiced in by the
friends of truth, learning, and virtue, as an instance of the great increase of
light in the Christian church — be indeed a happy change, owing to any such
cause as an increase of true knowledge and understanding in the things of
religion; or whether there is not
reason to fear, that it may be owing to some worse cause.
And I desire it may be considered,
whether the boldness of some writers may not deserve to be reflected on, who
have not scrupled to say, that if these and those things are true (which yet
appear to be the demonstrable dictates of reason, as well as the certain
dictates of the mouth of the Most High), then God is unjust, and cruel, and
guilty of manifest deceit and double dealing, and the like. Yea, some have gone so far as confidently to
assert, that if any book which pretends to be Scripture, teaches such
doctrines, that alone is sufficient warrant for mankind to reject it, as what
cannot be the world of God. Some, who
have not gone so far, have said, that if the Scripture seems to teach any such
doctrines, so contrary to reason, we are obliged to find out some other interpretation
of those texts, where such doctrines seem to be exhibited. Others express themselves yet more
modestly. They express a tenderness and
religious fear, lest they should receive and teach anything that should seem to
reflect on God’s moral character, or be a disparagement to his methods of
administration, in his moral government;
and therefore express themselves as not daring to embrace some
doctrines, though they seem to be delivered in Scripture, according to the more
obvious and natural construction of the words.
But indeed it would show a truer modesty and humility, if they would
more entirely rely on God’s wisdom and discernment, who knows infinitely better
than we what is agreeable to his own perfections, and never intended to leave
these matters to the decision of the wisdom and discernment of men; but by his own unerring instruction, to
determine for us what the truth is;
knowing how little our judgment is to be depended on, and how extremely
prone vain and blind men are to err in such matters.
The truth of the case is, that if the
Scripture plainly taught the opposite doctrines to those that are so much
stumbled at, viz. The Arminian
doctrine of free will, and others depending thereon, it would be the greatest
of all difficulties that attend the Scriptures, incomparably greater than its
containing any, even the most mysterious, of those doctrines of the first
reformers, which our late freethinkers have so superciliously exploded. Indeed, it is a glorious argument of the
divinity of the Holy Scriptures, that they teach such doctrines, which in one
age and another, through the blindness of men’s minds, and strong prejudices of
their hearts, are rejected, as most absurd and unreasonable, by the wise and
great men of the world; which yet, when
they are most carefully and strictly examined, appear to be exactly agreeable
to the most demonstrable, certain, and natural dictates of reason. By such things, it appears that “the
foolishness of God is wiser than men.”
(1 Cor. 1:19, 20) “For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the
wise; I will bring to nothing the
understanding of the prudent. Where is
the wise? Where is the scribe? Where is the disputer of this world? Hath not
God made foolish the wisdom of this world?” And as it was in time past, so
probably it will be in time to come, as it is also written (1 Cor.
1:27-29). “But God hath chosen he
foolish things of the world, to confound the wise; and God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the
things that are mighty; and base things
of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea, and things
which are not, to bring to nought things that are: that no flesh should glory in his presence.”
Amen.
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