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A Defense of Wesleyan-Armenianism Based on Karl Popper’s Solution to the Freewill-Determinism Paradox

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Abstract

This article attempts a defense of the Wesleyan-Armenian view on predestination and freewill by showing that it is analogous to the compatibility view inherent in Karl Popper’s, metaphysical Theory of the Three Worlds and his defense of freewill (Popper, 1972). While not objecting to Popper’s argument for freewill, I argue that the solution to the freewill-determinism paradox that follows from his argument is not just a defense of freewill, as he claims, but a compatibility position between freewill and (a version of) determinism. My argument builds on William James’ distinction between hard and soft determinism, and involves contemporary analyses of intentionality and causal theory. I then use the Popperian argument for compatibility to reject theological determinism, especially Calvinistic-double predestination in favor of conditional predestination (as defended by the Wesleyan-Armenian Tradition) which like (philosophical) compatibility, attempts to reconcile God’s ‘predestination’ or plan of salvation with human freewill and moral response.

Introduction

The Wesleyan view on the freewill-determinism paradox is Arminian in origin and content. Although it teaches predestination as scripture does (e.g. Eph. 1: 5 & 11, and I Pet. 1:2) the Wesleyan view understands predestination in terms of God’s pre-decision to “save the ones who repent and believe.” Several scriptures (including Mark 1:15; Acts 13:39; John 3:16; Rom. 3:22) call on the sinner to faith in Jesus or repentance for salvation, and even on the saved to hold on or persevere in times of temptations and trials in order not to lose one’s salvation (2 Pet. 1:10). So unlike the Calvinistic doctrine of unconditional double-predestination (or sublapsarianism) in which some people are eternally condemned to hell while others are

absolutely bound for heaven, this view is called “conditional predestination.” The explanation focuses both on God’s foreknowledge and freedom of the individual when it states “...the predetermination of the destiny of individuals is based on God’s foreknowledge of the way in which they will either freely reject Christ or freely accept him” (Arminius, 1608).

While this view clearly endorses freewill or human freedom, it categorically rejects the extremist view associated with Pelagian or Pelagianism which stresses human freedom at the expense of God’s foreknowledge or ‘predestination’. In philosophical terms then, the Wesleyan-Armenian view represents a compatibility position in the determinism-freewill debate. The theological and philosophical challenge for the Wesleyan-Armenian perspective then is how to reconcile ‘predestination’ or determinism and freewill.

I intend meeting this challenge by first arguing that Popper’s freewill defense is, contrary to his own conclusion, a defensible compatibility position. After defending the Popperian view I will show the similarities between it and the Wesleyan-Armenian view, and conclude via an Argument from Analogy that the Wesleyan-Armenian view is also justified for the same or similar reasons.

I. Conceptual Clarifications

A. Determinism – Meaning and Argument

Classical determinism in Western philosophy represents the view that every event which takes place has to take place because of antecedent conditions, and that no situation could have been otherwise than it is. Since human actions – including our decisions and choices – are events, they conclude that these are also the result of antecedent conditions or causes, and are therefore not free. Determinism is therefore a refutation of human freewill or man’s freedom in the metaphysical sense meaning, our autonomy or ability to consciously choose between alternatives. Reflecting on the implications of determinism for morality, Spinoza characterized the human condition as nothing less than “bondage”:

“The impotence of man to govern or restrain the emotions I call bondage, for a man who is under their control is not his own master, but is mastered by fortune, in whose power he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse although he sees the better before him.” (Spinoza: 1677)

The British philosopher Gilbert Ryle sums up his belief in determinism saying, “What is was to be;” meaning humans have no control over what happens or will happen (Ryle: 1966:15). Determinists also believe that if we knew all the antecedent causes of any event, we could in principle not only offer explanations for why they occur but will also be able to predict precisely what will happen next. This theory, they believe, holds not only for material objects but also for all human actions, including our individual decisions and choices. While determinists do not deny that humans might believe that their actions are free, from their position, they can only deduce that such a belief is an illusion as seen in the following standard determinist argument in outline.

1. Outline of a Determinist Argument

- P1. Every event has a cause (in terms of antecedent conditions).
- P2. Human actions (including our decisions) are vents.
- P3./ Human actions (including our decisions) are caused. P1-P2.
- P4. If an event is caused, then it follows by necessity and is consequently not free.
- C: Human actions are not free.

In defending their position, determinists often appeal to the principle of uniformity of causes. According to this fundamental principle in metaphysics and science, whenever the same causal conditions are given for a natural phenomenon, the same result will occur. So if human behavior is a natural phenomenon, then it too must be explicable in terms of the same cause-effect relationship. Determinism therefore seems to create a paradox for the libertarian who has to reject freewill or the well-established scientific principle of the uniformity of causes.

2. Implication of Determinism for Moral Responsibility

Notwithstanding the apparent support the determinist argument gains from metaphysics or science, it is seriously challenged by its implication for morality. For if determinism is true and freewill is an illusion, it follows logically that there can be no moral responsibility in a determinist world since moral responsibility requires choices based on freewill as shown in this outline:

- P1. If Determinism is true, then there is no freewill. (i.e. human actions follow by necessity like actions of robots and clocks etc. as seen in argument 1 above.)
- P2. If there is no freewill then there is no moral responsibility for human actions, (just as there is no moral responsibility or blame for computers or clocks for failing.)
- C: If Determinism is true, then there is no moral responsibility. (P1, P2, H.S.)

In the face of this challenge, some philosophers have given up the belief in determinism in favor of libertarianism while others have modified their position to some version of compatibility. Others like Sidney Hook however still believe that there can be moral responsibility in a determinist world (Hook 1991).

C. Indeterminism

Indeterminism is the negative thesis that determinism is false and that not all events are precisely predictable even in principle given the reality of chance events. A classic example of a chance event is the sinking of the Titanic caused by two independent causal chains- the flow of a gigantic iceberg from the North Pole and the trajectory of the Titanic sailing from England. As a negative thesis, even if indeterminism is true, it leaves unanswered the questions of the predictability in science as well as human freedom and consequently the question of moral responsibility.

D. Freewill

Freewill is the metaphysical position claiming that contrary to the determinist thesis, (some) human actions are free. Our morally relevant actions are said to be free in the sense that they do not follow from necessity, but are the result of deliberate or intentional choices among alternative causes of action. Simply stated, an action X by S is free if and only if S could have intentionally chosen to do other actions Y or Z.

E. Compatibilism

This position represents the views of those who believe that (some version of) determinism and freewill are not mutually exclusive but are compatible. Since it is consistent with such fundamental values as our belief in science and human responsibility, it is more

appealing than its alternatives. Attempts to defend it have however left many philosophers frustrated. For example, William James' promising attempt which began with the distinction he made between hard determinism and soft determinism (which is compatible with freewill and moral responsibility) led him to the conclusion that soft determinism is "a mere quagmire of evasions" (James, 2008).

II. Popper's Theory of the Three Worlds

In this section, I wish to briefly describe Popper's conception and its relevance for the determinism-freewill debate. In this conceptual schema or worldview, Popper conceives of three **distinct** but interrelated worlds that we can call W1, W2, and W3, for convenience (Popper, 1972: 153-190). W1 is the physical world of physical objects and states such as rocks, trees, buildings, machines, and physical forces, etc. W2 represents the subjective or mental world of our individual thoughts, feelings, beliefs, dispositions to act, intuitions, and all kinds of emotional states including our hopes and fears. W3 represents the world of objective knowledge -a semi-Platonic world of ideas discovered or created in the objective sense, the world of abstract ideas, theories, arguments, logical forms, ideologies, and true or false doctrines etc.

The order of the Three Worlds is not arbitrary but historical. The physical world (W1) Popper believes, existed before the world of animal feelings. W2 the subjective world of personal emotions and beliefs etc, and W3 only began with the evolution of the descriptive and argumentative functions of language, the higher functions of human language. Popper does not claim originality to the conception of W3, but traces its back to Plato and the Stoics. What is new with Popper is its modification and application to the problem of human freedom. The relationships among the worlds are of paramount interest to our discussion. The Three Worlds, according to Popper's analysis, are so related that W1 can interact with W2, and W2 can interact with W3; implying an indirect interaction between W1 and W3 via W2 as shown below.

W1 < ----- > W2 < ----- > W3

The illustration shows the interaction between the Three Worlds via the feedback-effect so critical in understanding Popper's theory of the Three Worlds. A paradigm case for our discussion is evident in the

work of scientists and engineers. After series of trial and error thinking in the subjective world (W2) the scientist may come out with a new theory. For example, the concept of a new space craft faster and safer than all previous or existing ones. After representing this conceptually and communicating it to his colleagues, the theory is no longer an object of the subjective world or W2 but has become an object of the objective or W3 since it is now in the public domain, openly accessible, and inter-subjectively verifiable by all other scientists and scholars. Next, the engineer tries to understand the new theory in his subjective mind (W2) making use of the critical skills in W3 such as the laws of mathematics, logic, and some principles or laws of physics, etc. To construct the model he also has to interact with W1, the physical world containing engines, metals, and plastics as well as the nuts and bolts or glues to put them together. To resolve any construction problems he will have to critically re-examine the theory using the critical functions of language in W3 such as logical consistency and theories of truth until he is satisfied in his own mind (W2).

For the purpose of Popper's freewill-thesis, it is important to emphasize that the interaction between these worlds implies that there is a causal influence between each world and the others, and that they are causally open toward each other and not causally closed as implied in the classical determinist thesis. Supposing W1 were closed and not open to W2 and W3, then the human mind, objective ideas, theories, purposes of action, moral principles etc. or W3 in general could not influence the events of W1 via the new space craft model and human action. W1 is however open and that explains why it is possible for W2 and W3 to influence W1 in the construction of the space craft. (As will be shown in due course, the possibility of causal influence between the Three Worlds implies the falsity of determinism.)

There are two other features of W3 which facilitate and guarantee the plastic control of human activities. The first feature of W3 is that it is autonomous, meaning as soon as we have uttered a word, sent a text message or picture via the social media, created a theory or published a book in print or on line, we have created objects that are now independent of ourselves. They have become objects of W3 whereby they are accessible and open to others for their critique,

rejection or approval. To borrow Popper's metaphor, they are now like arrows shot or words spoken, they cannot be retrieved or withdrawn. They are now beyond our control and have become part of the autonomous world called W3.

The most important components of this objective and autonomous world (or W3) are the regulative ideas relevant for moral thinking. These include our concepts or principles of rightness and wrongness, theories of truth, priorities, logical consistency and non-contradiction etc. According to Popper such concepts come as unplanned by-products of human action or thought just as honey is produced as unplanned by-product from bees. Given any two or more competing ideas or actions we encounter these judgments or comparisons as their components, and it is these that mostly guide our choices, decisions, and actions. In arriving at our decisions, we ask, "Which action is right for me to do now?" "Which action should be given priority?" "Which action is more consistent with my personal beliefs or philosophy of life?" "Or which action should be allowed to override all the competing alternative actions open to me?" The decisions that we eventually make after due reflection are then adopted as guides for our actions. They do not however determine or fix what we do as the determinist presumes since it is still within our power to reject or modify the decisions, or even to suspend the planned action. Hence these regulative ideas of W3 are best understood as plastic controls in contrast to iron controls in a determinist world that leave no room for human freedom.

Another feature of W3 that also facilitates and guarantees the plastic control of our activities is that it is intrinsically open. By this Popper means human knowledge is incompletable as proved by Godel's Theorem of the incompleteness of arithmetic. The incompleteness of both arithmetic and human knowledge can be seen in the fact that not every theorem is provable within arithmetic. Another proof is evident in the case of a person who tries to draw the map of his/her room and attempts to draw the map being drawn. The person will not only be frustrated but will eventually realize that such a project cannot be completed in principle given the incompleteness of W3 and the universe (Popper, 1972: 161). Popper sums this up in a jubilant tone:

Our universe is bound to be open since it contains knowledge that is incompletable. We live in an open universe... Our universe is partly causal, partly probabilistic, and partly open: it is emergent” (Popper,1973: 26).

III. Implications of Popper’s Theory for Determinism, Indeterminism, and Human Freedom

A. Popper Rejects Determinism

On the basis of the Theory of the Three Worlds Popper rejects determinism. First, he argues that while science achieves a significant degree of predictability - it cannot in principle - attain the absolute predictability implicit in determinism where morally relevant human actions are concerned since human knowledge and the universe are not closed but open. Second, Popper argues in support of the theory with reference to evolutionary biology. He explains that although humans are part of nature by virtue of the attainment of the higher functions of language and W3, humans have transcended the absolute control of nature as it existed prior to that stage of development. Humans have now evolved to the stage where we are capable of acting as free rational agents who can consciously guide our actions by the plastic controls discovered or invented in W3 including logic, ethics, constitutions, life projects, goals, objectives, and schedules etc.

In support of Popper, we can compare human sleep patterns before and after the discovery of the concepts of time and schedules in W3, and the invention and use of alarm clocks for example in W1. Psychologists who make long term careful observations of a person’s sleep patterns could in principle predict with a high degree of certainty when the sleeper will wake up. If the psychologists know that the sleeper (S) now utilizes a loud alarm clock for waking up, and they know when the alarm is set, they can predict with virtual certainty when S will wake up. With the understanding of time and schedules, and the use of alarm clocks however, it is virtually impossible for any psychologist who does not know when S has set the alarm clock to predict even in principle with any degree of certainty when the S will wake up. In short, S has now reached a stage in evolution where unlike the rooster or the cat, S has transcended the biological and environmental conditions that determined when S wakes up. S is now free to wake up at a time freely chosen with the

aid of the alarm clock set in the light of S's own preferred schedules for the day.

On the basis of an analogy between the behavior of clocks, clouds and (morally relevant) human actions, Popper argues for the following three related theses statements:

- A. Determinism is false
- B. Indeterminism is true but not enough to account for human freedom and rationality.
- C. To account for human freedom and rationality, we need to assume the existence and interaction between W1, W2, and W3 containing plastic controls.

In Popper's conceptual scheme, determinism is represented by clocks. For on his account, determinism is the view that physical systems are extremely regular, orderly and highly predictable. If determinism is true, Popper argues, then the whole world is a perfectly a running flawless clock, including all clouds, all organisms, all animals, and all humans. In agreement with the famous physicist Compton, Popper regards the consequence of upholding determinism as a nightmare. For if the world is so completely deterministic and the laws of physics apply to all human's actions, then Compton himself is an automaton. The only escape from this paradox, Popper maintains, is indeterminism which states that not all things are so rigidly determined. Popper represents the extremely opposite view that physical systems are like gasses, highly irregular, disorderly and more or less unpredictable is rather represented by like clouds. However for the determinists all clouds are clocks in the sense that the only reason why we cannot predict the clouds perfectly like the other systems is our lack of knowledge. If on the other hand indeterminism is absolutely true for all systems, then sheer chance plays a major role in our physical world.

So for Popper, to account for human freedom, indeterminism is a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition. What is needed for a full account of human freedom on his account is the plastic controls discovered or developed in W3 in the course of human linguistic **and cognitive** evolution. These are the regulative ideas behind our morally relevant actions. They include our moral and legal principles, values, constitutions, and rules of reasoning including logic, which we have

developed by means of the descriptive and analytic functions of language. Other components of W3 used as plastic controls are hypothesis, theories, arguments, critical discussions based on logic, codes of ethics including the 10 commandments, the Golden rule and the Beatitudes as well as plans, schedules, and rules for formal meetings and conferences etc. By virtue of these critical or rational and moral tools, human life has transcended nature's total control, natural selection, and similar processes of evolution to which humans were initially subjected to like the lower animals prior to the evolution of the higher functions of language and eventually the emergence of W3 with the plastic controls as components.

The Theory of the Three Worlds provides Popper with a plausible explanation for morally relevant human actions. Recalling the metaphor of clocks and clouds, such actions cannot be found at the determinist extreme represented by the clock nor at the indeterminist extreme represented by clouds. As depicted in the illustration below, they can only be found between the two extreme models where we find human actions represented by the plastic controls developed in W3 to guide our thoughts in W2 and our physical actions in W1.



The following outline represents a summary of Popper's argument for human freedom as alternative to determinism and indeterminism.

B. Karl Popper's Argument for Human Freedom/Freewill

- P1. In principle, human actions can be explained in terms of:
 - a. Determinism, b. Indeterminism, or c. Human Freedom
- P2. If Determinism is true, then all human actions – including our thoughts, behaviors, and creativity – are as perfectly predictable as the hands on a clock; but human actions such as our thoughts, decisions, choices and creativity are not

perfectly predictable like clocks. Quantum physics shows there are random events. Therefore determinism is false.

- P3. If indeterminism were true of all systems, then human actions would be random and as extremely unpredictable as the behavior of clouds or lottery balls in a quantum field. However human actions are not so completely unpredictable. We can for example predict within reason where our friends would be at this real time if we know their professional or personal ethics, goals or schedules for the day.
- P4. Free or morally relevant human actions are explicable and reasonably predictable in terms of the role of ‘plastic controls’ such as ideals, values, theories, laws, constitutions, goals, objectives, plans, and schedules used as regulative ideas, etc. (Ingram, 1990: 69).
- C: Therefore the best explanation for human behavior is neither determinism nor indeterminism but freedom/freewill. (P1-P4 Inference to the Best Explanation.)

IV. Why Popper’s Position Should be Construed as Compatibility and Not Just Freewill

The argument so far has shown that Popper offers a convincing argument against determinism and in defense of freewill. Building on that and the error theory showing why the determinists were wrong, I now wish to show why I believe Popper’s position is not just a defense of freewill but of compatibility the belief that (some version of) determinism is true and is compatible with freewill and moral responsibility.

A good starting point for this argument is the distinction William James made between Hard and Soft determinism in order to make room for both science and moral responsibility. Hard determinism is James’s term for classical determinism which leads to the conclusion that there can be no moral responsibility since freewill (denied by determinism) is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. Unhappy about this consequence of classical determinism, James proposed an alternative conception of determinism called soft determinism which will not only hold the scientific thesis that every

event has a cause but will also be compatible with moral responsibility.

Upon further analysis and reflection however James gave up on this project. For he found that while Hard Determinism could not account for the moral responsibility he desired and only led to pessimism soft determinism which he intended to defend led to the denial of scientific causality. Frustrated by the dilemma he described his own attempt at solving the freewill-determinism paradox as “a mere quagmire of evasions.” Had James succeeded in reconciling Hard Determinism with Soft determinism his position would have been a compatibility position reconciling (a form of) determinism with moral responsibility.

Like Popper however, James believed in pluralism and in indeterminism - the philosophical thesis that not every event is caused and that some events happen by chance and cannot be predicted even in principle. Since James accepts the truth of indeterminism and is also dissatisfied with Hard Determinism like Popper, James’ thesis about the determinism freewill must lie somewhere between the clocks and the clouds, using Popper’s metaphors. By the concept of plastic controls or regulative ideas in W3 and its application to intentional actions in World 2 and their effect in W1, Popper is able to escape James’ dilemma or quagmire of evasions and to show the way out of the free-will determinism paradox. This is because Popper’s position does not only reject hard determinism as false, but also defends soft determinism successfully by defending the thesis that that all events have a cause while noting that not all causes are deterministic or sufficient conditions. On his account, the morally relevant human actions are those that have probabilistic conditions and are the result of plastic controls in W3. Since such human actions are consistent with freewill and moral responsibility we can conclude that Popper’s argument is not just a defense of freewill and moral responsibility, but also of compatibility, the position that James identified as soft determinism but could not defend. Presented in outline, the reconstructed Popperian argument for compatibility would read thus.

Why Popper Is a Compatibilist

P1. Compatibilists accept (a version of) determinism compatible with both freewill and moral responsibility.

- P2. Popper would affirm Soft Determinism as reconstructed above
P3. Popper affirms freewill and moral responsibility on the basis of the Three World Theory with plastic controls in W3 (including, logical, ethical and legal principles, goals and objectives)
C: Popper is a compatibilist. (P1.-P3)

V. Why Classical Determinists Are Wrong and Popper is Right (Error Theory)

The critic might wonder how classical determinism fails where Popper's argument succeeds. The weakness of the determinists' argument can be explained in terms of their misconceptions of the nature of a) causation and b) intentionality. Cause may be defined (as described below) in terms of a sufficient condition, a necessary condition, or a probable condition for event *e*.

A. Analysis of Causality

1. Analysis of Sufficient Condition: Causal factors, *a*, *b*, *c*, *d* may be said to be a sufficient condition for the occurrence of event *e* if and only if they determine or guarantee the occurrence of event *e*.
2. Analysis of Necessary Condition: Causal factors *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, are necessary conditions for the occurrence of event *e* if and only if in the absence of any one of them *e* cannot happen.
3. Analysis of Probabilistic Conditions: Causal factors *a*, *b*, *c*, *d*, are probabilistic conditions for the occurrence of event *e* if and only if their presence (do not guarantee but) make the occurrence of *e* more likely than not.

Because the determinist worldview has no place for probabilistic conditions, determinists consider all ideological, philosophical, economic or political influences on a person as sufficient conditions guaranteeing or compelling a particular behavioral response. Hence they typically use the term 'determine' where they should use 'influence.' Thus sociologists who hold such deterministic worldviews wrongly describe group influences on others as factors that 'determine' their behavior. It is as if the factors guarantee the occurrence of such responses just as gravitational pull guarantees that any material object thrown up will inevitably come down.

In the *Poverty of Historicism* Popper condemns all such methodologies in the social sciences as dogmatic, unscientific, and

historicist. Since their worldview and methodologies mislead distressed people into believing that their unbearable existential circumstances are inevitable or inescapable thereby making some succumb to fatalism, he condemns determinism also as morally repugnant (ref. Osei/Plato). For example under the influence of determinism and especially fatalism, poor, sick, and ignorant people will most likely accept their conditions and face the unfortunate consequences instead of trying to help themselves or seeking help.

B: Analysis of Intentionality and Action Theory:

The second mistake made by determinists can be explained by examining their attitude toward intentional actions. In principle determinists make no distinction between intentional action and unintentional actions. Intentional actions by definition result from deliberation and choice and are consequently morally relevant. Determinists must reject the reality of intentional actions for humans, for to admit that some actions are intentional is to imply that they presuppose freewill which is incompatible with their worldview (Dennett, 1984 & 1996). Failure to acknowledge the reality of intentional actions however, does not constitute a disproof of intentional actions.

Intentional actions are real and can be illustrated from morally relevant every day human actions. Suppose for example, three student friends moving in a single file toward the dining hall from their lectures. Student A initiates a move to make fun of Student C by pushing Student B against C who falls down. A's action is different from that of B and C because A initiated the action. In other words, A decided to make fun of B. Let's suppose A's action was influenced by false beliefs about B and group pressure to make fun of C. By not resisting that temptation, and by choosing to act on it, A's action is morally culpable. B's action was not intentional since he was not aware of A's plans and was used as a missile to push C down. Hence, B and C's actions are not culpable or morally blameworthy since they could not have chosen to do otherwise. Only A's action is morally relevant or culpable since he could have chosen to do otherwise. Hence, while the actions of B and C can be described in action theory as caused by sufficient conditions that of A, was rather caused by a probabilistic condition.

The foregoing analyses of causality and intentionality reveal that the key premise, P4, in the “Outline of a Determinist Argument” (I.page.4 above) is false where they claim that: “If an event is caused then it follows by necessity.” As shown above, not all causes are sufficient conditions or deterministic since some causes -especially the morally relevant causes like Type A are probable conditions that do not determine or guarantee but only make certain actions more likely than not. The analyses also reveal that only Type A actions are morally relevant, and cannot in principle be caused by sufficient conditions but only by probable conditions including the use of plastic controls from W3 as explained in Popper’s Theory of the Three Worlds.

Evidently, Popper does not merely succeed in defending freewill. He also succeeds in defending compatibility by defending soft determinism as conceived by William James. Most of the confusion and paradoxes generated by the determinist-free will debate over the centuries can therefore be eliminated if classical determinists concede to the reality of intentional actions and probable causes including plastic controls or regulative ideas from W3 and replace statements such as “X’s action was *determined, compelled or conditioned* by socio-economic, political or ideological factors” with “X’s action was *influenced* by economic, religious and ideological factors or group pressure etc.” We could then re-deploy our intellectual resources more fruitfully in educating ourselves and especially our youth through critical thinking to be able to recognize temptation situations and how to avoid or overcome them by making the right decisions and choices using the plastic controls in W3 such as human values, constitutions and codes of ethics. By the same token, we could help poor individuals and nations to reject fatalistic attitudes toward their miserable existential conditions and take more responsibility for their own personal and social transformations.

VI. Application to the Wesleyan-Arminian View

The critic might be wondering about the significance of Popper’s argument for the Wesleyan-Armenian thesis. The similarities between the Popperian compatibility view and that of the Wesleyan Armenian view may be summarized thus:

1. Both reject determinism or Calvinistic unconditional double-predestination (since it depicts all human actions like clocks and denies the possibility of freewill, human autonomy and individual moral responsibility that are clearly presumed by biblical teachings as shown above)
2. Both defend freewill and moral responsibility (as seen in the use of plastic controls or the regulative ideas including the Ten Commandments, the Golden Rule, and constitutional laws we choose to guide our behaviors.)
3. Both maintain that freewill and determinism interpreted as every event has a cause (but not all causes are sufficient conditions) and that some causes like the plastic controls in W3, including codes of ethics, The Golden Rule, and constitutions, provide probabilistic conditions that *influence* but do not determine or fix our individual choices.

Popper's view, as argued above, is a compatibility position that emphasizes both freewill with moral responsibility and a causal theory that allows probabilistic causes (like plastic controls) that do not predetermine or fix, but influence our choices and **their** potential outcomes.

Therefore, the Wesleyan view is in all likelihood, also a compatibility view. (Argument by Analogy. Theses 1-3 above.)

With specific reference to salvation, the Wesleyan-Arminian thesis shows that through Christ's death, salvation has been made available for all sinners in terms of God's prevenient grace. Since prevenient grace is not irresistible however, the sinner can freely choose to accept or refuse God's offer of salvation. Salvation then is a potentiality or conditional depending on our free responses as clearly stated in John 3: 16. In Popper's metaphysical schema, the doctrine of salvation and the ethical teachings they reflect would all be part of the plastic controls or regulative ideas in W3. Teaching preaching , and counseling potential believers about salvation make sense only in such a world where salvation is an open possibility awaiting human positive response and cooperation with God, but certainly not in a Calvinistic world where the selection for both the saved and the unsaved has already been irrevocably made from all eternity by the Creator. Such a pre-selection would also appear to be logically inconsistent with a morally perfect God who shows no partiality but is

just and fair toward all his children, especially if the unsaved will be sent to hell for unbelief.

Conclusion

In defense of the Wesleyan-Armenian view on predestination and freewill I have argued by showing that it is analogous to the compatibility view inherent in Karl Popper's, metaphysical Theory of the Three Worlds and his defense of free will. This involved showing that Popper's solution to the freewill-determinism paradox is not just a defense of freewill or libertarianism, but a defense of compatibility-the metaphysical or theological position between freewill and (a version of) determinism or predestination. I have also made a three-point comparison between the Wesleyan-Armenian thesis for compatibility and the Popperian compatibility thesis and inferred by an Argument from Analogy that they are equally cogent. Finally, I have defended the Armenian-Wesleyan view against its counterparts in theological determinism, especially Calvinistic-double predestination, and in favor of conditional predestination (as defended by the Wesleyan-Armenian Tradition) which like compatibility, attempts to reconcile God's 'predestination' or plan of salvation with human free and moral response.

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